constitutionally based challenge in Connecticut

1995State v. Snook, 210 Conn. 244, 275-76 , 555 A.2d 390 , cert. denied, 492 U.S. 924 , 109 S. Ct. 3258 , 106 L.

1995State v. Snook, 210 Conn. 244, 275-76 , 555 A.2d 390 , cert. denied, 492 U.S. 924 , 109 S. Ct. 3258 , 106 L.

1995State v. Snook, 210 Conn. 244, 275-76 , 555 A.2d 390 , cert. denied, 492 U.S. 924 , 109 S. Ct. 3258 , 106 L.

1995State v. Snook, 210 Conn. 244, 275-76 , 555 A.2d 390 , cert. denied, 492 U.S. 924 , 109 S. Ct. 3258 , 106 L.

1995State v. Snook, 210 Conn. 244, 275-76 , 555 A.2d 390 , cert. denied, 492 U.S. 924 , 109 S. Ct. 3258 , 106 L.

1995State v. Snook, 210 Conn. 244, 275-76 , 555 A.2d 390 , cert. denied, 492 U.S. 924 , 109 S. Ct. 3258 , 106 L.

1995State v. Snook, 210 Conn. 244, 275-76 , 555 A.2d 390 , cert. denied, 492 U.S. 924 , 109 S. Ct. 3258 , 106 L.

1995State v. Snook, 210 Conn. 244, 275-76 , 555 A.2d 390 , cert. denied, 492 U.S. 924 , 109 S. Ct. 3258 , 106 L.

2002“In reviewing a constitutionally based challenge to the court’s instruction to the jury, we must examine the charge as a whole to determine whether it is reasonably possible that the jury was misled by the challenged instruction.” State v. Adams, 225 Conn. 270, 290 , 623 A.2d 42 (1993).

2002“In reviewing a constitutionally based challenge to the court’s instruction to the jury, we must examine the charge as a whole to determine whether it is reasonably possible that the jury was misled by the challenged instruction.” State v. Adams, 225 Conn. 270, 290 , 623 A.2d 42 (1993).

1999Because these claims were not preserved at trial, the defendant requests review under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40 , 567 A.2d 823 (1989). 3 “In reviewing a constitutionally based challenge to the court’s instructions to the jury, we must examine the charge as a whole to determine whether it is reasonably possible that the jury was misled by the challenged instruction.. . .

1999Because these claims were not preserved at trial, the defendant requests review under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40 , 567 A.2d 823 (1989). 3 “In reviewing a constitutionally based challenge to the court’s instructions to the jury, we must examine the charge as a whole to determine whether it is reasonably possible that the jury was misled by the challenged instruction.. . .

1996State v. Quintana, 209 Conn. 34, 50 , 547 A.2d 534 (1988); State v. Cardany, 35 Conn. App. 728, 737 , 646 A.2d 291 , cert. denied, 231 Conn. 942 , 653 A.2d 823 (1994).

1996State v. Quintana, 209 Conn. 34, 50 , 547 A.2d 534 (1988); State v. Cardany, 35 Conn. App. 728, 737 , 646 A.2d 291 , cert. denied, 231 Conn. 942 , 653 A.2d 823 (1994).

1996State v. Quintana, 209 Conn. 34, 50 , 547 A.2d 534 (1988); State v. Cardany, 35 Conn. App. 728, 737 , 646 A.2d 291 , cert. denied, 231 Conn. 942 , 653 A.2d 823 (1994).

1996State v. Quintana, 209 Conn. 34, 50 , 547 A.2d 534 (1988); State v. Cardany, 35 Conn. App. 728, 737 , 646 A.2d 291 , cert. denied, 231 Conn. 942 , 653 A.2d 823 (1994).

1996State v. Quintana, 209 Conn. 34, 50 , 547 A.2d 534 (1988); State v. Cardany, 35 Conn. App. 728, 737 , 646 A.2d 291 , cert. denied, 231 Conn. 942 , 653 A.2d 823 (1994).

1995State v. Quintana, 209 Conn. 34, 50 , 547 A.2d 534 (1988); State v. Cardany, 35 Conn. App. 728, 737 , 646 A.2d 291 , cert. denied, 231 Conn. 942 , 653 A.2d 823 (1994).

1996State v. Quintana, 209 Conn. 34, 50 , 547 A.2d 534 (1988); State v. Cardany, 35 Conn. App. 728, 737 , 646 A.2d 291 , cert. denied, 231 Conn. 942 , 653 A.2d 823 (1994).

1995State v. Quintana, 209 Conn. 34, 50 , 547 A.2d 534 (1988); State v. Cardany, 35 Conn. App. 728, 737 , 646 A.2d 291 , cert. denied, 231 Conn. 942 , 653 A.2d 823 (1994).

1994State v. Bailey, 209 Conn. 322, 338 , 551 A.2d 1206 (1988).

1994State v. Bailey, 209 Conn. 322, 338 , 551 A.2d 1206 (1988).

2007Although the United States Supreme Court in Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, Inc., supra, 314 U.S. at 249-50 , 62 S.Ct. 221 , held that the landward scope of the longshore act was defined by Jensen , it expressly declined to consider the continued vitality of the constitutionally based rule that states could not operate outside that *272 line. [19] See id.

2007Although the United States Supreme Court in Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, Inc., supra, 314 U.S. at 249-50 , 62 S.Ct. 221 , held that the landward scope of the longshore act was defined by Jensen , it expressly declined to consider the continued vitality of the constitutionally based rule that states could not operate outside that *272 line. [19] See id.

2007Second, we believe that the court in Flowers placed undue emphasis on the statement of the United States Supreme Court in Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. O'Rourke, supra, 344 U.S. at 337 , 73 S.Ct. 302 , that, under Jensen , "New Jersey could not have enacted statutes granting compensation for [the employee's] injury on navigable water." The threshold issue in O'Rourke was whether the employee's claim was covered by the longshore act, and the court in Parker clearly had indicated that the longshore act covered all claims by "employees engaged `in maritime employment, in whole or in part, upon the

2007Second, we believe that the court in Flowers placed undue emphasis on the statement of the United States Supreme Court in Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. O'Rourke, supra, 344 U.S. at 337 , 73 S.Ct. 302 , that, under Jensen , "New Jersey could not have enacted statutes granting compensation for [the employee's] injury on navigable water." The threshold issue in O'Rourke was whether the employee's claim was covered by the longshore act, and the court in Parker clearly had indicated that the longshore act covered all claims by "employees engaged `in maritime employment, in whole or in part, upon the

2000In reviewing a constitutionally based challenge to the court’s instructions to the jury, we must determine “whether the charge, read in its entirety, fairly presents the case to the jury in such a way that injustice is not done to either party under the established rules of law. . . . [W]e must consider the jury charge as a whole to determine whether it is reasonably possible that the instruction misled the jury.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Griffin, 253 Conn. 195, 206 , 749 A.2d 1192 (2000).

2000In reviewing a constitutionally based challenge to the court’s instructions to the jury, we must determine “whether the charge, read in its entirety, fairly presents the case to the jury in such a way that injustice is not done to either party under the established rules of law. . . . [W]e must consider the jury charge as a whole to determine whether it is reasonably possible that the instruction misled the jury.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Griffin, 253 Conn. 195, 206 , 749 A.2d 1192 (2000).

1998“In reviewing a constitutionally based challenge to the court’s instructions to the juiy, we must examine the charge as a whole to determine whether it is reasonably possible that the jury was misled by the challenged instruction.” State v. Barnes, 33 Conn. App. 603, 607 , 637 A.2d 398 (1994), aff'd, 232 Conn. 740 , 657 A.2d 611 (1995).

1998“In reviewing a constitutionally based challenge to the court’s instructions to the juiy, we must examine the charge as a whole to determine whether it is reasonably possible that the jury was misled by the challenged instruction.” State v. Barnes, 33 Conn. App. 603, 607 , 637 A.2d 398 (1994), aff'd, 232 Conn. 740 , 657 A.2d 611 (1995).

1998“In reviewing a constitutionally based challenge to the court’s instructions to the juiy, we must examine the charge as a whole to determine whether it is reasonably possible that the jury was misled by the challenged instruction.” State v. Barnes, 33 Conn. App. 603, 607 , 637 A.2d 398 (1994), aff'd, 232 Conn. 740 , 657 A.2d 611 (1995).

1998“In reviewing a constitutionally based challenge to the court’s instructions to the juiy, we must examine the charge as a whole to determine whether it is reasonably possible that the jury was misled by the challenged instruction.” State v. Barnes, 33 Conn. App. 603, 607 , 637 A.2d 398 (1994), aff'd, 232 Conn. 740 , 657 A.2d 611 (1995).

1997The adoption of this "cause and prejudice" requirement thus supplanted the earlier, and more petitioner-friendly rule requiring only a showing that a habeas petitioner had not deliberately bypassed the orderly process of direct appeal in order to be eligible for habeas relief. cf. Fay v. Noia , 372 U.S. 391 (1963).

1997In Wainwright v. Sykes , 433 U.S. 72 (1977), the United States Supreme Court held that the failure of the habeas petitioner to make a timely objection at his state criminal trial, in accordance with state rule, to the denial of a Federal constitutional right, barred Federal habeas review of the constitutionally-based claim in the absence of a showing of cause for noncompliance with the rule, and a showing of actual prejudice.

1993“In reviewing a constitutionally based challenge to the court’s instructions to the jury, we must examine the charge as a whole to determine whether it is reasonably possible that the jury was misled by the challenged instruction.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Booker, 28 Conn. App. 34, 46-47 , 611 A.2d 878 , cert. denied, 223 Conn. 919 , 614 A.2d 826 (1992). “[A]n error in the charge requires reversal only if, in the context of the whole instruction, there is a reasonable possibility that the jury was misled in reaching its verdict.” State v. Foster, 202 Conn. 520, 538 , 522 A.

1993“In reviewing a constitutionally based challenge to the court’s instructions to the jury, we must examine the charge as a whole to determine whether it is reasonably possible that the jury was misled by the challenged instruction.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Booker, 28 Conn. App. 34, 46-47 , 611 A.2d 878 , cert. denied, 223 Conn. 919 , 614 A.2d 826 (1992). “[A]n error in the charge requires reversal only if, in the context of the whole instruction, there is a reasonable possibility that the jury was misled in reaching its verdict.” State v. Foster, 202 Conn. 520, 538 , 522 A.

1993“In reviewing a constitutionally based challenge to the court’s instructions to the jury, we must examine the charge as a whole to determine whether it is reasonably possible that the jury was misled by the challenged instruction.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Booker, 28 Conn. App. 34, 46-47 , 611 A.2d 878 , cert. denied, 223 Conn. 919 , 614 A.2d 826 (1992). “[A]n error in the charge requires reversal only if, in the context of the whole instruction, there is a reasonable possibility that the jury was misled in reaching its verdict.” State v. Foster, 202 Conn. 520, 538 , 522 A.

1993“In reviewing a constitutionally based challenge to the court’s instructions to the jury, we must examine the charge as a whole to determine whether it is reasonably possible that the jury was misled by the challenged instruction.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Booker, 28 Conn. App. 34, 46-47 , 611 A.2d 878 , cert. denied, 223 Conn. 919 , 614 A.2d 826 (1992). “[A]n error in the charge requires reversal only if, in the context of the whole instruction, there is a reasonable possibility that the jury was misled in reaching its verdict.” State v. Foster, 202 Conn. 520, 538 , 522 A.

1993“In reviewing a constitutionally based challenge to the court’s instructions to the jury, we must examine the charge as a whole to determine whether it is reasonably possible that the jury was misled by the challenged instruction.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Booker, 28 Conn. App. 34, 46-47 , 611 A.2d 878 , cert. denied, 223 Conn. 919 , 614 A.2d 826 (1992). “[A]n error in the charge requires reversal only if, in the context of the whole instruction, there is a reasonable possibility that the jury was misled in reaching its verdict.” State v. Foster, 202 Conn. 520, 538 , 522 A.

1993“In reviewing a constitutionally based challenge to the court’s instructions to the jury, we must examine the charge as a whole to determine whether it is reasonably possible that the jury was misled by the challenged instruction.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Booker, 28 Conn. App. 34, 46-47 , 611 A.2d 878 , cert. denied, 223 Conn. 919 , 614 A.2d 826 (1992). “[A]n error in the charge requires reversal only if, in the context of the whole instruction, there is a reasonable possibility that the jury was misled in reaching its verdict.” State v. Foster, 202 Conn. 520, 538 , 522 A.

1992The charge is not to be judged in artificial isolation from the overall charge.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Falcon, 26 Conn. App. 259, 269 , 600 A.2d 1364 (1991), cert. denied, 221 Conn. 911 , 602 A.2d 10 (1992).

1992The charge is not to be judged in artificial isolation from the overall charge.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Falcon, 26 Conn. App. 259, 269 , 600 A.2d 1364 (1991), cert. denied, 221 Conn. 911 , 602 A.2d 10 (1992).

1992The charge is not to be judged in artificial isolation from the overall charge.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Falcon, 26 Conn. App. 259, 269 , 600 A.2d 1364 (1991), cert. denied, 221 Conn. 911 , 602 A.2d 10 (1992).

1992The charge is not to be judged in artificial isolation from the overall charge.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Falcon, 26 Conn. App. 259, 269 , 600 A.2d 1364 (1991), cert. denied, 221 Conn. 911 , 602 A.2d 10 (1992).