17 Massachusetts opinions name it 3 courts 1980–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Draytongreen1 sentence2025Evid. § 803(3), (4), or the narrow constitutionally based exception for statements critical to the defense, see Commonwealth v. Drayton, 473 Mass. 23, 25 (2015), S.C., 479 Mass. 479 (2018). | 1 | 1 |
Jackson v. Virginiared1 sentence2012This result finds no support in any previous decision by this court or the Supreme Judicial Court, and is incompatible with the constitutionally based standard, enunciated in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-319 (1979), and Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 678 (1978), by which we must test sufficiency of the evidence claims like the one presented in this case. | 1 | 1 |
Dickerson v. United Statesred1 sentence2005Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 435 (2000). | 1 | 1 |
Hennessy v. SUPERINTENDENT, MASS. CORRECTIONAL INST.green1 sentence2002See Hennessy v. Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Inst., Framingham, 386 Mass. 848 , 852 n.3 (1982); Averett, petitioner, 404 Mass. 28, 30 (1989). 2 Recognizing the superiority of a constitutionally based claim, Crowley suggests that requiring challenges to prison disciplinary proceedings to be by certiorari amounts to a prohibited statutory limitation on a constitutional right. | 1 | 1 |
Averettgreen1 sentence2002See Hennessy v. Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Inst., Framingham, 386 Mass. 848 , 852 n.3 (1982); Averett, petitioner, 404 Mass. 28, 30 (1989). 2 Recognizing the superiority of a constitutionally based claim, Crowley suggests that requiring challenges to prison disciplinary proceedings to be by certiorari amounts to a prohibited statutory limitation on a constitutional right. | 1 | 1 |
Good Hope Industries, Inc. v. Ryder Scott Co.green1 sentence2002When, as here, the assertion of in per-sonam jurisdiction has been challenged under Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), a plaintiff must make a prima facie showing of evidence that, if credited, would be sufficient to support findings of all facts essential to personal jurisdiction. “[T]he plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing sufficient facts on which to predicate jurisdiction over the defendant.” Good Hope Indus., Inc. v. Ryder Scott Co., 378 Mass. 1, 3 (1979) (Good Hope Indus.). | 1 | 1 |
In the Matter of a John Doe Grand Jury Investigationgreen1 sentence1998In the Matter of a John Doe Grand Jury Investigation, 410 Mass. 596, 598 (1991) (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hollimangreen1 sentence1996In State v. Holliman, 214 Conn. 38, 46 (1990), the court concluded that, even if no constitutional underpinning existed for exclusion of an identification based on an unnecessarily suggestive confrontation, the same considerations that are relevant in a constitutionally based challenge to admission of an identification should be involved in deciding the admissibility of an identification arguably tainted by a civilian-conducted suggestive confrontation. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Owensgreen1 sentence1994See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 2082 (1993) (defective reasonable doubt instructions cannot be harmless); Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306-307 (1991) (harmless error analysis may be applied to most constitutional errors); Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 256-257 (1988) (automatic reversal would be required for Sixth Amendment violations that pervade entire proceeding); Commonwealth v. Owens, 414 Mass. 595, 603-604 (1993); Commonwealth v. Perez, 411 Mass. 249, 260 (1991). | 1 | 1 |
Sullivan v. Louisianagreen1 sentence1994See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 2082 (1993) (defective reasonable doubt instructions cannot be harmless); Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306-307 (1991) (harmless error analysis may be applied to most constitutional errors); Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 256-257 (1988) (automatic reversal would be required for Sixth Amendment violations that pervade entire proceeding); Commonwealth v. Owens, 414 Mass. 595, 603-604 (1993); Commonwealth v. Perez, 411 Mass. 249, 260 (1991). | 1 | 1 |
Arizona v. Fulminantegreen1 sentence1994See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 2082 (1993) (defective reasonable doubt instructions cannot be harmless); Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306-307 (1991) (harmless error analysis may be applied to most constitutional errors); Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 256-257 (1988) (automatic reversal would be required for Sixth Amendment violations that pervade entire proceeding); Commonwealth v. Owens, 414 Mass. 595, 603-604 (1993); Commonwealth v. Perez, 411 Mass. 249, 260 (1991). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Perezgreen1 sentence1994See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 2082 (1993) (defective reasonable doubt instructions cannot be harmless); Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306-307 (1991) (harmless error analysis may be applied to most constitutional errors); Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 256-257 (1988) (automatic reversal would be required for Sixth Amendment violations that pervade entire proceeding); Commonwealth v. Owens, 414 Mass. 595, 603-604 (1993); Commonwealth v. Perez, 411 Mass. 249, 260 (1991). | 1 | 1 |
Satterwhite v. Texasgreen1 sentence1994See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 2082 (1993) (defective reasonable doubt instructions cannot be harmless); Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306-307 (1991) (harmless error analysis may be applied to most constitutional errors); Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 256-257 (1988) (automatic reversal would be required for Sixth Amendment violations that pervade entire proceeding); Commonwealth v. Owens, 414 Mass. 595, 603-604 (1993); Commonwealth v. Perez, 411 Mass. 249, 260 (1991). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Alanogreen1 sentence1991See Commonwealth v. Alano, supra at 876-877 . 3. | 1 | 1 |
SHOPPERS'WORLD v. Board of Assessors of Framinghamgreen1 sentence1987See, e.g., Shoppers’ World, Inc. v. Assessors of Framingham, 348 Mass. 366, 376-378 (1965). | 1 | 1 |
Davis v. Alaskagreen1 sentence1985See, e.g., Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974) (statutory privilege as to juvenile proceedings must yield to confrontation right to cross-examine effectively as guaranteed by Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments); Commonwealth v. Ferrara, 368 Mass. 182 (1975) (same); Commonwealth v. Joyce, 382 Mass. 222 (1981) (rape-shield law, G. | 1 | 1 |
Branzburg v. Hayesgreen1 sentence1982First, it is now clear that, despite the important First Amendment values inherent in the newsgathering and dissemination function, there is no constitutional privilege conferred upon a reporter to refuse to disclose his sources under either the Constitution of the United States, Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 688 (1972), Commonwealth v. Corsetti, 387 Mass. 1, 4 (1982). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Drayton
green
1 sentence2025Evid. § 803(3), (4), or the narrow constitutionally based exception for statements critical to the defense, see Commonwealth v. Drayton, 473 Mass. 23, 25 (2015), S.C., 479 Mass. 479 (2018). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Commonwealth v. D'Agostino
green
1 sentence2017Rather, as an exercise of our superintendence power, we conclude that, as a matter of 12 Although Commonwealth v. Zevitas, 418 Mass. 677 (1994), announced a constitutionally based rule requiring retroactive application, see Commonwealth v. D'Agostino, 421 Mass. 281 , 286- 287 (1995), this case is distinguishable because the challenged instruction here, unlike in Zevitas, supra at 682 , does not specifically mention the possibility of refusing a breathalyzer test. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Commonwealth v. Zevitas
green
2 sentences2017Rather, as an exercise of our superintendence power, we conclude that, as a matter of 12 Although Commonwealth v. Zevitas, 418 Mass. 677 (1994), announced a constitutionally based rule requiring retroactive application, see Commonwealth v. D'Agostino, 421 Mass. 281 , 286- 287 (1995), this case is distinguishable because the challenged instruction here, unlike in Zevitas, supra at 682 , does not specifically mention the possibility of refusing a breathalyzer test. 2017Rather, as an exercise of our superintendence power, we conclude that, as a matter of 12 Although Commonwealth v. Zevitas, 418 Mass. 677 (1994), announced a constitutionally based rule requiring retroactive application, see Commonwealth v. D'Agostino, 421 Mass. 281 , 286- 287 (1995), this case is distinguishable because the challenged instruction here, unlike in Zevitas, supra at 682 , does not specifically mention the possibility of refusing a breathalyzer test. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista
green
1 sentence2017We reiterate that our decision today is procedural only and has only prospective application. 15 procedure, the better practice is for a judge to refrain from giving a Downs-type instruction absent a request by the defendant or some rare set of facts that specifically directs the jury's attention to the absence of alcohol-test evidence.13 Cf. Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 442 Mass. 423, 444-445 , 447– 448 (2004) (using superintendence power to regulate presentation of evidence at trial in requiring, under certain circumstances, jury instructions regarding defendant's unrecorded statement to | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Commonwealth v. Latimore
green
1 sentence2012This result finds no support in any previous decision by this court or the Supreme Judicial Court, and is incompatible with the constitutionally based standard, enunciated in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-319 (1979), and Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 678 (1978), by which we must test sufficiency of the evidence claims like the one presented in this case. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Commonwealth v. Fuller
green
1 sentence2000While Fuller demands more of the defendant seeking access to privileged material than did Bishop, see Fuller, supra, 423 Mass, at 225, both tests are variants on the concept of relevancy. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Lyons v. Labor Relations Commission
green
2 sentences1987Lyons, supra at 502 . 1987Lyons, supra at 502 . | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Lyons v. Labor Relations Commission
green
1 sentence1986Accordingly, we con- elude, as did the Appeals Court in Lyons, supra at 569 , that any decision by the commission, including a prehearing dismissal, which effectively determines the outcome of a constitutionally based challenge of an agency fee is a final order under G. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Commonwealth v. Ferrara
green
1 sentence1985See, e.g., Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974) (statutory privilege as to juvenile proceedings must yield to confrontation right to cross-examine effectively as guaranteed by Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments); Commonwealth v. Ferrara, 368 Mass. 182 (1975) (same); Commonwealth v. Joyce, 382 Mass. 222 (1981) (rape-shield law, G. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Commonwealth v. Joyce
green
1 sentence1985See, e.g., Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974) (statutory privilege as to juvenile proceedings must yield to confrontation right to cross-examine effectively as guaranteed by Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments); Commonwealth v. Ferrara, 368 Mass. 182 (1975) (same); Commonwealth v. Joyce, 382 Mass. 222 (1981) (rape-shield law, G. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Commonwealth v. Corsetti
green
1 sentence1982First, it is now clear that, despite the important First Amendment values inherent in the newsgathering and dissemination function, there is no constitutional privilege conferred upon a reporter to refuse to disclose his sources under either the Constitution of the United States, Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 688 (1972), Commonwealth v. Corsetti, 387 Mass. 1, 4 (1982). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Commonwealth v. Rodriguez
green
1 sentence1980In Massachusetts, the primordial case which applies this constitutionally-based rule to self-defense is Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 370 Mass. 684 (1976). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.