recognized common law principle in Georgia

2024See Rasnick, 289 Ga. at 567 (1); Dutt, 354 Ga. App. at 566 (2). 2.

2023See also Rasnick v. Krishna Hospitality, 289 Ga. 565, 566-567 ( 713 SE2d 835 ) (2011). 7 The only other legal duty that Corsino claims the Hotel breached is set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 324A.3 That section of the Restatement provides, in relevant part: One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third person or his things, is subject to liability to the third person for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to protect his undertaking, if (a

1994Consequently, assuming this contractual obligation gave rise to an agency relationship by virtue of the bank’s agreement to make payment disbursements to the builder because the Petersons were out of town, recovery in tort requires “proof of not merely a breach of a contract term, but breach of a duty imposed by law — i.e., ‘either a duty imposed by a valid statutory enactment of the legislature or a duty imposed by a recognized common law principle declared in the reported decisions of (our) appellate courts.’ [Mauldin v. Sheffer, 113 Ga. App. 874, 880 , supra].” First Fed.

1990Assuming, without deciding, that this contractual obligation gave rise to an agency relationship, recovery in tort required proof of not merely a breach of a contract term, but breach of a duty imposed by law — i.e., “either a duty imposed by a valid statutory enactment of the legislature or a duty imposed by a recognized common law principle declared in the reported decisions of [our] appellate courts.” Id. at 880 .

2024“A legal duty sufficient to support liability in negligence is either a duty imposed by a valid statutory enactment of the legislature or a duty imposed by a recognized common law principle declared in the reported decisions of our appellate courts.” Id. (citation and punctuation omitted) “In 6 the absence of a legally cognizable duty, there can be no fault or negligence.” Id. (citation and punctuation omitted).

2024“A legal duty sufficient to support liability in negligence is either a duty imposed by a valid statutory enactment of the legislature or a duty imposed by a recognized common law principle declared in the reported decisions of our appellate courts.” Id. (citation and punctuation omitted) “In 6 the absence of a legally cognizable duty, there can be no fault or negligence.” Id. (citation and punctuation omitted).

2019Ceasar v. Wells Fargo Bank , 322 Ga. App. 529 , 533 (2) (b), 744 S.E.2d 369 (2013) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2019Ceasar v. Wells Fargo Bank , 322 Ga. App. 529 , 533 (2) (b), 744 S.E.2d 369 (2013) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2024Pearson asserted that Regional Finance breached its duties to: (1) “act reasonably in verifying that an individual who was cashing an unsolicited live check was the consumer to whom [Regional Finance] intended to send the check” and (2) “act reasonably in investigating any loan that was initiated by the cashing of an unsolicited live check upon complaint by the intended consumer that such loan was not initiated by him or her.” Pearson argues that these duties find their “basis in the longstanding common law maxim that defendants owe a duty to exercise ordinary care to protect others based on t

2024Pearson asserted that Regional Finance breached its duties to: (1) “act reasonably in verifying that an individual who was cashing an unsolicited live check was the consumer to whom [Regional Finance] intended to send the check” and (2) “act reasonably in investigating any loan that was initiated by the cashing of an unsolicited live check upon complaint by the intended consumer that such loan was not initiated by him or her.” Pearson argues that these duties find their “basis in the longstanding common law maxim that defendants owe a duty to exercise ordinary care to protect others based on t

2024See Rasnick, 289 Ga. at 567 (1); Dutt, 354 Ga. App. at 566 (2). 2.

2023(Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Boller, 311 Ga. App. at 695 - 696 (1) (a); accord Barrett v. Ga. Dept. of Transp., 304 Ga. App. 667, 669 (1) ( 697 SE2d 217 ) (2010). 23 The trial court’s order and the argument of Smith’s Estate on appeal both focus primarily on McCans’ expert opinion for the establishment of a standard of care and, as the trial court put it, whether National EMS had a duty to “do more” to try to make contact with Smith.

2023(Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Boller, 311 Ga. App. at 695 - 696 (1) (a); accord Barrett v. Ga. Dept. of Transp., 304 Ga. App. 667, 669 (1) ( 697 SE2d 217 ) (2010). 23 The trial court’s order and the argument of Smith’s Estate on appeal both focus primarily on McCans’ expert opinion for the establishment of a standard of care and, as the trial court put it, whether National EMS had a duty to “do more” to try to make contact with Smith.

2019See JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Durie, 350 Ga. App. 769, 772 (3) ( 830 SE2d 387 ) (2019) (“A legal duty sufficient to support liability in negligence is either a duty imposed by a valid statutory enactment of the legislature or a duty imposed by a recognized common law principle declared in the reported decisions of our appellate courts.”) (citation and punctuation 16 Because the trial court’s denial of AgSouth’s summary judgment as to the Wests’ claim of negligence was thus error, we reverse that portion of the judgment. 3.

2019See JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Durie, 350 Ga. App. 769, 772 (3) ( 830 SE2d 387 ) (2019) (“A legal duty sufficient to support liability in negligence is either a duty imposed by a valid statutory enactment of the legislature or a duty imposed by a recognized common law principle declared in the reported decisions of our appellate courts.”) (citation and punctuation 16 Because the trial court’s denial of AgSouth’s summary judgment as to the Wests’ claim of negligence was thus error, we reverse that portion of the judgment. 3.

2019(Citation and emphasis omitted.) Garvin v. Atlanta Gas Light, 334 Ga. App. 450, 453 (1) ( 779 SE2d 687 ) (2015).

2019(Citation and emphasis omitted.) Garvin v. Atlanta Gas Light, 334 Ga. App. 450, 453 (1) ( 779 SE2d 687 ) (2015).

2013Generally, a breach of contract, with nothing more, does not give rise to a tort action because a “tort is the unlawful violation of a private legal right other than a mere breach of contract.” 2 “To maintain an action in tort because of a breach of duty growing out of a contractual relation, the breach must be shown to have been a breach of [an independent] duty imposed by statute or a duty imposed by a recognized common law principle.”3 Thus, “a single act or course of conduct may constitute not only a breach of contract but an independent tort as well, if in addition to violating a contract

2013Generally, a breach of contract, with nothing more, does not give rise to a tort action because a “tort is the unlawful violation of a private legal right other than a mere breach of contract.” 2 “To maintain an action in tort because of a breach of duty growing out of a contractual relation, the breach must be shown to have been a breach of [an independent] duty imposed by statute or a duty imposed by a recognized common law principle.”3 Thus, “a single act or course of conduct may constitute not only a breach of contract but an independent tort as well, if in addition to violating a contract

2013Generally, a breach of contract, with nothing more, does not give rise to a tort action because a “tort is the unlawful violation of a private legal right other than a mere breach of contract.” 2 “To maintain an action in tort because of a breach of duty growing out of a contractual relation, the breach must be shown to have been a breach of [an independent] duty imposed by statute or a duty imposed by a recognized common law principle.”3 Thus, “a single act or course of conduct may constitute not only a breach of contract but an independent tort as well, if in addition to violating a contract

2013Generally, a breach of contract, with nothing more, does not give rise to a tort action because a “tort is the unlawful violation of a private legal right other than a mere breach of contract.” 2 “To maintain an action in tort because of a breach of duty growing out of a contractual relation, the breach must be shown to have been a breach of [an independent] duty imposed by statute or a duty imposed by a recognized common law principle.”3 Thus, “a single act or course of conduct may constitute not only a breach of contract but an independent tort as well, if in addition to violating a contract

2006Even if we assume that uninterrupted use of a parking lot was necessarily implied by the lease, and that Walton breached the lease by temporarily closing the lot for resurfacing, “recovery in tort requires proof of not merely a breach of a contract term, but breach of a duty imposed by law — i.e., either a duty imposed by a valid statutory enactment of the legislature or a duty imposed by a recognized common law principle declared in the reported decisions of our appellate courts.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Peterson v. First Clayton Bank &c., 214 Ga. App. 94, 99 (1) (b) ( 447 SE2d 6

2006Even if we assume that uninterrupted use of a parking lot was necessarily implied by the lease, and that Walton breached the lease by temporarily closing the lot for resurfacing, “recovery in tort requires proof of not merely a breach of a contract term, but breach of a duty imposed by law — i.e., either a duty imposed by a valid statutory enactment of the legislature or a duty imposed by a recognized common law principle declared in the reported decisions of our appellate courts.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Peterson v. First Clayton Bank &c., 214 Ga. App. 94, 99 (1) (b) ( 447 SE2d 6

1984Co., 115 Ga. App. 648, 651 ( 155 SE2d 694 ). “ ‘ “Generally, a mere breach of a valid contract amounting to no more than a failure to perform in accordance with its term does not constitute a tort or authorize the aggrieved party to elect whether he will proceed ex contractu or ex delicto. [Cits.]” Even where it is shown that the defendant’s failure to perform resulted in great annoyance or hardship to the plaintiff, recovery in tort is available only if the . . . contract is within those “certain classes of contracts that create a relation from which the law implies duties a breach of which w

1984Co., 115 Ga. App. 648, 651 ( 155 SE2d 694 ). “ ‘ “Generally, a mere breach of a valid contract amounting to no more than a failure to perform in accordance with its term does not constitute a tort or authorize the aggrieved party to elect whether he will proceed ex contractu or ex delicto. [Cits.]” Even where it is shown that the defendant’s failure to perform resulted in great annoyance or hardship to the plaintiff, recovery in tort is available only if the . . . contract is within those “certain classes of contracts that create a relation from which the law implies duties a breach of which w