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20 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1974–2025 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Hicksgreen2 sentences2016Citing case law that stands for the proposition that a statutory amendment creates a presumption that the legislature intended to change the law (People v. Hicks, 119 Ill. 2d 29, 34 (1987)), the City argues that these amendments reflect the General Assembly’s determination that a failure to provide a reasonable accommodation is a distinct species of civil rights violation that must be specifically enumerated in order to be proscribed. 2016Citing case law that stands for the proposition that a statutory amendment creates a presumption that the legislature intended to change the law (People v. Hicks, 119 Ill. 2d 29, 34 (1987)), the City argues that these amendments reflect the General Assembly’s determination that a failure to provide a reasonable accommodation is a distinct species of civil rights violation that must be specifically enumerated in order to be proscribed. | 2 | 2 |
Hopkinson v. Chicago Transit Authoritygreen1 sentence1991(Rivard v. Chicago Fire Fighters Union, Local No. 2 (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 303, 309 , 522 N.E.2d 1195, 1198 ; see Hopkinson, 211 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Stewart
green
2 sentences2025Stewart, 2022 IL 126116, ¶ 20 . 2025People v. Stewart, 2022 IL 126116, ¶ 20 . ¶ 46 In considering whether the statutory change to the felony murder rule was procedural or substantive in Taylor, this court reasoned as follows: “In this case, the statutory change to the felony murder rule is not of a procedural nature. | 4 | 2023–2025 |
Sanchez v. Access Associates
neutral
2 sentences1992Defendants also maintain that the 1987 amendment to section 13-203 does not affect the proper interpretation of its predecessor since a statutory amendment creates a presumption that the legislature intended the amendment to change the law as it formerly existed ( Sanchez v. Access Associates (1989), 179 Ill.App.3d 961, 966 , 128 Ill.Dec. 813 , 535 N.E.2d 27 ) and plaintiffs here did not overcome such presumption. 1992Defendants also maintain that the 1987 amendment to section 13 — 203 does not affect the proper interpretation of its predecessor since a statutory amendment creates a presumption that the legislature intended the amendment to change the law as it formerly existed (Sanchez v. Access Associates (1989), 179 Ill. | 3 | 1990–1992 |
Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Lenckos
green
2 sentences1983A statutory amendment creates a presumption that it was intended to change the former law. ( Caterpillar Tractor v. Lenckos (1979), 77 Ill. 1981A statutory amendment creates the presumption that the amendment is intended to change the former law (Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Lenckos (1979), 77 Ill. | 3 | 1981–1983 |
Rivard v. Chicago Fire Fighters Union, Local No. 2
green
2 sentences1991(Maiter v. Chicago Board of Education (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 373, 390 , 415 N.E.2d 1034 .) A statutory amendment creates a presumption of intent for prospective application where the change is “substantive” rather than “procedural.” (Rivard v. Chicago Fire Fighters Union, Local No. 2 (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 303, 309 , 522 N.E.2d 1195, 1198 .) The presumption can be rebutted by either the express language of the Act or by necessary implication drawn from the Act itself. 1991(Maiter v. Chicago Board of Education (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 373, 390 , 415 N.E.2d 1034 .) A statutory amendment creates a presumption of intent for prospective application where the change is “substantive” rather than “procedural.” (Rivard v. Chicago Fire Fighters Union, Local No. 2 (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 303, 309 , 522 N.E.2d 1195, 1198 .) The presumption can be rebutted by either the express language of the Act or by necessary implication drawn from the Act itself. | 2 | 1991–1991 |
Maiter v. Chicago Board of Education
green
2 sentences1991Those courts recognized that prospective application of a statute is preferred (Maiter v. Chicago Board of Education (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 373, 390 , 415 N.E.2d 1034 ) and a statutory amendment creates a presumption of intent for prospective application where the change is substantive and not procedural. 1991Those courts recognized that prospective application of a statute is preferred (Maiter v. Chicago Board of Education (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 373, 390 , 415 N.E.2d 1034 ) and a statutory amendment creates a presumption of intent for prospective application where the change is substantive and not procedural. | 2 | 1991–1991 |
People v. Miles
green
2 sentences2023July 1, 2021)). ¶ 18 While recognizing “a statutory amendment creates a presumption that it was intended to change existing law,” the Illinois Supreme Court indicated the presumption is not controlling in this situation because of the conflict over how section 5-4.5-95(b) should be interpreted between the First District’s decision in People v. Miles, 2020 IL App (1st) 180736 , 170 N.E.3d 984 , and this court’s prior and now vacated decision in this case. 2023July 1, 2021)). ¶ 18 While recognizing “a statutory amendment creates a presumption that it was intended to change existing law,” the Illinois Supreme Court indicated the presumption is not controlling in this situation because of the conflict over how section 5-4.5-95(b) should be interpreted between the First District’s decision in People v. Miles, 2020 IL App (1st) 180736 , 170 N.E.3d 984 , and this court’s prior and now vacated decision in this case. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Carey v. Elrod
green
1 sentence2022Id. at 299 (citing Parker, 123 Ill. 2d at 211 ). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Parker
green
1 sentence2022Id. at 299 (citing Parker, 123 Ill. 2d at 211 ). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Old Ben Coal Co. v. Human Rights Commission
green
1 sentence2016Id. at 306 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Potts v. Industrial Commission
green
2 sentences1996Hession v. Illinois Department of Public Aid, 129 Ill. 2d 535 , 544 N.E.2d 751 (1989); Potts v. Industrial Comm’n, 83 Ill. 2d 48 , 413 N.E.2d 1285 (1980). 1996Hession v. Illinois Department of Public Aid, 129 Ill. 2d 535 , 544 N.E.2d 751 (1989); Potts v. Industrial Comm’n, 83 Ill. 2d 48 , 413 N.E.2d 1285 (1980). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Hession v. Illinois Department of Public Aid
green
2 sentences1996Hession v. Illinois Department of Public Aid, 129 Ill. 2d 535 , 544 N.E.2d 751 (1989); Potts v. Industrial Comm’n, 83 Ill. 2d 48 , 413 N.E.2d 1285 (1980). 1996Hession v. Illinois Department of Public Aid, 129 Ill. 2d 535 , 544 N.E.2d 751 (1989); Potts v. Industrial Comm’n, 83 Ill. 2d 48 , 413 N.E.2d 1285 (1980). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Bruni v. Department of Registration & Education
green
2 sentences1992Bruni v. Department of Registration & Education (1974), 59 Ill.2d 6, 12 , 319 N.E.2d 37 . 1992Bruni v. Department of Registration & Education (1974), 59 Ill. 2d 6,12 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Weast Construction Co. v. Industrial Commission
green
2 sentences1986(Weast Construction Co. v. Industrial Com. (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 337, 340 , 466 N.E.2d 215, 216 .) However, this presumption may be overcome. 1986(Weast Construction Co. v. Industrial Com. (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 337, 340 , 466 N.E.2d 215, 216 .) However, this presumption may be overcome. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
People v. Davis
neutral
1 sentence1983App.3d 90 , 395 N.E.2d 1167 , aff'd (1981), 84 Ill.2d 102 , 417 N.E.2d 1343 ; People v. Davis (1981), 95 Ill. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Lenckos
green
2 sentences1983App.3d 90 , 395 N.E.2d 1167 , aff'd (1981), 84 Ill.2d 102 , 417 N.E.2d 1343 ; People v. Davis (1981), 95 Ill. 1983App.3d 90 , 395 N.E.2d 1167 , aff'd (1981), 84 Ill.2d 102 , 417 N.E.2d 1343 ; People v. Davis (1981), 95 Ill. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Chicago & Illinois Midland Railway Co. v. Department of Revenue
green
2 sentences1979Co. v. Department of Revenue (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 474 , 349 N.E.2d 22 ), it becomes clear that the former law did not provide for such a deduction, even impliedly. 1979Co. v. Department of Revenue (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 474 , 349 N.E.2d 22 ), it becomes clear that the former law did not provide for such a deduction, even impliedly. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Lubezny v. Ball
neutral
1 sentence1974(Lubezny v. Ball, 389 Ill. 263 .) And these subsequent acts of the General Assembly may be amendments to the act being construed.- (Modern Dairy Co. v. Department of Revenue, 413 Ill. 55 .) The plaintiff contends, however, that a statutory amendment creates a presumption that it was intended to change the law, citing Scribner v. Sachs, 18 Ill.2d 400 , and argues that since the 1967 amendment to the Medical Practice Act authorizes revocation of license for conviction of a Federal felony the prior provisions of the Act did not. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Modern Dairy Co. v. Department of Revenue
green
1 sentence1974(Lubezny v. Ball, 389 Ill. 263 .) And these subsequent acts of the General Assembly may be amendments to the act being construed.- (Modern Dairy Co. v. Department of Revenue, 413 Ill. 55 .) The plaintiff contends, however, that a statutory amendment creates a presumption that it was intended to change the law, citing Scribner v. Sachs, 18 Ill.2d 400 , and argues that since the 1967 amendment to the Medical Practice Act authorizes revocation of license for conviction of a Federal felony the prior provisions of the Act did not. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Scribner v. Sachs
green
1 sentence1974(Lubezny v. Ball, 389 Ill. 263 .) And these subsequent acts of the General Assembly may be amendments to the act being construed.- (Modern Dairy Co. v. Department of Revenue, 413 Ill. 55 .) The plaintiff contends, however, that a statutory amendment creates a presumption that it was intended to change the law, citing Scribner v. Sachs, 18 Ill.2d 400 , and argues that since the 1967 amendment to the Medical Practice Act authorizes revocation of license for conviction of a Federal felony the prior provisions of the Act did not. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.