work product doctrine in Ohio

2026See Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, L.L.P. v. Givaudan Flavors Corp, 2010-Ohio-4469, ¶ 54 (“The work- product doctrine emanates from Hickman . . . .”).

2025Leasing I, L.L.C. v. Tilton, 2012-Ohio-4668 , ¶ 24 (10th Dist.), citing Upjohn Co. at 396. {¶27} The work-product doctrine, on the other hand, “provides a qualified privilege protecting the attorney’s mental processes in preparation of litigation . . . .” (Emphasis sic.) Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, L.L.P. v. Givaudan Flavors Corp., 2010-Ohio-4469, ¶ 55 .

2022And the interests of the clients and the cause of justice would be poorly served.” Addressing these concerns, the work-product doctrine provides a qualified privilege protecting the attorney’s mental processes in preparation of litigation, establishing “a zone of privacy in which lawyers can analyze and prepare their client’s case free from scrutiny or interference by an adversary.” Hobley v. Burge (C.A.7, 2006), 433 F.3d 946, 949 .

2018And the interests of the clients and the cause of justice would be poorly served.” Addressing these concerns, the work-product doctrine provides a qualified privilege protecting the attorney’s mental processes in preparation of litigation, establishing “a zone of privacy in which lawyers can analyze and prepare their client’s case free from scrutiny or interference by an adversary.” Hobley v. Burge (C.A.7, 2006), 433 F.3d 946, 949 .

2013The protection for intangible work product exists because “[o]therwise, attorneys’ files would be protected from discovery, but attorneys themselves would have no work product objection to depositions.” Id. at ¶ 58, quoting In re Seagate Technology, L.L.C., 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed.Cir. 2007). {¶20} The Ohio Supreme Court has explained that “the determination of whether materials are protected by the work-product doctrine and the determination of ‘good cause’ under Civ.R. 26(B)(3), are ‘discretionary determinations to be made by the trial court.’” Sutton v. Stevens Painton Corp., 192 Ohio App.3d 68

2013Accordingly, our review of this case is for an abuse of discretion. {¶12} The Ohio Supreme Court has explained that “the determination of whether materials are protected by the work-product doctrine and the determination of ‘good cause’ under Civ.R. 26(B)(3), are ‘discretionary determinations to be made by the trial court.’” Sutton v. Stevens Painton Corp., 192 Ohio App.3d 68 , 2011-Ohio-841 , 951 N.E.2d 91, ¶12 (8th Dist.), quoting State ex rel.

2026The Court found that “except as required by Crim.R. 16, information assembled by law enforcement officials in connection with a probable or pending criminal proceeding is, by the work product exception found in R.C. 149.43(A)(2)(c), excepted from required release as said information is compiled in anticipation of litigation.” Id. at 435 .

2026The Steckman Court further held that the work-product exception does not include ongoing routine offense and incident reports, which “are subject to immediate release upon request.” Id.

2026The Work-Product Doctrine {¶ 33} The work-product doctrine is of more recent vintage than the attorney-client privilege, having been recognized by the United States Supreme Court in 1947 in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510 (1947).

2024Discovery, the attorney-client privilege, and the work-product doctrine {¶15} Under Civ.R. 26, “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action.” Discovery is deliberately broad to facilitate “the free flow of information between the parties,” because “ ‘[m]utual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation.’ ” Weckel v. Cole + Russell Architects, 2013- Ohio-2718, 994 N.E.2d 885 , ¶ 24 (1st Dist.), quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 , 67 S.Ct.

2019The work-product doctrine "is an intensely practical one, grounded in the realities of litigation in our adversary system." United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 (1975). {¶ 8} The work-product doctrine in civil cases in Ohio is set forth in Civ.R. 26(B)(3): Subject to the provisions of [Civ.R. 26(B)(5)], a party may obtain discovery of documents, electronically stored information and tangible things prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that other party's representative (including his attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or

2017The Supreme Court has also reasoned that " 'the doctrine is an intensely practical one, grounded in the realities of litigation in our adversary system,' and the privilege afforded by the work-product doctrine is not absolute." Squire, Sanders & Dempsey at ¶ 55, quoting United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238-39 (1975). {¶ 15} In Ohio, the work product doctrine also has a basis in rule.

2019Police Officers for Equal Rights v. Lashutka, 72 Ohio St.3d 185, 188 (1995). {¶ 25} In Steckman, the Supreme Court recognized that the work-product exception as found in R.C. 149.43 does not automatically shield all potential evidence of criminal activity from disclosure.

1996See Steckman, supra, at paragraph five of the syllabus, and Police Officers for Equal Rights, supra, 72 Ohio St.3d at 188, 648 N.E.2d at 810 .

2026Therefore, we apply a de novo review to determine whether the trial court erred in concluding that the January 28, 2015 and February 3, 2015 emails were not covered by the peer-review privilege. {¶ 11} Our review of the applicability of the work-product doctrine is different. “‘In Ohio, protection for an attorney’s work product is codified in Civ.R. 26, which notably recognizes work product as separate from privileged matters.’” Haile v. Detmer Sons Inc., 2022-Ohio-2891, ¶ 12 (2d Dist.), quoting Burnham v. Cleveland Clinic, 2016-Ohio-8000, ¶ 18 .

2026Consequently, we review the trial court’s ruling relating to the applicability of the work- product doctrine “under the abuse of discretion standard reserved for general discovery disputes rather than the de novo standard applied to disputes over privileged matters.” Id. “‘A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts in an unreasonable, arbitrary or 5 unconscionable manner.’” North v. Eichler, 2026-Ohio-857, ¶ 14 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Finnerty, 45 Ohio St.3d 104, 107 (1989). b.

2026Therefore, we apply a de novo review to determine whether the trial court erred in concluding that the January 28, 2015 and February 3, 2015 emails were not covered by the peer-review privilege. {¶ 11} Our review of the applicability of the work-product doctrine is different. “‘In Ohio, protection for an attorney’s work product is codified in Civ.R. 26, which notably recognizes work product as separate from privileged matters.’” Haile v. Detmer Sons Inc., 2022-Ohio-2891, ¶ 12 (2d Dist.), quoting Burnham v. Cleveland Clinic, 2016-Ohio-8000, ¶ 18 .

2025“The work product doctrine precludes discovery of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, strategies, and legal theories, both tangible and intangible, generated or commissioned by counsel in anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial.” Haile v. Detmer Sons Inc., 2022-Ohio-2891, ¶ 12 (2d Dist.), citing Squire, Sanders & Dempsey at ¶ 56-60. “[A] party may obtain discovery of documents . . . prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that other party’s representative (including his attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or

2017No. 101500, 2015-Ohio-1295 , ¶ 24, quoting United States v. Smith, 245 F.R.D. 605, 613 (N.D.Ohio 2007), citing In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litigation, 293 F.3d 289, 304, 306-07 (6th Cir.2002); see also Foley v. Poschke, 137 Ohio St. 593, 595 (1941) ("The general rule [is] that communications between an attorney and his [or her] client in the presence of a third person are not privileged.").

2006See In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litigation (C.A.6, 2002), 293 F.3d 289 .

2019As with the other withheld documents, the administrator's notes appear to be focused on the details of the alleged abuse, which was the subject of the SRI, rather than the broader legal concerns cited in Webster's testimony. {¶ 17} Appellants argue the trial court's decision is contrary to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981), where the court held the work-product doctrine applied to notes and memoranda prepared by a corporation's attorney while conducting interviews with corporate officers and employees as part of an internal investiga

2019On the other hand, “[t]he purpose of the work-product doctrine is ‘to prevent an attorney from taking undue advantage of his adversary's industry or efforts.’ ” Id. quoting Civ.R. 26(A)(2).

2017The work-product doctrine is designed “to prevent an attorney from taking undue advantage of his adversary's industry or efforts.” Id. citing Civ.R. 26(A)(2). {¶15} In Kirtos v. Nationwide Ins.

2011“The purpose of the work-product doctrine is ‘to prevent an attorney from taking undue advantage of his adversary’s industry or efforts.’ Civ.R. 26(A)(2).” Boone, 91 Ohio St.3d at 210 , 744 N.E.2d 154, fn. 2 . {¶ 26} The work-product doctrine encompasses materials prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial, and allows for the discovery of work product “only upon a showing of good cause therefor.” Civ.R. 26(B)(3). “[A]ttorney work product, including but not limited to mental impressions, theories, and legal conclusions, may be discovered upon a showing of good cause if it is directly a

2016Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). {¶5} ACS argues that Ms. Owens’s interrogatories improperly seek its attorney’s mental impressions, which are protected under the work product doctrine.

2013An abuse of discretion “implies that the court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.” Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 , 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983), quoting State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151 , 404 N.E.2d 144 (1980). {¶5} NeuroTherm argues that the Verrilli timeline is protected from discovery under the work-product privilege found in Civ.R. 26(B)(3) which states in relevant part: a party may obtain discovery of documents, electronically stored information and tangible things prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for tha

2022Chen, 142 Ohio St.3d 411 , 2015-Ohio-1480 , 31 N.E.3d 633 .

2022Chen, 142 Ohio St.3d 411 , 2015-Ohio-1480 , 31 N.E.3d 633 .

2018Co. , 155 Ohio App.3d 653 , 2003-Ohio-7257 , 802 N.E.2d 732 , ¶ 13-14 (trial court abused its discretion by denying appellant the opportunity to amend its privilege log and declining to conduct an in-camera review of the documents); Grace v. Mastruserio , 182 Ohio App.3d 243 , 2007-Ohio-3942 , 912 N.E.2d 608 , ¶ 34-40 (finding trial court abused its discretion in ordering production without in-camera inspection where "the record is insufficiently developed to determine whether compelling discovery of [the documents] violated the attorney-client privilege or the work-product doctrine."). {¶ 46}

2018Co. , 155 Ohio App.3d 653 , 2003-Ohio-7257 , 802 N.E.2d 732 , ¶ 13-14 (trial court abused its discretion by denying appellant the opportunity to amend its privilege log and declining to conduct an in-camera review of the documents); Grace v. Mastruserio , 182 Ohio App.3d 243 , 2007-Ohio-3942 , 912 N.E.2d 608 , ¶ 34-40 (finding trial court abused its discretion in ordering production without in-camera inspection where "the record is insufficiently developed to determine whether compelling discovery of [the documents] violated the attorney-client privilege or the work-product doctrine."). {¶ 46}

2023Miami No. 2003-CA-12, 2003-Ohio-5960 , wherein we found that the trial court had erred in denying a stay of discovery on the plaintiffs’ bad faith claim and held (1) claims file documents created prior to the denial of the insureds’ claim were not protected from discovery by the attorney-client privilege or the work-product doctrine for purposes of the insureds’ bad faith claim and (2) the bad faith claim was required to be bifurcated from other claims and discovery stayed until resolution of the other claims.

2006Co., 155 Ohio App.3d 258 , 2003-Ohio-5960 , 800 N.E.2d 757, ¶ 24 (reasoning that “[u]nder Boone , neither attorney-client privilege nor the work-product doctrine protects materials in a claims file, created prior to the denial of the claim, that may cast light on whether the insurer acted in bad faith in handling an insured’s claim”). *414 {¶ 13} Preferred Mutual argues that Boone and Garg are distinguishable from this case and, therefore, do not mandate discovery of its claims file, because those cases involved actions alleging the bad-faith denial of insurance coverage.

2013Gen. of Ohio, 57 Ohio St.3d 614, 615 (1991). 9 {¶24} Here, the trial court did not address the issue of the work-product doctrine.

1992Handgards, Inc., supra, 413 F.Supp. at 929 ; In re Election of November 6, 1990 for the Office of Attorney General of Ohio (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 614 , 567 N.E.2d 243 .

2005Written or oral information transmitted to the attorney and recorded as conveyed may be compelled upon a showing of good cause by the subpoenaing party. ‘Good cause,’ as set forth in Civ.R. 26(B)(3), requires a showing of substantial need, that the information is important in the preparation of the party’s case, and that there is an inability or difficulty in obtaining the information without undue hardship. {¶ 35} “The other type of work product is ‘opinion work product,’ which reflects the attorney’s mental impressions, opinions, conclusions, judgments, or *268 legal theories. * * * Because

2001When discussing this rule, we have previously found that "the work-product doctrine `is reflected * * * in interviews, statements, memoranda, correspondence, briefs, mental impressions, personal beliefs, and countless other tangible and intangible ways.'" (Emphasis added.) State v. Today's Bookstore, Inc. (1993), 86 Ohio App.3d 810 , 820 (citations omitted).