work product doctrine (Georgia) · Go Syfert
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work product doctrine in Georgia

18 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1970–2021 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (14)

CaseFollowedCited
McKesson HBOC, Inc. v. Adlergreen
gactapp · 2002 · cited in 4 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2004–2021
2 sentences

2021Here, the trial court concluded that Appellants had waived any right to make a claim of attorney-work product by filing the instant legal malpractice action, seemingly equating the waiver of attorney-work product with the waiver of the attorney-client privilege; this, however, was erroneous. “[T]he attorney-client privilege is intended to protect the attorney-client relationship by protecting communications between clients and attorneys, [while] the work-product doctrine directly protects the adversarial system by allowing attorneys to prepare cases without concern that their work will be used

2021Here, the trial court concluded that Appellants had waived any right to make a claim of attorney-work product by filing the instant legal malpractice action, seemingly equating the waiver of attorney-work product with the waiver of the attorney-client privilege; this, however, was erroneous. “[T]he attorney-client privilege is intended to protect the attorney-client relationship by protecting communications between clients and attorneys, [while] the work-product doctrine directly protects the adversarial system by allowing attorneys to prepare cases without concern that their work will be used

44
Waldrip v. Headgreen
ga · 2005 · cited in 2 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2018–2018
2 sentences

2018Cf. Waldrip v. Head , 279 Ga. 826 , 827 (II) (A), 620 S.E.2d 829 (2005) (holding that the work product doctrine as interpreted by this Court must "yield to" constitutional mandates if the two are in conflict).

2018Cf. Waldrip v. Head , 279 Ga. 826 , 827 (II) (A), 620 S.E.2d 829 (2005) (holding that the work product doctrine as interpreted by this Court must "yield to" constitutional mandates if the two are in conflict).

12
St. Simons Waterfront, LLC v. Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P.C.green
ga · 2013 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013
2 sentences

2013Simons Waterfront, LLC v. Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P.C., 293 Ga. 419, 429-430 (2) ( 746 SE2d 98 ) (2013). 16 “The work-product doctrine directly protects the adversarial system by allowing attorneys to prepare cases without concern that their work will be used against their clients,” 18 but “ at least in some circumstances, a lawyer’s unprofessional behavior may vitiate the work product privilege.” 19 The integrity of the adversary process is not furthered by protecting a lawyer who steps outside his role as ‘an officer of the court . . . work[ing] for the advancement of justice while fa

2013Simons Waterfront, LLC v. Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P.C., 293 Ga. 419, 429-430 (2) ( 746 SE2d 98 ) (2013). 16 “The work-product doctrine directly protects the adversarial system by allowing attorneys to prepare cases without concern that their work will be used against their clients,” 18 but “ at least in some circumstances, a lawyer’s unprofessional behavior may vitiate the work product privilege.” 19 The integrity of the adversary process is not furthered by protecting a lawyer who steps outside his role as ‘an officer of the court . . . work[ing] for the advancement of justice while fa

11
Cunningham v. John J. Harte Associates, Inc.green
gactapp · 1981 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013
2 sentences

2013Harte Assocs., Inc., 158 Ga. App. 774, 775 ( 282 SE2d 219 ) (1981) (statute of limitation began to run when written report was submitted to county, not from date of injury). 14 privilege and the work-product doctrine in declining to answer deposition questions regarding Shaw’s communications with the Board and with law enforcement.

2013Harte Assocs., Inc., 158 Ga. App. 774, 775 ( 282 SE2d 219 ) (1981) (statute of limitation began to run when written report was submitted to county, not from date of injury). 14 privilege and the work-product doctrine in declining to answer deposition questions regarding Shaw’s communications with the Board and with law enforcement.

11
Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers v. Henrygreen
ga · 2003 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013
2 sentences

2013We have previously held that “the work product doctrine does not apply to the situation in which a client seeks access to documents or other tangible things created or amassed by his attorney during the course of the representation.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers v. Henry, 276 Ga. 571, 573-574 ( 581 SE2d 37 ) (2003).

2013We have previously held that “the work product doctrine does not apply to the situation in which a client seeks access to documents or other tangible things created or amassed by his attorney during the course of the representation.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers v. Henry, 276 Ga. 571, 573-574 ( 581 SE2d 37 ) (2003).

11
Stephens v. ALAN v. MOCK CONST. CO., INC.green
gactapp · 2010 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2012–2012
1 sentence

2012See id.

11
In Re Columbia/Hca Healthcare Corporation Billing Practices Litigationgreen
ca6 · 2002 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2004–2004
1 sentence

2004Corp. v. Republic of Philippines, 951 F2d 1414, 1429 (V) (3rd Cir. 1992) (finding that when a party discloses protected materials to a government adversary in order to forestall prosecution or obtain lenient treatment, such disclosure waives the work product protection because both objectives are “foreign” to the rationale behind the work product doctrine); see also In re: Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litigation, 293 F3d 289, 306-307 (II) (6th Cir. 2002) (noting that the decision on whether to “ ‘show your hand’ ” by disclosing work product is a “quintessential litigation st

11
cluster 783139green
ca9 · 2003 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2004–2004
1 sentence

2004Fund, 339 F3d at 1094 (II) (B) (recognizing that “hundreds” of HBOC shareholders exchanged at least 20,000 shares of stock during the merger). 4 Under the work product doctrine, OCGA § 9-11-26 (b) (3), a party may obtain discovery of documents prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of his case and that he is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means.

11
Ronald K. Spivey v. Walter Zant, Warden, Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Centergreen
ca5 · 1982 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2003–2003
2 sentences

2003Simply put, "the work product doctrine does not apply to the situation in which a client seeks access to documents or other tangible things created or amassed by his attorney during the course of the representation." Spivey v. Zant, 683 F.2d 881, 885 (5th Cir.1982); Resolution Trust Corp. v. H—, P.C., supra. Adopting the majority view, we hold, therefore, that Henry is presumptively entitled to discover the memorandum which McDonald prepared on March 8.

2003Simply put, "the work product doctrine does not apply to the situation in which a client seeks access to documents or other tangible things created or amassed by his attorney during the course of the representation." Spivey v. Zant, 683 F.2d 881, 885 (5th Cir.1982); Resolution Trust Corp. v. H—, P.C., supra. Adopting the majority view, we hold, therefore, that Henry is presumptively entitled to discover the memorandum which McDonald prepared on March 8.

11
Zielinski v. Clorox Co.green
ga · 1998 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2002–2002
1 sentence

2002Compare Zielinski, supra at 40 (2) (forwarding copy of document to district attorney waived attorney-client privilege), and Osborn v. State, 233 Ga. App. 257, 260 (2) (b) ( 504 SE2d 74 ) (1998) (giving copy of statement to wife waived attorney-client privilege), with McKinnon v. Smock, 209 Ga. App. 647 -648 (2) ( 434 SE2d 92 ) (1993), aff’d, McKinnon v. Smock, supra (disclosure to testifying expert does not waive work-product protection).

11
Osborn v. Stategreen
gactapp · 1998 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2002–2002
2 sentences

2002Compare Zielinski, supra at 40 (2) (forwarding copy of document to district attorney waived attorney-client privilege), and Osborn v. State, 233 Ga. App. 257, 260 (2) (b) ( 504 SE2d 74 ) (1998) (giving copy of statement to wife waived attorney-client privilege), with McKinnon v. Smock, 209 Ga. App. 647 -648 (2) ( 434 SE2d 92 ) (1993), aff’d, McKinnon v. Smock, supra (disclosure to testifying expert does not waive work-product protection).

2002Compare Zielinski, supra at 40 (2) (forwarding copy of document to district attorney waived attorney-client privilege), and Osborn v. State, 233 Ga. App. 257, 260 (2) (b) ( 504 SE2d 74 ) (1998) (giving copy of statement to wife waived attorney-client privilege), with McKinnon v. Smock, 209 Ga. App. 647 -648 (2) ( 434 SE2d 92 ) (1993), aff’d, McKinnon v. Smock, supra (disclosure to testifying expert does not waive work-product protection).

11
McKinnon v. Smockgreen
gactapp · 1993 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2002–2002
2 sentences

2002Compare Zielinski, supra at 40 (2) (forwarding copy of document to district attorney waived attorney-client privilege), and Osborn v. State, 233 Ga. App. 257, 260 (2) (b) ( 504 SE2d 74 ) (1998) (giving copy of statement to wife waived attorney-client privilege), with McKinnon v. Smock, 209 Ga. App. 647 -648 (2) ( 434 SE2d 92 ) (1993), aff’d, McKinnon v. Smock, supra (disclosure to testifying expert does not waive work-product protection).

2002Compare Zielinski, supra at 40 (2) (forwarding copy of document to district attorney waived attorney-client privilege), and Osborn v. State, 233 Ga. App. 257, 260 (2) (b) ( 504 SE2d 74 ) (1998) (giving copy of statement to wife waived attorney-client privilege), with McKinnon v. Smock, 209 Ga. App. 647 -648 (2) ( 434 SE2d 92 ) (1993), aff’d, McKinnon v. Smock, supra (disclosure to testifying expert does not waive work-product protection).

11
Forehand v. Stategreen
ga · 1996 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1998–1998
2 sentences

1998See generally Forehand v. State, 267 Ga. 254, 256 (3), 477 S.E.2d 560 .

1998See generally Forehand v. State, 267 Ga. 254, 256 (3), 477 S.E.2d 560 .

11
Department of Transportation v. Hardaway Co.green
gactapp · 1995 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1997–1997
2 sentences

1997Dept. of Transp. v. Hardaway Co., 216 Ga.App. 262, 265 (2), 454 S.E.2d 167 (1995).

1997Dept. of Transp. v. Hardaway Co., 216 Ga.App. 262, 265 (2), 454 S.E.2d 167 (1995).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (8)

CaseCitedYears
Burgeson v. State green
ga · 1996
2 sentences

2005The habeas court continued its analysis as follows: “Additionally, the summary report is not Brady material in that Petitioner, himself, was aware that he had told law enforcement that he wanted to speak to an attorney. ” That reasoning is partially valid in that it highlights the requirement that “the defendant did not possess the evidence nor could he [have] obtain[ed] it himself with any reasonable diligence.” Burgeson, supra, 267 Ga. at 104 .

2005The habeas court continued its analysis as follows: “Additionally, the summary report is not Brady material in that Petitioner, himself, was aware that he had told law enforcement that he wanted to speak to an attorney. ” That reasoning is partially valid in that it highlights the requirement that “the defendant did not possess the evidence nor could he [have] obtain[ed] it himself with any reasonable diligence.” Burgeson, supra, 267 Ga. at 104 .

12005–2005
Resolution Trust Corp. v. H-, P.C. green
txnd · 1989
2 sentences

2003Simply put, "the work product doctrine does not apply to the situation in which a client seeks access to documents or other tangible things created or amassed by his attorney during the course of the representation." Spivey v. Zant, 683 F.2d 881, 885 (5th Cir.1982); Resolution Trust Corp. v. H—, P.C., supra. Adopting the majority view, we hold, therefore, that Henry is presumptively entitled to discover the memorandum which McDonald prepared on March 8.

2003Simply put, "the work product doctrine does not apply to the situation in which a client seeks access to documents or other tangible things created or amassed by his attorney during the course of the representation." Spivey v. Zant, 683 F.2d 881, 885 (5th Cir.1982); Resolution Trust Corp. v. H—, P.C., supra. Adopting the majority view, we hold, therefore, that Henry is presumptively entitled to discover the memorandum which McDonald prepared on March 8.

12003–2003
G. H. Bass & Co. v. Fulton County Board of Tax Assessors green
ga · 1997
1 sentence

2002In the absence of a showing of harassment, hardship, or a claim of privilege or other protection such as the work-product doctrine, as in Division 1, supra, McKesson has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for a protective order. 4.

12002–2002
In Re Paul green
ga · 1999
2 sentences

2002General Motors further argues that, based on In re Paul, 270 Ga. 680 ( 513 SE2d 219 ) (1999), because the work product rule protects the attorney as well as the client, this matter should be considered directly appealable because it involves a nonparty, the attorney.

2002General Motors further argues that, based on In re Paul, 270 Ga. 680 ( 513 SE2d 219 ) (1999), because the work product rule protects the attorney as well as the client, this matter should be considered directly appealable because it involves a nonparty, the attorney.

12002–2002
Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc. green
cand · 1991
1 sentence

1994Sporck v. Peil, 759 F2d 312, 316 (3rd Cir. 1985). [3] See Intermedics, 139 F.R.D. at 387 n. 3 (listing cases).

11994–1994
Hickman v. Taylor green
scotus · 1947
1 sentence

1975The work product doctrine stems from Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U. S. 495 (67 SC 385, 91 LE 451), in which the United States Supreme Court refused to require discovery of statements of witnesses obtained by an attorney after a claim arose but prior to litigation.

11975–1975
Atlantic Coast Line Railroad v. Gause green
gactapp · 1967
2 sentences

1970Co. v. Gause, 116 Ga. App. 216 , supra, the statement sought might be regarded as beyond the shelter of the work product protection rule is not necessary to consider, for it is recited in the motion to require its production that the statement was "taken from Mr. Lyle by plaintiff's attorney," and in its order the court refers to it as a statement "given to plaintiff's counsel." Under the ruling of the Supreme Court in Smith v. Smith, 223 Ga. 551 , supra, the statement is clearly within the work product rule and has its protection. 2.

1970Co. v. Gause, 116 Ga. App. 216 , supra, the statement sought might be regarded as beyond the shelter of the work product protection rule is not necessary to consider, for it is recited in the motion to require its production that the statement was "taken from Mr. Lyle by plaintiff’s attorney,” and in its order the court refers to it as a statement "given to plaintiff’s counsel.” Under the ruling of the Supreme Court in Smith v. Smith, 223 Ga. 551 , supra, the statement is clearly within the work product rule and has its protection. 2.

11970–1970
Smith v. Smith green
ga · 1967
2 sentences

1970Co. v. Gause, 116 Ga. App. 216 , supra, the statement sought might be regarded as beyond the shelter of the work product protection rule is not necessary to consider, for it is recited in the motion to require its production that the statement was "taken from Mr. Lyle by plaintiff's attorney," and in its order the court refers to it as a statement "given to plaintiff's counsel." Under the ruling of the Supreme Court in Smith v. Smith, 223 Ga. 551 , supra, the statement is clearly within the work product rule and has its protection. 2.

1970Co. v. Gause, 116 Ga. App. 216 , supra, the statement sought might be regarded as beyond the shelter of the work product protection rule is not necessary to consider, for it is recited in the motion to require its production that the statement was "taken from Mr. Lyle by plaintiff’s attorney,” and in its order the court refers to it as a statement "given to plaintiff’s counsel.” Under the ruling of the Supreme Court in Smith v. Smith, 223 Ga. 551 , supra, the statement is clearly within the work product rule and has its protection. 2.

11970–1970

Statutes the citing opinions construe

GA § 9-11-26 (8)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

CA 160 (1962–2026) TX 159 (1984–2026) FL 155 (1961–2026) OH 131 (1978–2026) PA 109 (1973–2026) IL 76 (1980–2025) WA 72 (1975–2025) MA 54 (1980–2025) NJ 52 (1950–2026) IN 46 (1976–2025) MO 43 (1977–2025) NC 40 (1990–2024) NY 40 (1964–2024) VA 37 (1970–2018) CT 34 (1969–2021) MI 34 (1975–2025) AL 26 (1987–2014) CO 26 (1981–2025) WV 25 (1984–2025) AZ 25 (1970–2025) TN 24 (1968–2024) MD 23 (1977–2025) IA 21 (1993–2024) MT 20 (1981–2018) RI 19 (1978–2025) DE 18 (1967–2025) GA 18 (1970–2021) KY 17 (1985–2024) NV 16 (1997–2019) LA 16 (1983–2025) OK 14 (1983–2026) DC 13 (1977–2023) MS 13 (1992–2023) NH 13 (1967–2021) NM 13 (1966–2025) ME 13 (2007–2019) WI 10 (1975–2003) UT 8 (1990–2023) HI 7 (1982–2023) AK 7 (1978–2018) KS 6 (1999–2019) ND 5 (1978–2022) MN 5 (1979–2024) OR 4 (1998–2023) AR 4 (1996–2009) SC 4 (1997–2019) VT 3 (1990–2023) SD 3 (1989–1999)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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