work product doctrine in Wisconsin

2003Although dealing mainly with the work-product doctrine, id., 34 Wis. 2d at 583-605 , 150 N.W.2d at 400-412 , Dudek also addressed the attorney-client privilege, id., 34 Wis. 2d at 578-583 , 150 N.W.2d at 398-400 .

2003Although dealing mainly with the work-product doctrine, id., 34 Wis. 2d at 583-605 , 150 N.W.2d at 400-412 , Dudek also addressed the attorney-client privilege, id., 34 Wis. 2d at 578-583 , 150 N.W.2d at 398-400 .

2002The work product doctrine was adopted in Wisconsin in Dudek, and codified by Wis. Stat. § 804.01 (2)(c). 24 Unlike the lawyer-client privilege, the work product doctrine is a "qualified privilege." Borgwardt, 196 Wis. 2d at 353 -354 (quoting United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 237-238 (1975)).

2002The work product doctrine only "gives way 'upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of the case and that the party seeking discovery is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means.'" Id. at 354 (quoting Wis. Stat. § 804.01 (2) (c) 1.); see also Dudek, 34 Wis. 2d at 591 ("[T]he work product of the lawyer usually is privileged and not subject to discovery except where the objectives of pretrial discovery are unnecessarily frustrated and where good cause is shown to make exceptio

1995Schlitz Brewing Co., 126 Wis. 2d 16, 31-32 , 374 N.W.2d 640, 648 (Ct. App. 1985) (Both the attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine "are owned by the attorney's client and can only be waived voluntarily at the client's direction."). 6 There is nothing in the record here that demonstrates that Borgwardt and C & S *356 Graphics either personally waived their attorney-client privilege in connection with the documents or that they directed their attorneys to waive the privilege.

1995Schlitz Brewing Co., 126 Wis. 2d 16, 31-32 , 374 N.W.2d 640, 648 (Ct. App. 1985) (Both the attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine "are owned by the attorney's client and can only be waived voluntarily at the client's direction."). 6 There is nothing in the record here that demonstrates that Borgwardt and C & S *356 Graphics either personally waived their attorney-client privilege in connection with the documents or that they directed their attorneys to waive the privilege.

1998Even if such a leap could be made, he has not indicated how the information from his expert fits Dudek's definition of work product as "the information [the lawyer] has assembled and the mental impressions, the legal theories and strategies that he [or she] has pursued or adopted as derived from interviews, statements, memoranda, correspondence, briefs, legal and factual research, mental impressions, personal beliefs, and other tangible or intangible means." Id. at 589 , 150 N.W.2d at 404 . 7 In Dyson v. Hempe, 140 Wis. 2d 792, 813 , 413 N.W.2d 379, 388 (Ct. App. 1987), for example, we recogni

1998Even if such a leap could be made, he has not indicated how the information from his expert fits Dudek's definition of work product as "the information [the lawyer] has assembled and the mental impressions, the legal theories and strategies that he [or she] has pursued or adopted as derived from interviews, statements, memoranda, correspondence, briefs, legal and factual research, mental impressions, personal beliefs, and other tangible or intangible means." Id. at 589 , 150 N.W.2d at 404 . 7 In Dyson v. Hempe, 140 Wis. 2d 792, 813 , 413 N.W.2d 379, 388 (Ct. App. 1987), for example, we recogni

1998The work-product doctrine as set forth in Dudek is now generally codified by § 804.01(2)(c)l, STATS.; Ranft v. Lyons, 163 Wis. 2d 282, 297 , 471 N.W.2d 254, 260 (Ct. App. 1991).

1998The work-product doctrine as set forth in Dudek is now generally codified by § 804.01(2)(c)l, STATS.; Ranft v. Lyons, 163 Wis. 2d 282, 297 , 471 N.W.2d 254, 260 (Ct. App. 1991).

1998Even if such a leap could be made, he has not indicated how the information from his expert fits Dudek's definition of work product as "the information [the lawyer] has assembled and the mental impressions, the legal theories and strategies that he [or she] has pursued or adopted as derived from interviews, statements, memoranda, correspondence, briefs, legal and factual research, mental impressions, personal beliefs, and other tangible or intangible means." Id. at 589 , 150 N.W.2d at 404 . 7 In Dyson v. Hempe, 140 Wis. 2d 792, 813 , 413 N.W.2d 379, 388 (Ct. App. 1987), for example, we recogni

1998Even if such a leap could be made, he has not indicated how the information from his expert fits Dudek's definition of work product as "the information [the lawyer] has assembled and the mental impressions, the legal theories and strategies that he [or she] has pursued or adopted as derived from interviews, statements, memoranda, correspondence, briefs, legal and factual research, mental impressions, personal beliefs, and other tangible or intangible means." Id. at 589 , 150 N.W.2d at 404 . 7 In Dyson v. Hempe, 140 Wis. 2d 792, 813 , 413 N.W.2d 379, 388 (Ct. App. 1987), for example, we recogni

1996The trial court held that the work-product doctrine prevented further inquiry into whether Dr. Rodriguez's lawyer had put on the "rehearsal." 4 Although the trial court's work-product rationale was faulty, we affirm *337 nevertheless because the Kuklinskis made an insufficient offer of proof to permit further inquiry once Dr. Rodriguez denied both that he had "rehearsed" his testimony and that his lawyer had "suggested" to him that he "should answer certain questions in certain ways." See State v. Holt, 128 Wis. 2d 110, 124 , 382 N.W.2d 679, 687 (Ct. App. 1985) (trial court will be affirmed if

1996The trial court held that the work-product doctrine prevented further inquiry into whether Dr. Rodriguez's lawyer had put on the "rehearsal." 4 Although the trial court's work-product rationale was faulty, we affirm *337 nevertheless because the Kuklinskis made an insufficient offer of proof to permit further inquiry once Dr. Rodriguez denied both that he had "rehearsed" his testimony and that his lawyer had "suggested" to him that he "should answer certain questions in certain ways." See State v. Holt, 128 Wis. 2d 110, 124 , 382 N.W.2d 679, 687 (Ct. App. 1985) (trial court will be affirmed if

1996The work-product doctrine protects against the forced disclosure of "documents and tangible things" that are "prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial," Rule 804.01(2)(c)1, Stats., as well as other information that may not have been reduced to tangible form, Meunier v. Ogurek, 140 Wis. 2d 782, 790 , 412 N.W.2d 155, 158 (Ct. App. 1987); 8 CHARLES A. WRIGHT et al.

1996The work-product doctrine protects against the forced disclosure of "documents and tangible things" that are "prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial," Rule 804.01(2)(c)1, Stats., as well as other information that may not have been reduced to tangible form, Meunier v. Ogurek, 140 Wis. 2d 782, 790 , 412 N.W.2d 155, 158 (Ct. App. 1987); 8 CHARLES A. WRIGHT et al.

1975In essence, the mere names and addresses of these doctors and technicians are a preliminary part of the work product being assembled by plaintiffs’ counsel.” *473 We stated in Blakely v. Waukesha Foundry Co. (1974), 65 Wis. 2d 468, 481, 482 , 222 N. W. 2d 920 : “Unless there has been a waiver of the work product privilege, ... we deem it of the utmost importance that under our adversary system counsel be encouraged to do a thorough job of investigation, including consulting experts, without having the results of such investigation used against their client, when such expert is not actually to

1975In essence, the mere names and addresses of these doctors and technicians are a preliminary part of the work product being assembled by plaintiffs’ counsel.” *473 We stated in Blakely v. Waukesha Foundry Co. (1974), 65 Wis. 2d 468, 481, 482 , 222 N. W. 2d 920 : “Unless there has been a waiver of the work product privilege, ... we deem it of the utmost importance that under our adversary system counsel be encouraged to do a thorough job of investigation, including consulting experts, without having the results of such investigation used against their client, when such expert is not actually to