17 Kentucky opinions name it 2 courts 1985–2024 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kentucky courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
O'CONNELL v. Cowangreen2 sentences2021Citing O’Connell v. Cowan, 332 S.W.3d 34 (Ky. 2010), the circuit court held that the information sought is privileged under the work product doctrine and that no in camera review was warranted. 2016O'Connell v. Cowan, 332 S.W.3d 34, 39 (Ky. 2010). | 2 | 3 |
Hoskins v. Mariclegreen2 sentences2021Thus, they argue the ultimate decision by the Court of Appeals was based on a faulty premise, thereby rendering its denial of their writ petition infirm. 4 The standard for granting a writ of prohibition is set forth in Hoskins v. Maricle as follows: A writ . . . may be granted upon a showing that (1) the lower court is proceeding or is about to proceed outside of its jurisdiction and there is no remedy through an application to an intermediate court; or (2) that the lower court is acting or is about to act erroneously, although within its jurisdiction, and there exists no adequate remedy by a 2010In Hoskins v. Maride, we said A writ of prohibition may be granted upon a showing that (1) the lower court is proceeding or is about to proceed outside of its jurisdiction and there is no remedy through an application to an intermediate court; or (2) that the lower court is acting or is about to act erroneously, although within its jurisdiction, and there exists no adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise and great injustice and irreparable injury will result if the petition is not granted. 150 S.W.3d 1,10 (Ky.2004). | 2 | 2 |
Univ. of Ky. v. Lexington H-L Servs., Inc.green2 sentences2021Litigation must be imminent or pending, and “the mere potential for litigation is not sufficient to place documents within the scope of the work-product doctrine.” Univ. of Kentucky v. Lexington H-L Servs., Inc., 579 S.W.3d 858, 865 (Ky. App. 2018). 2020Univ. of Kentucky v. Lexington H-L Servs., Inc., 579 S.W.3d 858, 863 (Ky. App. 2018), review denied (Aug. 21, 2019). | 2 | 2 |
Morrow v. Brown, Todd & Heyburngreen2 sentences2010"The work-product doctrine is designed to protect an adversary system of justice," Morrow v. Brown, Todd & Heyburn, 957 S.W.2d 722, 724 (Ky.1997), and is rooted in the United States Supreme Court's decision in Hickman v. Taylor . 2010“The work-product doctrine is designed to protect an adversary system of justice,” Morrow v. Brown, Todd & Heyburn, 957 S.W.2d 722, 724 (Ky.1997), and is rooted in the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hickman v. Taylor, CR 26.02(3)(a) is nearly identical to its federal counterpart, Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(3). | 2 | 2 |
The St. Luke Hospitals, Inc. v. Kopowskigreen2 sentences2023In fact CR 26, which codifies the work-product doctrine, specifically exempts communications protected by the attorney-client privilege from its disclosure provisions.” Kopowski, 160 S.W.3d at 777 (internal citation omitted). 2023In fact CR 26, which codifies the work-product doctrine, specifically exempts communications protected by the attorney-client privilege from its disclosure provisions.” Kopowski, 160 S.W.3d at 777 (internal citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2010CR 26.02(1); See State of New Hampshire v. Superior Court, 116 N.H. 1 , 350 A.2d 626, 627 (1976). 2010CR 26.02(1); See State of New Hampshire v. Superior Court, 116 N.H. 1 , 350 A.2d 626, 627 (1976). | 1 | 1 |
Hiatt v. Clarkgreen2 sentences2010See Hiatt v. Clark, 194 S.W.3d 324 (Ky.2006). 2010See Hiatt v. Clark, 194 S.W.3d 324 (Ky.2006). | 1 | 1 |
Sporck v. Peilgreen2 sentences2010See Sporck v. Peil, 759 F.2d 312, 316 (3rd Cir. 1985); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated March 19, 2002, and August 2, 2002, 318 F.3d 379 , 383 (2nd Cir. 2003) (recognizing that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Fed. 2010See Sporck v. Peil, 759 F.2d 312, 316 (3rd Cir. 1985); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated March 19, 2002, and August 2, 2002, 318 F.3d 379 , 383 (2nd Cir. 2003) (recognizing that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Fed. | 1 | 1 |
Wood v. McCowngreen2 sentences2010See Wood v. McCown, 784 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Tex.App. 1990). 2010See Wood v. McCown, 784 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Tex.App.1990). | 1 | 1 |
Cox v. Bradengreen2 sentences2010The Court of Appeals also agreed with the trial court that even if the work product privilege applied here, pursuant to CR 26.02(3)(a), Brightwell demonstrated "substantial need of the material in the preparation of his case and that he is unable, without undue hardship, to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means." The Jefferson County Attorney and Santry filed this matter of right appeal from the denial of the Court of Appeals of the petition for writ of prohibition. "[T]his Court has articulated a strict standard to *39 determine whether the remedy of a writ is avai 2010The Court of Appeals also agreed with the trial court that even if the work product privilege applied here, pursuant to CR 26.02(3)(a), Brightwell demonstrated “substantial need of the material in the preparation of his case and that he is unable, without undue hardship, to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means.” The Jefferson County Attorney and Santry filed this matter of right appeal from the denial of the Court of Appeals of the petition for writ of prohibition. “[T]his Court has articulated a strict standard to determine whether the remedy of a writ is availabl | 1 | 1 |
Ronald K. Spivey v. Walter Zant, Warden, Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Centergreen2 sentences2006For example, in Spivey v. Zant, 683 F.2d 881, 885 (5th Cir.1982), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that "the work product doctrine does not apply to the situation in which a client seeks access to documents or other tangible things created or amassed by his attorney during the course of the representation." Spivey , of course, was decided in the context of a civil case where the constitutional rights to adequate representation were not as attendant as they are in a criminal case such as the one here. 2006For example, in Spivey v. Zant, 683 F.2d 881, 885 (5th Cir.1982), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that “the work product doctrine does not apply to the situation in which a client seeks access to documents or other tangible things created or amassed by his attorney during the course of the representation.” Spivey , of course, was decided in the context of a civil case where the constitutional rights to adequate representation were not as attendant as they are in a criminal case such as the one here. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Taylorgreen2 sentences1998See State v. Taylor, N.C., 327 N.C. 147 , 393 S.E.2d 801 at 806-7 (1990); Gall v. Commonwealth, Ky., 702 S.W.2d 37 (1985). 1998See State v. Taylor, N.C., 327 N.C. 147 , 393 S.E.2d 801 at 806-7 (1990); Gall v. Commonwealth, Ky., 702 S.W.2d 37 (1985). | 1 | 1 |
Charlotte Motor Speedway, Inc. v. International Insurancegreen1 sentence1997Thus, “while it is clear that the Supreme Court is reluctant to recognize exceptions to Rule 26(b)(3), Upjohn indicates its willingness to do so_” Charlotte Motor Speedway, supra at 130. | 1 | 1 |
The Duplan Corporation v. Moulinage Et Retorderie De Chavanoz, Deering Milliken, Inc.green1 sentence1985Id. at 482. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kentucky. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Upjohn Co. v. United States
green
2 sentences1997However, in Upjohn Co. v. U.S., 449 U.S. 383 , 101 S.Ct. 677 , 66 L.Ed.2d 584 (1981), the United States Supreme Court in addressing the divergent lines of authority stated “[wjhile we are not prepared at this juncture to say that such material is always protected by the work-product rule, we think a far stronger showing of necessity and unavailability by other means ... would be necessary to compel disclosure.” Id. at 401-402 , 101 S.Ct. at 688-89 . 1997However, in Upjohn Co. v. U.S., 449 U.S. 383 , 101 S.Ct. 677 , 66 L.Ed.2d 584 (1981), the United States Supreme Court in addressing the divergent lines of authority stated “[wjhile we are not prepared at this juncture to say that such material is always protected by the work-product rule, we think a far stronger showing of necessity and unavailability by other means ... would be necessary to compel disclosure.” Id. at 401-402 , 101 S.Ct. at 688-89 . | 4 | 1997–2024 |
Hickman v. Taylor
green
2 sentences2020The work product doctrine was first established in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 , 67 S. Ct. 385 , 91 L. 2020The work product doctrine was first established in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 , 67 S. Ct. 385 , 91 L. | 4 | 1985–2020 |
Grange Mutual Insurance Co. v. Trude
green
1 sentence2023Trude, 151 S.W.3d at 818 . | 1 | 2023–2023 |
TRANSIT AUTHORITY OF RIVER CITY v. Vinson
green
2 sentences2020Ed. 451 (1947), as a tool to grant attorneys some “free[dom] from unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties and counsel.” Vinson, 703 S.W.2d at 486 . 2020Indeed, the work product doctrine was meant to protect parties from being forced to “hand over the result of his work to an opponent.” Vinson, 703 S.W.2d at 486 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
McMurry v. Eckert
green
1 sentence2016Id. (citing CR 26.02(3)(b)). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Docket No. 02-6239
green
2 sentences2010See Sporck v. Peil, 759 F.2d 312, 316 (3rd Cir. 1985); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated March 19, 2002, and August 2, 2002, 318 F.3d 379 , 383 (2nd Cir. 2003) (recognizing that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Fed. 2010See Sporck v. Peil, 759 F.2d 312, 316 (3rd Cir. 1985); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated March 19, 2002, and August 2, 2002, 318 F.3d 379 , 383 (2nd Cir. 2003) (recognizing that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Fed. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Doubleday v. Ruh
green
2 sentences2010Citing Doubleday v. Ruh, 149 F.R.D. 601 (E.D.Cal.1993), the Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that the work product privilege in CR 26.02(3)(a) did not apply to Santry's litigation file on Brightwell's prosecution and information regarding the prosecution because the criminal proceeding had been terminated, and neither Santry nor the Jefferson County Attorney's office was a party to the subsequent civil action. 2010Citing Doubleday v. Ruh, 149 F.R.D. 601 (E.D.Cal.1993), the Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that the work product privilege in CR 26.02(3)(a) did not apply to Santry’s litigation file on Brightwell’s prosecution and information regarding the prosecution because the criminal proceeding had been terminated, and neither Santry nor the Jefferson County Attorney’s office was a party to the subsequent civil action. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Gall v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence1998See State v. Taylor, N.C., 327 N.C. 147 , 393 S.E.2d 801 at 806-7 (1990); Gall v. Commonwealth, Ky., 702 S.W.2d 37 (1985). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Terrell v. Western Casualty & Surety Company
green
1 sentence1995Terrell v. Western Casualty & Surety Co., Ky., 427 S.W.2d 825 (1968). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
cluster 291747
green
1 sentence1991Likewise, we do not know whether the trial court adopted the “good cause exception” to the attorney-client privilege as enunciated in Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir.1970), *397 ce rt. denied, 401 U.S. 974 , 91 S.Ct. 1191 , 28 L.Ed.2d 323 (1971). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Securities & Exchange Commission v. Medical Committee for Human Rights
green
1 sentence1991Likewise, we do not know whether the trial court adopted the “good cause exception” to the attorney-client privilege as enunciated in Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir.1970), *397 ce rt. denied, 401 U.S. 974 , 91 S.Ct. 1191 , 28 L.Ed.2d 323 (1971). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Garner v. First American Life Insurance
green
1 sentence1991Likewise, we do not know whether the trial court adopted the “good cause exception” to the attorney-client privilege as enunciated in Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir.1970), *397 ce rt. denied, 401 U.S. 974 , 91 S.Ct. 1191 , 28 L.Ed.2d 323 (1971). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Parkin v. Florida
green
1 sentence1991Likewise, we do not know whether the trial court adopted the “good cause exception” to the attorney-client privilege as enunciated in Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir.1970), *397 ce rt. denied, 401 U.S. 974 , 91 S.Ct. 1191 , 28 L.Ed.2d 323 (1971). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.