Comptroller hearing in New York

1990In light of the significant delay in adequately particularizing the accident site, which still remains unclarified, and the discrepancies included in the descriptions thereof, the defendant would be prejudiced by allowing the amendment to the notice of claim (see, e.g., Faubert v City of New York, 90 AD2d 509 ).

1985Plaintiff’s testimony materially contradicted his notice of claim and only served to obscure, rather than to clarify, the manner to which the accident occurred (see, Caselli v City of New York, supra; Faubert v City of New York, 90 AD2d 509 ).

2007While the scope of the Comptroller’s inquiry as contained in the instant subpoenas is not unlimited, it is not up to the courts to “ ‘cull the good from the bad’ ” (Grotallio v Soft Drink Leasing Corp., 97 AD2d 383 [1983], quoting People v Doe, 39 AD2d 869, 870 [1972]).

2000Finally, the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Board awarding petitioner benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Law is not binding on the Comptroller and does not bar respondent, upon review of the evidence, from reaching a determination that petitioner is not permanently incapacitated from the performance of her job duties (see, Matter of Knight v New York State & Local Employees’ Retirement Sys., 266 AD2d 774, 776 ; Matter of Keller v Regan, 212 AD2d 856, 858 ).

2000Finally, the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Board awarding petitioner benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Law is not binding on the Comptroller and does not bar respondent, upon review of the evidence, from reaching a determination that petitioner is not permanently incapacitated from the performance of her job duties (see, Matter of Knight v New York State & Local Employees’ Retirement Sys., 266 AD2d 774, 776 ; Matter of Keller v Regan, 212 AD2d 856, 858 ).

1996Further, citing Matter of Pell v Board of Educ. ( 34 NY2d 222 , 231), the court found the Mayor’s denial of registration rationally based on the Comptroller’s timely and sound objection.

1996Appellant maintains that (1) the Comptroller’s objection to registration upon which the Mayor’s determination not to require registration was based was untimely filed and (2) the Mayor’s decision to deny registration of the contract was arbitrary and capricious, particularly in light of the approval of three other contracts for repairs to bridges in 1992. 6 This Court’s review of this article 78 proceeding is limited, inter alla, to "whether a determination was made in violation of lawful procedure, was affected by an error of law or was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion” (CPL

1992Although the courts have implied the requirement of notice and hearing where the exercise of a statutory power adversely affects property rights and the statute was silent (see, Matter of Hecht v Monaghan, 307 NY 461 ), the right to bid on a contract is not a property right.

1991The testimony of the petitioner Mazel Setton at the Comptroller’s hearing, conducted more than five months after the claim arose, did not serve to dissipate the prejudice to the appellant since it contradicted the notice of claim and served to obscure the correct location of the accident (see, Caselli v City of New York, 105 AD2d 251, 254 ).

1990Here, the defendant challenged the accuracy of the information contained in the city-involved accident report (cf., Mayer v DuPont Assocs., 80 AD2d 799 ), predicated upon the discrepancies in the responding police officer’s description of the location and nature of the alleged sidewalk defect and that provided by the plaintiff at a Comptroller’s hearing conducted approximately 14 months after the accident.

1990Nor did the plaintiff proffer any evidence that the condition of the sidewalk defect, which is transitory in nature (see, Caselli v City of New York, supra, at 253; cf., Evers v City of New York, 90 AD2d 786 ), remained the same at the time of either the Comptroller’s hearing or her motion to strike the defendant’s first affirmative defense (see, Fendig v City of New York, supra, at 521; Martire v City of New York, supra, at 567; Mazza v City of New York, supra).

1990The plaintiffs description places the sidewalk defect south of Atlantic Avenue and not within the triangular-shaped sidewalk (see, e.g., Bacchus v City of New York, 134 AD2d 393 ).

1986Thus, the plaintiff has not been prejudiced by the city’s delay (see, Wyso v City of New York, 91 AD2d 661 ; cf. Griffin v Columbia Univ., 51 AD2d 896 ).

1986Thus, the plaintiff has not been prejudiced by the city’s delay (see, Wyso v City of New York, 91 AD2d 661 ; cf. Griffin v Columbia Univ., 51 AD2d 896 ).

1985The facts testified to by plaintiff at the Comptroller’s hearing are insufficient to raise a genuine issue as to the existence of such a duty (see, Corcoran v Community School Dist. 17, 114 AD2d 835 ).

1984Under these circumstances, having applied for and accepted workers’ compensation benefits, plaintiff is foreclosed from maintaining the instant action at law against his employer (see Workers’ Compensation Law, §§11,29; Werner v State of New York, 53 NY2d 346 ; see Claudio v Lefrak, 100 AD2d 837 ; see, also, Jones v State of New York, 96 AD2d 105, 106 ). 11 Accordingly, summary judgment should have been granted to the defendant city on the basis that this action is barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Law.

1984Because plaintiff stated in his bill of particulars and in his testimony at a Comptroller’s hearing that he was an employee of the defendant city, plaintiff had the obligation of alleging that the accident in question was not covered by workers’ compensation (Murray v City of New York, 43 NY2d 400, 407 ).

1980We also conclude, as did the Court of Appeals in Goldin v Greenberg (supra), that the record adequately supports the conclusion that the categories of materials sought bear a reasonable relationship to the Comptroller’s inquiry.

1979A Statute of Limitations is not open to discretionary change by the courts no matter how compelling the circumstances (Arnold v Mayal Realty Co., 299 NY 57 ).” Plaintiff further contends that, pursuant to the General Municipal Law, the time for a claimant to initiate an action is barred for 60 days after completion of a Comptroller’s hearing, and therefore the Statute of Limitations should be tolled for at least 60 days after the one-year and 90-day period.

1977(See Matter of Stork Rest. v Boland, 282 NY 256, 267 ; Matter of Burke v Bromberger, 300 NY 248, 250 .) As to the matter of the journeyman-apprentice ratio, respondent has conceded that remand is required for the reason stated.

1977(See Matter of Stork Rest. v Boland, 282 NY 256, 267 ; Matter of Burke v Bromberger, 300 NY 248, 250 .) As to the matter of the journeyman-apprentice ratio, respondent has conceded that remand is required for the reason stated.

1971At Special Term, Mahoney, J. ( 60 Misc 2d 49 ) granted the Comptroller’s motion to dismiss the complaint as to him on the ground that this plaintiff could attack the determination of the Comptroller in an article 78 proceeding only, and granted this defendant’s motion for a judgment directing the Comptroller to pay the benefits to her.

1960This court’s disposition of the city’s contention that it was not negligent is based upon Mayer v. Temple Properties ( 307 N. Y. 559 ) and Runkel v. City of New York ( 282 App. Div. 173 ).

1960This court’s disposition of the city’s contention that it was not negligent is based upon Mayer v. Temple Properties ( 307 N. Y. 559 ) and Runkel v. City of New York ( 282 App. Div. 173 ).

1958The record before us seems so developed and the findings so cast as to test the area of permissible decision by the Comptroller under a claim of “accident” within the frame of the decision in Matter of Owens v. McGovern ( 309 N. Y. 449 ).

1947(Matter of Giannettino v. McGoldrick, 295 N. Y. 208 .) This obligation of the city, however, to pay wages at “ not less than the prevailing rate ” exists only by fiat of the Legislature, and the remedy nrovided by the Legislature for violation of the obligation it has created, is exclusive.

1946(Jacobus v. Colgate, 217 N. Y. 235, 240 ; Weiler v. Dry Dock Savings Inst. 258 App. Div. 581 , affd. 284 N. Y. 630 .) “ It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the provisions of a statute will not be applied retrospectively where they are capable of any other construction unless the intent of the Legislature to the contrary clearly appears ”.

1946(Jacobus v. Colgate, 217 N. Y. 235, 240 ; Weiler v. Dry Dock Savings Inst. 258 App. Div. 581 , affd. 284 N. Y. 630 .) “ It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the provisions of a statute will not be applied retrospectively where they are capable of any other construction unless the intent of the Legislature to the contrary clearly appears ”.

1946(Jacobus v. Colgate, 217 N. Y. 235, 240 ; Weiler v. Dry Dock Savings Inst. 258 App. Div. 581 , affd. 284 N. Y. 630 .) “ It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the provisions of a statute will not be applied retrospectively where they are capable of any other construction unless the intent of the Legislature to the contrary clearly appears ”.