continuous violation in New York

2016Plaintiff failed to preserve her argument that the continuous violation doctrine applies, and, in any event, the argument lacks merit (see generally Ferraro v New York City Dept. of Educ., 115 AD3d 497 , 497-498 [1st Dept 2014]; see also National Railroad Passenger Corporation v Morgan, 536 US 101, 113-114 [2002]).

2009Therefore, we find that plaintiff cannot invoke the continuous violation doctrine since the acts were discrete, separate acts which are subject to the three-year statute of limitations (see National Railroad Passenger Corporation v Morgan, 536 US 101 [2002]).

2017Additionally, the continuous violation doctrine is of no aid to plaintiff here, as the allegedly false misbehavior report and its use at the 2010 disciplinary hearing “constitute single and distinct events” (Thomas v City of Oneonta, 90 AD3d 1135, 1136 [2011]).

2017Additionally, the continuous violation doctrine is of no aid to plaintiff here, as the allegedly false misbehavior report and its use at the 2010 disciplinary hearing “constitute single and distinct events” (Thomas v City of Oneonta, 90 AD3d 1135, 1136 [2011]).

2017As for plaintiff’s retaliation claim against Edgar, plaintiff’s amended complaint “fail[ed] to allege facts establishing the requisite causal nexus between the protected activity and the adverse action” (Diaz v New York State Catholic Health Plan, Inc., 133 AD3d 473, 474 [2015] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Whitfield-Ortiz v Department of Educ. of City of N.Y., 116 AD3d 580 , 581 [2014]).

2017As for plaintiff’s retaliation claim against Edgar, plaintiff’s amended complaint “fail[ed] to allege facts establishing the requisite causal nexus between the protected activity and the adverse action” (Diaz v New York State Catholic Health Plan, Inc., 133 AD3d 473, 474 [2015] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Whitfield-Ortiz v Department of Educ. of City of N.Y., 116 AD3d 580 , 581 [2014]).

2017As for plaintiff’s retaliation claim against Edgar, plaintiff’s amended complaint “fail[ed] to allege facts establishing the requisite causal nexus between the protected activity and the adverse action” (Diaz v New York State Catholic Health Plan, Inc., 133 AD3d 473, 474 [2015] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Whitfield-Ortiz v Department of Educ. of City of N.Y., 116 AD3d 580 , 581 [2014]).

2017As for plaintiff’s retaliation claim against Edgar, plaintiff’s amended complaint “fail[ed] to allege facts establishing the requisite causal nexus between the protected activity and the adverse action” (Diaz v New York State Catholic Health Plan, Inc., 133 AD3d 473, 474 [2015] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Whitfield-Ortiz v Department of Educ. of City of N.Y., 116 AD3d 580 , 581 [2014]).

2025As Defendants correctly argue in their opposition, the continuous doctrine requires a three-pronged showing that "(1) the patient 'continued to seek, and in fact obtained, an actual course of treatment from the defendant physician during the relevant period'; (2) the course of treatment was 'for the same conditions or complaints underlying the plaintiff's medical malpractice claim'; and (3) the treatment is 'continuous'" ( Hillary v Gerstein, 178 AD3d 674, 678 [2d Dept 2019], quoting Gomez v Katz, 61 AD3d 108, 111-112 [2d Dept 2009]).

2025As Defendants correctly argue in their opposition, the continuous doctrine requires a three-pronged showing that "(1) the patient 'continued to seek, and in fact obtained, an actual course of treatment from the defendant physician during the relevant period'; (2) the course of treatment was 'for the same conditions or complaints underlying the plaintiff's medical malpractice claim'; and (3) the treatment is 'continuous'" ( Hillary v Gerstein, 178 AD3d 674 , 678 [2d Dept 2019], quoting Gomez v Katz, 61 AD3d 108, 111-112 [2d Dept 2009]).

2021We conclude that petitioner failed to establish that the alleged acts occurring before and during the limitations period were not separate and unrelated incidents, i.e., he failed to establish "that a specific related incident took place within the limitations period, which would have invoked the continuous violation doctrine" ( Matter of Lozada v Elmont Hook & Ladder Co. No. [*2]1 , 151 AD3d 860, 862 [2d Dept 2017]; cf. Clark , 302 AD2d at 945 ).

2020While the continuous violation doctrine is also well recognized under the federal and [*3]state discrimination laws ( see Patterson v County of Oneida , 375 F3d 206, 220 [2d Cir 2004]; Bermudez v City of New York, 783 F Supp 2d 560 [SD NY 2011]), its contours are narrower.

2020Under federal anti-discrimination laws, the continuing violation doctrine "is triggered by continual unlawful acts, [and] not by continual ill effects from the original violation" ( Hamer v City of Trinidad , 924 F3d 1093, 1099 [10th Cir 2019][internal quotation marks omitted], cert denied —US&mdash, 140 S Ct 644 [2019]).

2019It was permissible for the entire course of conduct to be charged as a single count of contempt ( see People v Alonzo , 16 NY3d 267, 270 [2011]), and for the People to argue that theory ( see People v Tucker , 41 AD3d 210 , 211 [1st Dept 2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 882 [2007], cert denied 552 US 1153 [2008]).

1994Interest Research Group v Williams, 127 AD2d 512, 513 ; see, Matter of Howard v Wyman, 28 NY2d 434, 438 ; Matter of Duflo Spray-Chem. v Jorling, 153 AD2d 244, 247 ).

1989As this court has previously noted, "CPLR 3404 merely creates a presumption that an action marked off calendar and not restored for a period of one year has been abandoned” (Stavrou v Abravos-Vernadakis, 109 AD2d 676, 677 ; see also, Galante v Solon Holding Corp., 46 AD2d 636 ).