pendency hearing in New York

2008Contrary to the defendant’s contentions, none of these factors were already accounted for in the risk assessment instrument and were all properly considered as justification for the upward departure (see People v Liguori, 48 AD3d 773 [2008]; People v Turner, 45 AD3d 747 [2007], lv denied 10 NY3d 704 [2008]; People v Hands, 37 AD3d 441 [2007]; People v Dexter, 21 AD3d 403 [2005]).

2008Contrary to the defendant’s contentions, none of these factors were already accounted for in the risk assessment instrument and were all properly considered as justification for the upward departure (see People v Liguori, 48 AD3d 773 [2008]; People v Turner, 45 AD3d 747 [2007], lv denied 10 NY3d 704 [2008]; People v Hands, 37 AD3d 441 [2007]; People v Dexter, 21 AD3d 403 [2005]).

2008Contrary to the defendant’s contentions, none of these factors were already accounted for in the risk assessment instrument and were all properly considered as justification for the upward departure (see People v Liguori, 48 AD3d 773 [2008]; People v Turner, 45 AD3d 747 [2007], lv denied 10 NY3d 704 [2008]; People v Hands, 37 AD3d 441 [2007]; People v Dexter, 21 AD3d 403 [2005]).

2008Contrary to the defendant’s contentions, none of these factors were already accounted for in the risk assessment instrument and were all properly considered as justification for the upward departure (see People v Liguori, 48 AD3d 773 [2008]; People v Turner, 45 AD3d 747 [2007], lv denied 10 NY3d 704 [2008]; People v Hands, 37 AD3d 441 [2007]; People v Dexter, 21 AD3d 403 [2005]).

2007(Compare Asher v Abbott Labs., 307 AD2d 211 [1st Dept 2003] [stay of state court antitrust action was warranted pending outcome of federal antitrust class action involving same defendant where the claims in the two actions were substantially identical].) Instead, respondents argue that based on Matter of Welch ( 183 Misc 2d 890 [Sup Ct, NY County 2000]) the scope of discovery must be determined by the District Court.

2007(Compare Asher v Abbott Labs., 307 AD2d 211 [1st Dept 2003] [stay of state court antitrust action was warranted pending outcome of federal antitrust class action involving same defendant where the claims in the two actions were substantially identical].) Instead, respondents argue that based on Matter of Welch ( 183 Misc 2d 890 [Sup Ct, NY County 2000]) the scope of discovery must be determined by the District Court.

2006In fact, this question was directly addressed in People v Persons 181 Misc 2d 189 (County Ct of New York, Nassau Cty, 1999).

2003Auth. ( 283 AD2d 353 [1st Dept 2001]), the Appellate Division upheld NYCHA’s authority to deny remaining family member status to an occupant with a fairly extensive criminal record who had engaged in criminal conduct even during the pendency of his claim.

1996We affirm, for, as Supreme Court rightly observed, petitioner’s failure to seek injunctive relief to maintain the status quo during the pendency of this challenge to the State Environmental Quality Review Act (ECL art 8 [hereinafter SEQRA]; see, Matter of Many v Village of Sharon Springs Bd. of Trustees, 218 AD2d 845 ), during which time the underlying project—a large warehouse facility in the Village of Sharon Springs, Schoharie County—has been substantially completed, at a cost of over $25 million, and placed into operation, has rendered his claims moot (see, Ughetta v Barile, 210 AD2d 562,

1996Neither the fact that an ancillary part of the facility has not yet been completed, nor petitioner’s assertion that it is the operation of the facility, not its construction per se, that poses a risk to the environment, warrants a different conclusion (see, Matter of Save the Pine Bush v City Engr., 220 AD2d 871, 872 , lv denied 87 NY2d 807 ; Matter of Friends of Pine Bush v Planning Bd., 86 AD2d 246, 247 , affd 59 NY2d 849 ).

1996We affirm, for, as Supreme Court rightly observed, petitioner’s failure to seek injunctive relief to maintain the status quo during the pendency of this challenge to the State Environmental Quality Review Act (ECL art 8 [hereinafter SEQRA]; see, Matter of Many v Village of Sharon Springs Bd. of Trustees, 218 AD2d 845 ), during which time the underlying project—a large warehouse facility in the Village of Sharon Springs, Schoharie County—has been substantially completed, at a cost of over $25 million, and placed into operation, has rendered his claims moot (see, Ughetta v Barile, 210 AD2d 562,

1996Neither the fact that an ancillary part of the facility has not yet been completed, nor petitioner’s assertion that it is the operation of the facility, not its construction per se, that poses a risk to the environment, warrants a different conclusion (see, Matter of Save the Pine Bush v City Engr., 220 AD2d 871, 872 , lv denied 87 NY2d 807 ; Matter of Friends of Pine Bush v Planning Bd., 86 AD2d 246, 247 , affd 59 NY2d 849 ).

1996Neither the fact that an ancillary part of the facility has not yet been completed, nor petitioner’s assertion that it is the operation of the facility, not its construction per se, that poses a risk to the environment, warrants a different conclusion (see, Matter of Save the Pine Bush v City Engr., 220 AD2d 871, 872 , lv denied 87 NY2d 807 ; Matter of Friends of Pine Bush v Planning Bd., 86 AD2d 246, 247 , affd 59 NY2d 849 ).

1995Even if a reasonable period of time for production of the Grand Jury minutes is excluded (see, People v Harris, 187 AD2d 1015 , affd 82 NY2d 409 ), the period of delay exceeds the six-month readiness period.

1995We reject the People’s argument that the 44 days must be excluded because of the pendency of defense counsel’s motions (see, People v Roscoe, 210 AD2d 1003 ).

1995Even if a reasonable period of time for production of the Grand Jury minutes is excluded (see, People v Harris, 187 AD2d 1015 , affd 82 NY2d 409 ), the period of delay exceeds the six-month readiness period.

1991School Dist., supra, at 798; Matter of Adlerstein v Board of Educ., 64 NY2d 90, 100 ).

1983(Botwinick v Ogden, 59 NY2d 909 , revg 87 AD2d 293 .) In addition, the theoretical basis for permitting a claimant to bring a common-law action against a medical facility open to the public is the fact that any injuries sustained were not “incidental” to his employment.

1983(Botwinick v Ogden, 59 NY2d 909 , revg 87 AD2d 293 .) In addition, the theoretical basis for permitting a claimant to bring a common-law action against a medical facility open to the public is the fact that any injuries sustained were not “incidental” to his employment.