pendency claim in Georgia

1937This rule that the pendency of claim litigation in a court of record will prevent the running of the statute is subject to the exception that “where pending a claim case the claimant dies, and the plaintiff in execution thereafter allows more than seven years to elapse before taking steps to make parties or to have an entry made upon the execution by an officer authorized to execute and return the same, it becomes dormant.” Beck v. Hamilton, 113 Ga. 273 ( 38 S. E. 754 ).

1937This rule that the pendency of claim litigation in a court of record will prevent the running of the statute is subject to the exception that “where pending a claim case the claimant dies, and the plaintiff in execution thereafter allows more than seven years to elapse before taking steps to make parties or to have an entry made upon the execution by an officer authorized to execute and return the same, it becomes dormant.” Beck v. Hamilton, 113 Ga. 273 ( 38 S. E. 754 ).

2013(Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 34-9-58 provides: “The State Board of Workers’ Compensation shall exercise all powers and perform all duties relating to the enforcement of this chapter.” Among other duties under the LOA, Aetna agreed not to “deny or reduce any payments to be different from the negotiated rate to Provider for any workers’ compensation Compensable Services provided by Provider to Claimants)” and that “Any Payors to which [Aetna] provides access to this Agreement, must also agree to all terms and conditions within this Agreement.” We do note, however, that in asserting that the Board

2007“In order for the pendency of a suit to act as a defense to a second suit on the same cause filed by the same suitor against the same party, the first suit must be pending.” (Citations omitted.) Bouldin, 161 Ga. App. at 397 . “[A]n action is not a pending suit between the parties until service of process.

1987Co., 157 Ga. App. 372 (2) ( 277 SE2d 746 ) (1981), this court held that it makes no difference “who gave notice of the lawsuit and claim so long as notice is given in a reasonable and timely manner,” with the result that the carrier has actual knowledge of the pendency of a claim.

1987Co., 157 Ga. App. 372 (2) ( 277 SE2d 746 ) (1981), this court held that it makes no difference “who gave notice of the lawsuit and claim so long as notice is given in a reasonable and timely manner,” with the result that the carrier has actual knowledge of the pendency of a claim.

1981Co., 240 Ga. 619 ( 241 SE2d 824 ) (1978).

1981Co., 240 Ga. 619 ( 241 SE2d 824 ) (1978).

1963This method of dealing with claims of creditors to money in the hands of the sheriff, also an officer of the court, was quite frankly conceived by the Supreme Court in Foster v. Rutherford, 20 Ga. 668 , as one which it proposed to establish, did establish in that case, and ultimately succeeded in having incorporated in subsequent Codes of this State.

1941City of Atlanta v. Truitt, 55 Ga. App. 365 ( 190 S. E. 369 ).

1941City of Atlanta v. Truitt, 55 Ga. App. 365 ( 190 S. E. 369 ).

1911Sellars, contra. (í>) A levy of tlie execution made by the sheriff of Appling county on June 2, 1896, prior to the “backing” of the execution by a justice of the peace of that county, entered July 30, 1896, was unauthorized (Formby v. Shackleford, 94 Ga. 670 ( 21 S. E. 711 ); Wilcher v. Pool, 121 Ga. 305 ( 48 S. E. 956 )); therefore, neither such levy nor the pendency of claims filed to the property so levied on, by persons other than the claimants in the present case, prevented the dormancy of the judgment. (c) Nor was the dormancy of the judgment prevented by a levy of the execution made by

1911Sellars, contra. (í>) A levy of tlie execution made by the sheriff of Appling county on June 2, 1896, prior to the “backing” of the execution by a justice of the peace of that county, entered July 30, 1896, was unauthorized (Formby v. Shackleford, 94 Ga. 670 ( 21 S. E. 711 ); Wilcher v. Pool, 121 Ga. 305 ( 48 S. E. 956 )); therefore, neither such levy nor the pendency of claims filed to the property so levied on, by persons other than the claimants in the present case, prevented the dormancy of the judgment. (c) Nor was the dormancy of the judgment prevented by a levy of the execution made by

1911Sellars, contra. (í>) A levy of tlie execution made by the sheriff of Appling county on June 2, 1896, prior to the “backing” of the execution by a justice of the peace of that county, entered July 30, 1896, was unauthorized (Formby v. Shackleford, 94 Ga. 670 ( 21 S. E. 711 ); Wilcher v. Pool, 121 Ga. 305 ( 48 S. E. 956 )); therefore, neither such levy nor the pendency of claims filed to the property so levied on, by persons other than the claimants in the present case, prevented the dormancy of the judgment. (c) Nor was the dormancy of the judgment prevented by a levy of the execution made by

1911Sellars, contra. (í>) A levy of tlie execution made by the sheriff of Appling county on June 2, 1896, prior to the “backing” of the execution by a justice of the peace of that county, entered July 30, 1896, was unauthorized (Formby v. Shackleford, 94 Ga. 670 ( 21 S. E. 711 ); Wilcher v. Pool, 121 Ga. 305 ( 48 S. E. 956 )); therefore, neither such levy nor the pendency of claims filed to the property so levied on, by persons other than the claimants in the present case, prevented the dormancy of the judgment. (c) Nor was the dormancy of the judgment prevented by a levy of the execution made by

1907All persons interested, who are notified in writing by the sheriff or movant of the pendency of the rule, will be bound by. the judgment of distribution.” -Civil Code, §4776; Hopkins v. Pedrick, 75 Ga. 706 ; National Bank v. Exchange Bank, 110 Ga. 693 (2). 2.

1903In Mer chants’ Bank v. Davis, 3 Ga. 112, it was held that where an execution owned by persons residing in one county was-levied upon land in another county, and a claim interposed there, the superior court of that county had jurisdiction in equity over the plaintiff, in consequence of the pendency of the claim.

1903In Mays v. Taylor, 7 Ga. 238 , it was held that where the plaintiff in execution resides in one county, and directs a levy to be made on personal property of the defendant who resides in a different county, and the levy is accordingly made by the sheriff of that county, the fact of such levy, without more, is not sufficient to give a court of equity jurisdiction of the person of the plaintiff, and compel him to litigate his rights in the county where the levy is made.

1901The case of Stanford v. Connery, 84 Ga. 731 , discloses similar activity on the part of the plaintiff in execution in the effort to enforce his judgment.