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12 California opinions name it 2 courts 1984–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Newport-Mesa Unified School District v. Hubertgreen2 sentences1984Education Code section 56505, subdivision (d) provides: “During the pendency of the hearing proceedings, including the actual state-level hearing, the pupil shall remain in his or her present placement unless the public agency and the parent agree otherwise.” (Italics added.) In Newport-Mesa Unified School Dist. v. Hubert (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 724 [ 183 Cal.Rptr. 334 ], reimbursement for private school tuition was disallowed because the parents unilaterally enrolled their child in private school before a due process hearing was held. 1984Education Code section 56505, subdivision (d) provides: “During the pendency of the hearing proceedings, including the actual state-level hearing, the pupil shall remain in his or her present placement unless the public agency and the parent agree otherwise.” (Italics added.) In Newport-Mesa Unified School Dist. v. Hubert (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 724 [ 183 Cal.Rptr. 334 ], reimbursement for private school tuition was disallowed because the parents unilaterally enrolled their child in private school before a due process hearing was held. | 1 | 2 |
Oiye v. Foxgreen1 sentence2016(See Oiye v. Fox (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1057-1058 [" 'It is well settled in this state that the relationship of debtor and creditor arises in tort cases the moment the cause of action accrues[,]' " and " ' "[o]ne having a claim for a tort is a creditor before the commencement of an action thereon, as well as after, and as such creditor, is, upon recovering judgment, entitled to avoid a fraudulent transfer antedating the commencement of his action." ' "].) However, the Lucketts' status as potential judgment creditors does not advance their claim under the UVTA, as they do not allege that | 1 | 1 |
Reliable Electric Co., Inc. v. Olson Construction Companygreen1 sentence2012(In re Longardner & Associates, Inc. (7th Cir. 1988) 855 F.2d 455, 465 [“This notice of the pendency of a hearing to consider confirmation of the plan is sufficient to satisfy due process requirements because the creditor had the opportunity to be heard at that March 7 hearing.”]; Reliable Electric Co. v. Olson Construction Co. (10th Cir. 1984) 726 F.2d 620, 623 [“[N]otwithstanding the language of section 1141, the discharge of a claim without reasonable notice of the confirmation hearing is violative of the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution.”]; In re St. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Longardner & Associates, Inc., Debtor. Appeal of Landahl, Brown & Weed Associates, Incgreen1 sentence2012(In re Longardner & Associates, Inc. (7th Cir. 1988) 855 F.2d 455, 465 [“This notice of the pendency of a hearing to consider confirmation of the plan is sufficient to satisfy due process requirements because the creditor had the opportunity to be heard at that March 7 hearing.”]; Reliable Electric Co. v. Olson Construction Co. (10th Cir. 1984) 726 F.2d 620, 623 [“[N]otwithstanding the language of section 1141, the discharge of a claim without reasonable notice of the confirmation hearing is violative of the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution.”]; In re St. | 1 | 1 |
Lysick v. Walcomgreen2 sentences1999Co. (1984) 157 Cal. App.3d 59, 76 , 203 Cal.Rptr. 524 .) In other words, the attorney represents two clients, the insured and the insurer. ( Lysick v. Walcom (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 136, 146 , 65 Cal.Rptr. 406 .) This trio has been portrayed as a "loose partnership, coalition or alliance directed toward a common goal, sharing a common purpose which lasts during the pendency of the claim or litigation against the insured." ( American Mut. 1999Co. (1984) 157 Cal. App.3d 59, 76 , 203 Cal.Rptr. 524 .) In other words, the attorney represents two clients, the insured and the insurer. ( Lysick v. Walcom (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 136, 146 , 65 Cal.Rptr. 406 .) This trio has been portrayed as a "loose partnership, coalition or alliance directed toward a common goal, sharing a common purpose which lasts during the pendency of the claim or litigation against the insured." ( American Mut. | 1 | 1 |
Young v. Hainesgreen2 sentences1991Sections 364 and 365 were enacted in 1975 as part of MICRA, "an interrelated legislative scheme enacted to deal specifically with all medical malpractice claims." ( Young v. *325 Haines (1986) 41 Cal.3d 883, 894 [ 226 Cal. Rptr. 547 , 718 P.2d 909 ].) Section 356, a non-MICRA provision, was enacted in 1872 (13A West's Ann. 1991Sections 364 and 365 were enacted in 1975 as part of MICRA, "an interrelated legislative scheme enacted to deal specifically with all medical malpractice claims." ( Young v. *325 Haines (1986) 41 Cal.3d 883, 894 [ 226 Cal. Rptr. 547 , 718 P.2d 909 ].) Section 356, a non-MICRA provision, was enacted in 1872 (13A West's Ann. | 1 | 1 |
Eistrat v. Cekadagreen2 sentences1991(Compare, e.g., Cal. Cigarette Concessions v. City of L.A. (1960) 53 Cal.2d 865, 868 [ 3 Cal. Rptr. 675 , 350 P.2d 715 ] [§ 356 held to toll the statute of limitations during the pendency of a claim for refund of municipal business license taxes when the presentation of a claim to the city was a prerequisite to bringing court action]; Eistrat v. Cekada (1958) 50 Cal.2d 289, 291-292 [ 324 P.2d 881 ] [§ 356 held applicable to a restraining order in a bankruptcy proceeding that prevented the plaintiff from commencing an action].) Our conclusion that section 356 does not apply to section 364 is al 1991(Compare, e.g., Cal. Cigarette Concessions v. City of L.A. (1960) 53 Cal.2d 865, 868 [ 3 Cal. Rptr. 675 , 350 P.2d 715 ] [§ 356 held to toll the statute of limitations during the pendency of a claim for refund of municipal business license taxes when the presentation of a claim to the city was a prerequisite to bringing court action]; Eistrat v. Cekada (1958) 50 Cal.2d 289, 291-292 [ 324 P.2d 881 ] [§ 356 held applicable to a restraining order in a bankruptcy proceeding that prevented the plaintiff from commencing an action].) Our conclusion that section 356 does not apply to section 364 is al | 1 | 1 |
California Cigarette Concessions, Inc. v. City of Los Angelesgreen2 sentences1991(Compare, e.g., Cal. Cigarette Concessions v. City of L.A. (1960) 53 Cal.2d 865, 868 [ 3 Cal. Rptr. 675 , 350 P.2d 715 ] [§ 356 held to toll the statute of limitations during the pendency of a claim for refund of municipal business license taxes when the presentation of a claim to the city was a prerequisite to bringing court action]; Eistrat v. Cekada (1958) 50 Cal.2d 289, 291-292 [ 324 P.2d 881 ] [§ 356 held applicable to a restraining order in a bankruptcy proceeding that prevented the plaintiff from commencing an action].) Our conclusion that section 356 does not apply to section 364 is al 1991(Compare, e.g., Cal. Cigarette Concessions v. City of L.A. (1960) 53 Cal.2d 865, 868 [ 3 Cal. Rptr. 675 , 350 P.2d 715 ] [§ 356 held to toll the statute of limitations during the pendency of a claim for refund of municipal business license taxes when the presentation of a claim to the city was a prerequisite to bringing court action]; Eistrat v. Cekada (1958) 50 Cal.2d 289, 291-292 [ 324 P.2d 881 ] [§ 356 held applicable to a restraining order in a bankruptcy proceeding that prevented the plaintiff from commencing an action].) Our conclusion that section 356 does not apply to section 364 is al | 1 | 1 |
People v. Vicki H.green2 sentences1989(In re Vicki H. (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 484, 498-499 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 294 ].) In essence, the determination of competency is a condition precedent to the continuation of further section 602 proceedings. 1989(In re Vicki H. (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 484, 498-499 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 294 ].) In essence, the determination of competency is a condition precedent to the continuation of further section 602 proceedings. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Bonifield v. County of Nevada
green
1 sentence2013In Bonifield v. County of Nevada (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 298, 303-304 , the Third District disagreed and held the running of the limitations period is suspended during the pendency of the claim in federal court and for 30 days after its dismissal. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Thompson v. California Fair Plan Assn.
green
2 sentences2002The court held that the pendency of the claim against HUD did not toll the statute of limitations against Skochko, stating that, “although filing the claim with HUD put the agency on notice of appellant’s intended suit against the government, it did not put respondent on notice of appellant’s intended suit against him.” (Garabedian v. Skochko, supra, 232 Cal.App.3d at p. 848 .) *955 In Thompson v. California Fair Plan Assn. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 760 [ 270 Cal.Rptr. 590 ], the plaintiff sued an insurer and obtained a declaratory judgment reforming a policy to name her as the insured. 2002The court held that the pendency of the claim against HUD did not toll the statute of limitations against Skochko, stating that, “although filing the claim with HUD put the agency on notice of appellant’s intended suit against the government, it did not put respondent on notice of appellant’s intended suit against him.” (Garabedian v. Skochko, supra, 232 Cal.App.3d at p. 848 .) *955 In Thompson v. California Fair Plan Assn. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 760 [ 270 Cal.Rptr. 590 ], the plaintiff sued an insurer and obtained a declaratory judgment reforming a policy to name her as the insured. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Garabedian v. Skochko
green
1 sentence2002The court held that the pendency of the claim against HUD did not toll the statute of limitations against Skochko, stating that, “although filing the claim with HUD put the agency on notice of appellant’s intended suit against the government, it did not put respondent on notice of appellant’s intended suit against him.” (Garabedian v. Skochko, supra, 232 Cal.App.3d at p. 848 .) *955 In Thompson v. California Fair Plan Assn. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 760 [ 270 Cal.Rptr. 590 ], the plaintiff sued an insurer and obtained a declaratory judgment reforming a policy to name her as the insured. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
M & R PROPERTIES v. Thomson
green
2 sentences2002We decline to so declare.” (Ibid.) M & R Properties v. Thomson (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 899 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 579 ], further explored the effects of a tentative ruling in the context of the defendant’s right to dismiss an action for lack of prosecution under the five-year statute. 2002We decline to so declare.” (Ibid.) M & R Properties v. Thomson (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 899 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 579 ], further explored the effects of a tentative ruling in the context of the defendant’s right to dismiss an action for lack of prosecution under the five-year statute. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Purdy v. Pacific Automobile Insurance
green
2 sentences1999Co. (1984) 157 Cal. App.3d 59, 76 , 203 Cal.Rptr. 524 .) In other words, the attorney represents two clients, the insured and the insurer. ( Lysick v. Walcom (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 136, 146 , 65 Cal.Rptr. 406 .) This trio has been portrayed as a "loose partnership, coalition or alliance directed toward a common goal, sharing a common purpose which lasts during the pendency of the claim or litigation against the insured." ( American Mut. 1999Co. (1984) 157 Cal. App.3d 59, 76 , 203 Cal.Rptr. 524 .) In other words, the attorney represents two clients, the insured and the insurer. ( Lysick v. Walcom (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 136, 146 , 65 Cal.Rptr. 406 .) This trio has been portrayed as a "loose partnership, coalition or alliance directed toward a common goal, sharing a common purpose which lasts during the pendency of the claim or litigation against the insured." ( American Mut. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Dowell v. County of Contra Costa
green
2 sentences1991This point seems to have been recognized in Collier v. City of Pasadena (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 917 [ 191 Cal.Rptr. 681 ], in which the court stated, “under ordinary circumstances [a] workers’ compensation claim would not equitably toll a personal injury action against a third party who might also be liable for the injury.” (142 Cal.App.3d at pp. 924-925.) In Dowell v. County of Contra Costa (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 896 [ 219 Cal.Rptr. 341 ], plaintiff contended the statute of limitations on her cause of action against the county was tolled during the pendency of her claim against the State of Cali 1991This point seems to have been recognized in Collier v. City of Pasadena (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 917 [ 191 Cal.Rptr. 681 ], in which the court stated, “under ordinary circumstances [a] workers’ compensation claim would not equitably toll a personal injury action against a third party who might also be liable for the injury.” (142 Cal.App.3d at pp. 924-925.) In Dowell v. County of Contra Costa (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 896 [ 219 Cal.Rptr. 341 ], plaintiff contended the statute of limitations on her cause of action against the county was tolled during the pendency of her claim against the State of Cali | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Collier v. City of Pasadena
green
2 sentences1991This point seems to have been recognized in Collier v. City of Pasadena (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 917 [ 191 Cal.Rptr. 681 ], in which the court stated, “under ordinary circumstances [a] workers’ compensation claim would not equitably toll a personal injury action against a third party who might also be liable for the injury.” (142 Cal.App.3d at pp. 924-925.) In Dowell v. County of Contra Costa (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 896 [ 219 Cal.Rptr. 341 ], plaintiff contended the statute of limitations on her cause of action against the county was tolled during the pendency of her claim against the State of Cali 1991This point seems to have been recognized in Collier v. City of Pasadena (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 917 [ 191 Cal.Rptr. 681 ], in which the court stated, “under ordinary circumstances [a] workers’ compensation claim would not equitably toll a personal injury action against a third party who might also be liable for the injury.” (142 Cal.App.3d at pp. 924-925.) In Dowell v. County of Contra Costa (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 896 [ 219 Cal.Rptr. 341 ], plaintiff contended the statute of limitations on her cause of action against the county was tolled during the pendency of her claim against the State of Cali | 1 | 1991–1991 |
American Home Assurance Company v. Hughes
green
2 sentences1987In American Home Assurance Company v. Hughes (1969) 209 Va. 514 [ 165 S.E.2d 411 ], the policy was quite similar to the one before us. 1987In American Home Assurance Company v. Hughes (1969) 209 Va. 514 [ 165 S.E.2d 411 ], the policy was quite similar to the one before us. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Lemaire v. Continental Casualty Company
neutral
1 sentence1987Plaintiff’s interpretation is inconsistent with the language requiring the regular and personal attendance of a physician.” (Ibid.) In Lemaire v. Continental Casualty Company (La.App. 1973) 284 So.2d 102 , the policy provided in part: “Indemnity provided in this Part is payable only for a period of disability during which the Insured Mortgagor is under the regular care and attendance of a currently licensed physician . . . .” (At p. 103.) The court held that this provision, as well as a provision entitling the insurer to examine the insured as often as it may reasonably require during the pend | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Stacey G., by Her Next Friends, William and Jane G. v. Pasadena Independent School District
green
1 sentence1985Dist. (5th Cir.1983) 695 F.2d 949, 953 .) *792 The consequences of violating the "stay put" requirement are stated in 34 Code of Federal Regulations section 300.403 (1984), as follows: "If a handicapped child has available a free appropriate public education and the parents choose to place the child in a private school or facility, the public agency is not required by this part to pay for the child's education at the private school or facility." (See also 34 C.F.R. § 104.33 (c)(4) (1984), promulgated under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.) Thus, as noted in Newport-Mesa Unified School | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Timothy Tilton, by His Guardian and Next Friend, Mona Richards v. Jefferson County Board of Education
green
2 sentences1985Respondents' contention is based on the "stay put" requirement of the Act, 20 United States Code section 1415 (e)(3), which directs that "[d]uring the pendency of any proceedings conducted pursuant to this section, unless the State or local educational agency and the parents or guardian otherwise agree, the child shall remain in the then current educational placement of such child...." The California "stay put" provision is similar, requiring the student to "remain in his or her present placement" during "the pendency of the hearing proceedings...." (Ed. Code, § 56505, subd. (d).) The purpose 1985(Tilton, by Richards v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ. (6th Cir. 1983) 705 F.2d 800, 804 ; Stacey G. v. Pasadena Independent Sch. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.