20 New York opinions name it 7 courts 1935–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Toomer v. Witsellgreen2 sentences2018The Supreme Court has made clear that "the privileges and immunities clause is not an absolute" ( Toomer v Witsell , 334 US 385, 396 [1948]; see also United Building & Constr. 1986The Supreme Court has long held that the privileges and immunities clause was "intended to create a national economic union.” (Supreme Ct. of N. H. v Piper, 470 US 274, 280 [1985]; Baldwin v Montana Fish & Game Commn., 436 US 371, 386 [1978]; Toomer v Witsell, 334 US 385, 396 [1948].) Cases interpreting that clause have held that it applies to the right of citizens of one State to do business in another State "on terms of substantial equality with the citizens of that State.” (Toomer v Witsell, 334 US, at p 396 .) Thus, the Supreme Court has rejected higher license fees for nonresident fisherm | 2 | 8 |
In re Gordongreen2 sentences1999While the Legislature and the Governor may elect to otherwise recoup revenue lost by virtue of the enactment of chapter 5, they cannot, however, place nonresidents on unequal footing due to the mere fact that they reside outside of New York State. 2 Notably, New York’s Court of Appeals has also found that disparate tax classifications between residents and nonresidents are contrary to New York statute and New York tax policy. 3 (See, Matter of Friedsam v State Tax Commn., 64 NY2d 76, 81 [1984] [“the Commission’s determination supporting a disparate tax classification between resident and nonre 1981The court stated ( 48 NY2d 266, 270-272 , supra): “The principal purpose of the privileges and immunities clause, like the commerce clause, is to eliminate protectionist burdens placed upon individuals engaged in trade or commerce by confining the power of a State to apply its laws exclusively to nonresidents *** In essence, the clause prevents a State from discriminating against nonresidents merely to further its own parochial interests or those of its residents * * * it is settled that a State may not premise an individual’s right to engage in his chosen occupation within its borders solely | 2 | 5 |
Baldwin v. Fish and Game Comm'n of Mont.green2 sentences1986The Supreme Court has long held that the privileges and immunities clause was "intended to create a national economic union.” (Supreme Ct. of N. H. v Piper, 470 US 274, 280 [1985]; Baldwin v Montana Fish & Game Commn., 436 US 371, 386 [1978]; Toomer v Witsell, 334 US 385, 396 [1948].) Cases interpreting that clause have held that it applies to the right of citizens of one State to do business in another State "on terms of substantial equality with the citizens of that State.” (Toomer v Witsell, 334 US, at p 396 .) Thus, the Supreme Court has rejected higher license fees for nonresident fisherm 1979An entirely different question is presented, however, when a State seeks to preserve for the enjoyment of its citizens a "resource” it has created through its own efforts (Tribe, American Constitutional Law, § 6.33 [1979 Supp], pp 38-39; see Baldwin v Montana Fish and Game Comm., 436 US 371 ). | 2 | 2 |
McCready v. Virginiagreen2 sentences1982The privileges and immunities clause of article IV of the United States Constitution provides: “The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.” (US Const, art IV, § 2, cl 1.) Cases interpreting this clause have originated in a panoply of factual situations ranging from statutes prohibiting shrimp fishing by nonresidents in coastal waters {McCready v Virginia, 94 US 391 ) to limiting the performance of abortions in Georgia to residents only {Doe v Bolton, 410 US 179 ). 1979While acknowledging that a State’s ownership of a resource will ordinarily be the dispositive factor in evaluating whether a discriminatory statute passes muster under the privileges and immunities clause (see McCready v Virginia, 94 US 391 ), the Supreme Court nevertheless rejected the enactment at issue in Hicklin , stating: "Alaska has little or no proprietary interest in much of the activity swept within the ambit of Alaska Hire; and the connection of the State’s oil and gas with much of the covered activity is sufficiently attenuated so that it cannot justifiably be the basis for requirin | 1 | 3 |
City of Philadelphia v. New Jerseygreen2 sentences1979The manifest distinction between the two is that the privileges and immunities clause is an affirmative grant of rights to individuals whereas the commerce clause has been read to limit the power of the individual States to restrict the free flow of goods and services across State lines (see Philadelphia v New Jersey, 437 US 617, 621-622 ). . 1979Moreover, the Hughes court was careful to note that the State had not sought to forbid or regulate the interstate flow of hulks, an allusion to the prohibition against the erection of absolute trade barriers between the States (id., at p 806; see, also, Philadelphia v New Jersey, 437 US 617 ). | 1 | 3 |
Doe v. Boltonred2 sentences1982The privileges and immunities clause of article IV of the United States Constitution provides: “The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.” (US Const, art IV, § 2, cl 1.) Cases interpreting this clause have originated in a panoply of factual situations ranging from statutes prohibiting shrimp fishing by nonresidents in coastal waters {McCready v Virginia, 94 US 391 ) to limiting the performance of abortions in Georgia to residents only {Doe v Bolton, 410 US 179 ). 1979In the wake of this decision has come renewed appreciation of the breadth of the protections afforded by the privileges and immunities clause (see, e.g., Doe v Bolton, 410 US 179 [access to medical services cannot be limited to State residents]; Matter of Gordon, 48 NY2d 266 [bar examination residency requirements unconstitutional]). | 1 | 2 |
City of NY v. State of NYgreen1 sentence2018Trades Council of Camden Cty. v Mayor & Council of Camden , 465 US 208, 218 [1984] ["Not all forms of discrimination against citizens of other States are constitutionally suspect"]; City of New York v State of New York , 94 NY2d 577, 593 [2000]). | 1 | 1 |
United Building & Constr. Trades Council of Camden Cty. v. Mayor and Council of Camdengreen1 sentence2018Trades Council of Camden Cty. v Mayor & Council of Camden , 465 US 208, 218 [1984] ["Not all forms of discrimination against citizens of other States are constitutionally suspect"]; City of New York v State of New York , 94 NY2d 577, 593 [2000]). | 1 | 1 |
Friedsam v. State Tax Commissiongreen1 sentence1999While the Legislature and the Governor may elect to otherwise recoup revenue lost by virtue of the enactment of chapter 5, they cannot, however, place nonresidents on unequal footing due to the mere fact that they reside outside of New York State. 2 Notably, New York’s Court of Appeals has also found that disparate tax classifications between residents and nonresidents are contrary to New York statute and New York tax policy. 3 (See, Matter of Friedsam v State Tax Commn., 64 NY2d 76, 81 [1984] [“the Commission’s determination supporting a disparate tax classification between resident and nonre | 1 | 1 |
Brady v. Stategreen1 sentence1999While the Legislature and the Governor may elect to otherwise recoup revenue lost by virtue of the enactment of chapter 5, they cannot, however, place nonresidents on unequal footing due to the mere fact that they reside outside of New York State. 2 Notably, New York’s Court of Appeals has also found that disparate tax classifications between residents and nonresidents are contrary to New York statute and New York tax policy. 3 (See, Matter of Friedsam v State Tax Commn., 64 NY2d 76, 81 [1984] [“the Commission’s determination supporting a disparate tax classification between resident and nonre | 1 | 1 |
Stalland v. South Dakota Board of Bar Examinersgreen1 sentence1986"The privileges and immunities clause clearly extends unique protection to nonresidents who wish to engage in their chosen occupation and earn a livelihood within the state on an equal basis with residents.” (Stalland v South Dakota Bd. of Bar Examiners, 530 F Supp 155, 158 [DSD 1982].) Certainly serving as a managing agent is a "common calling” or "chosen occupation”. | 1 | 1 |
Supreme Court of NH v. Pipergreen2 sentences1986The Supreme Court has long held that the privileges and immunities clause was "intended to create a national economic union.” (Supreme Ct. of N. H. v Piper, 470 US 274, 280 [1985]; Baldwin v Montana Fish & Game Commn., 436 US 371, 386 [1978]; Toomer v Witsell, 334 US 385, 396 [1948].) Cases interpreting that clause have held that it applies to the right of citizens of one State to do business in another State "on terms of substantial equality with the citizens of that State.” (Toomer v Witsell, 334 US, at p 396 .) Thus, the Supreme Court has rejected higher license fees for nonresident fisherm 1986Acting as a managing agent is the type of economic interest protected by cases such as Baldwin v Montana Fish & Game Commn. (supra), Hicklin v Orbeck (supra), Toomer v Witsell (supra) and Supreme Ct. of N. H. v Piper (supra). | 1 | 1 |
| Matter of Strauss v. Hanniggreen | 1 | 1 |
| Wisconsin v. Yodergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| Smith v. Loughmangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Haldeman v. Reading Co.yellow | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hicklin v. Orbeck
green
2 sentences1986(Hicklin v Orbeck, 437 US 518 [1978].) The court has applied the privileges and immunities clause to rights "fundamental” to the national union. 1981In Hicklin v Orbeck (supra, p 525 ), the basic tenet of the privileges and immunities clause was stated to be that: “a resident of one State is constitutionally entitled to travel [from one State] to another State for purposes of employment free from discriminatory restrictions in favor of state residents imposed by the other State.” In determining whether a State accorded “substantial equality of treatment” to citizens of other States, our Court of Appeals in Salla v County of Monroe of State of N.Y. ( 48 NY2d 514, 522 ) summarized the test as twofold, to wit: “When a right protected by secti | 5 | 1978–1986 |
Dunn v. Blumstein
green
2 sentences1982(Elkison v Deliesseline, Fed Case No. 4366; Smith v Turner, 7 How [48 US] 283; Crandall v Nevada, 6 Wall [73 US] 35; Paul v Virginia, 8 Wall [75 US] 168; Ward v Maryland, 12 Wall [79 US] 418; Twining v New Jersey, 211 US 78 ; Edwards v California, 314 US 160 ; Shapiro v Thompson, 394 US 618 ; Dunn v Blumstein, 405 US 330 ; Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v Porter, 480 F Supp 686 .) 1 Thus, the defendant claims that the condition prohibiting the defendant from exercising his right to interstate travel nullifies the South Carolina conviction. 1980Matters which directly implicate its sovereignty, such as voting (Dunn v Blumstein, 405 US 330 ) or entitlement to public office (Chimento v Stark, 414 US 802 ), furnish ready examples of areas in which a State may constitutionally condition eligibility upon residence” (Matter of Gordon, 48 NY2d 266, 271 [emphasis supplied]; see, also, Hendon v Board of Educ., 281 NY 757 ; cf. Matter of Contento v Kohinke, 42 AD2d 1025 ). | 4 | 1979–1982 |
Jamerson v. Lennox
green
2 sentences1980Matters which directly implicate its sovereignty, such as voting ( Dunn v Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 ) or entitlement to public office ( Chimento v Stark, 414 U.S. 802 ), furnish ready examples of areas in which a State may constitutionally condition eligibility upon residence." (Emphasis supplied.) A notary public functions in a manner which directly implicates the sovereignty of the State. 1980Matters which directly implicate its sovereignty, such as voting (Dunn v Blumstein, 405 US 330 ) or entitlement to public office (Chimento v Stark, 414 US 802 ), furnish ready examples of areas in which a State may constitutionally condition eligibility upon residence” (Matter of Gordon, 48 NY2d 266, 271 [emphasis supplied]; see, also, Hendon v Board of Educ., 281 NY 757 ; cf. Matter of Contento v Kohinke, 42 AD2d 1025 ). | 3 | 1979–1980 |
Golden v. Tully
neutral
2 sentences1996Lastly, Goodwin justified the *290 disparity on the basis that deductions for certain personal expenses reflected acceptable State policy to "give aid or encouragement of the character embodied in the tax deductions to its own residents” where the policies were linked to residence, and in such instances the State was not "constitutionally required to extend similar aid or encouragement to the residents of other States.” {Id. at 702.) After Goodwin, the Appellate Division in Matter of Golden v Tully ( 88 AD2d 1058 ) considered a privileges and immunities challenge to New York’s policy of granti 1983Respondent urges that this court’s decision in Matter of Golden v Tully ( 88 AD2d 1058 , affd 58 NY2d 1047 ) should be distinguished because the Court of Appeals affirmance was based upon an “erroneous” admission by the Tax Commission, i.e., “it was admitted that petitioners’ nonresidence in ‘New York State was determinative of the disallowance of said moving expenses.’ No other rationale was then proffered to justify the discrepancy in treating residents and nonresidents” (Matter of Golden v Tully, 58 NY2d 1047, 1049 , supra). | 2 | 1983–1996 |
Twining v. New Jersey
red
2 sentences1982(Elkison v Deliesseline, Fed Case No. 4366; Smith v Turner, 7 How [48 US] 283; Crandall v Nevada, 6 Wall [73 US] 35; Paul v Virginia, 8 Wall [75 US] 168; Ward v Maryland, 12 Wall [79 US] 418; Twining v New Jersey, 211 US 78 ; Edwards v California, 314 US 160 ; Shapiro v Thompson, 394 US 618 ; Dunn v Blumstein, 405 US 330 ; Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v Porter, 480 F Supp 686 .) 1 Thus, the defendant claims that the condition prohibiting the defendant from exercising his right to interstate travel nullifies the South Carolina conviction. 1979As Mr. Justice Douglas pointed out in his concurring opinion in Edwards v California ( 314 US 160, 178 ): "The right to move freely from State to State is an incident of national citizenship protected by the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against state interference.” (See, also, Twining v New Jersey, 211 US 78 ; Crandall v Nevada, 6 Wall [73 US] 35.) Since the United States Supreme Court has held that children are "persons” under our Constitution (Tinker v Des Moines School Dist., 393 US 503, 511 ), they must be afforded their rights under the privileges and immun | 2 | 1979–1982 |
Travis v. Yale & Towne Manufacturing Co.
green
2 sentences1982Co. ( 252 US 60 ), the two landmark United States Supreme Court cases on discriminatory State taxation under the privileges and immunities clause, the majority’s correct determination that petitioners’ moving expenses are not in any way attributable to any New York income-producing source or activity effectively forecloses any constitutional objections to the disallowance of such expenses as a deduction. 1955Co., 252 U. S. 60, 79 ). | 2 | 1955–1982 |
Edwards v. California
green
2 sentences1982(Elkison v Deliesseline, Fed Case No. 4366; Smith v Turner, 7 How [48 US] 283; Crandall v Nevada, 6 Wall [73 US] 35; Paul v Virginia, 8 Wall [75 US] 168; Ward v Maryland, 12 Wall [79 US] 418; Twining v New Jersey, 211 US 78 ; Edwards v California, 314 US 160 ; Shapiro v Thompson, 394 US 618 ; Dunn v Blumstein, 405 US 330 ; Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v Porter, 480 F Supp 686 .) 1 Thus, the defendant claims that the condition prohibiting the defendant from exercising his right to interstate travel nullifies the South Carolina conviction. 1979As Mr. Justice Douglas pointed out in his concurring opinion in Edwards v California ( 314 US 160, 178 ): "The right to move freely from State to State is an incident of national citizenship protected by the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against state interference.” (See, also, Twining v New Jersey, 211 US 78 ; Crandall v Nevada, 6 Wall [73 US] 35.) Since the United States Supreme Court has held that children are "persons” under our Constitution (Tinker v Des Moines School Dist., 393 US 503, 511 ), they must be afforded their rights under the privileges and immun | 2 | 1979–1982 |
Shapiro v. Thompson
green
2 sentences1982(Elkison v Deliesseline, Fed Case No. 4366; Smith v Turner, 7 How [48 US] 283; Crandall v Nevada, 6 Wall [73 US] 35; Paul v Virginia, 8 Wall [75 US] 168; Ward v Maryland, 12 Wall [79 US] 418; Twining v New Jersey, 211 US 78 ; Edwards v California, 314 US 160 ; Shapiro v Thompson, 394 US 618 ; Dunn v Blumstein, 405 US 330 ; Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v Porter, 480 F Supp 686 .) 1 Thus, the defendant claims that the condition prohibiting the defendant from exercising his right to interstate travel nullifies the South Carolina conviction. 1979Accordingly, I would reject the contentions advanced by the plaintiffs in this case and reverse the order of the Appellate Division which struck down the statute as unconstitutional. 1 I note at the outset that we are not here faced with a challenge to the durational aspects of the residency requirement contained in section 222 of the Labor Law (compare Shapiro v Thompson, 394 US 618 , with Sosna v Iowa, 419 US 393 ; Memorial Hosp. v Maricopa County, 415 US 250 ; and Vlandis v Klein, 412 US 441 ). 2 Nor have we been asked to consider the propriety of a purely regulatory measure calculated to p | 2 | 1979–1982 |
Goodwin v. State Tax Commission
green
2 sentences1982As in Matter of Goodwin v State Tax Comm. ( 286 App Div 694, 701 , affd 1 NY2d 680 , app dsmd 352 US 805 ), the constitutional issue in this case arises from the fact that New York State allows certain deductions by its residents but does not allow the same deductions by nonresidents. 1971The court in Matter of Goodwin v. State Tax Comm. ( 286 App. Div. 694, 700-701 ) stated: “‘Like many other constitutional provisions, the privileges and immunities clause (art. | 2 | 1971–1982 |
Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers, Inc. v. Mayor of Boston
green
1 sentence1983In such circumstances it may be more difficult to find a violation of the privileges and immunities clause because the discrimination adversely affects citizens of the Commonwealth as well." ( Ibid .) It should be noted that the Massachusetts court also based its decision in the case upon the Commerce Clause ( ibid.; Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers v Mayor of Boston, 425 N.E.2d 346 [1981]). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Maser v. County of Onondaga
neutral
2 sentences1983Respondent urges that this court’s decision in Matter of Golden v Tully ( 88 AD2d 1058 , affd 58 NY2d 1047 ) should be distinguished because the Court of Appeals affirmance was based upon an “erroneous” admission by the Tax Commission, i.e., “it was admitted that petitioners’ nonresidence in ‘New York State was determinative of the disallowance of said moving expenses.’ No other rationale was then proffered to justify the discrepancy in treating residents and nonresidents” (Matter of Golden v Tully, 58 NY2d 1047, 1049 , supra). 1983Respondent urges that this court’s decision in Matter of Golden v Tully ( 88 AD2d 1058 , affd 58 NY2d 1047 ) should be distinguished because the Court of Appeals affirmance was based upon an “erroneous” admission by the Tax Commission, i.e., “it was admitted that petitioners’ nonresidence in ‘New York State was determinative of the disallowance of said moving expenses.’ No other rationale was then proffered to justify the discrepancy in treating residents and nonresidents” (Matter of Golden v Tully, 58 NY2d 1047, 1049 , supra). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Pennsylvania v. Porter
green
1 sentence1982(Elkison v Deliesseline, Fed Case No. 4366; Smith v Turner, 7 How [48 US] 283; Crandall v Nevada, 6 Wall [73 US] 35; Paul v Virginia, 8 Wall [75 US] 168; Ward v Maryland, 12 Wall [79 US] 418; Twining v New Jersey, 211 US 78 ; Edwards v California, 314 US 160 ; Shapiro v Thompson, 394 US 618 ; Dunn v Blumstein, 405 US 330 ; Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v Porter, 480 F Supp 686 .) 1 Thus, the defendant claims that the condition prohibiting the defendant from exercising his right to interstate travel nullifies the South Carolina conviction. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Goodwin v. State Tax Commission
green
1 sentence1982As in Matter of Goodwin v State Tax Comm. ( 286 App Div 694, 701 , affd 1 NY2d 680 , app dsmd 352 US 805 ), the constitutional issue in this case arises from the fact that New York State allows certain deductions by its residents but does not allow the same deductions by nonresidents. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Goodwin v. State Tax Commission
green
1 sentence1982As in Matter of Goodwin v State Tax Comm. ( 286 App Div 694, 701 , affd 1 NY2d 680 , app dsmd 352 US 805 ), the constitutional issue in this case arises from the fact that New York State allows certain deductions by its residents but does not allow the same deductions by nonresidents. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
In re the Application of Tang
green
1 sentence1981It did not pass on the question of whether such requirement violates the due process and equal protection clauses, noting (supra, p 270, n 6) that challenges on such grounds had been rejected in Matter of Tang, (supra) and in other cases. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Salla v. County of Monroe
green
1 sentence1981In Hicklin v Orbeck (supra, p 525 ), the basic tenet of the privileges and immunities clause was stated to be that: “a resident of one State is constitutionally entitled to travel [from one State] to another State for purposes of employment free from discriminatory restrictions in favor of state residents imposed by the other State.” In determining whether a State accorded “substantial equality of treatment” to citizens of other States, our Court of Appeals in Salla v County of Monroe of State of N.Y. ( 48 NY2d 514, 522 ) summarized the test as twofold, to wit: “When a right protected by secti | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Contento v. Kohinke
green
1 sentence1980Matters which directly implicate its sovereignty, such as voting (Dunn v Blumstein, 405 US 330 ) or entitlement to public office (Chimento v Stark, 414 US 802 ), furnish ready examples of areas in which a State may constitutionally condition eligibility upon residence” (Matter of Gordon, 48 NY2d 266, 271 [emphasis supplied]; see, also, Hendon v Board of Educ., 281 NY 757 ; cf. Matter of Contento v Kohinke, 42 AD2d 1025 ). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
De Hond v. Nyquist
green
1 sentence1980The court is of the opinion that such a relationship does exist.” (Matter of De Hond v Nyquist, 65 Misc 2d 526, 528-529 .) Recently, the Court of Appeals in discussing the residency requirements embodied in CPLR 9406 (subd 2) for admission to the New York State Bar, declared: "it is settled that a State may not premise an individual’s right to engage in his chosen occupation within its borders solely on residence * * * This is not to say, of course, that the privileges and immunities clause forbids a State from ever differentiating between residents and nonresidents. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Blake v. McClung green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Salla v. County of Monroe neutral | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc. green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Mullaney v. Anderson green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Lemmon v. . People. green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp. green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Vlandis v. Kline green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Sosna v. Iowa green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Bates v. State Bar of Arizona green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Adamson v. California green | 1 | 1957–1957 |
| Slochower v. Board of Higher Ed. of New York City green | 1 | 1957–1957 |
| General American Tank Car Corp. v. Day green | 1 | 1955–1955 |
| Hess v. Pawloski green | 1 | 1945–1945 |
| Hemphill v. Orloff green | 1 | 1935–1935 |
| Hemphill v. Orloff green | 1 | 1935–1935 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.