privileges and immunities clause in California

1977Plaintiff attempts to bring into play the equal protection clause, commerce clause, and the privileges and immunities clause of the United States Constitution and the so-called constitutional "right to travel". (3) These constitutional provisions and rights apply only to state action, or to acts by individuals abridging rights pursuant to specific state laws so that to a significant extent the state has become involved as a governmental entity. (16 Am.Jur.2d, Constitutional Law, § 491, pp. 854-857 (equal protection); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Ware (1973) 414 U.S. 117, 123-125 [

1977Plaintiff attempts to bring into play the equal protection clause, commerce clause, and the privileges and immunities clause of the United States Constitution and the so-called constitutional "right to travel". (3) These constitutional provisions and rights apply only to state action, or to acts by individuals abridging rights pursuant to specific state laws so that to a significant extent the state has become involved as a governmental entity. (16 Am.Jur.2d, Constitutional Law, § 491, pp. 854-857 (equal protection); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Ware (1973) 414 U.S. 117, 123-125 [

2009IV, § 2.) As plaintiffs correctly observe, the privileges and immunities clause “bar[s] discrimination against citizens of other States where there is no substantial reason for the discrimination beyond the mere fact that they are citizens of other States.” (Toomer v. Witsell (1948) 334 U.S. 385, 396 [ 92 L.Ed. 1460 , 68 S.Ct. 1156 ] (Toomer).) Plaintiffs contend that section 8279.1 violates the privileges and immunities clause because it impermissibly discriminates against nonresidents of California.

2009IV, § 2.) As plaintiffs correctly observe, the privileges and immunities clause “bar[s] discrimination against citizens of other States where there is no substantial reason for the discrimination beyond the mere fact that they are citizens of other States.” (Toomer v. Witsell (1948) 334 U.S. 385, 396 [ 92 L.Ed. 1460 , 68 S.Ct. 1156 ] (Toomer).) Plaintiffs contend that section 8279.1 violates the privileges and immunities clause because it impermissibly discriminates against nonresidents of California.

2010Section 1621(c) defines “ ‘[s]tate or local public benefit.’ ” 4 Plaintiffs do not rely on the privileges and immunities clause of article IV, section 2, clause 1 of the United States Constitution, which provides, “The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states.” (See Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper (1985) 470 U.S. 274 [ 84 L.Ed.2d 205 , 105 S.Ct. 1272 ]; Baldwin v. Montana Fish and Game Comm’n (1978) 436 U.S. 371 [ 56 L.Ed.2d 354 , 98 S.Ct. 1852 ].)

2010Section 1621(c) defines “ ‘[s]tate or local public benefit.’ ” 4 Plaintiffs do not rely on the privileges and immunities clause of article IV, section 2, clause 1 of the United States Constitution, which provides, “The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states.” (See Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper (1985) 470 U.S. 274 [ 84 L.Ed.2d 205 , 105 S.Ct. 1272 ]; Baldwin v. Montana Fish and Game Comm’n (1978) 436 U.S. 371 [ 56 L.Ed.2d 354 , 98 S.Ct. 1852 ].)

1995In Paul v. Virginia (1868) 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 [ 19 L.Ed. 357 ], the court rejected a challenge predicated on the privileges and immunities clause made by a corporation to a tax imposed by the State of Virginia on out-of-state insurance companies.

1995In Paul v. Virginia (1868) 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 [ 19 L.Ed. 357 ], the court rejected a challenge predicated on the privileges and immunities clause made by a corporation to a tax imposed by the State of Virginia on out-of-state insurance companies.

2024The privileges and immunities clause “does not preclude disparity in treatment where substantial reasons exist for the discrimination and the degree of discrimination bears a close relation to such reasons.” (Supreme Court of Va. v. Friedman (1988) 487 U.S. 59, 67 .) As we have explained, the Legislature sought to pare down the sex offender registry in California so that it would be more useful to law enforcement and the public, and to give a chance for termination to low-risk offenders who had successfully registered for years.

2006As Parker argues, the privileges and immunities clause prohibits “discrimination against citizens of other States where there is no substantial reason for the discrimination beyond the mere fact that they are citizens of other States.” (Toomer v. Witsell, supra, 334 U.S. at p. 396 , italics added.) But “disparity of treatment” is permitted “where there are perfectly valid independent reasons for it,” and “there is something to indicate that non-citizens constitute a peculiar source of the evil at which the statute is aimed.” (Id., at pp. 396, 398.) Moreover, equal treatment of residents and no

2010(See, e.g., Slaughter-House Cases (1872) 83 U.S. 36 [ 21 L.Ed. 394 ].) Plaintiffs note, correctly, that unlike some other constitutional provisions, the privileges and immunities clause applies only to citizens.

2010(See, e.g., Slaughter-House Cases (1872) 83 U.S. 36 [ 21 L.Ed. 394 ].) Plaintiffs note, correctly, that unlike some other constitutional provisions, the privileges and immunities clause applies only to citizens.

1977Plaintiff attempts to bring into play the equal protection clause, commerce clause, and the privileges and immunities clause of the United States Constitution and the so-called constitutional "right to travel". (3) These constitutional provisions and rights apply only to state action, or to acts by individuals abridging rights pursuant to specific state laws so that to a significant extent the state has become involved as a governmental entity. (16 Am.Jur.2d, Constitutional Law, § 491, pp. 854-857 (equal protection); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Ware (1973) 414 U.S. 117, 123-125 [

1977Plaintiff attempts to bring into play the equal protection clause, commerce clause, and the privileges and immunities clause of the United States Constitution and the so-called constitutional "right to travel". (3) These constitutional provisions and rights apply only to state action, or to acts by individuals abridging rights pursuant to specific state laws so that to a significant extent the state has become involved as a governmental entity. (16 Am.Jur.2d, Constitutional Law, § 491, pp. 854-857 (equal protection); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Ware (1973) 414 U.S. 117, 123-125 [

1989Therefore, any incidental burden on an out-of-state motorist’s right to drive a noncomplying vehicle in this state does not violate any constitutional rights under the privileges and immunities clause (Cf. Edwards v. California (1941) 314 U.S. 160, 169 [ 86 L.Ed. 119 , 62 S.Ct. 164 ] (conc. opn. of Douglas, J.).) 2.-5. * The judgment is affirmed.

1989Therefore, any incidental burden on an out-of-state motorist’s right to drive a noncomplying vehicle in this state does not violate any constitutional rights under the privileges and immunities clause (Cf. Edwards v. California (1941) 314 U.S. 160, 169 [ 86 L.Ed. 119 , 62 S.Ct. 164 ] (conc. opn. of Douglas, J.).) 2.-5. * The judgment is affirmed.

1989That clause protects only those rights incident to national citizenship; it does not protect rights that depend solely on state law. ( Addison v. Addison (1965) 62 Cal.2d 558, 568 [ 43 Cal. Rptr. 97 , 399 P.2d 897 , 14 A.L.R.3d 391 ]; Slaughter-House Cases (1872) 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 74-80 [ 21 L Ed 394, 408-410 ].) The right to a three-member hearing panel is a creature of state law.

1989That clause protects only those rights incident to national citizenship; it does not protect rights that depend solely on state law. ( Addison v. Addison (1965) 62 Cal.2d 558, 568 [ 43 Cal. Rptr. 97 , 399 P.2d 897 , 14 A.L.R.3d 391 ]; Slaughter-House Cases (1872) 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 74-80 [ 21 L Ed 394, 408-410 ].) The right to a three-member hearing panel is a creature of state law.

2010Section 1621(c) defines “ ‘[s]tate or local public benefit.’ ” 4 Plaintiffs do not rely on the privileges and immunities clause of article IV, section 2, clause 1 of the United States Constitution, which provides, “The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states.” (See Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper (1985) 470 U.S. 274 [ 84 L.Ed.2d 205 , 105 S.Ct. 1272 ]; Baldwin v. Montana Fish and Game Comm’n (1978) 436 U.S. 371 [ 56 L.Ed.2d 354 , 98 S.Ct. 1852 ].)

2010Section 1621(c) defines “ ‘[s]tate or local public benefit.’ ” 4 Plaintiffs do not rely on the privileges and immunities clause of article IV, section 2, clause 1 of the United States Constitution, which provides, “The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states.” (See Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper (1985) 470 U.S. 274 [ 84 L.Ed.2d 205 , 105 S.Ct. 1272 ]; Baldwin v. Montana Fish and Game Comm’n (1978) 436 U.S. 371 [ 56 L.Ed.2d 354 , 98 S.Ct. 1852 ].)

2006Saenz emphasizes that the protections provided by the privileges and immunities clause for nonresidents while in another state are not absolute. ( Saenz, supra, 526 U.S. at pp. 501-502.) Disparate treatment of nonresidents who are in the state temporarily is permissible if there is a “ ‘substantial reason’ ” for the disparate treatment “ ‘. . . beyond the mere fact that they are citizens of other States.’ ” ( 526 U.S. at p. 502 , citing Toomer v. Witsell, supra, 334 U.S. at p. 396 .) Indisputably, the instant case is not a first or third component case because Parker is not a resident of Calif

2001The travel right is not absolute. ( Saenz v. Roe, supra, 526 U.S. at p. 500 , 119 S.Ct. 1518 ; Toomer v. Witsell, supra, 334 U.S. at p. 396 , 68 S.Ct. 1156 .) A state may defeat a Privileges and Immunities Clause claim by showing "a substantial reason" for the discriminatory treatment of the person who has left or entered its boundaries. ( Toomer v. Witsell, supra, 334 U.S. at p. 396 , 68 S.Ct. 1156 ; United Building & Constr.

2003(Attorney General of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez (1986) 476 U.S. 898, 901-903 [ 90 L.Ed.2d 899 , 106 S.Ct. 2317 ]; Tobe v. City of Santa Ana (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1069, 1096-1097, 1100 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 402 , 892 P.2d 1145 ].) At least in its earliest derivation (the privileges and immunities clause), the United States Supreme Court unequivocally declared that it did not extend to a corporation, which consequently was not entitled to engage in unlicensed out-of-state business.

2003(Attorney General of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez (1986) 476 U.S. 898, 901-903 [ 90 L.Ed.2d 899 , 106 S.Ct. 2317 ]; Tobe v. City of Santa Ana (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1069, 1096-1097, 1100 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 402 , 892 P.2d 1145 ].) At least in its earliest derivation (the privileges and immunities clause), the United States Supreme Court unequivocally declared that it did not extend to a corporation, which consequently was not entitled to engage in unlicensed out-of-state business.

2024(U.S. Const., art IV, § 2, cl. 1.) This clause was designed to place “ ‘ “the citizens of each State upon the same footing with citizens of other States, so far as the advantages resulting from citizenship in those States are concerned.” ’ ” (McBurney v. Young (2013) 569 U.S. 221, 226 (McBurney).) But this does not mean “that ‘state citizenship or residency may never be used by a State to distinguish among persons.’ ” (Ibid.) “ ‘Nor must a State 13 always apply all its laws or all its services equally to anyone, resident or nonresident, who may request it so to do.’ ” (Ibid.) Rather, the high

2024(McBurney, supra, 569 U.S. at p. 231 .) But section 290.5 does not deny citizens of other states “ ‘reasonable and adequate’ ” access to California courts.

2011(E.g., In re Luis F. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 176, 183 [ 99 Cal.Rptr.3d 174 ] [probation condition requiring use of prescribed medication infringed 14th Amend, liberty interest].) Indeed the federal constitutional right to travel asserted here has been variously attributed to the privileges and immunities clause and the . liberty protection of the Fourteenth Amendment. ( Tobe, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 1096-1098.) The state right to intrastate travel is attributed to the correlative provisions of the California Constitution, article I, sections 7 and 24.

2011(E.g., In re Luis F. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 176, 183 [ 99 Cal.Rptr.3d 174 ] [probation condition requiring use of prescribed medication infringed 14th Amend, liberty interest].) Indeed the federal constitutional right to travel asserted here has been variously attributed to the privileges and immunities clause and the . liberty protection of the Fourteenth Amendment. ( Tobe, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 1096-1098.) The state right to intrastate travel is attributed to the correlative provisions of the California Constitution, article I, sections 7 and 24.

2003(Attorney General of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez (1986) 476 U.S. 898, 901-903 [ 90 L.Ed.2d 899 , 106 S.Ct. 2317 ]; Tobe v. City of Santa Ana (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1069, 1096-1097, 1100 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 402 , 892 P.2d 1145 ].) At least in its earliest derivation (the privileges and immunities clause), the United States Supreme Court unequivocally declared that it did not extend to a corporation, which consequently was not entitled to engage in unlicensed out-of-state business.

2003(Attorney General of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez (1986) 476 U.S. 898, 901-903 [ 90 L.Ed.2d 899 , 106 S.Ct. 2317 ]; Tobe v. City of Santa Ana (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1069, 1096-1097, 1100 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 402 , 892 P.2d 1145 ].) At least in its earliest derivation (the privileges and immunities clause), the United States Supreme Court unequivocally declared that it did not extend to a corporation, which consequently was not entitled to engage in unlicensed out-of-state business.

2001But we mention this latter claim only to reject it as without merit, since clearly a tax upon income is not an interference with interstate commerce simply because the income is derived from a source within another state; and moreover, if there be any tendency to interfere with such commerce it is purely collateral and incidental. [Citations.]” (Ibid., fn. 2 [ 56 S.Ct. at p. 254 ].) The court went on to uphold the dividends provision, but invalidate the interest provision (id. at p. *885 436 [56 S.Ct. at pp. 261-262]); it later overruled Colgate insofar as it had found therein a violation of t

2001But we mention this latter claim only to reject it as without merit, since clearly a tax upon income is not an interference with interstate commerce simply because the income is derived from a source within another state; and moreover, if there be any tendency to interfere with such commerce it is purely collateral and incidental. [Citations.]” (Ibid., fn. 2 [ 56 S.Ct. at p. 254 ].) The court went on to uphold the dividends provision, but invalidate the interest provision (id. at p. *885 436 [56 S.Ct. at pp. 261-262]); it later overruled Colgate insofar as it had found therein a violation of t

2001Trades v. Mayor (1984) 465 U.S. 208, 222 [ 104 S.Ct. 1020, 1029-1030 , 79 L.Ed.2d 249 ].) Further, in Saenz , while discussing the privileges and immunities clause aspect of the travel right, the United States Supreme Court cited as an example of allowable discrimination the discussion in Vlandis v. Kline, supra, 412 U.S. at page 445 [93 S.Ct. at pages 2232-2233] where it was unquestioned that the State of Connecticut had a right to impose higher college tuition on nonresident students.

2001Trades v. Mayor, supra, 465 U.S. at p. 222 , 104 S.Ct. 1020 .) Further, states have "considerable leeway" in determining whether local problems require legislative action. ( Lunding v. New York Tax Appeals Tribunal (1998) 522 U.S. 287, 298 , 118 S.Ct. 766 , 139 L.Ed.2d 717 ; Toomer v. Witsell, supra, 334 U.S. at p. 396 , 68 S.Ct. 1156 .) Moreover, in the higher education context, states may engage in reasonably based discriminatory conduct utilizing residence as a cost or funding factor. ( Saenz v. Roe, supra, 526 U.S. at p. 500 , 119 S.Ct. 1518 [Privileges and Immunities Clause and travel rig

2001Trades v. Mayor (1984) 465 U.S. 208, 222 [ 104 S.Ct. 1020, 1029-1030 , 79 L.Ed.2d 249 ].) Further, in Saenz , while discussing the privileges and immunities clause aspect of the travel right, the United States Supreme Court cited as an example of allowable discrimination the discussion in Vlandis v. Kline, supra, 412 U.S. at page 445 [93 S.Ct. at pages 2232-2233] where it was unquestioned that the State of Connecticut had a right to impose higher college tuition on nonresident students.

2001Trades v. Mayor (1984) 465 U.S. 208, 222 [ 104 S.Ct. 1020, 1029-1030 , 79 L.Ed.2d 249 ].) Further, in Saenz , while discussing the privileges and immunities clause aspect of the travel right, the United States Supreme Court cited as an example of allowable discrimination the discussion in Vlandis v. Kline, supra, 412 U.S. at page 445 [93 S.Ct. at pages 2232-2233] where it was unquestioned that the State of Connecticut had a right to impose higher college tuition on nonresident students.