privileges and immunities clause in Massachusetts

14 Massachusetts opinions name it 2 courts 1946–2009 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (18)

Case	Followed	Cited
Hicklin v. Orbeckgreen scotus · 1978 · cited in 4 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 1981–2007 2 sentences 2007Privileges and Immunities Clause Article IV, §2, cl. 1 of the United States Constitution provides that “[t]he Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of Citizens in the several States.” The privileges and immunities clause “ ‘establishes a norm of comity,’ . . . that is to prevail among the states with respect to their treatment of each other’s residents.” Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 523-24 (1978); Matter of Jadd, 391 Mass. 227, 228 (1984). 1984The Board of Bar Examiners *228 may, in its discretion, excuse the applicant from taking the regular law examination on the applicant’s compliance with the following conditions: “6.1.1 The applicant’s principal residence is in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.” 2 We shall not discuss his claim based on the commerce clause in part because his rights probably would be no greater under the commerce clause than under the privileges and immunities clause, given “their common origin in the Fourth Article of the Articles of Confederation and their shared vision of federalism.” Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437	3	4
Zobel v. Williamsgreen scotus · 1982 · cited in 2 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 1985–2009 2 sentences 2009That right, although not explicitly enumerated, see Shapiro v. Thompson, supra at 630 & n.8, may be grounded in the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 , 501-503 & n.15 (1999); the commerce clause, see Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 172-174 (1941); or the original Articles of Confederation, see Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 79-81 (1982) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 1985That motion was denied, and since the Commissioner no longer argues the point, we do not address it. 6 If the right to travel is founded instead on the privileges and immunities clause of Article IV of the United States Constitution (see Zobel v. Williams, *530 457 U.S. 55, 71-81 [1982] [O’Connor, J., concurring]), the plaintiffs’ challenge to the statute is without foundation, since new and old residents of the State are treated without distinction.	2	2
Baldwin v. Fish and Game Comm'n of Mont.green scotus · 1978 · cited in 2 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 2006–2007 2 sentences 2007“Only with respect to those ‘privileges’ and ‘immunities’ bearing upon the vitality of the Nation as a single entity must the State treat all citizens, resident and nonresident, equally.” Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm’n of Mont., 436 U.S. 371, 383 (1978) (these rights are referred to as “fundamental” under the clause); Jadd, 391 Mass. at 228 . 2007See Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 383 (“[A] State [need not] always apply all its laws or all its services equally to anyone, resident or nonresident, who may request it so to do”).	2	2
In the Matter of Jaddgreen mass · 1984 · cited in 2 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 1992–2007 2 sentences 2007Privileges and Immunities Clause Article IV, §2, cl. 1 of the United States Constitution provides that “[t]he Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of Citizens in the several States.” The privileges and immunities clause “ ‘establishes a norm of comity,’ . . . that is to prevail among the states with respect to their treatment of each other’s residents.” Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 523-24 (1978); Matter of Jadd, 391 Mass. 227, 228 (1984). 1992Compare Matter of Jadd, 391 Mass. 227, 230 (1984) (practice of law is a fundamental right for purposes of analysis under the privileges and immunities clause). 5 The full text of S.J.C.	2	2
Toomer v. Witsellgreen scotus · 1948 · cited in 2 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 1984–2006 2 sentences 2006However, like several other constitutional provisions, the privileges and immunities clause is not absolute in the protections that it affords citizens, see Toomer v. Witsell, supra at 396 , and a State need not extend to a visitor all of the same rights accorded to a resident. 1984Where the right is fundamental, the privileges and immunities clause bars discrimination against nonresidents “where there is no substantial reason for the discrimination beyond the mere fact that they are citizens of other States.” Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948).	2	2
Haguer v. Committee for Industrial Organizationgreen scotus · 1939 · cited in 2 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 1946–1975 2 sentences 1975It is because that clause does not apply to corporations, Arizona Commercial Mining Co. v. Iron Cap Copper Co. 236 Mass. 185, 194 (1920); Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U. S. 496, 514 (1939); Asbury Hosp. v. Cass County, 326 U. S. 207, 210-211 (1945), that the equal protection clause, which does so apply, Louis K. 1946The liberty of the press is enjoyed, not only by individuals, but also by associations of individuals such as labor unions (Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U. S. 496 ), and even by corporations, although a corporation is not a “citizen" and must find its protection against abridgment of its liberty by State action in the due process clause rather than the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.	1	2
Hutchins v. District of Columbiagreen cadc · 1998 · cited in 1 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009 1 sentence 2009See also Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 536-537 (D.C.	1	1
Edwards v. Californiagreen scotus · 1941 · cited in 1 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009 1 sentence 2009That right, although not explicitly enumerated, see Shapiro v. Thompson, supra at 630 & n.8, may be grounded in the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 , 501-503 & n.15 (1999); the commerce clause, see Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 172-174 (1941); or the original Articles of Confederation, see Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 79-81 (1982) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).	1	1
Opinion of the Justices to the Senategreen mass · 1984 · cited in 1 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006 1 sentence 2006“The [privileges and immunities] clause was intended to fuse a collection of independent States into one nation and was designed to ensure that a citizen of one State who ventures into another State is accorded the same privileges enjoyed by the citizens of that State.” Opinion of the Justices, 393 Mass. 1201, 1202 (1984).	1	1
Shapiro v. Thompsongreen scotus · 1969 · cited in 1 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 1999–1999 1 sentence 1999The United States Supreme Court has recognized that all citizens have the right “to travel throughout the . . . land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations that unreasonably burden or restrict this movement.” Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-630 (1968).	1	1
Sosna v. Iowagreen scotus · 1975 · cited in 1 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 1985–1985 2 sentences 1985Id. at 76 . 7 But see Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 , 406-407 (1975), where the Supreme Court did not invoke the penalty analysis to uphold a one-year residency requirement for access to a State’s divorce courts, but instead applied “what appears to be an ad hoc balancing test.” Id. at 419 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 8 See, e.g., U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1984, 493 & 746 (104th ed. 1983) (prices of one-family houses in northeastern United States rose by approximately 20% more than the consumer price index from 1970 to 1981). 9 The plaintiffs argue that 1985Id. at 76 . 7 But see Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 , 406-407 (1975), where the Supreme Court did not invoke the penalty analysis to uphold a one-year residency requirement for access to a State’s divorce courts, but instead applied “what appears to be an ad hoc balancing test.” Id. at 419 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 8 See, e.g., U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1984, 493 & 746 (104th ed. 1983) (prices of one-family houses in northeastern United States rose by approximately 20% more than the consumer price index from 1970 to 1981). 9 The plaintiffs argue that	1	1
Canfield v. Wisconsin Board of Attorneys Professional Competencegreen wiwd · 1980 · cited in 1 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 1984–1984 1 sentence 1984Canfield v. Wisconsin Bd. of Attorneys Professional Competence, 490 F. Supp. 1286, 1290-1291 (W.D.	1	1
Reeves, Inc. v. Stakegreen scotus · 1980 · cited in 1 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 1981–1981 2 sentences 1981See Reeves, Inc. v. 477 Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976). 1. 1981The Commonwealth would thus turn to Hughes, supra, and Reeves, supra, in determining the extent to which a State, acting as a purchaser of goods and services, is exempt from the restrictions of the privileges and immunities clause. 18 The Commonwealth is correct that the commerce clause does not prevent a State from preferring resident business in purchasing goods, see Hughes, supra at 810 , or services, American Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 339 F. Supp. 719 , 723 478 (M.D.	1	1
Pierce v. Society of Sistersgreen · 1925 · cited in 1 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 1977–1977 1 sentence 1977A corporation, we have held, is not a ‘citizen’ within *784 the meaning of the privileges and immunities clause. [Citation omitted.] But a corporation is a ‘person’ within the meaning of the equal protection and due process of law clauses, which are the clauses involved here.” The Supreme Court had previously indicated in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925), that “[a]ppellees are corporations and therefore, it is said, they cannot claim for themselves the liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees.	1	1
Arizona Commercial Mining Co. v. Iron Cap Copper Co.green mass · 1920 · cited in 1 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 1975–1975 1 sentence 1975It is because that clause does not apply to corporations, Arizona Commercial Mining Co. v. Iron Cap Copper Co. 236 Mass. 185, 194 (1920); Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U. S. 496, 514 (1939); Asbury Hosp. v. Cass County, 326 U. S. 207, 210-211 (1945), that the equal protection clause, which does so apply, Louis K.	1	1
Asbury Hospital v. Cass Countygreen scotus · 1945 · cited in 1 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 1975–1975 1 sentence 1975It is because that clause does not apply to corporations, Arizona Commercial Mining Co. v. Iron Cap Copper Co. 236 Mass. 185, 194 (1920); Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U. S. 496, 514 (1939); Asbury Hosp. v. Cass County, 326 U. S. 207, 210-211 (1945), that the equal protection clause, which does so apply, Louis K.	1	1
Orient Insurance v. Daggsgreen scotus · 1899 · cited in 1 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 1972–1972 2 sentences 1972Co. v. Daggs, 172 U. S. 557, 561 (see Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 177 U. S. 28, 45 ; Hemphill v. Orloff, 277 U. S. 537 ), they are “persons” within the meaning of the due process clause of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 1972Co. v. Daggs, 172 U.S. 557, 561 (see Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 177 U.S. 28, 45 ; Hemphill v. Orloff, 277 U.S. 537 ), they are "persons" within the meaning of the due process clause of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.	1	1
Grosjean v. American Press Co.green scotus · 1936 · cited in 1 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 1946–1946 1 sentence 1946Grosjean v. American Press Co. Inc. 297 U. S. 233, 243, 244 .	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (11)

Case	Cited	Years
Saenz v. Roe green scotus · 1999 2 sentences 2009That right, although not explicitly enumerated, see Shapiro v. Thompson, supra at 630 & n.8, may be grounded in the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 , 501-503 & n.15 (1999); the commerce clause, see Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 172-174 (1941); or the original Articles of Confederation, see Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 79-81 (1982) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 2005The second component, however, is “expressly protected” in the privileges and immunities clause of Article IV of the United States Constitution, which states that “The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.” Id., quoting Article IV, § 2, of the United States Constitution.	2	2005–2009
Cote-Whitacre v. Department of Public Health green mass · 2006 2 sentences 2007Therefore, “like several other constitutional provisions, the privileges and immunities clause is not absolute in the protections that it affords citizens and a State need not extend to a visitor all of the same rights accorded to a resident.” Cote-Whiteacre, 446 Mass. at 379 . 2007“The plain language of the privileges and immunities clause does not specify those privileges and immunities as to which equality of treatment is required.” Cote-Whiteacre, 446 Mass. at 380 .	1	2007–2007
Leis v. Flynt green scotus · 1979 2 sentences 1984Jacoby & Meyers v. Supreme Court, 459 U.S. 962 (1982), that “nothing suggests [that the Supreme Court] would now” declare the practice of law to be a fundamental privilege under the privileges and immunities clause seems of doubtful merit, particularly as that view relies on Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438 (1979) (per curiam opinion), which, on due process grounds, dealt with the question of the admission of an attorney, pro hac vice, to handle a particular case. 1984In determining that out-of-State attorneys had no right protected by the due process clause to appear in a particular court proceeding, the Supreme Court stated in Leis v. Flynt, supra at 442: “Since the founding of the Republic, the licensing and regulation of lawyers has been left exclusively to the States and the District of Columbia within their respective jurisdictions.	1	1984–1984
Jacoby v. Supreme Court of New Jersey green scotus · 1982 1 sentence 1984Jacoby & Meyers v. Supreme Court, 459 U.S. 962 (1982), that “nothing suggests [that the Supreme Court] would now” declare the practice of law to be a fundamental privilege under the privileges and immunities clause seems of doubtful merit, particularly as that view relies on Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438 (1979) (per curiam opinion), which, on due process grounds, dealt with the question of the admission of an attorney, pro hac vice, to handle a particular case.	1	1984–1984
In re Gordon green ny · 1979 2 sentences 1984In Matter of Gordon, 48 N.Y.2d 266 (1979), the Court of Appeals of New York struck down, on privileges and immunities grounds, requirements that an applicant for admission to the bar by examination have been (1) a New York resident for the six months immediately preceding submission of his application for admission to practice, and (2) a New York resident at the time of his admission. 7 The New York court’s broad reasoning in condemnation of its residency requirements reaches any residency requirement for bar admission, including admission on motion. 8 Id. at 272-273 . 1984In Matter of Gordon, 48 N.Y.2d 266 (1979), the Court of Appeals of New York struck down, on privileges and immunities grounds, requirements that an applicant for admission to the bar by examination have been (1) a New York resident for the six months immediately preceding submission of his application for admission to practice, and (2) a New York resident at the time of his admission. 7 The New York court’s broad reasoning in condemnation of its residency requirements reaches any residency requirement for bar admission, including admission on motion. 8 Id. at 272-273 .	1	1984–1984
Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp. green scotus · 1976 2 sentences 1981The Commonwealth would thus turn to Hughes, supra, and Reeves, supra, in determining the extent to which a State, acting as a purchaser of goods and services, is exempt from the restrictions of the privileges and immunities clause. 18 The Commonwealth is correct that the commerce clause does not prevent a State from preferring resident business in purchasing goods, see Hughes, supra at 810 , or services, American Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 339 F. Supp. 719 , 723 478 (M.D. 1981The Commonwealth would thus turn to Hughes, supra, and Reeves, supra, in determining the extent to which a State, acting as a purchaser of goods and services, is exempt from the restrictions of the privileges and immunities clause. 18 The Commonwealth is correct that the commerce clause does not prevent a State from preferring resident business in purchasing goods, see Hughes, supra at 810 , or services, American Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 339 F. Supp. 719 , 723 478 (M.D.	1	1981–1981
Northern Acceptance Trust 1065 v. Brinkerhoff green scotus · 1972 1 sentence 1981Fla.) (three-judge court), aff’d mem., 409 U.S. 904 (1972), or in the distribution of State-produced materials in a shortage situation, Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, supra at 446-447 .	1	1981–1981
American Yearbook Company v. Askew green flmd · 1972 1 sentence 1981The Commonwealth would thus turn to Hughes, supra, and Reeves, supra, in determining the extent to which a State, acting as a purchaser of goods and services, is exempt from the restrictions of the privileges and immunities clause. 18 The Commonwealth is correct that the commerce clause does not prevent a State from preferring resident business in purchasing goods, see Hughes, supra at 810 , or services, American Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 339 F. Supp. 719 , 723 *478 (M.D.	1	1981–1981
Paul v. Virginia red scotus · 1869 2 sentences 1972Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168 . 1972Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168 .	1	1972–1972
Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas green · 1900 2 sentences 1972Co. v. Daggs, 172 U. S. 557, 561 (see Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 177 U. S. 28, 45 ; Hemphill v. Orloff, 277 U. S. 537 ), they are “persons” within the meaning of the due process clause of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 1972Co. v. Daggs, 172 U.S. 557, 561 (see Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 177 U.S. 28, 45 ; Hemphill v. Orloff, 277 U.S. 537 ), they are "persons" within the meaning of the due process clause of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.	1	1972–1972
Hemphill v. Orloff green scotus · 1928 2 sentences 1972Co. v. Daggs, 172 U. S. 557, 561 (see Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 177 U. S. 28, 45 ; Hemphill v. Orloff, 277 U. S. 537 ), they are “persons” within the meaning of the due process clause of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 1972Co. v. Daggs, 172 U.S. 557, 561 (see Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 177 U.S. 28, 45 ; Hemphill v. Orloff, 277 U.S. 537 ), they are "persons" within the meaning of the due process clause of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.	1	1972–1972

Statutes the citing opinions construe

MA § Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 59, § 5 (4) MA § Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 55, § 7 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

WA 114 (1940–2026) CA 32 (1944–2024) IN 21 (1902–2020) NY 20 (1935–2018) TX 16 (1937–2015) AK 15 (1977–2019) MA 14 (1946–2009) FL 12 (1940–1992) PA 11 (1951–2025) WI 10 (1971–2020) IL 9 (1983–2010) CT 9 (1977–2024) AR 8 (1964–2014) OR 8 (1974–2022) ND 6 (1955–2008) WV 6 (1982–2006) OH 6 (1958–2017) IA 6 (1932–2024) WY 6 (1985–2022) AZ 6 (1965–2023) LA 6 (1957–2018) ME 5 (1935–1998) NC 5 (1941–1994) MN 4 (1918–1992) MT 4 (1981–1992) NE 4 (1979–2003) NJ 4 (1954–1981) MO 4 (1940–2016) MD 3 (1976–2009) MI 2 (2001–2001) CO 2 (1929–1994) MS 2 (1988–2003) SD 2 (1970–1985) OK 2 (1989–2000) NH 2 (1980–1986) KS 2 (1982–1985) TN 2 (1955–2017) HI 2 (1969–1996) PR 2 (1945–1954) RI 2 (1949–2009)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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