20 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 1886–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Davis v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co.green2 sentences1998See Davis, supra, 158 F.R.D. at 176-178. 1998See Davis, supra, 158 F.R.D. at 176-178. | 2 | 2 |
Cope v. Metropolitan Life Insurancegreen2 sentences2007Id. at 434-436 (plaintiffs' claims present the classic case for treatment as a class action because they are based on written documents that uniformly indicate the omission of standard disclosure warnings). {¶ 27} As the foregoing supreme court decisions indicate, allegations of misrepresentations used in standardized forms or routinized procedures may well be the basis for class treatment, notwithstanding the need for each class member to prove elements of inducement and reliance. 2006See, e.g., Hamilton, supra (undisputed that class members were charged interest rates other than those disclosed in mortgage loan agreements); Cope v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. (1988), 82 Ohio St.3d 426 , 696 N.E.2d 1001 (involved the identical omission of standard disclosure warnings in the written insurance policies of every class member). | 1 | 4 |
State v. Longgreen2 sentences2025Accordingly, I will focus on the evidence related to the elements of the defense of another and, in particular, the second element regarding whether it was reasonable for Smith to believe Charae, Penn, Cordell, and Mr. Thomas were in imminent or immediate danger of death or great bodily harm. {¶ 59} With regards to the second element—whether it was reasonable for Smith to believe Charae, Penn, Cordell, and Mr. Thomas were in imminent or immediate danger of death or great bodily harm, the instructions addressed the second and third elements together and stated: 6 In Taylor-Hollingsworth, we tra 2005The Ohio Supreme Court has recognized the discretionary aspect of the plain error doctrine, warning courts to notice plain error "with the utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice." Id., quoting State v. Long (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 91 . {¶ 24} In cases where a trial court fails to make findings and state reasons in compliance with Comer, this omission is error, and in cases occurring after the Comer decision, the error is plain. | 1 | 2 |
Hamilton v. Ohio Savings Bankgreen2 sentences2013Hamilton, supra; Cope, supra, at 436 . {¶53} FM argues that appellees’ fraud claim lacks any common misrepresentation because each class member would have his or her own transactions listed in his or her account statement. 2004See, e.g., Hamilton, supra (undisputed that class members were charged interest rates other than those disclosed in mortgage loan agreements); Cope v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. (1988), 82 Ohio St.3d 426 (involved the identical omission of standard disclosure warnings in the written insurance policies of every class member). | 1 | 2 |
United States v. Dominguez Benitezgreen1 sentence2025The United States Supreme Court has held that “a defendant[-appellant] must thus satisfy the judgment of the reviewing court, informed by the entire record, that the probability of a different result is ‘sufficient to No. 23AP-599 28 undermine confidence in the outcome’ of the proceeding.” United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 83 (2004), quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).6 Therefore, informed by the entire record regarding the defense-of-another affirmative defense, I consider whether there is a reasonable probability that the omission of the instruction on | 1 | 1 |
Strickland v. Washingtongreen1 sentence2025The United States Supreme Court has held that “a defendant[-appellant] must thus satisfy the judgment of the reviewing court, informed by the entire record, that the probability of a different result is ‘sufficient to No. 23AP-599 28 undermine confidence in the outcome’ of the proceeding.” United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 83 (2004), quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).6 Therefore, informed by the entire record regarding the defense-of-another affirmative defense, I consider whether there is a reasonable probability that the omission of the instruction on | 1 | 1 |
State v. Lucasgreen1 sentence2025Although Vera-Lopez acknowledges that “it is possible that [he] was not confined for more than the 180-day-period imposed[,]” he maintains that this omission is error because “should he violate the terms of his community control sanction, he will be entitled to credit for all the time he was confined in the case.” While Vera-Lopez’s hypothetical argument makes sense, it is unavailing for several reasons. {¶11} Initially, it is undisputed that Vera-Lopez has served the six-month jail term. “[T]his court and others have generally held that once a defendant has served his or her sentence and has | 1 | 1 |
State v. Mastrodonatogreen1 sentence2025Although Vera-Lopez acknowledges that “it is possible that [he] was not confined for more than the 180-day-period imposed[,]” he maintains that this omission is error because “should he violate the terms of his community control sanction, he will be entitled to credit for all the time he was confined in the case.” While Vera-Lopez’s hypothetical argument makes sense, it is unavailing for several reasons. {¶11} Initially, it is undisputed that Vera-Lopez has served the six-month jail term. “[T]his court and others have generally held that once a defendant has served his or her sentence and has | 1 | 1 |
City of Cleveland v. Pavlick, 91232 (11-26-2008)green1 sentence2025Although Vera-Lopez acknowledges that “it is possible that [he] was not confined for more than the 180-day-period imposed[,]” he maintains that this omission is error because “should he violate the terms of his community control sanction, he will be entitled to credit for all the time he was confined in the case.” While Vera-Lopez’s hypothetical argument makes sense, it is unavailing for several reasons. {¶11} Initially, it is undisputed that Vera-Lopez has served the six-month jail term. “[T]his court and others have generally held that once a defendant has served his or her sentence and has | 1 | 1 |
State v. Fieldgreen1 sentence2025Although Vera-Lopez acknowledges that “it is possible that [he] was not confined for more than the 180-day-period imposed[,]” he maintains that this omission is error because “should he violate the terms of his community control sanction, he will be entitled to credit for all the time he was confined in the case.” While Vera-Lopez’s hypothetical argument makes sense, it is unavailing for several reasons. {¶11} Initially, it is undisputed that Vera-Lopez has served the six-month jail term. “[T]his court and others have generally held that once a defendant has served his or her sentence and has | 1 | 1 |
State v. Eleyetgreen1 sentence2025Although Vera-Lopez acknowledges that “it is possible that [he] was not confined for more than the 180-day-period imposed[,]” he maintains that this omission is error because “should he violate the terms of his community control sanction, he will be entitled to credit for all the time he was confined in the case.” While Vera-Lopez’s hypothetical argument makes sense, it is unavailing for several reasons. {¶11} Initially, it is undisputed that Vera-Lopez has served the six-month jail term. “[T]his court and others have generally held that once a defendant has served his or her sentence and has | 1 | 1 |
State v. Troyergreen1 sentence2025Although Vera-Lopez acknowledges that “it is possible that [he] was not confined for more than the 180-day-period imposed[,]” he maintains that this omission is error because “should he violate the terms of his community control sanction, he will be entitled to credit for all the time he was confined in the case.” While Vera-Lopez’s hypothetical argument makes sense, it is unavailing for several reasons. {¶11} Initially, it is undisputed that Vera-Lopez has served the six-month jail term. “[T]his court and others have generally held that once a defendant has served his or her sentence and has | 1 | 1 |
Bridge v. Park National Bankgreen2 sentences2015Bank, 169 Ohio App.3d 384 , 2006-Ohio-5691, ¶ 18 (10th Dist.). 2015Bank, 169 Ohio App.3d 384 , 2006-Ohio-5691, ¶ 18 (10th Dist.). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Bordner, Unpublished Decision (3-23-2005)green1 sentence2005See Bordner, 2005-Ohio-1269 . | 1 | 1 |
Schmidt v. Avco Corp.green2 sentences1998See Davis, supra, 158 F.R.D. at 176-178 . {¶ 31} In Simpson, the court also relied on our decision in Schmidt v. Avco Corp. (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 310 , 15 OBR 439, 473 N.E.2d 822 , for the proposition that class certification is properly denied when claims require proof of inducement and reliance. 1998See Davis, supra, 158 F.R.D. at 176-178 . {¶ 31} In Simpson, the court also relied on our decision in Schmidt v. Avco Corp. (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 310 , 15 OBR 439, 473 N.E.2d 822 , for the proposition that class certification is properly denied when claims require proof of inducement and reliance. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Wilson
green
1 sentence2025Although Vera-Lopez acknowledges that “it is possible that [he] was not confined for more than the 180-day-period imposed[,]” he maintains that this omission is error because “should he violate the terms of his community control sanction, he will be entitled to credit for all the time he was confined in the case.” While Vera-Lopez’s hypothetical argument makes sense, it is unavailing for several reasons. {¶11} Initially, it is undisputed that Vera-Lopez has served the six-month jail term. “[T]his court and others have generally held that once a defendant has served his or her sentence and has | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Lewis
green
1 sentence2019“The difference between the Castle Doctrine and the rebuttable presumption of self-defense lies in the legal status of the victim.” State v. Lewis, 2012-Ohio-3684 , 976 N.E.2d 258 , ¶ 18 (8th Dist.). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Jackson
green
2 sentences2017While we agree with Lipkins that such an instruction arguably would have been appropriate here, Lipkins does not demonstrate prejudice sufficient to render the omission of the instruction plain error. {¶ 33} The Supreme Court has held that even where "a special instruction from the trial court on appellant's duty to retreat would have been appropriate to the evidence adduced at trial," there is no plain error from the omission of that instruction where the "failure to give such an instruction neither affected appellant's substantial rights nor contributed to his conviction." State v. Jackson , 2017While we agree with Lipkins that such an instruction arguably would have been appropriate here, Lipkins does not demonstrate prejudice sufficient to render the omission of the instruction plain error. {¶ 33} The Supreme Court has held that even where "a special instruction from the trial court on appellant's duty to retreat would have been appropriate to the evidence adduced at trial," there is no plain error from the omission of that instruction where the "failure to give such an instruction neither affected appellant's substantial rights nor contributed to his conviction." State v. Jackson , | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Enderle v. Zettler, Unpublished Decision (8-21-2006)
green
1 sentence2008Enderle v. Zettler , Butler App. No. CA2005-11-484, 2006-Ohio-4326 , ¶ 37 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
In re M.D.
green
1 sentence2005The Ohio Supreme Court has recognized the discretionary aspect of the plain error doctrine, warning courts to notice plain error "with the utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice." Id., quoting State v. Long (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 91 . {¶ 24} In cases where a trial court fails to make findings and state reasons in compliance with Comer, this omission is error, and in cases occurring after the Comer decision, the error is plain. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
State v. Goodballet
neutral
1 sentence2002In light of this evidence and McClain's failure to demonstrate that inclusion of an alibi instruction would have affected the outcome of his trial, we cannot conclude that the absence of an alibi instruction provides a ground for reopening. {¶ 40} In his fourth assignment of error, McClain complains that the following jury instruction "diluted" the element of intent with respect to the charge of aggravated murder: {¶ 41} When the central [idea], essence or gist of the offense is a prohibition or forbidding of conduct of a certain nature, a person acts purposely if his specific intention was to | 1 | 2002–2002 |
State v. DePew
green
1 sentence2000The trial court told counsel that it did not want to call the jury out and explain the additional language because doing so "would tend to highlight it." In State v. DePew (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 275 , the appellant claimed the trial court erred when, in its instructions to the jury, it listed all seven of the mitigating factors set forth in R.C. 2929.04 (B) although the appellant had not argued all of them. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Smith v. Flesher
green
2 sentences1996Smith v. Flesher (1967), 12 Ohio St.2d 107 , 41 O.O.2d 412 , 233 N.E.2d 137 , paragraph two of syllabus; Luong v. Schultz (1994), 97 Ohio App.3d 472, 476 , 646 N.E.2d 1164, 1166-1167 ; Jaworowski v. Med. 1996Smith v. Flesher (1967), 12 Ohio St.2d 107 , 41 O.O.2d 412 , 233 N.E.2d 137 , paragraph two of syllabus; Luong v. Schultz (1994), 97 Ohio App.3d 472, 476 , 646 N.E.2d 1164, 1166-1167 ; Jaworowski v. Med. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Luong v. Schultz
green
2 sentences1996Smith v. Flesher (1967), 12 Ohio St.2d 107 , 41 O.O.2d 412 , 233 N.E.2d 137 , paragraph two of syllabus; Luong v. Schultz (1994), 97 Ohio App.3d 472, 476 , 646 N.E.2d 1164, 1166-1167 ; Jaworowski v. Med. 1996Smith v. Flesher (1967), 12 Ohio St.2d 107 , 41 O.O.2d 412 , 233 N.E.2d 137 , paragraph two of syllabus; Luong v. Schultz (1994), 97 Ohio App.3d 472, 476 , 646 N.E.2d 1164, 1166-1167 ; Jaworowski v. Med. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Lyon v. State
neutral
1 sentence1965The denial of this right was error.” In the syllabus in the case of Lyon v. State, 116 Ohio St. 265 , it was held “nor is it error for the court to require that an omission to challenge peremptorily or a waiver of such challenge shall have the same effect as the exercise of the *276 right.” However, as stated on page 271 in the opinion, at the beginning of the trial the court made the following statement: “I think we will now stipulate, at this time, the rule that will be applied, with reference to the exercising of peremptory challenges. | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Valentine v. Pavilonis
neutral
1 sentence1933Plaintiff’s Request Number 3 does not contain the exception provided in the third proposition of the syllabus of the case of Valentine v Pavilonis, 27 Oh Ap 26, ( 6 Abs 359 ; 6 Abs 462 ), but this exception is set forth in Plaintiff’s Request Number 8 which was given, and these requests read together correctly state the law, and the omission of the exception from Request Number 3 was therefore not prejudicial error. | 1 | 1933–1933 |
Valentine v. Pavilonis
neutral
1 sentence1933Plaintiff’s Request Number 3 does not contain the exception provided in the third proposition of the syllabus of the case of Valentine v Pavilonis, 27 Oh Ap 26, ( 6 Abs 359 ; 6 Abs 462 ), but this exception is set forth in Plaintiff’s Request Number 8 which was given, and these requests read together correctly state the law, and the omission of the exception from Request Number 3 was therefore not prejudicial error. | 1 | 1933–1933 |
| State v. Lane green | 1 | 1921–1921 |
State v. Musick
green
1 sentence1921App., 415; State v. McKinney, 111 N. C., 683 ; State v. Musick, 101 Mo., 260 ; State v. Casford, 76 Ia., 330 ; Jones v. State, 52 Ark., 345; Obrien v. Commonwealth, 89 Ky., 354 ; State v. Estep, 44 Kans., 572 , and a number of other cases to the same effect. | 1 | 1921–1921 |
| State v. Estep neutral | 1 | 1921–1921 |
| State v. . McKinney neutral | 1 | 1921–1921 |
State v. Casford
green
1 sentence1921App., 415; State v. McKinney, 111 N. C., 683 ; State v. Musick, 101 Mo., 260 ; State v. Casford, 76 Ia., 330 ; Jones v. State, 52 Ark., 345; Obrien v. Commonwealth, 89 Ky., 354 ; State v. Estep, 44 Kans., 572 , and a number of other cases to the same effect. | 1 | 1921–1921 |
O'Brien v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence1921App., 415; State v. McKinney, 111 N. C., 683 ; State v. Musick, 101 Mo., 260 ; State v. Casford, 76 Ia., 330 ; Jones v. State, 52 Ark., 345; Obrien v. Commonwealth, 89 Ky., 354 ; State v. Estep, 44 Kans., 572 , and a number of other cases to the same effect. | 1 | 1921–1921 |
| Shafher v. State neutral | 1 | 1886–1886 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.