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13 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1885–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Jones v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1991It is true that the judge sua sponte could have instructed the jury on the limited purpose for which the Drew evidence was admitted, but the omission of such an instruction “does not necessarily constitute reversible error.” Jones v. United States, 477 A.2d 231, 242 (D.C.1984) (citations omitted). 1991It is true that the judge sua sponte could have instructed the jury on the limited purpose for which the Drew evidence was admitted, but the omission of such an instruction "does not necessarily constitute reversible error." Jones v. United States, 477 A.2d 231, 242 (D.C.1984) (citations omitted). *64 In these circumstances, since the judge's discretion was never invoked, we see no plain error in her failure to exercise that discretion either by restricting the amount of the Drew evidence or by giving a limiting instruction on the use of that evidence. | 3 | 3 |
Fowler v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2013The omission of an inquiry could be overlooked if this were the unusual case exemplified by Abney, supra, where the defendant’s “familiarity with the courts in precisely this kind of legal proceeding” could be inferred from his frequent arrests and court appearances on the same charge (unlawful entry on the U.S. Capitol Grounds), such that he “was certainly aware of the nature of the charges he faced and possible punishments therefor.” 464 A.2d at 109 ; see also Fowler, 411 A.2d at 623 (defendant’s knowledge of the “seriousness of the charges” could be inferred from his pretrial letter to the 2013The omission of an inquiry could be overlooked if this were the unusual case exemplified by Abney, supra, where the defendant’s “familiarity with the courts in precisely this kind of legal proceeding” could be inferred from his frequent arrests and court appearances on the same charge (unlawful entry on the U.S. Capitol Grounds), such that he “was certainly aware of the nature of the charges he faced and possible punishments therefor.” 464 A.2d at 109 ; see also Fowler, 411 A.2d at 623 (defendant’s knowledge of the “seriousness of the charges” could be inferred from his pretrial letter to the | 2 | 2 |
Maura v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2026“Having chosen not to object or to request a particular instruction, a defendant as a general rule should not be allowed to claim the omission as error on appeal,” Maura v. United States, 555 A.2d 1015, 1018 (D.C. 1989). | 1 | 1 |
Perry v. Seragreen2 sentences2017See, e.g., Perry v. Sera, 623 A.2d 1210, 1214, 1215 (D.C. 1993) (“[W]e think that [Rule 3] should not be so stringently construed as to bar an appeal where, as here, it is clear from the face of the Notice of Appeal that appellant was seeking review of the underlying judgment dismissing her claim as well as the denial of the [m]otion for [Reconsideration”); id. (noting that “on the Notice of Appeal, appellant wrote ... that she was appealing from the denial of the ‘[m]otion for [Reconsideration of [o]rder dismissing complaint’ ” but that “on the very next line[,] where appellant was to indicat 2017See, e.g., Perry v. Sera, 623 A.2d 1210, 1214, 1215 (D.C. 1993) (“[W]e think that [Rule 3] should not be so stringently construed as to bar an appeal where, as here, it is clear from the face of the Notice of Appeal that appellant was seeking review of the underlying judgment dismissing her claim as well as the denial of the [m]otion for [Reconsideration”); id. (noting that “on the Notice of Appeal, appellant wrote ... that she was appealing from the denial of the ‘[m]otion for [Reconsideration of [o]rder dismissing complaint’ ” but that “on the very next line[,] where appellant was to indicat | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2016See id. at 595-97 . 5 . | 1 | 1 |
People v. Hessgreen1 sentence2008D.C.Code § 22-405(a), supra note 2; see State v. Dawdy, 533 N.W.2d 551, 555 (Iowa 1995) ("Even though an initial arrest is unlawful, a defendant has no right to resist the arrest.”); People v. Hess, 687 P.2d 443, 445 (Colo.1984) (en banc) ("Even if the stop or the taking into protective custody was unlawful, we conclude that the defendant had no right to resist an arrest....”); Commonwealth v. Moreira, 388 Mass. 596 , 447 N.E.2d 1224, 1227 (1983) ("[I]n the absence of excessive or unnecessary force by an arresting officer, a person may not use force to resist an arrest by one who he knows or h | 1 | 1 |
State v. Dawdygreen1 sentence2008D.C.Code § 22-405(a), supra note 2; see State v. Dawdy, 533 N.W.2d 551, 555 (Iowa 1995) ("Even though an initial arrest is unlawful, a defendant has no right to resist the arrest.”); People v. Hess, 687 P.2d 443, 445 (Colo.1984) (en banc) ("Even if the stop or the taking into protective custody was unlawful, we conclude that the defendant had no right to resist an arrest....”); Commonwealth v. Moreira, 388 Mass. 596 , 447 N.E.2d 1224, 1227 (1983) ("[I]n the absence of excessive or unnecessary force by an arresting officer, a person may not use force to resist an arrest by one who he knows or h | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Moreiragreen2 sentences2008D.C.Code § 22-405(a), supra note 2; see State v. Dawdy, 533 N.W.2d 551, 555 (Iowa 1995) ("Even though an initial arrest is unlawful, a defendant has no right to resist the arrest.”); People v. Hess, 687 P.2d 443, 445 (Colo.1984) (en banc) ("Even if the stop or the taking into protective custody was unlawful, we conclude that the defendant had no right to resist an arrest....”); Commonwealth v. Moreira, 388 Mass. 596 , 447 N.E.2d 1224, 1227 (1983) ("[I]n the absence of excessive or unnecessary force by an arresting officer, a person may not use force to resist an arrest by one who he knows or h 2008D.C.Code § 22-405(a), supra note 2; see State v. Dawdy, 533 N.W.2d 551, 555 (Iowa 1995) ("Even though an initial arrest is unlawful, a defendant has no right to resist the arrest.”); People v. Hess, 687 P.2d 443, 445 (Colo.1984) (en banc) ("Even if the stop or the taking into protective custody was unlawful, we conclude that the defendant had no right to resist an arrest....”); Commonwealth v. Moreira, 388 Mass. 596 , 447 N.E.2d 1224, 1227 (1983) ("[I]n the absence of excessive or unnecessary force by an arresting officer, a person may not use force to resist an arrest by one who he knows or h | 1 | 1 |
Harris v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1995Peterson did not specifically request that the court instruct the jury that the government must prove that the sawed-off shotgun was operable and faded to object to the trial court’s omission; therefore, the standard of review is for plain error. “[Rjeversal under the plain error doctrine is justified only in exceptional circumstances where ‘a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result.”’ Harris v. United States, 602 A.2d 154, 159 (D.C.1992) (en banc) (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 , 163 n. 14, 102 S.Ct. 1584 , 1592 n. 14, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982)); see also Curington v. United | 1 | 1 |
Watts v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1995Peterson did not specifically request that the court instruct the jury that the government must prove that the sawed-off shotgun was operable and faded to object to the trial court’s omission; therefore, the standard of review is for plain error. “[Rjeversal under the plain error doctrine is justified only in exceptional circumstances where ‘a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result.”’ Harris v. United States, 602 A.2d 154, 159 (D.C.1992) (en banc) (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 , 163 n. 14, 102 S.Ct. 1584 , 1592 n. 14, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982)); see also Curington v. United | 1 | 1 |
White v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1995Peterson did not specifically request that the court instruct the jury that the government must prove that the sawed-off shotgun was operable and faded to object to the trial court’s omission; therefore, the standard of review is for plain error. “[Rjeversal under the plain error doctrine is justified only in exceptional circumstances where ‘a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result.”’ Harris v. United States, 602 A.2d 154, 159 (D.C.1992) (en banc) (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 , 163 n. 14, 102 S.Ct. 1584 , 1592 n. 14, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982)); see also Curington v. United | 1 | 1 |
Curington v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1995Peterson did not specifically request that the court instruct the jury that the government must prove that the sawed-off shotgun was operable and faded to object to the trial court’s omission; therefore, the standard of review is for plain error. “[Rjeversal under the plain error doctrine is justified only in exceptional circumstances where ‘a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result.”’ Harris v. United States, 602 A.2d 154, 159 (D.C.1992) (en banc) (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 , 163 n. 14, 102 S.Ct. 1584 , 1592 n. 14, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982)); see also Curington v. United | 1 | 1 |
Arnold v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1978Reliance is placed, properly we think, on the harmless error holding of Arnold v. United States, D.C.App., 358 A.2d 335, 341-42 (1976) (en banc). 1978Reliance is placed, properly we think, on the harmless error holding of Arnold v. United States, D.C.App., 358 A.2d 335, 341-42 (1976) (en banc). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Abney v. United States
green
2 sentences2013The omission of an inquiry could be overlooked if this were the unusual case exemplified by Abney, supra, where the defendant’s “familiarity with the courts in precisely this kind of legal proceeding” could be inferred from his frequent arrests and court appearances on the same charge (unlawful entry on the U.S. Capitol Grounds), such that he “was certainly aware of the nature of the charges he faced and possible punishments therefor.” 464 A.2d at 109 ; see also Fowler, 411 A.2d at 623 (defendant’s knowledge of the “seriousness of the charges” could be inferred from his pretrial letter to the 2013The omission of an inquiry could be overlooked if this were the unusual case exemplified by Abney, supra, where the defendant’s “familiarity with the courts in precisely this kind of legal proceeding” could be inferred from his frequent arrests and court appearances on the same charge (unlawful entry on the U.S. Capitol Grounds), such that he “was certainly aware of the nature of the charges he faced and possible punishments therefor.” 464 A.2d at 109 ; see also Fowler, 411 A.2d at 623 (defendant’s knowledge of the “seriousness of the charges” could be inferred from his pretrial letter to the | 2 | 2013–2013 |
Hsu v. United States
green
2 sentences2013We stated in Hsu , that “[a] valid waiver, if there was one, was made prior to trial or not at all.” 392 A.2d at 986 . 6 The government takes this statement literally by pointing out that, after the trial judge let Tillman proceed pro se but before the jury was sworn, a back-and-forth colloquy between judge and defendant alerted Tillman specifically to the proof requirements for escape (“The government just has to prove that the judge put you in a halfway house and you left.”). 2013We stated in Hsu , that “[a] valid waiver, if there was one, was made prior to trial or not at all.” 392 A.2d at 986 . 6 The government takes this statement literally by pointing out that, after the trial judge let Tillman proceed pro se but before the jury was sworn, a back-and-forth colloquy between judge and defendant alerted Tillman specifically to the proof requirements for escape (“The government just has to prove that the judge put you in a halfway house and you left.”). | 2 | 2013–2013 |
Donnelly Associates, Ltd. Partnership v. District of Columbia Historic Preservation Review Board
green
1 sentence2018Review Bd. , 520 A.2d 270 , 276 (D.C. 1987). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
United States v. Olano
green
2 sentences2008In light of the fact that three defense witnesses agreed that there has been "tugging back and forth” or “trying to impede” or "stopping the gate,” and that witness Pope himself acknowledged that Dolson had been "preventing [the officer] from getting through that gate,” we cannot say that the judge's omission of the instruction had a "prejudicial impact on the jury’s deliberations.” Id. at 734 , 113 S.Ct. 1770 (citation and internal questions marks omitted). 8 . 2008In light of the fact that three defense witnesses agreed that there has been "tugging back and forth” or “trying to impede” or "stopping the gate,” and that witness Pope himself acknowledged that Dolson had been "preventing [the officer] from getting through that gate,” we cannot say that the judge's omission of the instruction had a "prejudicial impact on the jury’s deliberations.” Id. at 734 , 113 S.Ct. 1770 (citation and internal questions marks omitted). 8 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
United States v. Frady
green
2 sentences1995Peterson did not specifically request that the court instruct the jury that the government must prove that the sawed-off shotgun was operable and faded to object to the trial court’s omission; therefore, the standard of review is for plain error. “[Rjeversal under the plain error doctrine is justified only in exceptional circumstances where ‘a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result.”’ Harris v. United States, 602 A.2d 154, 159 (D.C.1992) (en banc) (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 , 163 n. 14, 102 S.Ct. 1584 , 1592 n. 14, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982)); see also Curington v. United 1995Peterson did not specifically request that the court instruct the jury that the government must prove that the sawed-off shotgun was operable and faded to object to the trial court’s omission; therefore, the standard of review is for plain error. “[Rjeversal under the plain error doctrine is justified only in exceptional circumstances where ‘a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result.”’ Harris v. United States, 602 A.2d 154, 159 (D.C.1992) (en banc) (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 , 163 n. 14, 102 S.Ct. 1584 , 1592 n. 14, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982)); see also Curington v. United | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Miller v. Brass Co.
green
1 sentence1885Brass Co., as reported in 104 U. S., 350 , in which the court say: “But it must be remembered that the claim of a specific device or combination, and an omission to claim other devices or combinations apparent on the face of the patent, are, in law, a dedication to the public of that which is not claimed.” And in the same opinion, on page 352, they use this language: “This legal effect of the patent cannot be revoked unless the patentee surrenders it and proves that the specification was framed by real inadvertence, accident or mistake, without any fraudulent or deceptive intention on his part | 1 | 1885–1885 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.