omission bar in Maryland

2018Id. at 383-84 , 439 A.2d at 1110 -11 .

2018Id. at 383-84 , 439 A.2d at 1110 -11 .

2020Bratt v. State, 62 Md.

1998This Court used the standard as defined in Golt in holding that the landlords’ omission was a violation of section 13-301(3). 15 Legg, 100 Md.App. at 761 , 642 *31 A.2d 906.

1998The plaintiff asserted that, in addition to the commission of “deceptive” trade practices, the defendants “violated the CPA’s prohibition against ‘unfair’ trade practices.” Id. at 763 , 642 A.2d 906 .

1998This Court used the standard as defined in Golt in holding that the landlords’ omission was a violation of section 13-301(3). 15 Legg, 100 Md.App. at 761 , 642 *31 A.2d 906.

1998The plaintiff asserted that, in addition to the commission of “deceptive” trade practices, the defendants “violated the CPA’s prohibition against ‘unfair’ trade practices.” Id. at 763 , 642 A.2d 906 .

1986Noble v. State, 293 Md. 549, 558 , 446 A.2d 844 (1982); Countess, supra. The State contends that “[djefense counsel’s statement of Appellant’s election, made in open court in the presence of Appellant, and reiterated several hours later at the outset of trial, coupled with Appellant’s lack of objection, under the circumstances constitutes substantial compliance with Maryland Rule 4-246 and, in any event, should be deemed a waiver of his objection to any technical violation of the rule.” We disagree.

1986Noble v. State, 293 Md. 549, 558 , 446 A.2d 844 (1982); Countess, supra. The State contends that “[djefense counsel’s statement of Appellant’s election, made in open court in the presence of Appellant, and reiterated several hours later at the outset of trial, coupled with Appellant’s lack of objection, under the circumstances constitutes substantial compliance with Maryland Rule 4-246 and, in any event, should be deemed a waiver of his objection to any technical violation of the rule.” We disagree.

1950Eq. 271, 59 A. 247 , in which a lease of land gave the lessee an option to purchase, but before the expiration thereof the lessee accepted a new lease which described the premises more specifically, contained a restriction on the use, not contained in the first lease, and omitted the option, and in which the first lease was not surrendered, and both leases contained a covenant to surrender the premises at the expiration of the term, it was said, 59 A. at page 250 : “The omission of the clause giving the option to purchase proves nothing.

1950Eq. 271, 59 A. 247 , in which a lease of land gave the lessee an option to purchase, but before the expiration thereof the lessee accepted a new lease which described the premises more specifically, contained a restriction on the use, not contained in the first lease, and omitted the option, and in which the first lease was not surrendered, and both leases contained a covenant to surrender the premises at the expiration of the term, it was said, 59 A. at page 250 : “The omission of the clause giving the option to purchase proves nothing.

1910Armstrong v. Sweeney, 73 Neb. 775 ; Collins v. McWalters, 72 N. Y.