force presumption in Pennsylvania

2013Relying on Commonwealth v. Brown, 506 Pa. 169 , 484 A.2d 738 (1984), it posits that conduct or words that are threatening that cause a person to relinquish property meet the force requirement of the applicable robbery statute.

2013Relying on Commonwealth v. Brown, 506 Pa. 169 , 484 A.2d 738 (1984), it posits that conduct or words that are threatening that cause a person to relinquish property meet the force requirement of the applicable robbery statute.

1995In John M., supra, 524 Pa. at 306 , 571 A.2d 1380 , the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reaffirmed the force of this presumption, characterizing it as “one of the strongest presumptions known to law.” Id. at 312-13 , 571 A.2d at 1383 (citing Cairgle, supra, 366 Pa. 249 , 77 A.2d at 439 ); see also Selm v. Elliott, 411 Pa.Super. 602 , 602 A.2d 358 (1992).

1995In John M., supra, 524 Pa. at 306 , 571 A.2d 1380 , the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reaffirmed the force of this presumption, characterizing it as “one of the strongest presumptions known to law.” Id. at 312-13 , 571 A.2d at 1383 (citing Cairgle, supra, 366 Pa. 249 , 77 A.2d at 439 ); see also Selm v. Elliott, 411 Pa.Super. 602 , 602 A.2d 358 (1992).

1997In John M., supra, our supreme court reaffirmed the force of this presumption, labeling it “one of the strongest presumptions known to law.” Id. at 312-13, 571 A.2d at 1383 (citing Cairgle v. American Radiator & S.S.

1995In John M., supra, 524 Pa. at 306 , 571 A.2d 1380 , the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reaffirmed the force of this presumption, characterizing it as “one of the strongest presumptions known to law.” Id. at 312-13 , 571 A.2d at 1383 (citing Cairgle, supra, 366 Pa. 249 , 77 A.2d at 439 ); see also Selm v. Elliott, 411 Pa.Super. 602 , 602 A.2d 358 (1992).

1980That is what the Sixth Circuit did in United States v. Heller, supra , and this court, in Commonwealth v. Bready, supra , and Commonwealth v. Black, supra ; it would not be an unworthy result here, given the force of the factors previously discussed in part II of this opinion as favoring the conclusion that strict liability was not intended.

1980That is what the Sixth Circuit did in United States v. Heller, supra, and this court, in Commonwealth v. Bready, supra, and Commonwealth v. Black, supra; it would not be an unworthy result here, given the force of the factors previously discussed in part II of this opinion as favoring the conclusion that strict liability was not intended.

1980Code section 1517(b) states: “The Board shall formulate rules and regulations for adoption by the Department on physical and mental criteria including vision standards relating to the licensing of drivers under the provisions of this chapter [15].” See Com. v. Byrd, 41 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 38, 44 , 399 A. 2d 425 (1979), affirming 39 Somerset 213 (1977), decided on other grounds, recognizing “the distinction in administrative law between the weight accorded an agency rule promulgated under a grant of legislative power by the legislature and the force of a rule promulgated under the interpretive

1980Code section 1517(b) states: “The Board shall formulate rules and regulations for adoption by the Department on physical and mental criteria including vision standards relating to the licensing of drivers under the provisions of this chapter [15].” See Com. v. Byrd, 41 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 38, 44 , 399 A. 2d 425 (1979), affirming 39 Somerset 213 (1977), decided on other grounds, recognizing “the distinction in administrative law between the weight accorded an agency rule promulgated under a grant of legislative power by the legislature and the force of a rule promulgated under the interpretive

1980That is what the Sixth Circuit did in United States v. Heller, supra , and this court, in Commonwealth v. Bready, supra , and Commonwealth v. Black, supra ; it would not be an unworthy result here, given the force of the factors previously discussed in part II of this opinion as favoring the conclusion that strict liability was not intended.

1980That is what the Sixth Circuit did in United States v. Heller, supra, and this court, in Commonwealth v. Bready, supra, and Commonwealth v. Black, supra; it would not be an unworthy result here, given the force of the factors previously discussed in part II of this opinion as favoring the conclusion that strict liability was not intended.

1980On the effect of the physician’s unavailability or lack of independent recollection, see Brown, Pennsylvania Evidence, Chapter VII, Part XIII E3, citing Lane v. Samuels, 350 Pa. 446 , 39 A. 2d 626 (1944); Freedman v. Mutual Life Ins.

1980On the effect of the physician’s unavailability or lack of independent recollection, see Brown, Pennsylvania Evidence, Chapter VII, Part XIII E3, citing Lane v. Samuels, 350 Pa. 446 , 39 A. 2d 626 (1944); Freedman v. Mutual Life Ins.

1961The force of the rule of uniformity is shown in Traylor v. Allentown, supra, where the court said, pages 494 and 495: “Actually, there was no competent evidence whatsoever adduced at the hearing in the court below as to the fair market value of the property.

1932The agreement of sale in Hopkins v. Phillips, supra, is closely similar to that in the instant case, the minor variations in the language employed being insufficient to destroy the force of the rule so far as it applies to the written contract.

1921The force of the presumption of guilt is one of fact to be inferred by the jury, not of law, and the jury must pass on all the evidence including the reasonableness of the explanation of his possession by the accused: Stover v. People, 56 N. Y. 315 .

1917The force of the doctrine on which he relies is fully declared in our own cases of McNeely v. Bank of North America, 221 Pa. 588 , and Lesley v. Ewing, 248 Pa. 135 .

1917The force of the doctrine on which he relies is fully declared in our own cases of McNeely v. Bank of North America, 221 Pa. 588 , and Lesley v. Ewing, 248 Pa. 135 .

1911L. & P. 674, it is said: “The terms ‘reservation’ and ‘exception’ are often used interchangeably, and the technical meaning will give way to the manifest intent, even though the technical term to the contrary be used.” The point is discussed at considerable length in Whitaker v. Brown, 46 Pa. 197 , and in Kister v. Reeser, 98 Pa. 1 , where it is said that the terms “reservation” and “exception” “are often used in the same sense, the technical distinction being disregarded.” By reference to the deed, it appears that except for the purpose set forth in the clause of reservation, the right of the

1911L. & P. 674, it is said: “The terms ‘reservation’ and ‘exception’ are often used interchangeably, and the technical meaning will give way to the manifest intent, even though the technical term to the contrary be used.” The point is discussed at considerable length in Whitaker v. Brown, 46 Pa. 197 , and in Kister v. Reeser, 98 Pa. 1 , where it is said that the terms “reservation” and “exception” “are often used in the same sense, the technical distinction being disregarded.” By reference to the deed, it appears that except for the purpose set forth in the clause of reservation, the right of the

1906In Commonwealth v. Detwiller, 131 Pa. 614 , Mr. Justice Williams in discussing the enabling statutes so far as they relate to aliens, said: “ Even as to real estate, the distinction as between a resident alien friend and a citizen has disappeared in Pennsylvania, and nearly every other state in the union.” The learned Justice referred to the act of 1807, wherein it is provided generally that alien friends resident within our state may purchase lands, tenements and hereditaments and have and hold the same in fee simple or any lesser estate, as fully to all intents and purposes as the natural bo

1900The learned judge of the court below, in his opinion filed, cites the case of Fryer v. Rishell, 84 Pa. 521 .

1900Recognizing the force of this rule of property, the parties to the proceeding in Scott’s Estate, 147 Pa. 102 , in preparing the agreement of separation, caused the same to be duly acknowledged by both parties, in the manner required by law, and the question now presented for our determination, therefore, did not arise in that ease.

1892In no case has it ever been held that mental anguish alone, unaccompanied by an injury to the person, afforded a ground of action.” In Wyman v. Leavitt, 71 Me. 227 , a contractor of a railroad was blasting rocks within the right of way of the road.

1857R. 365; 3 Rawle 249 ; 5 W. & S. 357, 513 ; and he has been faithfully followed in many other eases: 8 Watts 366 ; 8 State R. 213; 9 Id. 262; 12 Id. 175; 14 Id. 201; 19 Id. 251, 366; 25 Id. 308; 26 Id. 372, 383.

1857R. 365; 3 Rawle 249 ; 5 W. & S. 357, 513 ; and he has been faithfully followed in many other eases: 8 Watts 366 ; 8 State R. 213; 9 Id. 262; 12 Id. 175; 14 Id. 201; 19 Id. 251, 366; 25 Id. 308; 26 Id. 372, 383.