force requirement in California

2016Juries are warned in advance that counsel’s remarks are mere argument, missteps can be challenged when they occur, and juries generally understand that counsel’s assertions are the ‘statements of advocates.’ Thus, argument should ‘not be judged as having the same force as an instruction from the court.’ ” ( Gonzalez, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 1224, fn. 2.) Indeed, the trial court here emphasized in several ways that jurors should follow its instructions rather than anything potentially contrary in counsel’s arguments.

2016Juries are warned in advance that counsel’s remarks are mere argument, missteps can be challenged when they occur, and juries generally understand that counsel’s assertions are the ‘statements of advocates.’ Thus, argument should ‘not be judged as having the same force as an instruction from the court.’ ” ( Gonzalez, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 1224, fn. 2.) Indeed, the trial court here emphasized in several ways that jurors should follow its instructions rather than anything potentially contrary in counsel’s arguments.

2024(People v. Dominguez (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1358 (Dominguez) [“We assume the discussion of force in the context of a kidnapping prosecution in [In re] Michele D. [(2002) 29 Cal.4th 600 ] applies equally to the force requirement of false imprisonment.

2023(In re Michele D. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 600, 610 (Michele D.).) We reasoned that infants and children are too young to give their consent to being moved and are therefore “in a different position vis-à-vis the force requirement for kidnapping than those who can apprehend the force being used against them and resist it.” (Ibid.) Thus, “the amount of force required to kidnap an unresisting infant or child is simply the amount of physical force required to take and carry the child away a substantial distance for an illegal purpose or with an illegal intent.” (Ibid.) We conclude that an unresisting in

2025(See People v. Morales, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 480 [force used when defendant held the victim in such a way that she could not move while he positioned her up against the trunk of a tree and penetrated her private parts with his finger]; People v. Alvarez (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 999, 1005 [“acts of grabbing, holding and restraining that occur in conjunction with the lewd acts themselves” satisfied the force requirement.].) Thus, there is insufficient evidence the aggravated sexual assault was committed by force.

2024(See Alvarez, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 1005 [“the force requirement will be deemed satisfied when the defendant uses any force that is ‘different from and in excess of the type of force which is used in accomplishing similar lewd acts with a victim's consent’ ”].) 3 In his reply brief, Narsappa asserts for the first time that K.C.’s testimony that she attempted to push him away is related solely to count 4.

2026(Pitmon, supra, 170 Cal.App.3d at p. 44 [the defendant placed minor victim’s hand on his genitals and rubbed himself with the victim’s hand]; People v. Babcock, supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 385 [the defendant took minor victim’s hand and made her touch his crotch]; People v. Neel (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1784, 1790 [the defendant grabbed daughter’s wrist, placed her hand on his penis, and moved it up and down], disapproved on another ground in Soto, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 248, fn. 12 .) We agree that appellant’s “manipulation of [L.’s] hand as a tool to rub his genitals was a use of physical forc

2009(See, e.g., People v. Bolander (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 155, 160-161 [ 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 365 ] [“defendant’s acts of overcoming the victim’s resistance to having his pants pulled down, bending the victim over, and pulling the victim’s waist towards him” constituted forcible lewd conduct]; People v. Neel, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at p. 1790 [“defendant’s acts of forcing the victim’s head down on his penis when she tried to pull away and grabbing her wrist, placing her hand on his penis, and then ‘making it go up and down’ ” constituted forcible lewd conduct]; People v. Babcock, supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at

2025(People v. Buell (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 682, 687 .) The threshold elements the prosecution was required to prove here were whether defendant employed “any willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another.” (§ 242.) “Only 11 a slight unprivileged touching is needed to satisfy the force requirement of a criminal battery.” (People v. Ausbie (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 855, 860, fn. 2 , disapproved on other grounds in People v. Santana (2013) 56 Cal.4th 999, 1011, fn. 6 .) There is no question that the record here amply supports the “slight touching,” i.e., the force, requirement

2016In other words, force against the person is enough; it need not be violent or severe, it need not cause bodily harm or even pain, and it need not leave a mark.’” (People v. Shockley (2013) 58 Cal.4th 400, 404 , italics added.) Therefore, “[o]nly a slight unprivileged touching is needed to satisfy the force requirement of a criminal battery.” (People v. Ausbie (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 855, 860, fn. 2 , disapproved on other grounds in People v. Santana (2013) 56 Cal.4th 999, 1011, fn. 6 .) The crime of battery does not require proof that the defendant intended to injure the victim.

2025(People v. Buell (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 682, 687 .) The threshold elements the prosecution was required to prove here were whether defendant employed “any willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another.” (§ 242.) “Only 11 a slight unprivileged touching is needed to satisfy the force requirement of a criminal battery.” (People v. Ausbie (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 855, 860, fn. 2 , disapproved on other grounds in People v. Santana (2013) 56 Cal.4th 999, 1011, fn. 6 .) There is no question that the record here amply supports the “slight touching,” i.e., the force, requirement

2016In other words, force against the person is enough; it need not be violent or severe, it need not cause bodily harm or even pain, and it need not leave a mark.’” (People v. Shockley (2013) 58 Cal.4th 400, 404 , italics added.) Therefore, “[o]nly a slight unprivileged touching is needed to satisfy the force requirement of a criminal battery.” (People v. Ausbie (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 855, 860, fn. 2 , disapproved on other grounds in People v. Santana (2013) 56 Cal.4th 999, 1011, fn. 6 .) The crime of battery does not require proof that the defendant intended to injure the victim.

2024Juries are warned in advance that counsel’s remarks are mere argument, missteps can be challenged when they occur, and juries generally understand that counsel’s 16 assertions are the “statements of advocates.” Thus, argument should “not be judged as having the same force as an instruction from the court.” ’ ” (People v. Cortez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 101, 131 ; see People v. Centeno (2014) 60 Cal.4th 659, 676 [“ ‘[w]hen argument runs counter to instructions given a jury, we will ordinarily conclude that the jury followed the latter and disregarded the former’ ”].) Here, the trial court also instruc

2023And after the prosecutor’s remark, he did not discuss the reasonable doubt standard again 41 or apply his rephrasing of the standard to the evidence, as the prosecutor did in Centeno, supra, 60 Cal.4th at pages 671-672. “[W]e presume not only that jurors follow instructions in general [citation], but also ‘that jurors treat the court’s instructions as a statement of the law by a judge, and the prosecutor’s comments as words spoken by an advocate in an attempt to persuade.’” (Potts, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 1037 ; see People v. Cortez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 101, 131-132 [“‘argument should “not be judg

2023(See People v. Butcher, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 318 [we review the superior court’s decision to revoke probation or parole for an abuse of discretion].) 5 Analogizing Yennifer’s limited cognitive capability to the defenselessness of young children, the superior court cited People v. Thomas (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1278 , overruled in part by People v. Shockley, supra, 58 Cal.4th at page 406 , which involved the commission of lewd acts as well as battery, and a decision from Division One of this court, depublished by the Supreme Court, involving rape and the continuous sexual abuse of severa

2016In other words, force against the person is enough; it need not be violent or severe, it need not cause bodily harm or even pain, and it need not leave a mark.’” (People v. Shockley (2013) 58 Cal.4th 400, 404 , italics added.) Therefore, “[o]nly a slight unprivileged touching is needed to satisfy the force requirement of a criminal battery.” (People v. Ausbie (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 855, 860, fn. 2 , disapproved on other grounds in People v. Santana (2013) 56 Cal.4th 999, 1011, fn. 6 .) The crime of battery does not require proof that the defendant intended to injure the victim.

2009Likewise, an assailant may achieve oral copulation without having to grab the *1005 victim’s head to prevent the victim from resisting.” (People v. Neel (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1784, 1790 [ 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 293 ].) Lewd conduct of this sort is punishable in and of itself. (§ 288, subd. (a).) Therefore, it stands to reason that the force requirement will be deemed satisfied when the defendant uses any force that is “different from and in excess of the type of force which is used in accomplishing similar lewd acts with a victim’s consent.” (People v. Neel, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at p. 1790 .) Accordi

2009Likewise, an assailant may achieve oral copulation without having to grab the *1005 victim’s head to prevent the victim from resisting.” (People v. Neel (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1784, 1790 [ 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 293 ].) Lewd conduct of this sort is punishable in and of itself. (§ 288, subd. (a).) Therefore, it stands to reason that the force requirement will be deemed satisfied when the defendant uses any force that is “different from and in excess of the type of force which is used in accomplishing similar lewd acts with a victim’s consent.” (People v. Neel, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at p. 1790 .) Accordi

2026(Pitmon, supra, 170 Cal.App.3d at p. 44 [the defendant placed minor victim’s hand on his genitals and rubbed himself with the victim’s hand]; People v. Babcock, supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 385 [the defendant took minor victim’s hand and made her touch his crotch]; People v. Neel (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1784, 1790 [the defendant grabbed daughter’s wrist, placed her hand on his penis, and moved it up and down], disapproved on another ground in Soto, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 248, fn. 12 .) We agree that appellant’s “manipulation of [L.’s] hand as a tool to rub his genitals was a use of physical forc

2023But these principles have no application to a case where under the law there can be no consent.” (Id. at p. 215; accord, People v. Soto (2011) 51 Cal.4th 229, 248 .) Verdegreen illuminates the connection between force and consent. “[T]he concepts of consent and force or fear ‘are clearly intertwined.’ ” (Majors, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 327 .) Normally, “ ‘If a person’s free will was not overborne by the use of force or the threat of force, there was no kidnapping.’ ” (Hill, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 856 .) But where a victim is unable to legally consent, and has no true free will, the traditiona

2021Those cases recognized “the quantum of force … required to kidnap an unresisting infant or child is simply the amount of physical force required to take and carry the child away a substantial distance for an illegal purpose or with an illegal intent.” (Michele D., supra, at p. 603.) But they “did not create a new or different crime of kidnapping ….” (People v. Westerfield (2019) 6 Cal.5th 632, 715 (Westerfield).) Nor did they eliminate the force requirement. 8 8 In Michele D., the Supreme Court “granted review to resolve the issue of what quantum of force, if any, must be shown to sustain a co

2021Those cases recognized “the quantum of force … required to kidnap an unresisting infant or child is simply the amount of physical force required to take and carry the child away a substantial distance for an illegal purpose or with an illegal intent.” (Michele D., supra, at p. 603.) But they “did not create a new or different crime of kidnapping ….” (People v. Westerfield (2019) 6 Cal.5th 632, 715 (Westerfield).) Nor did they eliminate the force requirement.8 8 In Michele D., the Supreme Court “granted review to resolve the issue of what quantum of force, if any, must be shown to sustain a con

2017(See People v. Lopez (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1230, 1234 [ 214 Cal.Rptr.3d 618 ] (Lopez); see also People v. Lopez, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 1060-1061.) In People v. Anderson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 989 [ 125 Cal.Rptr.3d 408 , 252 P.3d 968 ] (Anderson), the California Supreme Court, in concluding that “intent to cause the victim to experience force or fear” is not an element of the offense of robbery, stated, “The law does require that the perpetrator exert some quantum of force in excess of that ‘necessary to accomplish the mere seizing of the property.’ ” (Id. at p. 995, quoting People v. Morales (197

2017(See People v. Lopez (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1230, 1234 [ 214 Cal.Rptr.3d 618 ] (Lopez); see also People v. Lopez, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 1060-1061.) In People v. Anderson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 989 [ 125 Cal.Rptr.3d 408 , 252 P.3d 968 ] (Anderson), the California Supreme Court, in concluding that “intent to cause the victim to experience force or fear” is not an element of the offense of robbery, stated, “The law does require that the perpetrator exert some quantum of force in excess of that ‘necessary to accomplish the mere seizing of the property.’ ” (Id. at p. 995, quoting People v. Morales (197

2015(See, e.g., People v. Bolander (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 155, 160-161 [‘defendant’s acts of overcoming the victim’s resistance to having his pants pulled down, bending the victim over, and pulling the victim’s waist towards him’ constituted forcible lewd conduct]; People v. Neel [(1993)] 19 Cal.App.4th [1784,] 1790 [‘defendant’s acts of forcing the victim’s head down on his penis when she tried to pull away and grabbing her wrist, placing her hand on his penis, and then “making it go up and down”‘ constituted forcible lewd conduct]; People v. Babcock [(1993)] 14 Cal.App.4th [383,] 388 [force eleme

2009(See, e.g., People v. Bolander (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 155, 160-161 [ 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 365 ] [“defendant’s acts of overcoming the victim’s resistance to having his pants pulled down, bending the victim over, and pulling the victim’s waist towards him” constituted forcible lewd conduct]; People v. Neel, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at p. 1790 [“defendant’s acts of forcing the victim’s head down on his penis when she tried to pull away and grabbing her wrist, placing her hand on his penis, and then ‘making it go up and down’ ” constituted forcible lewd conduct]; People v. Babcock, supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at

2015XIII A, XIII C, XIII D), the Act’s plain language instructs us to construe the power of taxation liberally so long as it is approved by the requisite supermajority of voters. “ ‘[D]ue respect for the political branches of our government requires us to interpret the laws in accordance with the expressed intention of the Legislature. . . .’ ” (Professional Engineers in California Government v. Brown (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 861, 872-873 [ 177 Cal.Rptr.3d 567 ]; see Galbiso v. Orosi Public Utility Dist. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 652, 665 [ 107 Cal.Rptr.3d 36 ] [liberally construing statute with simila

2015XIII A, XIII C, XIII D), the Act’s plain language instructs us to construe the power of taxation liberally so long as it is approved by the requisite supermajority of voters. “ ‘[D]ue respect for the political branches of our government requires us to interpret the laws in accordance with the expressed intention of the Legislature. . . .’ ” (Professional Engineers in California Government v. Brown (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 861, 872-873 [ 177 Cal.Rptr.3d 567 ]; see Galbiso v. Orosi Public Utility Dist. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 652, 665 [ 107 Cal.Rptr.3d 36 ] [liberally construing statute with simila

2025(People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 947 .) “It is elementary . . . that the prosecutor’s argument is not evidence and the theories suggested are not the exclusive theories that may be considered by the jury.” (People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1126 .) Indeed, juries “ ‘are warned in advance that counsel’s remarks are mere argument.’ ” (People v. Cortez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 101, 131 .) Thus, a prosecutor’s argument should not be given “ ‘undue weight’ ” when “ ‘analyzing how a reasonable jury understood . . . instructions.’ ” (Ibid.) In other words, “ ‘argument should “not be judged as ha

2024Juries are warned in advance that counsel’s remarks are mere argument, missteps can be challenged when they occur, and juries generally understand that counsel’s assertions are the “statements of advocates.” Thus, argument should “not be judged as having the same force as an instruction from the court.”’” (People v. Cortez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 101 , 131–132.) Moreover, the record indicates the jury found Gil was the direct perpetrator of the first degree murder as the jury found he personally used a firearm in the commission of the murder, after the jury was instructed it could not rely on the ai

2022(See, e.g., In re Lisea (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1041 , 1056.) However, there is a significant difference between a court instructing a jury on a theory of law that does not fit the facts of the case and a prosecutor briefly arguing such a theory in her closing argument. “[A]lthough pertinent to the prejudice calculation, the arguments of counsel ‘are not to be judged as having the same force as an instruction from the court.’ ” (Soule v. General Motors Corp. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 548, 586 (conc. opn. of Arabian, J.), quoting Boyde v. California (1990) 494 U.S. 370 , 384–385.) The prosecutor here rais

1994Thus, although pertinent to the prejudice calculation, the arguments of counsel "are not to be judged as having the same force as an instruction from the court." ( Boyde v. California (1990) 494 U.S. 370, 384-385 [ 108 L.Ed.2d 316, 331-332 , 110 S.Ct. 1190 ].) Counsel's argument was merely that — argument — unless and until a ratifying instruction from the trial court dignified it with the force of law.

2016(People v. Pitmon (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 38, 48 .) In Alvarez, a panel of this court held that “acts of grabbing, holding and restraining that occur in conjunction with the lewd acts themselves” satisfy the force requirement under section 288, subdivision (b)(1) because they are “‘different from and in excess of the type of force which is used in accomplishing similar lewd acts with a victim’s consent.’ [Citation.]” ( Alvarez, supra, at p. 1005 .) K. testified about four instances of molestation, two of which involved Dearing applying force, in the form of tugging at her arm or shirt.

2016(Ibid.) After articulating the standard as a matter of first impression, the Court of Appeal concluded that the force requirement of section 288(b)(1) was “doubly met: defendant’s acts of picking the girls up and carrying them along were applications of physical force 9 substantially different from and substantially greater than that necessary to accomplish the lewd act of feeling their crotches.” (Cicero, supra, 157 Cal.App.3d at p. 474 .) Similarly, in Pitmon, supra, 170 Cal.App.3d at pp. 44–45, the defendant grabbed the eight-year-old victim’s hand, placed it on his own genitals, and rubbed

2020(Oliver, at p. 763.) More recently, in In re Michele D. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 600, 603 (Michele D.), a case involving the kidnapping of a 12-month-old child, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the holding in Oliver, supra, 55 Cal.2d 761 and recognized “that infants and young children are [also] in a different position vis-a-vis the force requirement for kidnapping than those who can apprehend the force being used against them and resist it.” (Id. at p. 610.) The Court concluded that “the amount of force required to kidnap an unresisting infant or child is simply the amount of physical force required to

2020(Oliver, at p. 763.) More recently, in In re Michele D. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 600, 603 (Michele D.), a case involving the kidnapping of a 12-month-old child, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the holding in Oliver, supra, 55 Cal.2d 761 and recognized “that infants and young children are [also] in a different position vis-a-vis the force requirement for kidnapping than those who can apprehend the force being used against them and resist it.” (Id. at p. 610.) The Court concluded that “the amount of force required to kidnap an unresisting infant or child is simply the amount of physical force required to

2024(People v. Dominguez (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1358 (Dominguez) [“We assume the discussion of force in the context of a kidnapping prosecution in [In re] Michele D. [(2002) 29 Cal.4th 600 ] applies equally to the force requirement of false imprisonment.

2015We formulate that standard as follows: the amount of force required to 53 kidnap an unresisting infant or child is simply the amount of physical force required to take and carry the child away a substantial distance for an illegal purpose or with an illegal intent.’ (Michele D., supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 610 . . . .)” (Dominguez, supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 1358 .) The Dominguez court assumed “the discussion of force in the context of a kidnapping prosecution in Michele D. applies equally to the force requirement of false imprisonment.” (Dominguez, supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 1358 .) Appellant

2023But these principles have no application to a case where under the law there can be no consent.” (Id. at p. 215; accord, People v. Soto (2011) 51 Cal.4th 229, 248 .) Verdegreen illuminates the connection between force and consent. “[T]he concepts of consent and force or fear ‘are clearly intertwined.’ ” (Majors, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 327 .) Normally, “ ‘If a person’s free will was not overborne by the use of force or the threat of force, there was no kidnapping.’ ” (Hill, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 856 .) But where a victim is unable to legally consent, and has no true free will, the traditiona

2009The court concluded that there was "ample evidence of force or fear" in Hill because the defendants had forced the woman and her child to accompany them in the car, and had driven the car with both the woman and the child inside of it. ( Hill, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 857 .) "Here, defendant snatched the baby as well [as] the mother.

2022Unlike principles of law presented by the court, “[t]he jury was free to accept or reject that argument.” (People v. Dennis (1998) 17 Cal.4th 468, 548 .) In light of the prosecutor’s wide latitude to comment on the state of the evidence (People v. Martinez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 957 ), and to “ ‘ “vigorously argue [her] case” ’ ” (People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 819 ), and given the brevity of the prosecutor’s argument concerning the kill zone theory, we are not persuaded that the prosecutor committed prejudicial error in arguing the analogy.

2017As explained herein, however, we conclude the Burns formulation of the force requirement encompasses the Morales test. 4 “To satisfy the asportation requirement for robbery, ‘no great movement is required, and it is not necessary that the property be taken out of the physical presence of the victim.’ [Citation.] ‘[S]light movement’ is enough to satisfy the asportation requirement.” (Hill, supra. 17 Cal.4th at p. 852 .) 5 Anderson does state in discussing the force element, “defendant drove Pamela’s car with more force than necessary to move it to a place of safety.” (Anderson, supra. 51 Cal.tt

2015XIII A, XIII C, XIII D), the Act’s plain language instructs us to construe the power of taxation liberally so long as it is approved by the requisite supermajority of voters. “ ‘[D]ue respect for the political branches of our government requires us to interpret the laws in accordance with the expressed intention of the Legislature. . . .’ ” (Professional Engineers in California Government v. Brown (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 861, 872-873 [ 177 Cal.Rptr.3d 567 ]; see Galbiso v. Orosi Public Utility Dist. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 652, 665 [ 107 Cal.Rptr.3d 36 ] [liberally construing statute with simila

2015XIII A, XIII C, XIII D), the Act’s plain language instructs us to construe the power of taxation liberally so long as it is approved by the requisite supermajority of voters. “ ‘[D]ue respect for the political branches of our government requires us to interpret the laws in accordance with the expressed intention of the Legislature. . . .’ ” (Professional Engineers in California Government v. Brown (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 861, 872-873 [ 177 Cal.Rptr.3d 567 ]; see Galbiso v. Orosi Public Utility Dist. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 652, 665 [ 107 Cal.Rptr.3d 36 ] [liberally construing statute with simila

2009(Oliver, at p. 768.) While Oliver itself said nothing about relaxing the force requirement where the kidnap victim was a child, two subsequent Court of Appeal cases attributed such an interpretation to Oliver . 13 In Parnell v. Superior Court (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 392 [ 173 Cal.Rptr. 906 ] (Parnell), the Court of Appeal found that there was “ample force to satisfy the ‘forcible taking’ element of section 207.” (Parnell, at p. 402.) However, in a footnote, the court stated that, in “dicta in Oliver,” “our Supreme Court has implied that the kidnaping of a minor can be accomplished even if unacco

2009(Oliver, at p. 768.) While Oliver itself said nothing about relaxing the force requirement where the kidnap victim was a child, two subsequent Court of Appeal cases attributed such an interpretation to Oliver . 13 In Parnell v. Superior Court (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 392 [ 173 Cal.Rptr. 906 ] (Parnell), the Court of Appeal found that there was “ample force to satisfy the ‘forcible taking’ element of section 207.” (Parnell, at p. 402.) However, in a footnote, the court stated that, in “dicta in Oliver,” “our Supreme Court has implied that the kidnaping of a minor can be accomplished even if unacco

2004An assault is an attempted battery. ( People v. Yeats (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 874, 878 , 136 Cal.Rptr. 243 .) Only a slight unprivileged touching is needed to satisfy the force requirement of a criminal battery. ( People v. Mansfield (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 82, 88 , 245 Cal.Rptr. 800 .) As respondent concedes, the offense of mayhem includes by definition a completed battery. (§§ 203, 242.) The court in In re Ronnie N. (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 731, 734 , 220 Cal.Rptr. 365 appears to have misread DeAngelis as addressing the question whether mayhem necessarily includes assault by means of force likely to

2004(People v. Mansfield (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 82, 88 [ 245 Cal.Rptr. 800 ].) As respondent concedes, the offense of mayhem includes by definition a completed battery. (§§ 203, 242.) The court in In re Ronnie N. (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 731, 734 [ 220 Cal.Rptr. 365 ] appears to have misread DeAngelis as addressing the question whether mayhem necessarily includes assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury.