82 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1883–2025 9 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Cliff v. Hugginsgreen2 sentences2025“In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the presumption [of service] has the force of a rule of law.” Cliff v. Huggins, 724 S.W.2d 778, 780 (Tex. 1987). 2025Co. v. Herrera, 11 S.W.3d 924, 927 (Tex. 1999) (determining that Rule 21a presumption vanished because conflicting evidence of non-receipt was presented to trial court); Cliff v. Huggins, 724 S.W.2d 778, 780 (Tex. 1987) (“In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the presumption has the force of a rule of law.”). | 19 | 35 |
Thomas v. Raygreen2 sentences2024Regardless, the court asked Wilcrest if the notice of hearing was sent by certified mail, return receipt requested on Kapur, and Wilcrest confirmed it had been. 10 contrary, the presumption has the force of a rule of law.” Thomas v. Ray, 889 S.W.2d 237, 238 (Tex. 1994) (orig. proceeding). 2024“In the absence of any proof to the contrary, the presumption has the force of a rule of law.” Thomas v. Ray, 889 S.W.2d 237, 238 (Tex. 1994) (orig. proceeding). | 5 | 20 |
Bell v. Stategreen2 sentences2024This presumption “vanishes when opposing evidence is introduced that [a document] was not received.” In re E.A., 287 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex. 2009) (quoting Cliff, 724 S.W.2d at 780). 1994In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the presumption has the force of a rule of law. [citation omitted] The presumption, however, is not “evidence” and it *17 vanishes when opposing evidence is introduced that the letter was not received. [citation omitted] Cliff, 724 S.W.2d at 780. | 2 | 2 |
Southland Life Insurance v. Greenwadegreen2 sentences2013Jur. 2d Notice § 38; E.W.H., Annotation, Rebuttal of Presumption of Receipt of Letter Properly Mailed and Addressed, 91 A.L.R. 161 (1934). 7 evidence to the contrary, the presumption has the force of a rule of law.‖ Southland, 138 Tex. at 455 , 159 S.W.2d at 857 . ―This presumption relieves the sender of the difficult burden of showing that the recipient actually received notice.‖ Wesco Distribution, Inc. v. Westport Group, Inc., 150 S.W.3d 553, 561 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, no pet.). 2013Jur. 2d Notice § 38; E.W.H., Annotation, Rebuttal of Presumption of Receipt of Letter Properly Mailed and Addressed, 91 A.L.R. 161 (1934). 7 evidence to the contrary, the presumption has the force of a rule of law.‖ Southland, 138 Tex. at 455 , 159 S.W.2d at 857 . ―This presumption relieves the sender of the difficult burden of showing that the recipient actually received notice.‖ Wesco Distribution, Inc. v. Westport Group, Inc., 150 S.W.3d 553, 561 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, no pet.). | 1 | 7 |
Wembley Investment Co. v. Herreragreen1 sentence2025Co. v. Herrera, 11 S.W.3d 924, 927 (Tex. 1999) (determining that Rule 21a presumption vanished because conflicting evidence of non-receipt was presented to trial court); Cliff v. Huggins, 724 S.W.2d 778, 780 (Tex. 1987) (“In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the presumption has the force of a rule of law.”). | 1 | 1 |
In Re EAgreen1 sentence2024This presumption “vanishes when opposing evidence is introduced that [a document] was not received.” In re E.A., 287 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex. 2009) (quoting Cliff, 724 S.W.2d at 780). | 1 | 1 |
Clark v. Arizonagreen1 sentence2015“As applied to mens rea (and every other element), the force of the presumption of innocence is measured by the force of the showing needed to overcome it, which is proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant’s state of mind was in fact what the charge states.” Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 766 (2006); Louis v. State, 329 S.W.3d 260, 269 (Tex. App. Texarkana 2010), affirmed, 393 S.W.3d 246 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Louis v. Stategreen1 sentence2015“As applied to mens rea (and every other element), the force of the presumption of innocence is measured by the force of the showing needed to overcome it, which is proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant’s state of mind was in fact what the charge states.” Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 766 (2006); Louis v. State, 329 S.W.3d 260, 269 (Tex. App. Texarkana 2010), affirmed, 393 S.W.3d 246 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Virgil Edward Kuykendall v. Jessica Beverlygreen1 sentence2015Kuykendall v. Beverly, 436 S.W.3d 809, 813 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014. no pet.). | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Ogbolugreen1 sentence2014Brown v. Ogbolu, 331 S.W.3d 530, 534 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2011, no pet.). 12 Thus, we hold that the certificate of service of the amended petition by Lewisville ISD by certified mail under rule 21a was sufficient to affirmatively establish on the face of the record strict compliance with the rules and with due process. | 1 | 1 |
Wesco Distribution, Inc. v. Westport Group, Inc.green1 sentence2013Jur. 2d Notice § 38; E.W.H., Annotation, Rebuttal of Presumption of Receipt of Letter Properly Mailed and Addressed, 91 A.L.R. 161 (1934). 7 evidence to the contrary, the presumption has the force of a rule of law.‖ Southland, 138 Tex. at 455 , 159 S.W.2d at 857 . ―This presumption relieves the sender of the difficult burden of showing that the recipient actually received notice.‖ Wesco Distribution, Inc. v. Westport Group, Inc., 150 S.W.3d 553, 561 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, no pet.). | 1 | 1 |
Donnell v. Ottsgreen1 sentence2009Donnell v. Otts, 230 S.W. 864, 865 (Tex. Civ. | 1 | 1 |
Vaughn v. Stategreen2 sentences1999Moreover, Subsection (b) imbues this requirement with the force of a presumption because, as the Court of Criminal Appeals aptly phrased it, "The punishment of one for an offense when he is able to show that the act was done without guilty knowledge or intent is contrary to the general principles of criminal law ...." Vaughn v. State, 86 Tex.Crim. 255 , 219 S.W. 206, 208 (1919); [other citations omitted]. 1999Moreover, Subsection (b) imbues this requirement with the force of a presumption because, as the Court of Criminal Appeals aptly phrased it, "The punishment of one for an offense when he is able to show that the act was done without guilty knowledge or intent is contrary to the general principles of criminal law ...." Vaughn v. State, 86 Tex.Crim. 255 , 219 S.W. 206, 208 (1919); [other citations omitted]. | 1 | 1 |
Krchnak v. Fultongreen1 sentence1991Cliff v. Huggins, 724 S.W.2d 778, 780 (Tex. 1987); Krchnak v. Fulton, 759 S.W.2d 524, 528 (Tex. 1988, writ denied); Hurt v. Bays, 537 S.W.2d 139 (Tex. Civ. | 1 | 1 |
Costello v. Johnsongreen1 sentence1988Cliff v. Huggins, 724 S.W.2d 778, 780 (Tex.1987); Costello v. Johnson, 680 S.W.2d 529, 532 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1984, writ ref d n.r.e.). | 1 | 1 |
| Hancock v. Butlergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
APPROXIMATELY $14,980.00 v. State
green
2 sentences2020See Modelist, 2011 WL 3717010 , at *2; Approximately $14,980.00, 261 S.W.3d at 186 . 2020See Modelist, 2011 WL 3717010 , at *2; Approximately $14,980.00, 261 S.W.3d at 186 . | 2 | 2020–2020 |
Meek v. Bishop Peterson & Sharp, P.C.
green
2 sentences2003Id. 2000Id. | 2 | 2000–2003 |
Neill v. State
green
2 sentences2001Despite Subsection (b), of course, the legislature is free to dispense with the requirement of a culpable mental state — as it has done in creating the so-called strict liability offenses, e.g., Neill v. State, 225 S.W.2d 829 (Tex.Crim.App.1949) (adulterated food); Goodwin v. State, 63 Tex.Crim. 140 , 138 S.W. 399 (1911) (speeding) —but its intent to eliminate mens rea must be manifest. 1999Despite Subsection (b), of course, the legislature is free to dispense with the requirement of a culpable mental stateas it has done in creating the so-called strict liability offenses, e.g., Neill v. State, 225 S.W.2d 829 (Tex.Crim.App. 1949) (adulterated food); Goodwin v. State, 63 Tex.Crim. 140 , 138 S.W. 399 (1911) (speeding) but its intent to eliminate mens rea must be manifest. [Emphasis added.] See Stalling v. State, 90 Tex.Crim. 310 , 234 S.W. 914 (1921) [(although statute requiring driver of automobile to stop and render aid did not include element of knowledge, lack of knowledge wo | 2 | 1999–2001 |
Goodwin v. State
green
2 sentences2001Despite Subsection (b), of course, the legislature is free to dispense with the requirement of a culpable mental state — as it has done in creating the so-called strict liability offenses, e.g., Neill v. State, 225 S.W.2d 829 (Tex.Crim.App.1949) (adulterated food); Goodwin v. State, 63 Tex.Crim. 140 , 138 S.W. 399 (1911) (speeding) —but its intent to eliminate mens rea must be manifest. 2001Despite Subsection (b), of course, the legislature is free to dispense with the requirement of a culpable mental state — as it has done in creating the so-called strict liability offenses, e.g., Neill v. State, 225 S.W.2d 829 (Tex.Crim.App.1949) (adulterated food); Goodwin v. State, 63 Tex.Crim. 140 , 138 S.W. 399 (1911) (speeding) —but its intent to eliminate mens rea must be manifest. | 2 | 1999–2001 |
Almanza v. State
green
1 sentence2016We next consider the state of the evidence, Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171 , which shows that an ordinary force instruction would not have affected the trial’s outcome. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Ulbricht v. Friedsam
green
1 sentence2015In the instances of land conveyances abutting bodies of water, “the presumption that the grantor intends to convey all the land he owns under the water is very strong and expressions substantially to the effect that nothing short of an express reservation of the bed will overcome the force of the presumption are not uncommon in the cases.” Ulbricht, 325 S.W.2d at 673 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Louis, Cory Don
green
1 sentence2015“As applied to mens rea (and every other element), the force of the presumption of innocence is measured by the force of the showing needed to overcome it, which is proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant’s state of mind was in fact what the charge states.” Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 766 (2006); Louis v. State, 329 S.W.3d 260, 269 (Tex. App. Texarkana 2010), affirmed, 393 S.W.3d 246 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Stalling v. State
green
2 sentences1999Despite Subsection (b), of course, the legislature is free to dispense with the requirement of a culpable mental stateas it has done in creating the so-called strict liability offenses, e.g., Neill v. State, 225 S.W.2d 829 (Tex.Crim.App. 1949) (adulterated food); Goodwin v. State, 63 Tex.Crim. 140 , 138 S.W. 399 (1911) (speeding) but its intent to eliminate mens rea must be manifest. [Emphasis added.] See Stalling v. State, 90 Tex.Crim. 310 , 234 S.W. 914 (1921) [(although statute requiring driver of automobile to stop and render aid did not include element of knowledge, lack of knowledge wo 1999Despite Subsection (b), of course, the legislature is free to dispense with the requirement of a culpable mental stateas it has done in creating the so-called strict liability offenses, e.g., Neill v. State, 225 S.W.2d 829 (Tex.Crim.App. 1949) (adulterated food); Goodwin v. State, 63 Tex.Crim. 140 , 138 S.W. 399 (1911) (speeding) but its intent to eliminate mens rea must be manifest. [Emphasis added.] See Stalling v. State, 90 Tex.Crim. 310 , 234 S.W. 914 (1921) [(although statute requiring driver of automobile to stop and render aid did not include element of knowledge, lack of knowledge wo | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Bloom v. Texas State Board of Pharmacy
green
2 sentences1999Despite Subsection (b), of course, the legislature is free to dispense with the requirement of a culpable mental stateas it has done in creating the so-called strict liability offenses, e.g., Neill v. State, 225 S.W.2d 829 (Tex.Crim.App. 1949) (adulterated food); Goodwin v. State, 63 Tex.Crim. 140 , 138 S.W. 399 (1911) (speeding) but its intent to eliminate mens rea must be manifest. [Emphasis added.] See Stalling v. State, 90 Tex.Crim. 310 , 234 S.W. 914 (1921) [(although statute requiring driver of automobile to stop and render aid did not include element of knowledge, lack of knowledge wo 1999Despite Subsection (b), of course, the legislature is free to dispense with the requirement of a culpable mental state — as it has done in creating the so-called strict liability offenses, e.g., Neill v. State, 225 S.W.2d 829 (Tex.Crim.App. 1949) (adulterated food); Goodwin v. State, 63 Tex.Crim. 140 , 138 S.W. 399 (1911) (speeding) — but its intent to eliminate mens rea must be manifest. [Emphasis added.] See Stalling v. State, 90 Tex.Crim. 310 , 234 S.W. 914 (1921) [ (although statute requiring driver of automobile to stop and render aid did not include element of knowledge, lack of knowledg | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Hurt v. Bays
green
1 sentence1991Cliff v. Huggins, 724 S.W.2d 778, 780 (Tex. 1987); Krchnak v. Fulton, 759 S.W.2d 524, 528 (Tex. 1988, writ denied); Hurt v. Bays, 537 S.W.2d 139 (Tex. Civ. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Switzer v. Joseph
green
2 sentences1975Appellant recognizes the force of the rule in Switzer v. Joseph, supra, but claims that the following testimony of Echols is direct evidence of conspiracy, and that, as a result, she has succeeded in taking the case beyond the Switzer v. Joseph, supra, rule, and that she has raised an issue of fact which should have been resolved by the jury. 1975Appellant recognizes the force of the rule in Switzer v. Joseph, supra, but claims that the following testimony of Echols is direct evidence of conspiracy, and that, as a result, she has succeeded in taking the case beyond the Switzer v. Joseph, supra, rule, and that she has raised an issue of fact which should have been resolved by the jury. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Hopkins v. Hopkins green | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| McMahan v. McMahan neutral | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Wallace v. First National Bank of Paris
green
2 sentences1970Hassell v. Frey, 131 Tex. 578 , 117 S.W.2d 413 (1938); Federal Land Bank of Houston v. Little, 130 Tex. 173 , 107 S.W.2d 374 (1937); Calvery v. Calvery, 122 Tex. 204 , 55 S.W.2d 527 (1932); Wallace v. First National Bank, 120 Tex. 92 , 35 S.W.2d 1036 (1931); Hopkins v. Hopkins, 103 Tex. 15 , 122 S.W. 15 (1909); Simonton v. White, 93 Tex. 50 , 53 S.W. 339 (1899); Hancock v. Butler, 21 Tex. 804, 812 (1858); McMahan v. McMahan, 198 S.W. 354 (Tex.Civ.App.1917, writ ref.). 1970Hassell v. Frey, 131 Tex. 578 , 117 S.W.2d 413 (1938); Federal Land Bank of Houston v. Little, 130 Tex. 173 , 107 S.W.2d 374 (1937); Calvery v. Calvery, 122 Tex. 204 , 55 S.W.2d 527 (1932); Wallace v. First National Bank, 120 Tex. 92 , 35 S.W.2d 1036 (1931); Hopkins v. Hopkins, 103 Tex. 15 , 122 S.W. 15 (1909); Simonton v. White, 93 Tex. 50 , 53 S.W. 339 (1899); Hancock v. Butler, 21 Tex. 804, 812 (1858); McMahan v. McMahan, 198 S.W. 354 (Tex.Civ.App.1917, writ ref.). | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Federal Land Bank v. Little
green
2 sentences1970Hassell v. Frey, 131 Tex. 578 , 117 S.W.2d 413 (1938); Federal Land Bank of Houston v. Little, 130 Tex. 173 , 107 S.W.2d 374 (1937); Calvery v. Calvery, 122 Tex. 204 , 55 S.W.2d 527 (1932); Wallace v. First National Bank, 120 Tex. 92 , 35 S.W.2d 1036 (1931); Hopkins v. Hopkins, 103 Tex. 15 , 122 S.W. 15 (1909); Simonton v. White, 93 Tex. 50 , 53 S.W. 339 (1899); Hancock v. Butler, 21 Tex. 804, 812 (1858); McMahan v. McMahan, 198 S.W. 354 (Tex.Civ.App.1917, writ ref.). 1970Hassell v. Frey, 131 Tex. 578 , 117 S.W.2d 413 (1938); Federal Land Bank of Houston v. Little, 130 Tex. 173 , 107 S.W.2d 374 (1937); Calvery v. Calvery, 122 Tex. 204 , 55 S.W.2d 527 (1932); Wallace v. First National Bank, 120 Tex. 92 , 35 S.W.2d 1036 (1931); Hopkins v. Hopkins, 103 Tex. 15 , 122 S.W. 15 (1909); Simonton v. White, 93 Tex. 50 , 53 S.W. 339 (1899); Hancock v. Butler, 21 Tex. 804, 812 (1858); McMahan v. McMahan, 198 S.W. 354 (Tex.Civ.App.1917, writ ref.). | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Hassell v. Frey
neutral
2 sentences1970Hassell v. Frey, 131 Tex. 578 , 117 S.W.2d 413 (1938); Federal Land Bank of Houston v. Little, 130 Tex. 173 , 107 S.W.2d 374 (1937); Calvery v. Calvery, 122 Tex. 204 , 55 S.W.2d 527 (1932); Wallace v. First National Bank, 120 Tex. 92 , 35 S.W.2d 1036 (1931); Hopkins v. Hopkins, 103 Tex. 15 , 122 S.W. 15 (1909); Simonton v. White, 93 Tex. 50 , 53 S.W. 339 (1899); Hancock v. Butler, 21 Tex. 804, 812 (1858); McMahan v. McMahan, 198 S.W. 354 (Tex.Civ.App.1917, writ ref.). 1970Hassell v. Frey, 131 Tex. 578 , 117 S.W.2d 413 (1938); Federal Land Bank of Houston v. Little, 130 Tex. 173 , 107 S.W.2d 374 (1937); Calvery v. Calvery, 122 Tex. 204 , 55 S.W.2d 527 (1932); Wallace v. First National Bank, 120 Tex. 92 , 35 S.W.2d 1036 (1931); Hopkins v. Hopkins, 103 Tex. 15 , 122 S.W. 15 (1909); Simonton v. White, 93 Tex. 50 , 53 S.W. 339 (1899); Hancock v. Butler, 21 Tex. 804, 812 (1858); McMahan v. McMahan, 198 S.W. 354 (Tex.Civ.App.1917, writ ref.). | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Simonton v. White
neutral
1 sentence1970Hassell v. Frey, 131 Tex. 578 , 117 S.W.2d 413 (1938); Federal Land Bank of Houston v. Little, 130 Tex. 173 , 107 S.W.2d 374 (1937); Calvery v. Calvery, 122 Tex. 204 , 55 S.W.2d 527 (1932); Wallace v. First National Bank, 120 Tex. 92 , 35 S.W.2d 1036 (1931); Hopkins v. Hopkins, 103 Tex. 15 , 122 S.W. 15 (1909); Simonton v. White, 93 Tex. 50 , 53 S.W. 339 (1899); Hancock v. Butler, 21 Tex. 804, 812 (1858); McMahan v. McMahan, 198 S.W. 354 (Tex.Civ.App.1917, writ ref.). | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| Calvery v. Calvery green | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| Mayor of Galveston v. Menard green | 1 | 1961–1961 |
| Simmons v. Dickson green | 1 | 1961–1961 |
| Cartwright v. Warren green | 1 | 1919–1919 |
| Holbein v. De La Garza green | 1 | 1919–1919 |
| Linney v. Wood green | 1 | 1915–1915 |
| Frank v. Tatum green | 1 | 1903–1903 |
| Baldwin v. Sager neutral | 1 | 1883–1883 |
| Meidel v. Anthis green | 1 | 1883–1883 |
| Howe Machine Co. v. Willie green | 1 | 1883–1883 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.