exclusive-remedy defense in Texas

2018Subsequently, in TIC Energy , Texas Supreme Court held regarding OCIPs: [A] "general contractor who has, pursuant to a written agreement, purchased a workers' compensation insurance policy covering its subcontractors and its subcontractors' employees ... becomes the statutory employer of its subcontractor's employees, and is thus entitled to the benefits conferred on employers by the [TWCA]." Furthermore, because a contractor can " 'provide[ ]' workers' compensation, even when it has not purchased the insurance directly, ... multiple tiers of subcontractors [thereby] qualify as statutory emplo

2018It held that, because a contractor can " 'provide[ ]' workers' compensation, even when it has not purchased the insurance directly, ... multiple tiers of subcontractors [thereby] qualify as statutory employers entitled to the exclusive-remedy defense." See id. at 74 ( quoting HCBeck , 284 S.W.3d at 359 ).

2023As we previously observed, it is “just the opposite, if [Oteka’s] injury is compensable, this would likely bar [her] suit pursuant to the exclusive-remedy defense.” Mann, 549 S.W.3d at 321 (citing Walls Reg’l 7 Hosp. v. Bomar, 9 S.W.3d 805, 806 (Tex. 1999) (per curiam)).

2021See Berry Contracting, 549 S.W.3d at 321 (citing Walls Reg’l Hosp. v. Bomar, 9 S.W.3d 805, 806 (Tex. 1999) (per curiam)).

2024See Berry Contracting, L.P. v. Mann, 549 S.W.3d 314, 324 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2018, pet. denied) (holding that Section 406.123(f)’s requirement that a general contractor file a coverage agreement with a workers’ compensation insurance carrier—the failure of which constituted an administrative violation—did not affect its ability to satisfy the exclusive-remedy’s employer element).

2023As we previously observed, it is “just the opposite, if [Oteka’s] injury is compensable, this would likely bar [her] suit pursuant to the exclusive-remedy defense.” Mann, 549 S.W.3d at 321 (citing Walls Reg’l 7 Hosp. v. Bomar, 9 S.W.3d 805, 806 (Tex. 1999) (per curiam)).

2021Thus, pursuing the exclusive- remedy defense through a plea to the jurisdiction “is problematic and not to be encouraged.” Robles v. Mount Franklin Food, L.L.C., 591 S.W.3d 158 , 163 (Tex. App.— El Paso 2019, pet. denied) (quoting Briggs v. Toyota Mfg. of Tex., 337 S.W.3d 275, 281 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2010, no pet.)).

2021See id. at 163–64; Briggs, 337 S.W.3d at 281 .

2021In TIC Energy & Chemical, Inc., the Texas Supreme Court discussed its holding in 11 HCBeck as follows: In HCBeck, Ltd. v. Rice, we explained that a “general contractor who has, pursuant to a written agreement, purchased a workers’ compensation insurance policy covering its subcontractors and its subcontractors’ employees . . . becomes the statutory employer of its subcontractor’s employees, and is thus entitled to the benefits conferred on employers by the Act.” Furthermore, because a contractor can “‘provide[ ]’ workers’ compensation, even when it has not purchased the insurance directly, . .

2021This reasoning aligns with TIC Energy & Chem., Inc., which states that a contractor “‘provide[s]’ workers’ compensation, even when it has not purchased the insurance directly . . . multiple tiers of subcontractors [thereby] qualify as statutory employers entitled to the exclusive-remedy defense.” 498 S.W.3d at 74 .

2024See Port Elevator- Brownsville v. Casados, 358 S.W.3d 238, 242 (Tex. 2012).

2018Id.

2018Id. at 75 n.45 (citing HCBeck , 284 S.W.3d at 359 , Entergy Gulf States Inc. v. Summers , 282 S.W.3d 433 , 436-38 (Tex. 2009), Funes v. Eldridge Elec.

2016See HCBeck, 284 S.W,3d at 359 (because a contractor can " 'provided' workers’ compensation, even when it has not purchased the insurance directly, ... multiple tiers of subcontractors [thereby] qualify as statutory employers entitled to the exclusive remedy defense”); Entergy Gulf States, 282 S.W.3d at 436-38 (premises owner can be a general contractor and thus entitled to the exclusive-remedy defense by virtue of an agreement complying with section 406.123); Funes, 270 S.W.3d at 670-72 (subcontractor entitled to exclusive-remedy defense against claims by another subcontractor’s employee); Eti

2018Once the ROCIP provision is satisfied, "the statutory employer/employee relationship extends throughout all tiers of subcontractors and ... all covered employees are fellow servants who are equally entitled to workers' compensation benefits and equally immune from suit...." TIC Energy & Chem., Inc. v. Martin , 498 S.W.3d 68 , 75 n.45 (Tex. 2016) (quoting Etie v. Walsh & Albert Co., Ltd. , 135 S.W.3d 764 , 765 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. denied) ).

2016See HCBeck, 284 S.W,3d at 359 (because a contractor can " 'provided' workers’ compensation, even when it has not purchased the insurance directly, ... multiple tiers of subcontractors [thereby] qualify as statutory employers entitled to the exclusive remedy defense”); Entergy Gulf States, 282 S.W.3d at 436-38 (premises owner can be a general contractor and thus entitled to the exclusive-remedy defense by virtue of an agreement complying with section 406.123); Funes, 270 S.W.3d at 670-72 (subcontractor entitled to exclusive-remedy defense against claims by another subcontractor’s employee); Eti

2016See Wingfoot Enters. v. Alvarado, 111 S.W.3d 134, 134-35 (Tex.2003). .

2015Id. at 358 (quoting Wingfoot Enters., 111 S.W.3d at 142 ) (emphasis in original).

2025Co., 543 S.W.3d 750, 751 (Tex. 2017) (orig. proceeding) (quoting In re Crawford & Co., 458 S.W.3d 920, 925-26 (Tex. 2015) (orig. proceeding)). 33 See Accident Fund, 543 S.W.3d at 753 . 11 The University acknowledges that the Legislature did not enact express language granting the Division exclusive jurisdiction to determine the exclusive-remedy defense and its subsidiary issues—e.g., course and scope, workers’ compensation insurance coverage, employee and employer status, and injury.

2025Co., 543 S.W.3d 750, 751 (Tex. 2017) (orig. proceeding) (quoting In re Crawford & Co., 458 S.W.3d 920, 925-26 (Tex. 2015) (orig. proceeding)). 33 See Accident Fund, 543 S.W.3d at 753 . 11 The University acknowledges that the Legislature did not enact express language granting the Division exclusive jurisdiction to determine the exclusive-remedy defense and its subsidiary issues—e.g., course and scope, workers’ compensation insurance coverage, employee and employer status, and injury.

2025Co., 543 S.W.3d 750, 751 (Tex. 2017) (orig. proceeding) (quoting In re Crawford & Co., 458 S.W.3d 920, 925-26 (Tex. 2015) (orig. proceeding)). 33 See Accident Fund, 543 S.W.3d at 753 . 11 The University acknowledges that the Legislature did not enact express language granting the Division exclusive jurisdiction to determine the exclusive-remedy defense and its subsidiary issues—e.g., course and scope, workers’ compensation insurance coverage, employee and employer status, and injury.

2023See City of Bellaire v. Johnson, 400 S.W.3d 922, 924 (Tex. 2013) (per curiam) (“suit for injury from the operation of a motor-driven vehicle” would have waived sovereign immunity “but for the exclusive-remedy bar provided by the [TWCA]”).

2021Here, Medrano’s live petition does not allege facts that negate his cause of action, no special exceptions appear in the record, and the petition does not contain any internal pleading defects that are incurable. 9 judgment on the exclusive-remedy defense would have been proper, “particularly since it was not substantially developed in the trial court.” See Kelley v. Bluff Creek Oil Co., 309 S.W.2d 208, 215 (Tex. 1958) (declining to rule on the merits of a plea in bar); Tex. Underground, 335 S.W.3d at 676 (concluding that a dismissal could not be upheld as a summary judgment in the absence of

2021Here, Medrano’s live petition does not allege facts that negate his cause of action, no special exceptions appear in the record, and the petition does not contain any internal pleading defects that are incurable. 9 judgment on the exclusive-remedy defense would have been proper, “particularly since it was not substantially developed in the trial court.” See Kelley v. Bluff Creek Oil Co., 309 S.W.2d 208, 215 (Tex. 1958) (declining to rule on the merits of a plea in bar); Tex. Underground, 335 S.W.3d at 676 (concluding that a dismissal could not be upheld as a summary judgment in the absence of

2021Here, Medrano’s live petition does not allege facts that negate his cause of action, no special exceptions appear in the record, and the petition does not contain any internal pleading defects that are incurable. 9 judgment on the exclusive-remedy defense would have been proper, “particularly since it was not substantially developed in the trial court.” See Kelley v. Bluff Creek Oil Co., 309 S.W.2d 208, 215 (Tex. 1958) (declining to rule on the merits of a plea in bar); Tex. Underground, 335 S.W.3d at 676 (concluding that a dismissal could not be upheld as a summary judgment in the absence of

2019See Garza, 161 S.W.3d at 475-77 ; Trahan, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 6493 , at **15-16.

2018See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228 (procedure for plea to the jurisdiction when evidence has been submitted to trial court mirrors that of traditional summary judgment).

2018See Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009) (to prevail on summary judgment, movant must demonstrate no issues of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law); Garcia, 372 S.W.3d at 635 (“If a fact issue exists, the trial court should deny the plea.”).

2018Roberts v. Davis, 160 S.W.3d 256, 261 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2005, pet. denied) (holding that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment on defendants’ limitations defense). 2.

2018Roberts, 160 S.W.3d at 261 .

2018See Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009) (to prevail on summary judgment, movant must demonstrate no issues of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law); Garcia, 372 S.W.3d at 635 (“If a fact issue exists, the trial court should deny the plea.”).

2016See HCBeck, 284 S.W,3d at 359 (because a contractor can " 'provided' workers’ compensation, even when it has not purchased the insurance directly, ... multiple tiers of subcontractors [thereby] qualify as statutory employers entitled to the exclusive remedy defense”); Entergy Gulf States, 282 S.W.3d at 436-38 (premises owner can be a general contractor and thus entitled to the exclusive-remedy defense by virtue of an agreement complying with section 406.123); Funes, 270 S.W.3d at 670-72 (subcontractor entitled to exclusive-remedy defense against claims by another subcontractor’s employee); Eti

2016See HCBeck, 284 S.W,3d at 359 (because a contractor can " 'provided' workers’ compensation, even when it has not purchased the insurance directly, ... multiple tiers of subcontractors [thereby] qualify as statutory employers entitled to the exclusive remedy defense”); Entergy Gulf States, 282 S.W.3d at 436-38 (premises owner can be a general contractor and thus entitled to the exclusive-remedy defense by virtue of an agreement complying with section 406.123); Funes, 270 S.W.3d at 670-72 (subcontractor entitled to exclusive-remedy defense against claims by another subcontractor’s employee); Eti

2009See Tex Ins.Code. §§ 2053.001-.054; Lee Lewis Constr., Inc. v. Harrison, 70 S.W.3d 778, 795 (Tex.2001) (Hecht, J., concurring) (a contractor's employer "has the same economic incentive the contractor has to minimize job-related risks to workers”).

2008Co., 416 Mich. 267, 274-75 , 330 N.W.2d 397, 399 (1982)); see also Downie, 122 Mich.App. at 737, 333 N.W.2d at 535 (“When an employee’s injury is within the scope of the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act, workers’ compensation benefits are the employee’s exclusive remedy against the employer.”); McKinley v. Holiday Inn, 115 Mich.App. 160, 163 , 320 N.W.2d 329, 331 (1982) (per curiam) (“If the WDCA covers the kind of injury suffered, the act[’s] remedy is exclusive even though under the facts of the particular case no compensation is payable because there has been no actual loss of earning c

2008Co., 416 Mich. 267, 274-75 , 330 N.W.2d 397, 399 (1982)); see also Downie, 122 Mich.App. at 737, 333 N.W.2d at 535 (“When an employee’s injury is within the scope of the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act, workers’ compensation benefits are the employee’s exclusive remedy against the employer.”); McKinley v. Holiday Inn, 115 Mich.App. 160, 163 , 320 N.W.2d 329, 331 (1982) (per curiam) (“If the WDCA covers the kind of injury suffered, the act[’s] remedy is exclusive even though under the facts of the particular case no compensation is payable because there has been no actual loss of earning c

2008Co., 416 Mich. 267, 274-75 , 330 N.W.2d 397, 399 (1982)); see also Downie, 122 Mich.App. at 737, 333 N.W.2d at 535 (“When an employee’s injury is within the scope of the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act, workers’ compensation benefits are the employee’s exclusive remedy against the employer.”); McKinley v. Holiday Inn, 115 Mich.App. 160, 163 , 320 N.W.2d 329, 331 (1982) (per curiam) (“If the WDCA covers the kind of injury suffered, the act[’s] remedy is exclusive even though under the facts of the particular case no compensation is payable because there has been no actual loss of earning c

2008Co., 416 Mich. 267, 274-75 , 330 N.W.2d 397, 399 (1982)); see also Downie, 122 Mich.App. at 737, 333 N.W.2d at 535 (“When an employee’s injury is within the scope of the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act, workers’ compensation benefits are the employee’s exclusive remedy against the employer.”); McKinley v. Holiday Inn, 115 Mich.App. 160, 163 , 320 N.W.2d 329, 331 (1982) (per curiam) (“If the WDCA covers the kind of injury suffered, the act[’s] remedy is exclusive even though under the facts of the particular case no compensation is payable because there has been no actual loss of earning c