Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
20 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1996–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State Ex Rel. Texas Department of Transportation v. Precision Solar Controls, Inc.green2 sentences2014See Mitchell, 977 S.W.2d at 579–80; see also Masonheimer, 220 S.W.3d at 508 (distinguishing mistrials from cases reversed on appeal in Oregon v. Kennedy analysis). 2011The Court of Criminal Appeals subsequently discussed the Oregon v. Kennedy standard in Ex parte Masonheimer, 220 S.W.3d 494 (Tex.Crim.App.2007). | 4 | 8 |
Ex Parte Lewisgreen2 sentences2014The Double Jeopardy Clause affords a criminal defendant a “valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal.” Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 671 - 72, 102 S.Ct. at 2087 ; see Ex parte Lewis, 219 S.W.3d 335, 371 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007)(adopting Oregon v. Kennedy standard as the correct standard when addressing a double jeopardy claim under the Texas Constitution and overruling Bauder v. State, 921 S.W.2d 696 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996), which had established a rule that retrial would be barred when it was shown that the prosecutor was aware of but consciously disregarded the risk that hi 2013“The Oregon v. Kennedy standard delineating these bounds is usually read to mean that a retrial after a defense-requested mistrial is jeopardy-barred only when the prosecutorial conduct giving rise to the successful motion for a mistrial was intended to provoke [or goad] the defendant into moving for a mistrial.” Id. (citing Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 676, 679 , 102 S. Ct. at 2089-91 ; Ex parte Lewis, 219 S.W.3d at 358-59 ) (internal quotations omitted). | 4 | 8 |
Oregon v. Kennedygreen2 sentences2018App. 2007) (quoting Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 679 (1982)) (adopting the Oregon v. Kennedy standard as the proper rule in Texas). 2018App. 2007) (quoting Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 679 (1982)) (adopting the Oregon v. Kennedy standard as the proper rule in Texas). | 4 | 7 |
Albernaz v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2008It seems to me that if any of our precedent deserves closer scrutiny, it would be Davis and Mitchell, not Bauder.”); see also Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 343 , 101 S.Ct. 1137, 1144 , 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981) (“the decisional law in the area [of Double Jeopardy] is a veritable Sargasso Sea which could not fail to challenge the most intrepid judicial navigator”). 2008It seems to me that if any of our precedent deserves closer scrutiny, it would be Davis and Mitchell, not Bauder.”); see also Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 343 , 101 S.Ct. 1137, 1144 , 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981) (“the decisional law in the area [of Double Jeopardy] is a veritable Sargasso Sea which could not fail to challenge the most intrepid judicial navigator”). | 2 | 2 |
Giglio v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2007See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 , 92 S.Ct. 763 , 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972) (“The prosecutor’s office is an entity and as such it is the spokesman for the Government. 2007See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 , 92 S.Ct. 763 , 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972) (“The prosecutor’s office is an entity and as such it is the spokesman for the Government. | 2 | 2 |
Bauder v. Statered2 sentences2014The Double Jeopardy Clause affords a criminal defendant a “valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal.” Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 671 - 72, 102 S.Ct. at 2087 ; see Ex parte Lewis, 219 S.W.3d 335, 371 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007)(adopting Oregon v. Kennedy standard as the correct standard when addressing a double jeopardy claim under the Texas Constitution and overruling Bauder v. State, 921 S.W.2d 696 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996), which had established a rule that retrial would be barred when it was shown that the prosecutor was aware of but consciously disregarded the risk that hi 2007In response to the difficulties in applying the Oregon v. Kennedy standard, we came up with a new standard in Bauder v. State, 921 S.W.2d 696 (Tex.Crim.App.1996). | 1 | 3 |
Ex Parte Mitchellgreen1 sentence2014See Mitchell, 977 S.W.2d at 579–80; see also Masonheimer, 220 S.W.3d at 508 (distinguishing mistrials from cases reversed on appeal in Oregon v. Kennedy analysis). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Masonheimergreen2 sentences2007And, since appellee won in the trial court, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. [14] In considering whether the State acted "intentionally" under the Oregon v. Kennedy standard, the Court of Appeals considered only the mens rea of the "new lead prosecutor." See Masonheimer, 154 S.W.3d at 251, 254 . 2007And, since appellee won in the trial court, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. 14 In considering whether the State acted “intentionally” under the Oregon v. Kennedy standard, the Court of Appeals considered only the mens rea of the “new lead prosecutor.” See Masonheimer, 154 S.W.3d at 251, 254 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ex Parte Wheeler
green
2 sentences2015From the record before us, we see no untoward events or insurmountable rulings that befell the 4 Ex parte Wheeler is a pre-Ex parte Lewis case, but these factors were set out to assist in deciding claims under either the federal or state constitutional guarantees against double jeopardy and would still apply to the Oregon v. Kennedy analysis. 203 S.W.3d at 323 . 10 State. 2015There were multiple attempts to have 1 Ex parte Wheeler is a pre-Ex parte Lewis case, but these factors were set out to assist in deciding claims under either the federal or state constitutional guarantees against double jeopardy and would still apply to the Oregon v. Kennedy analysis. 203 S.W.3d at 323 . 6 Guzman testify to what the complaining witness had told her. | 2 | 2015–2015 |
State v. White
green
2 sentences1996Several state supreme courts have explicitly adopted the Oregon v. Kennedy standard under their state constitutions, including Virginia (Robinson v. Commonwealth, 18 Va.App. 814 , 447 S.E.2d 542 (1994)); Kentucky (Stamps v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 868 (Ky.1983); North Carolina (State v. White, 322 N.C. 506 , 369 S.E.2d 813 (1988)). 1996Several state supreme courts have explicitly adopted the Oregon v. Kennedy standard under their state constitutions, including Virginia (Robinson v. Commonwealth, 18 Va.App. 814 , 447 S.E.2d 542 (1994)); Kentucky (Stamps v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 868 (Ky.1983); North Carolina (State v. White, 322 N.C. 506 , 369 S.E.2d 813 (1988)). | 2 | 1996–1997 |
Stamps v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences1996Several state supreme courts have explicitly adopted the Oregon v. Kennedy standard under their state constitutions, including Virginia ( Robinson v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 814 , 447 S.E.2d 542 (1994)); Kentucky ( Stamps v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 868 (Ky.1983); North Carolina ( State v. White, 322 N.C. 506 , 369 S.E.2d 813 (1988)). 1996Several state supreme courts have explicitly adopted the Oregon v. Kennedy standard under their state constitutions, including Virginia (Robinson v. Commonwealth, 18 Va.App. 814 , 447 S.E.2d 542 (1994)); Kentucky (Stamps v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 868 (Ky.1983); North Carolina (State v. White, 322 N.C. 506 , 369 S.E.2d 813 (1988)). | 2 | 1996–1997 |
Robinson v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences1996Several state supreme courts have explicitly adopted the Oregon v. Kennedy standard under their state constitutions, including Virginia (Robinson v. Commonwealth, 18 Va.App. 814 , 447 S.E.2d 542 (1994)); Kentucky (Stamps v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 868 (Ky.1983); North Carolina (State v. White, 322 N.C. 506 , 369 S.E.2d 813 (1988)). 1996Several state supreme courts have explicitly adopted the Oregon v. Kennedy standard under their state constitutions, including Virginia (Robinson v. Commonwealth, 18 Va.App. 814 , 447 S.E.2d 542 (1994)); Kentucky (Stamps v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 868 (Ky.1983); North Carolina (State v. White, 322 N.C. 506 , 369 S.E.2d 813 (1988)). | 2 | 1996–1997 |
Anderson v. State
green
2 sentences1996Anderson v. State, 635 S.W.2d 722 (Tex.Crim.App.1982). 1996Anderson v. State, 635 S.W.2d 722 (Tex.Crim.App.1982). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.