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20 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1992–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Serrano v. Union Planters Bank, N.A.green2 sentences2010When the party without the burden of proof suffers an unfavorable finding, the challenge on appeal is one of “no evidence to support the finding.” Seirano v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 162 S.W.3d 576, 579 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2004, pet. denied). 2010When the party without the burden of proof suffers an unfavorable finding, the challenge on appeal is one of “no evidence to support the finding.” Seirano v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 162 S.W.3d 576, 579 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2004, pet. denied). | 3 | 3 |
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Rangelred2 sentences2003Diaz pleaded 1 and proved 2 her case in reliance on our decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Rangel, 966 S.W.2d 199, 202 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1998, pet. ref d). 3 The. trial court denied Wal-Mart’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict in reliance on our decision in Rangel . 4 Yet today, the majority overrules our Rangel decision and renders judgment against Diaz on the very theory Rangel specifically held was “not the standard Ms. Rangel had to meet.” Id. 2003Diaz pleaded 1 and proved 2 her case in reliance on our decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Rangel, 966 S.W.2d 199, 202 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1998, pet. ref d). 3 The. trial court denied Wal-Mart’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict in reliance on our decision in Rangel . 4 Yet today, the majority overrules our Rangel decision and renders judgment against Diaz on the very theory Rangel specifically held was “not the standard Ms. Rangel had to meet.” Id. | 3 | 3 |
Williamson v. John Deere Co.green2 sentences2009In his response to Wal-Mart's motion, Chacon included the affidavit of Cindy Trigo, the legal assistant with the Herrman law firm, who attempted to settle the case with Wal-Mart "[f]or nearly two years.” . 708 S.W.2d 38, 40 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1986, no writ). . 2009In his response to Wal-Mart's motion, Chacon included the affidavit of Cindy Trigo, the legal assistant with the Herrman law firm, who attempted to settle the case with Wal-Mart "[f]or nearly two years." 13. 708 S.W.2d 38, 40 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1986, no writ). 14. | 2 | 2 |
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Gonzalezgreen2 sentences2003Assn, 612 S.W.2d 199, 205 (Tex.1980)); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Gonzalez, 954 S.W.2d 777, 784 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1997) ("[T]he harsh reality is that if the plaintiff cannot prove facts to support her cause of action, there is simply no recovery.”) (Angeline, J., dissenting), rev’d, 968 S.W.2d 934, 937 (Tex. 1998) (relying on the dissent). .The dissent contends that the case .should be remanded because Diaz relied on our opinion in Rangel in pleading and proving her case and because the trial court also relied on that opinion in denying Wal-Mart’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verd 2003Ass’n , 612 S.W.2d 199, 205 (Tex. 1980)); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Gonzalez , 954 S.W.2d 777, 784 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997) (“[T]he harsh reality is that if the plaintiff cannot prove facts to support her cause of action, there is simply no recovery.”) (Angeline, J., dissenting), rev’d , 968 S.W.2d 934, 937 (Tex. 1998) (relying on the dissent). 2: The dissent contends that the case should be remanded because Diaz relied on our opinion in Rangel in pleading and proving her case and because the trial court also relied on that opinion in denying Wal-Mart’s motion for judgment notwithstanding t | 2 | 2 |
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Gonzalezgreen2 sentences2003Assn, 612 S.W.2d 199, 205 (Tex.1980)); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Gonzalez, 954 S.W.2d 777, 784 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1997) ("[T]he harsh reality is that if the plaintiff cannot prove facts to support her cause of action, there is simply no recovery.”) (Angeline, J., dissenting), rev’d, 968 S.W.2d 934, 937 (Tex. 1998) (relying on the dissent). .The dissent contends that the case .should be remanded because Diaz relied on our opinion in Rangel in pleading and proving her case and because the trial court also relied on that opinion in denying Wal-Mart’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verd 2003Ass’n , 612 S.W.2d 199, 205 (Tex. 1980)); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Gonzalez , 954 S.W.2d 777, 784 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997) (“[T]he harsh reality is that if the plaintiff cannot prove facts to support her cause of action, there is simply no recovery.”) (Angeline, J., dissenting), rev’d , 968 S.W.2d 934, 937 (Tex. 1998) (relying on the dissent). 2: The dissent contends that the case should be remanded because Diaz relied on our opinion in Rangel in pleading and proving her case and because the trial court also relied on that opinion in denying Wal-Mart’s motion for judgment notwithstanding t | 2 | 2 |
Schaefer v. Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'ngreen2 sentences2003Assn, 612 S.W.2d 199, 205 (Tex.1980)); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Gonzalez, 954 S.W.2d 777, 784 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1997) ("[T]he harsh reality is that if the plaintiff cannot prove facts to support her cause of action, there is simply no recovery.”) (Angeline, J., dissenting), rev’d, 968 S.W.2d 934, 937 (Tex. 1998) (relying on the dissent). .The dissent contends that the case .should be remanded because Diaz relied on our opinion in Rangel in pleading and proving her case and because the trial court also relied on that opinion in denying Wal-Mart’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verd 2003Ass’n , 612 S.W.2d 199, 205 (Tex. 1980)); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Gonzalez , 954 S.W.2d 777, 784 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997) (“[T]he harsh reality is that if the plaintiff cannot prove facts to support her cause of action, there is simply no recovery.”) (Angeline, J., dissenting), rev’d , 968 S.W.2d 934, 937 (Tex. 1998) (relying on the dissent). 2: The dissent contends that the case should be remanded because Diaz relied on our opinion in Rangel in pleading and proving her case and because the trial court also relied on that opinion in denying Wal-Mart’s motion for judgment notwithstanding t | 2 | 2 |
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Merrellgreen2 sentences2017Id. at 839 . 2015The Texas Supreme Court in Merrell concluded that the trial court, while having 9 admitted the expert’s evidence over Wal-Mart’s objection, had properly granted summary judgment because “[s]uch conclusory statements cannot support a judgment even when no objection was made . . .” 313 S.W.3d at 840 (Tex. 2010). | 1 | 2 |
Holland v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.green2 sentences2016In Holland , Wal-Mart’s issue concerning availability of attorney’s fees was a purely legal question, and, “[b]y asserting nonrecoverability in its motion for j.mo.v., Wal-Mart gave the trial court ample opportunity to rule on the availability of attorney’s fees before an erroneous judgment was rendered.” Id. 2013The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and held that Wal-Mart’s objection was timely enough “to give the trial court an opportunity to resolve the legal issue before rendering judgment.” Id. at 280 ; see also Holland v. Wal-Mart, 1 S.W.3d 91 (Tex. 1999) (objection raised in motion for judgment notwithstanding verdict preserved Wal-Mart’s claim that attorney’s fees not recoverable under claim submitted to jury). | 1 | 2 |
Star-Telegram, Inc. v. Doegreen1 sentence2022See Star-Telegram, Inc., 915 S.W.2d at 473 ; Emmert v. Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB as Trustee for ARLP, Securitization Trust, Series 2015- 1, No. 02-00012-CV, 2021 WL 733301 , at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 25, 2021, 15 Wal-Mart’s motion contended that there was no evidence of (1) an unreasonable risk of harm; (2) its knowledge of an unreasonably dangerous condition; (3) its breach of duty; and (4) proximate cause of injury (specifically, that “Plaintiff’s fall was proximately caused by any action or inaction on the part of Defendants” [Emphasis added]). | 1 | 1 |
Jennings v. Burgessgreen1 sentence2009CIV.PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 16.064 (Vernon 2008). [3] Diaz v. Westphal, 941 S.W.2d 96, 97-98 (Tex. 1997) (citing Jennings v. Burgess, 917 S.W.2d 790, 793 (Tex. 1996); Delgado v. Burns, 656 S.W.2d 428, 429 (Tex. 1983)); French v. Gill, 252 S.W.3d 748, 751 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2008, pet. denied). [4] Diaz, 941 S.W.2d at 98 ; French, 252 S.W.3d at 751 . [5] Section 16.064 provides a tolling provision for litigation initially filed in a court without jurisdiction if, within sixty days of the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, suit is filed in a court of proper jurisdiction and if the initial fili | 1 | 1 |
French v. Gillgreen2 sentences2009CIV.PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 16.064 (Vernon 2008). [3] Diaz v. Westphal, 941 S.W.2d 96, 97-98 (Tex. 1997) (citing Jennings v. Burgess, 917 S.W.2d 790, 793 (Tex. 1996); Delgado v. Burns, 656 S.W.2d 428, 429 (Tex. 1983)); French v. Gill, 252 S.W.3d 748, 751 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2008, pet. denied). [4] Diaz, 941 S.W.2d at 98 ; French, 252 S.W.3d at 751 . [5] Section 16.064 provides a tolling provision for litigation initially filed in a court without jurisdiction if, within sixty days of the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, suit is filed in a court of proper jurisdiction and if the initial fili 2009CIV.PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 16.064 (Vernon 2008). [3] Diaz v. Westphal, 941 S.W.2d 96, 97-98 (Tex. 1997) (citing Jennings v. Burgess, 917 S.W.2d 790, 793 (Tex. 1996); Delgado v. Burns, 656 S.W.2d 428, 429 (Tex. 1983)); French v. Gill, 252 S.W.3d 748, 751 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2008, pet. denied). [4] Diaz, 941 S.W.2d at 98 ; French, 252 S.W.3d at 751 . [5] Section 16.064 provides a tolling provision for litigation initially filed in a court without jurisdiction if, within sixty days of the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, suit is filed in a court of proper jurisdiction and if the initial fili | 1 | 1 |
Delgado v. Burnsgreen1 sentence2009CIV.PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 16.064 (Vernon 2008). [3] Diaz v. Westphal, 941 S.W.2d 96, 97-98 (Tex. 1997) (citing Jennings v. Burgess, 917 S.W.2d 790, 793 (Tex. 1996); Delgado v. Burns, 656 S.W.2d 428, 429 (Tex. 1983)); French v. Gill, 252 S.W.3d 748, 751 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2008, pet. denied). [4] Diaz, 941 S.W.2d at 98 ; French, 252 S.W.3d at 751 . [5] Section 16.064 provides a tolling provision for litigation initially filed in a court without jurisdiction if, within sixty days of the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, suit is filed in a court of proper jurisdiction and if the initial fili | 1 | 1 |
Diaz v. Westphalgreen2 sentences2009CIV.PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 16.064 (Vernon 2008). [3] Diaz v. Westphal, 941 S.W.2d 96, 97-98 (Tex. 1997) (citing Jennings v. Burgess, 917 S.W.2d 790, 793 (Tex. 1996); Delgado v. Burns, 656 S.W.2d 428, 429 (Tex. 1983)); French v. Gill, 252 S.W.3d 748, 751 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2008, pet. denied). [4] Diaz, 941 S.W.2d at 98 ; French, 252 S.W.3d at 751 . [5] Section 16.064 provides a tolling provision for litigation initially filed in a court without jurisdiction if, within sixty days of the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, suit is filed in a court of proper jurisdiction and if the initial fili 2009CIV.PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 16.064 (Vernon 2008). [3] Diaz v. Westphal, 941 S.W.2d 96, 97-98 (Tex. 1997) (citing Jennings v. Burgess, 917 S.W.2d 790, 793 (Tex. 1996); Delgado v. Burns, 656 S.W.2d 428, 429 (Tex. 1983)); French v. Gill, 252 S.W.3d 748, 751 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2008, pet. denied). [4] Diaz, 941 S.W.2d at 98 ; French, 252 S.W.3d at 751 . [5] Section 16.064 provides a tolling provision for litigation initially filed in a court without jurisdiction if, within sixty days of the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, suit is filed in a court of proper jurisdiction and if the initial fili | 1 | 1 |
Virtual Healthcare Services, Ltd. v. Labordegreen1 sentence2009Wal-Mart refers to the June 19, 2007 affidavit. [10] Parker, 216 S.W.3d at 909-10 . [11] Id. at 911 (citing Virtual Healthcare Servs., Ltd. v. Laborde, 193 S.W.3d 636, 644 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2006, no pet.)). [12] In his response to Wal-Mart's motion, Chacon included the affidavit of Cindy Trigo, the legal assistant with the Herrman law firm, who attempted to settle the case with Wal-Mart "[f]or nearly two years." [13] 708 S.W.2d 38, 40 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1986, no writ). [14] See id. [15] At the hearing on Wal-Mart's motion for summary judgment on August 28, 2008, Byerly argued that the affidavit | 1 | 1 |
Hernandez Ex Rel. Emeterio v. Tokai Corp.green1 sentence2008Wal-Mart's challenge to the design defect is preserved, but Wal-Mart is limited to the grounds alleged in its motion. 26 Hernandez v. Tokai Corp., 2 S.W.3d 251, 258 (Tex. 1999) (quoting jury instruction contained in Turner v. Gen. | 1 | 1 |
Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mendezgreen1 sentence2008Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844 , 847 n.1 (Tex. 1979)). "'The inference of defect may not be drawn . . . from the mere fact of a product-related accident.'" Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d at 602 (quoting Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 3 reporters' note to cmt. d (1998)); see Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mendez, 204 S.W.3d 797, 807 (Tex. 2006). | 1 | 1 |
Thomas v. Oldhamgreen1 sentence2000See Thomas v. Oldham , 895 S.W.2d 352, 359-60 (Tex. 1995). | 1 | 1 |
Bryan v. Dockerygreen1 sentence1992Bryan v. Dockery, 788 S.W.2d 447, 449 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, no writ). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Elizabeth Shirey v. Wal-Mart Stores Texas, L.L.C.
green
1 sentence2020Id. 2017 WL 1177967 , at *2–3. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. McKenzie
green
2 sentences2013The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and held that Wal-Mart’s objection was timely enough “to give the trial court an opportunity to resolve the legal issue before rendering judgment.” Id. at 280 ; see also Holland v. Wal-Mart, 1 S.W.3d 91 (Tex. 1999) (objection raised in motion for judgment notwithstanding verdict preserved Wal-Mart’s claim that attorney’s fees not recoverable under claim submitted to jury). 2013The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and held that Wal-Mart’s objection was timely enough “to give the trial court an opportunity to resolve the legal issue before rendering judgment.” Id. at 280 ; see also Holland v. Wal-Mart, 1 S.W.3d 91 (Tex. 1999) (objection raised in motion for judgment notwithstanding verdict preserved Wal-Mart’s claim that attorney’s fees not recoverable under claim submitted to jury). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Merrell v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
green
1 sentence2010The court of appeals reversed, holding that Merrell produced evidence on each challenged element of their cause of action. 276 S.W.3d 117, 187-38 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Parker v. Cumming
green
2 sentences2009Wal-Mart refers to the June 19, 2007 affidavit. [10] Parker, 216 S.W.3d at 909-10 . [11] Id. at 911 (citing Virtual Healthcare Servs., Ltd. v. Laborde, 193 S.W.3d 636, 644 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2006, no pet.)). [12] In his response to Wal-Mart's motion, Chacon included the affidavit of Cindy Trigo, the legal assistant with the Herrman law firm, who attempted to settle the case with Wal-Mart "[f]or nearly two years." [13] 708 S.W.2d 38, 40 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1986, no writ). [14] See id. [15] At the hearing on Wal-Mart's motion for summary judgment on August 28, 2008, Byerly argued that the affidavit 2009Wal-Mart refers to the June 19, 2007 affidavit. [10] Parker, 216 S.W.3d at 909-10 . [11] Id. at 911 (citing Virtual Healthcare Servs., Ltd. v. Laborde, 193 S.W.3d 636, 644 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2006, no pet.)). [12] In his response to Wal-Mart's motion, Chacon included the affidavit of Cindy Trigo, the legal assistant with the Herrman law firm, who attempted to settle the case with Wal-Mart "[f]or nearly two years." [13] 708 S.W.2d 38, 40 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1986, no writ). [14] See id. [15] At the hearing on Wal-Mart's motion for summary judgment on August 28, 2008, Byerly argued that the affidavit | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway
green
1 sentence2008Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844 , 847 n.1 (Tex. 1979)). "'The inference of defect may not be drawn . . . from the mere fact of a product-related accident.'" Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d at 602 (quoting Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 3 reporters' note to cmt. d (1998)); see Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mendez, 204 S.W.3d 797, 807 (Tex. 2006). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Turner v. General Motors Corp.
green
1 sentence2008Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844 , 847 n.1 (Tex. 1979)). "'The inference of defect may not be drawn . . . from the mere fact of a product-related accident.'" Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d at 602 (quoting Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 3 reporters' note to cmt. d (1998)); see Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mendez, 204 S.W.3d 797, 807 (Tex. 2006). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Ard
green
1 sentence2000Ard, 991 S.W.2d at 523 . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Hardin v. Hardin
green
1 sentence1996Id. at 349-50 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.