Oregon standard in Washington

2011Lopez, 153 Wash.2d at 580 , 106 P.3d 221 .

2011Lopez, 153 Wn.2d at 580 .

2021Alderson v. State, 105 Or.

2021Alderson v. State, 105 Or.

2020Additionally, on the facts of this case, it appears the result would be the same under either standard. 7 Lewis, 78 Wn.

2018Turning to the slightly broader Oregon standard, the court in Lewis, observed that retrial was barred if the deliberate misconduct of the prosecutor 35 78 Wn.

2011Lopez, 153 Wash.2d at 580 , 106 P.3d 221 .

2011Lopez, 153 Wash.2d at 580 , 106 P.3d 221 .

2005In addition, the Birklid court rejected Oregon’s test, which focused on “whether the employer had an opportunity consciously to weigh the consequences of its act and knew that someone, not necessarily the plaintiff specifically, would be injured.” Birklid, 127 Wn.2d at 865 (citing Lusk v. Monaco Motor Homes, Inc., 97 Or.

2005In addition, the Birklid court rejected Oregon's test, which focused on "whether the employer had an opportunity consciously to weigh the consequences of its act and knew that someone, not necessarily the plaintiff specifically, would be injured." Birklid, 127 Wash.2d at 865 , 904 P.2d 278 (citing Lusk v. Monaco Motor Homes, Inc., 97 Or.App. 182 , 775 P.2d 891 (1989)).

2005In addition, the Birklid court rejected Oregon’s test, which focused on “whether the employer had an opportunity consciously to weigh the consequences of its act and knew that someone, not necessarily the plaintiff specifically, would be injured.” Birklid, 127 Wn.2d at 865 (citing Lusk v. Monaco Motor Homes, Inc., 97 Or.

2005In addition, the Birklid court rejected Oregon's test, which focused on "whether the employer had an opportunity consciously to weigh the consequences of its act and knew that someone, not necessarily the plaintiff specifically, would be injured." Birklid, 127 Wash.2d at 865 , 904 P.2d 278 (citing Lusk v. Monaco Motor Homes, Inc., 97 Or.App. 182 , 775 P.2d 891 (1989)).

2020Because our Supreme Court has held the federal and state constitutional prohibitions on double jeopardy “afford the same protections and are identical,” Strine, 176 Wn.2d at 751 (quoting Ervin, 158 Wn.2d at 752), and the court applied the more limited federal standard in State v. Benn, 161 Wn.2d 256, 270 , 165 P.3d 1232 (2007), we decline to apply the broader Oregon standard.

2020Because our Supreme Court has held the federal and state constitutional prohibitions on double jeopardy “afford the same protections and are identical,” Strine, 176 Wn.2d at 751 (quoting Ervin, 158 Wn.2d at 752), and the court applied the more limited federal standard in State v. Benn, 161 Wn.2d 256, 270 , 165 P.3d 1232 (2007), we decline to apply the broader Oregon standard.

2020Because our Supreme Court has held the federal and state constitutional prohibitions on double jeopardy “afford the same protections and are identical,” Strine, 176 Wn.2d at 751 (quoting Ervin, 158 Wn.2d at 752), and the court applied the more limited federal standard in State v. Benn, 161 Wn.2d 256, 270 , 165 P.3d 1232 (2007), we decline to apply the broader Oregon standard.

2020Because our Supreme Court has held the federal and state constitutional prohibitions on double jeopardy “afford the same protections and are identical,” Strine, 176 Wn.2d at 751 (quoting Ervin, 158 Wn.2d at 752), and the court applied the more limited federal standard in State v. Benn, 161 Wn.2d 256, 270 , 165 P.3d 1232 (2007), we decline to apply the broader Oregon standard.

2020Because our Supreme Court has held the federal and state constitutional prohibitions on double jeopardy “afford the same protections and are identical,” Strine, 176 Wn.2d at 751 (quoting Ervin, 158 Wn.2d at 752), and the court applied the more limited federal standard in State v. Benn, 161 Wn.2d 256, 270 , 165 P.3d 1232 (2007), we decline to apply the broader Oregon standard.

2020Because our Supreme Court has held the federal and state constitutional prohibitions on double jeopardy “afford the same protections and are identical,” Strine, 176 Wn.2d at 751 (quoting Ervin, 158 Wn.2d at 752), and the court applied the more limited federal standard in State v. Benn, 161 Wn.2d 256, 270 , 165 P.3d 1232 (2007), we decline to apply the broader Oregon standard.

2018Both require a "rare and compelling" set of facts before dismissal is warranted.34 31 63 Wn.

2018Both require a "rare and compelling" set of facts before dismissal is warranted.34 31 63 Wn.

2018If the prosecutor intended to goad the defense into seeking a mistrial, re-trial is precluded.19 Other bad faith actions by the prosecutor are not enough.20 Washington courts have recognized the possibility of a slightly broader exception based on the Oregon Supreme Court's interpretation of its state constitution.21 Under the "Oregon standard," double jeopardy precludes retrial if the prosecutor "knows that the conduct is improper and prejudicial and either intends or is indifferent to the resulting mistrial or reversal."22 The difference between the federal and Oregon standards is quite narr

2018If the prosecutor intended to goad the defense into seeking a mistrial, re-trial is precluded.19 Other bad faith actions by the prosecutor are not enough.20 Washington courts have recognized the possibility of a slightly broader exception based on the Oregon Supreme Court's interpretation of its state constitution.21 Under the "Oregon standard," double jeopardy precludes retrial if the prosecutor "knows that the conduct is improper and prejudicial and either intends or is indifferent to the resulting mistrial or reversal."22 The difference between the federal and Oregon standards is quite narr

2005In addition, the Birklid court rejected Oregon's test, which focused on "whether the employer had an opportunity consciously to weigh the consequences of its act and knew that someone, not necessarily the plaintiff specifically, would be injured." Birklid, 127 Wash.2d at 865 , 904 P.2d 278 (citing Lusk v. Monaco Motor Homes, Inc., 97 Or.App. 182 , 775 P.2d 891 (1989)).

1991Since Washington modeled its privileges and immunities clause after the Oregon clause and since the two clauses are substantially identical, we can look to Oregon decisions for guidance. [50] In State v. Clark, 291 Or. 231 , 630 P.2d 810 , cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1084 (1981), the defendant challenged the procedure of charging a defendant pursuant to an information as opposed to an indictment.

1991Since Washington modeled its privileges and immunities clause after the Oregon clause and since the two clauses are substantially identical, we can look to Oregon decisions for guidance. [50] In State v. Clark, 291 Or. 231 , 630 P.2d 810 , cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1084 (1981), the defendant challenged the procedure of charging a defendant pursuant to an information as opposed to an indictment.

1991Since Washington modeled its privileges and immunities clause after the Oregon clause and since the two clauses are substantially identical, we can look to Oregon decisions for guidance. 50 In State v. Clark, 291 Or. 231 , 630 P.2d 810 , cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1084 (1981), the defendant challenged the procedure of charging a defendant pursuant to an information as opposed to an indictment.

1991Since Washington modeled its privileges and immunities clause after the Oregon clause and since the two clauses are substantially identical, we can look to Oregon decisions for guidance. [50] In State v. Clark, 291 Or. 231 , 630 P.2d 810 , cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1084 (1981), the defendant challenged the procedure of charging a defendant pursuant to an information as opposed to an indictment.

1989App. 171 , 672 P.2d 771 (1983), aff'd, 101 Wn.2d 604 , 682 P.2d 878 (1984). 7 The only authority cited by appellant which would support a narrow interpretation of the Washington rule is from the official comment to the Oregon rule which parallels ER 801(d)(1)(iii).

1989App. 171 , 672 P.2d 771 (1983), aff'd, 101 Wn.2d 604 , 682 P.2d 878 (1984). 7 The only authority cited by appellant which would support a narrow interpretation of the Washington rule is from the official comment to the Oregon rule which parallels ER 801(d)(1)(iii).

1989App. 171 , 672 P.2d 771 (1983), aff'd, 101 Wn.2d 604 , 682 P.2d 878 (1984). 7 The only authority cited by appellant which would support a narrow interpretation of the Washington rule is from the official comment to the Oregon rule which parallels ER 801(d)(1)(iii).

1989App. 171 , 672 P.2d 771 (1983), aff'd, 101 Wn.2d 604 , 682 P.2d 878 (1984). 7 The only authority cited by appellant which would support a narrow interpretation of the Washington rule is from the official comment to the Oregon rule which parallels ER 801(d)(1)(iii).

1987Fernandez appealed directly to the Supreme Court, which transferred the case to this court. *33 A summary judgment is properly granted only if the pleadings, affidavits, depositions and admissions in the file "demonstrate there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Wilson v. Steinbach, 98 Wn.2d 434, 437 , 656 P.2d 1030 (1982).

1987Fernandez appealed directly to the Supreme Court, which transferred the case to this court. *33 A summary judgment is properly granted only if the pleadings, affidavits, depositions and admissions in the file "demonstrate there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Wilson v. Steinbach, 98 Wn.2d 434, 437 , 656 P.2d 1030 (1982).

1979I would adopt the Oregon rule in State v. Brown, 262 Ore. 442, 458 , 497 P.2d 1191 (1972), where it is held that a second prosecution is for the "same offense" and is prohibited if (1) the charges arise out of the same act or transaction, and (2) the charges could have been tried in the same court [at the same time], and (3) the prosecutor knew or reasonably should have known of the facts relevant to the second charge at the time of the original prosecution. *930 This rule comports with the spirit of the doctrine of double jeopardy.

1979I would adopt the Oregon rule in State v. Brown, 262 Ore. 442, 458 , 497 P.2d 1191 (1972), where it is held that a second prosecution is for the "same offense" and is prohibited if (1) the charges arise out of the same act or transaction, and (2) the charges could have been tried in the same court [at the same time], and (3) the prosecutor knew or reasonably should have known of the facts relevant to the second charge at the time of the original prosecution. *930 This rule comports with the spirit of the doctrine of double jeopardy.

1972Hilton v. Probate Court, 145 Minn. 155 , 176 N.W. 493 (1920); In re Estate of McKinney, 175 Misc. 377 , 24 N.Y.S.2d 906, 909 (1940); Black v. Beagle, 59 Wyo. 268 , 139 P.2d 439 , 140 P.2d 594 , 148 A.L.R. 243 (1943). *96 Washington recognized the soundness of the Oregon approach in In re Estate of Eilermann, 179 Wash. 15 , 35 P.2d 763 (1934), where the Oregon rule that an owner’s interest in land is converted into personal property when he enters into an executory contract for the sale of the land and places the purchaser in possession was noted with approval.

1972Hilton v. Probate Court, 145 Minn. 155 , 176 N.W. 493 (1920); In re Estate of McKinney, 175 Misc. 377 , 24 N.Y.S.2d 906, 909 (1940); Black v. Beagle, 59 Wyo. 268 , 139 P.2d 439 , 140 P.2d 594 , 148 A.L.R. 243 (1943). *96 Washington recognized the soundness of the Oregon approach in In re Estate of Eilermann, 179 Wash. 15 , 35 P.2d 763 (1934), where the Oregon rule that an owner’s interest in land is converted into personal property when he enters into an executory contract for the sale of the land and places the purchaser in possession was noted with approval.

1972Hilton v. Probate Court, 145 Minn. 155 , 176 N.W. 493 (1920); In re Estate of McKinney, 175 Misc. 377 , 24 N.Y.S.2d 906, 909 (1940); Black v. Beagle, 59 Wyo. 268 , 139 P.2d 439 , 140 P.2d 594 , 148 A.L.R. 243 (1943). *96 Washington recognized the soundness of the Oregon approach in In re Estate of Eilermann, 179 Wash. 15 , 35 P.2d 763 (1934), where the Oregon rule that an owner’s interest in land is converted into personal property when he enters into an executory contract for the sale of the land and places the purchaser in possession was noted with approval.

1972Hilton v. Probate Court, 145 Minn. 155 , 176 N.W. 493 (1920); In re Estate of McKinney, 175 Misc. 377 , 24 N.Y.S.2d 906, 909 (1940); Black v. Beagle, 59 Wyo. 268 , 139 P.2d 439 , 140 P.2d 594 , 148 A.L.R. 243 (1943). *96 Washington recognized the soundness of the Oregon approach in In re Estate of Eilermann, 179 Wash. 15 , 35 P.2d 763 (1934), where the Oregon rule that an owner’s interest in land is converted into personal property when he enters into an executory contract for the sale of the land and places the purchaser in possession was noted with approval.

1972Hilton v. Probate Court, 145 Minn. 155 , 176 N.W. 493 (1920); In re Estate of McKinney, 175 Misc. 377 , 24 N.Y.S.2d 906, 909 (1940); Black v. Beagle, 59 Wyo. 268 , 139 P.2d 439 , 140 P.2d 594 , 148 A.L.R. 243 (1943). *96 Washington recognized the soundness of the Oregon approach in In re Estate of Eilermann, 179 Wash. 15 , 35 P.2d 763 (1934), where the Oregon rule that an owner’s interest in land is converted into personal property when he enters into an executory contract for the sale of the land and places the purchaser in possession was noted with approval.

1972Hilton v. Probate Court, 145 Minn. 155 , 176 N.W. 493 (1920); In re Estate of McKinney, 175 Misc. 377 , 24 N.Y.S.2d 906, 909 (1940); Black v. Beagle, 59 Wyo. 268 , 139 P.2d 439 , 140 P.2d 594 , 148 A.L.R. 243 (1943). *96 Washington recognized the soundness of the Oregon approach in In re Estate of Eilermann, 179 Wash. 15 , 35 P.2d 763 (1934), where the Oregon rule that an owner’s interest in land is converted into personal property when he enters into an executory contract for the sale of the land and places the purchaser in possession was noted with approval.

1972The Eilermann case held that the vendor’s interest in a real estate contract is intangible personal property, citing Davie v. Davie, 47 Wash. 231 , 91 P. 950 (1907), for the proposition that the vendor under a real estate contract has an interest which is but the right to the proceeds which is personal rather than real property.

1972The Eilermann case held that the vendor’s interest in a real estate contract is intangible personal property, citing Davie v. Davie, 47 Wash. 231 , 91 P. 950 (1907), for the proposition that the vendor under a real estate contract has an interest which is but the right to the proceeds which is personal rather than real property.