Oregon rule in Oregon

2013Id. at 629 ; see also State v. Kennedy, 290 Or 493, 497 , 624 P2d 99 (1981) (Oregon stop statutes were intended to codify decisions by this court interpreting Article I, section 9, and the United States Supreme Court interpreting the Fourth Amendment).

2013Id. at 629 ; see also State v. Kennedy, 290 Or 493, 497 , 624 P2d 99 (1981) (Oregon stop statutes were intended to codify decisions by this court interpreting Article I, section 9, and the United States Supreme Court interpreting the Fourth Amendment).

2012See Pamplin, 319 Or at 433 (“Because the Oregon rule is almost identical to the federal one and was based on it, decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States concerning [the federal rule] that predated the adoption of the Oregon counterpart inform us as to the intent of the Oregon lawmakers.”).

2012See Pamplin, 319 Or at 433 (“Because the Oregon rule is almost identical to the federal one and was based on it, decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States concerning [the federal rule] that predated the adoption of the Oregon counterpart inform us as to the intent of the Oregon lawmakers.”).

1993See also State v. Phillips, 314 Or 460, 471-73 , 840 P2d 666 (1992) (applying that rule); State v. Williams, 313 Or 19, 56 , 828 P2d 1006 (1992) (explaining same); State v. Walton, 311 Or 223, 230-31 , 809 P2d 81 (1991) (describing constitutional basis for Oregon doctrine and contrasting rule under federal constitution).

1993See also State v. Phillips, 314 Or 460, 471-73 , 840 P2d 666 (1992) (applying that rule); State v. Williams, 313 Or 19, 56 , 828 P2d 1006 (1992) (explaining same); State v. Walton, 311 Or 223, 230-31 , 809 P2d 81 (1991) (describing constitutional basis for Oregon doctrine and contrasting rule under federal constitution).

2026See Sterling v. Cupp, 290 Or 611, 614 , 625 P2d 123 (1981) (“This is required, not for the sake either of parochialism or of style, but because the state does not deny any right claimed under the federal Constitution when the claim before the court in fact is fully met by state law.”); see also Hans Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States’ Bill of Rights, 9 Nonprecedential Memo Op: 347 Or App 675 (2026) 677 U of Baltimore L Rev 379, 390 (1980).

2026See Sterling v. Cupp, 290 Or 611, 614 , 625 P2d 123 (1981) (“This is required, not for the sake either of parochialism or of style, but because the state does not deny any right claimed under the federal Constitution when the claim before the court in fact is fully met by state law.”); see also Hans Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States’ Bill of Rights, 9 Nonprecedential Memo Op: 347 Or App 675 (2026) 677 U of Baltimore L Rev 379, 390 (1980).

2025See, e.g., 2 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 41 comment h (2012) (explaining that the general duty to avoid unreasonably creating risks of physical harm covers cases in which “care provided to a patient may create risks to others,” such as “prescribing an inappropriate medication that impairs the patient”); Medina v. Hochberg, 465 Mass 102, 109, 987 NE2d 1206, 1212 (2013) (“In prescribing the medication, a physician has created the possibility that the patient might decide to operate a motor vehicle while taking it, experi- ence a known side effect, an

2025See, e.g., 2 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 41 comment h (2012) (explaining that the general duty to avoid unreasonably creating risks of physical harm covers cases in which “care provided to a patient may create risks to others,” such as “prescribing an inappropriate medication that impairs the patient”); Medina v. Hochberg, 465 Mass 102, 109, 987 NE2d 1206, 1212 (2013) (“In prescribing the medication, a physician has created the possibility that the patient might decide to operate a motor vehicle while taking it, experi- ence a known side effect, an

2015Nonetheless, the Kock court rejected the federal standard embodied in Carney , which applies to vehicles that are movable when first encountered by the police in connection with a crime, for the Oregon standard established in Brown , which the Kock court identified as applying to “[s]earches of automobiles that have just been lawfully stopped by [the] police,” Kock, 302 Or at 33 , that is, to vehicles that are moving when the police stop them.

2015Nonetheless, the Kock court rejected the federal standard embodied in Carney , which applies to vehicles that are movable when first encountered by the police in connection with a crime, for the Oregon standard established in Brown , which the Kock court identified as applying to “[s]earches of automobiles that have just been lawfully stopped by [the] police,” Kock, 302 Or at 33 , that is, to vehicles that are moving when the police stop them.

2013Id. at 629 ; see also State v. Kennedy, 290 Or 493, 497 , 624 P2d 99 (1981) (Oregon stop statutes were intended to codify decisions by this court interpreting Article I, section 9, and the United States Supreme Court interpreting the Fourth Amendment).

2013See State v. Valdez, 277 Or 621, 624-26 , 561 P2d 1006 (1977) (discussing origins of stop statute); see also State v. Kennedy, 290 Or 493, 497 , 624 P2d 99 (1981) (Oregon stop statutes were intended to codify decisions by this court interpreting Article I, section 9, and the United States Supreme Court interpreting the Fourth Amendment), rejected in part on other grounds by State v. Hall, 339 Or 7, 20 , 115 P3d 908 (2005), and State v. Stevens, 311 Or 119, 136-37 , 806 P2d 92 (1991).

2001ORCP 4 L provides that an Oregon court will have jurisdiction over a party served pursuant to ORCP 7: *79 “Notwithstanding a failure to satisfy the requirement of sections B through K of this rule, in any action where prosecution of the action against a defendant in this state is not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or the Constitution of the United States.” In State ex rel Circus Circus Reno, Inc. v. Pope, 317 Or 151 , 854 P2d 461 (1993), the court adopted the following test for determining whether the exercise of jurisdiction under ORCP 4 L over a non-Oregon defendant exists:

2001ORCP 4 L provides that an Oregon court will have jurisdiction over a party served pursuant to ORCP 7: *79 “Notwithstanding a failure to satisfy the requirement of sections B through K of this rule, in any action where prosecution of the action against a defendant in this state is not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or the Constitution of the United States.” In State ex rel Circus Circus Reno, Inc. v. Pope, 317 Or 151 , 854 P2d 461 (1993), the court adopted the following test for determining whether the exercise of jurisdiction under ORCP 4 L over a non-Oregon defendant exists:

2022According to one committee chairman, the avowed purpose of that convention was to ‘establish the supremacy of the white race,’ and the resulting document included many of the trappings of the Jim Crow era: a poll tax, a combined literacy and property ownership test, and a grandfather clause that in practice exempted white residents from the most onerous of these requirements. * * * “Adopted in the 1930s, Oregon’s rule permitting non- unanimous verdicts can be similarly traced to the rise of the Ku Klux Klan and efforts to dilute ‘the influence of racial, ethnic, and religious minorities on Ore

2021It observed, “Adopted in the 1930s, Oregon’s rule permitting nonunanimous verdicts can be similarly traced to the rise of the Ku Klux Klan and efforts to dilute ‘the influence of racial, ethnic, and religious minorities on Oregon juries.’ ” Ramos, 590 US at ___, 140 S Ct at 1394 (quoting State v. Williams, No. 15CR58698, at 16 (Multnomah Cty Cir Ct, Dec 15, 2016) (James, Circuit Judge) (footnote omitted)). 20 State v. Heine Although the majority opinion did not reach the issue, having concluded that a unanimity requirement is an essential part of an impartial jury, Justice Sotomayor and Justic

2024Our discussion, thus, includes some of those federal cases and related resources because we are permitted to “look to federal cases applying the federal rule [from which the Oregon rule is derived] as interpretive guides.” State v. Cornell, 109 Or App 396, 400 , 820 P2d 11 (1991), aff’d, 314 Or 673 , 842 P2d 394 (1992).

2024Our discussion, thus, includes some of those federal cases and related resources because we are permitted to “look to federal cases applying the federal rule [from which the Oregon rule is derived] as interpretive guides.” State v. Cornell, 109 Or App 396, 400 , 820 P2d 11 (1991), aff’d, 314 Or 673 , 842 P2d 394 (1992).

2024Our discussion, thus, includes some of those federal cases and related resources because we are permitted to “look to federal cases applying the federal rule [from which the Oregon rule is derived] as interpretive guides.” State v. Cornell, 109 Or App 396, 400 , 820 P2d 11 (1991), aff’d, 314 Or 673 , 842 P2d 394 (1992).

2024Our discussion, thus, includes some of those federal cases and related resources because we are permitted to “look to federal cases applying the federal rule [from which the Oregon rule is derived] as interpretive guides.” State v. Cornell, 109 Or App 396, 400 , 820 P2d 11 (1991), aff’d, 314 Or 673 , 842 P2d 394 (1992).

2017See ORS 466.086(2) (granting the commission authority to adopt rules necessary for Oregon to gain the EPA’s authorization of a state-run RCRA program); see also State v. Cooper, 319 Or 162, 168 , 874 P2d 822 (1994) (resolving a dispute over the meaning of an Oregon rule of evidence by considering congressional intent of federal rule of evidence that served as model).

2017See ORS 466.086(2) (granting the commission authority to adopt rules necessary for Oregon to gain the EPA’s authorization of a state-run RCRA program); see also State v. Cooper, 319 Or 162, 168 , 874 P2d 822 (1994) (resolving a dispute over the meaning of an Oregon rule of evidence by considering congressional intent of federal rule of evidence that served as model).

1993See also State v. Phillips, 314 Or 460, 471-73 , 840 P2d 666 (1992) (applying that rule); State v. Williams, 313 Or 19, 56 , 828 P2d 1006 (1992) (explaining same); State v. Walton, 311 Or 223, 230-31 , 809 P2d 81 (1991) (describing constitutional basis for Oregon doctrine and contrasting rule under federal constitution).

1993See also State v. Phillips, 314 Or 460, 471-73 , 840 P2d 666 (1992) (applying that rule); State v. Williams, 313 Or 19, 56 , 828 P2d 1006 (1992) (explaining same); State v. Walton, 311 Or 223, 230-31 , 809 P2d 81 (1991) (describing constitutional basis for Oregon doctrine and contrasting rule under federal constitution).

2026(See Def’s Reply and Response at 5-6 (citing Con-way, Inc. & Affiliates v. Dept. of Rev., 353 Or 616, 626 , 302 P3d 804, 809 (2013).) And later actions by the legislature seem even less relevant when the prior intention that the court 28 House Bill 2225 was the perennial “reconnect” bill to consider whether or how to conform Oregon law to recent federal income tax law changes.

2026(See Def’s Reply and Response at 5-6 (citing Con-way, Inc. & Affiliates v. Dept. of Rev., 353 Or 616, 626 , 302 P3d 804, 809 (2013).) And later actions by the legislature seem even less relevant when the prior intention that the court 28 House Bill 2225 was the perennial “reconnect” bill to consider whether or how to conform Oregon law to recent federal income tax law changes.

2023(Def’s Mot at 14.) ORDER ON SECOND CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT TC-MD 190031N 4 Because the phrase “primary business activity” is not defined by statute, this court in Oracle Corp. v. Dept. of Rev., 24 OTR 359, 389 (2021) considered its meaning under Oregon’s framework for statutory interpretation. 4 When ORS 314.665(6) was enacted in 1995, the plain meaning of “primary” was “first, chief, or principal” and required a comparison of at least two activities under the statute.

2023Id. at 389-90 (internal quotation marks omitted).

2023See Spencer, 355 Or at 686 .