19 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1926–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Fushek v. Stategreen2 sentences2018"The uniformity requirement avoids 'the anomalous situation where some persons would be entitled to a jury trial and others would not, although charged with exactly the same substantive Arizona crime.' " Fushek, 218 Ariz. 285 , ¶ 14, 183 P.3d 536 , 540, quoting Derendal , 209 Ariz. 416 , ¶ 25, 104 P.3d 147 , 151. 2018"The uniformity requirement avoids 'the anomalous situation where some persons would be entitled to a jury trial and others would not, although charged with exactly the same substantive Arizona crime.' " Fushek, 218 Ariz. 285 , ¶ 14, 183 P.3d 536 , 540, quoting Derendal , 209 Ariz. 416 , ¶ 25, 104 P.3d 147 , 151. | 1 | 3 |
Apache County v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co.green2 sentences1986Despite express statutory language suggesting that all property listed as "Class one" comprised one property class, we held that each subparagraph constituted a separate class for purposes of the uniformity clause. 106 Ariz. at 359 , 476 P.2d at 660 . 1986Despite express statutory language suggesting that all property listed as "Class one" comprised one property class, we held that each subparagraph constituted a separate class for purposes of the uniformity clause. 106 Ariz. at 359 , 476 P.2d at 660 . | 1 | 2 |
Continental Lighting & Contracting, Inc. v. Premier Grading & Utilities, LLCgreen2 sentences2023See Cont’l Lighting & Contracting, Inc. v. Premiere Grading & Utils., LLC, 227 Ariz. 382 , 386 ¶ 12 (App. 2011) (explaining arguments not raised at the superior court are waived on appeal). 8 HUHTAMAKI v. MARICOPA Opinion of the Court CONCLUSION ¶23 We affirm. ¶24 Because it is not the prevailing party, we deny Huhtamaki’s requests for its attorney’s fees and costs. 2023See Cont’l Lighting & Contracting, Inc. v. Premiere Grading & Utils., LLC, 227 Ariz. 382 , 386 ¶ 12 (App. 2011) (explaining arguments not raised at the superior court are waived on appeal). 8 HUHTAMAKI v. MARICOPA Opinion of the Court CONCLUSION ¶23 We affirm. ¶24 Because it is not the prevailing party, we deny Huhtamaki’s requests for its attorney’s fees and costs. | 1 | 1 |
Bunker's Glass Co. v. PILKINGTON, PLCgreen2 sentences2014Bunker’s Glass, 206 Ariz. at 12 ¶¶ 7-8, 75 P.3d at 102 (declining to follow federal precedent even though AR.S. § 44-1412 provides that “in construing this article, the courts may use as a guide interpretations given by the federal courts to comparable federal antitrust statutes”). ¶ 19 Absent a uniformity directive in AUT-SA, and given § 44-407’s clear text and the split of authority on the preemptive scope of similar provisions, we do not find the conflicting views of other courts helpful. 2014Bunker’s Glass, 206 Ariz. at 12 ¶¶ 7-8, 75 P.3d at 102 (declining to follow federal precedent even though AR.S. § 44-1412 provides that “in construing this article, the courts may use as a guide interpretations given by the federal courts to comparable federal antitrust statutes”). ¶ 19 Absent a uniformity directive in AUT-SA, and given § 44-407’s clear text and the split of authority on the preemptive scope of similar provisions, we do not find the conflicting views of other courts helpful. | 1 | 1 |
State Ex Rel. McDougall v. Strohsongreen2 sentences2008McDougall v. Strohson, 190 Ariz. 120, 125 , 945 P.2d 1251, 1256 (1997)). 2008McDougall v. Strohson, 190 Ariz. 120, 125 , 945 P.2d 1251, 1256 (1997)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Minnesota Farmers Mutual Insurancegreen2 sentences1994See Minnesota Farmers, 176 N.W. at 757 (Differences between classes “must not be so wanting in substance that the classification results in permitting one to escape a burden imposed on another under substantially similar circumstances and conditions.”). 1994See Minnesota Farmers, 176 N.W. at 757 (Differences between classes "must not be so wanting in substance that the classification results in permitting one to escape a burden imposed on another under substantially similar circumstances and conditions."). | 1 | 1 |
Gillis v. Yountgreen2 sentences1994Under a uniformity clause, property cannot be put in different classes “according to size or location rather than value because this would be arbitrary classification.” Gillis v. Yount, 748 S.W.2d 357, 363 (Ky.1988); State v. Minnesota Farmers Mut. 1994Under a uniformity clause, property cannot be put in different classes "according to size or location rather than value because this would be arbitrary classification." Gillis v. Yount, 748 S.W.2d 357, 363 (Ky. 1988); State v. Minnesota Farmers Mut. | 1 | 1 |
Bartsch v. Planning & Zoning Commissiongreen2 sentences1991It also violates the policy of equal treatment underlying § 9-462.01(C) because it “is exactly the arbitrary and discriminatory use of the police power which the statute was designed to prevent.” See Bartsch, 6 Conn.App. at 690-91 , 506 A.2d at 1096 (requiring a buffer between one zone of a particular classification and another zone of a different classification in one instance but not in others violates the statutory uniformity requirement). 1991It also violates the policy of equal treatment underlying § 9-462.01(C) because it “is exactly the arbitrary and discriminatory use of the police power which the statute was designed to prevent.” See Bartsch, 6 Conn.App. at 690-91 , 506 A.2d at 1096 (requiring a buffer between one zone of a particular classification and another zone of a different classification in one instance but not in others violates the statutory uniformity requirement). | 1 | 1 |
Henry v. Whitegreen2 sentences1991We agree with the trial court that the Ordinance “in fact and in law [creates] an overlay zone.” Creating an overlay zone and requiring a use permit for uses that are permitted without such a permit in other C-2 districts in the City violates the plain and unambiguous language of § 9-462.01(C) that “[a]ll zoning regulations shall be uniform for each class or kind of ... use of land throughout each zone.” See Henry v. White, 194 Tenn. 192, 198 , 250 S.W.2d 70, 72 (1952) (concluding that a similar uniformity requirement clearly and unequivocally forbids the city “from permitting on certain stree 1991We agree with the trial court that the Ordinance “in fact and in law [creates] an overlay zone.” Creating an overlay zone and requiring a use permit for uses that are permitted without such a permit in other C-2 districts in the City violates the plain and unambiguous language of § 9-462.01(C) that “[a]ll zoning regulations shall be uniform for each class or kind of ... use of land throughout each zone.” See Henry v. White, 194 Tenn. 192, 198 , 250 S.W.2d 70, 72 (1952) (concluding that a similar uniformity requirement clearly and unequivocally forbids the city “from permitting on certain stree | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
America West Airlines, Inc. v. Deparment of Revenue
green
2 sentences2003The Arizona Supreme Court found a violation of the Uniformity Clause, explaining that commuter aircraft must be taxed in the same manner because the property has “similar physical attributes and productiveness, [and is] used the same way and for the same purpose by owners in the same industry.” Id. at 532-33 , 880 P.2d at 1078-79 . ¶ 31 Importantly, the court explained that no Uniformity Clause violation exists when Arizona taxes identical property if it is used for different purposes. 2003The Arizona Supreme Court found a violation of the Uniformity Clause, explaining that commuter aircraft must be taxed in the same manner because the property has “similar physical attributes and productiveness, [and is] used the same way and for the same purpose by owners in the same industry.” Id. at 532-33 , 880 P.2d at 1078-79 . ¶ 31 Importantly, the court explained that no Uniformity Clause violation exists when Arizona taxes identical property if it is used for different purposes. | 5 | 1997–2003 |
Derendal v. Griffith
green
2 sentences2023Derendal, 209 Ariz. 416, ¶ 25 . ¶22 The uniformity requirement is illustrated by Fushek, in which the defendant was charged with ten misdemeanors accompanied by a special allegation of sexual motivation under A.R.S. § 13-118. 2018"The uniformity requirement avoids 'the anomalous situation where some persons would be entitled to a jury trial and others would not, although charged with exactly the same substantive Arizona crime.' " Fushek, 218 Ariz. 285 , ¶ 14, 183 P.3d 536 , 540, quoting Derendal , 209 Ariz. 416 , ¶ 25, 104 P.3d 147 , 151. | 3 | 2008–2023 |
Roosevelt Elementary School District Number 66 v. Bishop
green
2 sentences2014Although Justice Feldman concurred in the result, he could "not go so far as to conclude that even if every child in the state were receiving an ‘adequate education, gross facility disparities’ resulting from a state-imposed financing scheme 'would violate the uniformity clause.’ ” Roosevelt I, 179 Ariz. at 249 , 877 P.2d at 822 . 3 . 2014Although Justice Feldman concurred in the result, he could "not go so far as to conclude that even if every child in the state were receiving an ‘adequate education, gross facility disparities’ resulting from a state-imposed financing scheme 'would violate the uniformity clause.’ ” Roosevelt I, 179 Ariz. at 249 , 877 P.2d at 822 . 3 . | 2 | 1994–2014 |
BUCCELLATO v. Morgan
green
2 sentences2018As such, we "do not consider any consequences that would not apply to every person convicted of the charged crime at the time of conviction." Buccellato v. Morgan , 220 Ariz. 120 , ¶ 17, 203 P.3d 1180 , 1185-86 (App. 2008). ¶ 14 The additional penalty Spence relies upon is the fact that a defendant who harms multiple victims during a single course of conduct is subject to separate charges for each victim and, if convicted, the sentences may be imposed consecutively. 2018As such, we "do not consider any consequences that would not apply to every person convicted of the charged crime at the time of conviction." Buccellato v. Morgan , 220 Ariz. 120 , ¶ 17, 203 P.3d 1180 , 1185-86 (App. 2008). ¶ 14 The additional penalty Spence relies upon is the fact that a defendant who harms multiple victims during a single course of conduct is subject to separate charges for each victim and, if convicted, the sentences may be imposed consecutively. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Aileen H. Char Life Interest v. Maricopa County
green
2 sentences2004Char Life Interest v. Maricopa County, 208 Ariz. 286 , 93 P.3d 486 (2004), a group of property owners claimed that their multi-family residential properties were valued in a discriminatory manner, citing the uniformity clause of the Arizona Constitution. 2004Char Life Interest v. Maricopa County, 208 Ariz. 286 , 93 P.3d 486 (2004), a group of property owners claimed that their multi-family residential properties were valued in a discriminatory manner, citing the uniformity clause of the Arizona Constitution. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Westin Tucson Hotel Co. v. State Department of Revenue
green
2 sentences2000In Westin, we concluded that a Uniformity Clause violation was not shown where Westin Tucson Hotel established that the assessor conferred a tax benefit on one taxpayer, but failed to establish that such benefit was “routinely granted to other taxpayers in similar situations.” 188 Ariz. at 366 , 936 P.2d at 189 . 2000In Westin, we concluded that a Uniformity Clause violation was not shown where Westin Tucson Hotel established that the assessor conferred a tax benefit on one taxpayer, but failed to establish that such benefit was “routinely granted to other taxpayers in similar situations.” 188 Ariz. at 366 , 936 P.2d at 189 . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Arizona Department of Revenue v. Trico Electric Cooperative, Inc.
green
2 sentences1999Trico, 151 Ariz. at 548 , 729 P.2d at 902 . 1999Trico, 151 Ariz. at 548 , 729 P.2d at 902 . | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Knappen v. Swensen
green
1 sentence1926A. 701, 41 N. W. 948 ; Cook County v. Fairbank, 222 Ill. 578 , 78 N. E. 895 ; Hauser v. Miller, 37 Mont. 22 , 94 Pac. 197 ; State v. Mann, 76 Wis. 469 , 45 N. W. 526 , 46 N. W. 51 . *59 The most recent case holding such a statute unconstitutional is Malin v. Lamoure County, supra. The opinion in that case was written by Mr. Justice Bruce and in it he has compressed in short space, in very plain and cogent language, the principal reasons why such statutes ought not to be upheld and why they are violative of the uniformity rule of taxation. | 1 | 1926–1926 |
Hauser v. Miller
neutral
2 sentences1926A. 701, 41 N. W. 948 ; Cook County v. Fairbank, 222 Ill. 578 , 78 N. E. 895 ; Hauser v. Miller, 37 Mont. 22 , 94 Pac. 197 ; State v. Mann, 76 Wis. 469 , 45 N. W. 526 , 46 N. W. 51 . *59 The most recent case holding such a statute unconstitutional is Malin v. Lamoure County, supra. The opinion in that case was written by Mr. Justice Bruce and in it he has compressed in short space, in very plain and cogent language, the principal reasons why such statutes ought not to be upheld and why they are violative of the uniformity rule of taxation. 1926A. 701, 41 N. W. 948 ; Cook County v. Fairbank, 222 Ill. 578 , 78 N. E. 895 ; Hauser v. Miller, 37 Mont. 22 , 94 Pac. 197 ; State v. Mann, 76 Wis. 469 , 45 N. W. 526 , 46 N. W. 51 . *59 The most recent case holding such a statute unconstitutional is Malin v. Lamoure County, supra. The opinion in that case was written by Mr. Justice Bruce and in it he has compressed in short space, in very plain and cogent language, the principal reasons why such statutes ought not to be upheld and why they are violative of the uniformity rule of taxation. | 1 | 1926–1926 |
Cook County v. Kellogg Fairbank
green
1 sentence1926A. 701, 41 N. W. 948 ; Cook County v. Fairbank, 222 Ill. 578 , 78 N. E. 895 ; Hauser v. Miller, 37 Mont. 22 , 94 Pac. 197 ; State v. Mann, 76 Wis. 469 , 45 N. W. 526 , 46 N. W. 51 . *59 The most recent case holding such a statute unconstitutional is Malin v. Lamoure County, supra. The opinion in that case was written by Mr. Justice Bruce and in it he has compressed in short space, in very plain and cogent language, the principal reasons why such statutes ought not to be upheld and why they are violative of the uniformity rule of taxation. | 1 | 1926–1926 |
State ex rel. Sanderson v. Mann
green
2 sentences1926A. 701, 41 N. W. 948 ; Cook County v. Fairbank, 222 Ill. 578 , 78 N. E. 895 ; Hauser v. Miller, 37 Mont. 22 , 94 Pac. 197 ; State v. Mann, 76 Wis. 469 , 45 N. W. 526 , 46 N. W. 51 . *59 The most recent case holding such a statute unconstitutional is Malin v. Lamoure County, supra. The opinion in that case was written by Mr. Justice Bruce and in it he has compressed in short space, in very plain and cogent language, the principal reasons why such statutes ought not to be upheld and why they are violative of the uniformity rule of taxation. 1926A. 701, 41 N. W. 948 ; Cook County v. Fairbank, 222 Ill. 578 , 78 N. E. 895 ; Hauser v. Miller, 37 Mont. 22 , 94 Pac. 197 ; State v. Mann, 76 Wis. 469 , 45 N. W. 526 , 46 N. W. 51 . *59 The most recent case holding such a statute unconstitutional is Malin v. Lamoure County, supra. The opinion in that case was written by Mr. Justice Bruce and in it he has compressed in short space, in very plain and cogent language, the principal reasons why such statutes ought not to be upheld and why they are violative of the uniformity rule of taxation. | 1 | 1926–1926 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.