5 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1978–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Florida Dept. of Educ. v. Glassergreen2 sentences2019Further construing this term in Holmes, this Court concluded that the Opportunity Scholarship Program at issue violated article IX, section 1 because it “reduce[d] money available to the free schools” and “fund[ed] private schools that [we]re not ‘uniform’ when compared with each other or the public system.” 919 So. 2d at 398 (emphasis added). - 56 - Importantly, as Justice Kogan explained, the uniformity requirement of article IX, section 1 “is not and never was intended to require that each school district be a mirror image of every other one.” Fla. Dep’t of Educ. v. Glasser, 622 So. 2d 944, 2019Further construing this term in Holmes , this Court concluded that the Opportunity Scholarship Program at issue violated article IX, section 1 because it "reduce[d] money available to the free schools" and "fund[ed] private schools that [we]re not ' uniform ' when compared with each other or the public system." 919 So.2d at 398 (emphasis added). *153 Importantly, as Justice Kogan explained, the uniformity requirement of article IX, section 1"is not and never was intended to require that each school district be a mirror image of every other one." Fla. Dep't of Educ. v. Glasser , 622 So.2d 944 , | 2 | 3 |
Bush v. Holmesgreen2 sentences2019Further construing this term in Holmes, this Court concluded that the Opportunity Scholarship Program at issue violated article IX, section 1 because it “reduce[d] money available to the free schools” and “fund[ed] private schools that [we]re not ‘uniform’ when compared with each other or the public system.” 919 So. 2d at 398 (emphasis added). - 56 - Importantly, as Justice Kogan explained, the uniformity requirement of article IX, section 1 “is not and never was intended to require that each school district be a mirror image of every other one.” Fla. Dep’t of Educ. v. Glasser, 622 So. 2d 944, 2019Further construing this term in Holmes , this Court concluded that the Opportunity Scholarship Program at issue violated article IX, section 1 because it "reduce[d] money available to the free schools" and "fund[ed] private schools that [we]re not ' uniform ' when compared with each other or the public system." 919 So.2d at 398 (emphasis added). *153 Importantly, as Justice Kogan explained, the uniformity requirement of article IX, section 1"is not and never was intended to require that each school district be a mirror image of every other one." Fla. Dep't of Educ. v. Glasser , 622 So.2d 944 , | 2 | 2 |
City of Deerfield Beach v. Vaillantgreen1 sentence2002See City of Deerfield Beach v. Vaillant, 419 So.2d 624, 625-26 (Fla.1982) (noting that the circuit court's review of the decision of a city's administrative review board, although accomplished by petition for writ of certiorari, is actually a review to which the party is entitled as a matter of right and is effectively "an appeal"); Cherokee Crushed Stone v. City of Miramar, 421 So.2d 684, 685 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). [6] The City relied on Metropolitan Dade County v. Hernandez, 708 So.2d 1008 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998), for the proposition that an ordinance conferring certiorari jurisdiction does not vio | 1 | 1 |
Cherokee Crushed Stone, Inc. v. City of Miramargreen1 sentence2002See City of Deerfield Beach v. Vaillant, 419 So.2d 624, 625-26 (Fla.1982) (noting that the circuit court's review of the decision of a city's administrative review board, although accomplished by petition for writ of certiorari, is actually a review to which the party is entitled as a matter of right and is effectively "an appeal"); Cherokee Crushed Stone v. City of Miramar, 421 So.2d 684, 685 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). [6] The City relied on Metropolitan Dade County v. Hernandez, 708 So.2d 1008 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998), for the proposition that an ordinance conferring certiorari jurisdiction does not vio | 1 | 1 |
Burnsed v. Seaboard Coastline Railroad Companygreen1 sentence1978See Burnsed v. Seaboard Coastline Railroad, 290 So.2d 13 (Fla. 1974). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Metropolitan Dade County v. Hernandez
neutral
1 sentence2002See City of Deerfield Beach v. Vaillant, 419 So.2d 624, 625-26 (Fla.1982) (noting that the circuit court's review of the decision of a city's administrative review board, although accomplished by petition for writ of certiorari, is actually a review to which the party is entitled as a matter of right and is effectively "an appeal"); Cherokee Crushed Stone v. City of Miramar, 421 So.2d 684, 685 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). [6] The City relied on Metropolitan Dade County v. Hernandez, 708 So.2d 1008 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998), for the proposition that an ordinance conferring certiorari jurisdiction does not vio | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Alsdorf v. Broward County
green
1 sentence1978They suggest that a tax for Pinellas County's municipal taxing service unit is uniform within the "taxing unit" that is, the unincorporated area and they support this view by reference to Article VIII, Section 1(h) of the Constitution and our decision in Alsdorf v. Broward County, 333 So.2d 457 (Fla. 1976). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.