uniformity requirement in Montana

2002Hilger v. Moore (1919), 56 Mont. 146 , 182 P. 477 . *395 ¶20 The Taxpayers further assert that the uniformity doctrine is still a constitutional requirement in this state under the language of Article VIII, Sections 1 and 3 in the 1972 Montana Constitution.

2002Hilger v. Moore (1919), 56 Mont. 146 , 182 P. 477 . *395 ¶20 The Taxpayers further assert that the uniformity doctrine is still a constitutional requirement in this state under the language of Article VIII, Sections 1 and 3 in the 1972 Montana Constitution.

2021The amendment of the zoning map constitutes the second step of the process. 17 ¶27 Hartshorne argued in its complaint and summary judgment motion that Ordinance 18-23 violated the uniformity requirement by treating “the Developer’s WR-4 zoned property differently than other WR-4 zoned property anywhere else in the City, and further treats the Developer’s residential PUD zoned property differently than other Residential PUD zoned property anywhere else in the City.” The District Court agreed, concluding without elaboration that Ordinance 18-23 violates the uniformity requirement “to the extent

2021The amendment of the zoning map constitutes the second step of the process. 17 ¶27 Hartshorne argued in its complaint and summary judgment motion that Ordinance 18-23 violated the uniformity requirement by treating “the Developer’s WR-4 zoned property differently than other WR-4 zoned property anywhere else in the City, and further treats the Developer’s residential PUD zoned property differently than other Residential PUD zoned property anywhere else in the City.” The District Court agreed, concluding without elaboration that Ordinance 18-23 violates the uniformity requirement “to the extent

2021The amendment of the zoning map constitutes the second step of the process. 17 ¶27 Hartshorne argued in its complaint and summary judgment motion that Ordinance 18-23 violated the uniformity requirement by treating “the Developer’s WR-4 zoned property differently than other WR-4 zoned property anywhere else in the City, and further treats the Developer’s residential PUD zoned property differently than other Residential PUD zoned property anywhere else in the City.” The District Court agreed, concluding without elaboration that Ordinance 18-23 violates the uniformity requirement “to the extent

2021Wagner v. Woodward, 2012 MT 19, ¶ 16 , 363 Mont. 403 , 270 P.3d 21 5 The City filed a response brief as Appellee, which included argument supporting IO2.5’s position on the uniformity requirement.

2021Wagner v. Woodward, 2012 MT 19, ¶ 16 , 363 Mont. 403 , 270 P.3d 21 5 The City filed a response brief as Appellee, which included argument supporting IO2.5’s position on the uniformity requirement.

2021State v. Kelm, 2013 MT 115, ¶ 22 , 370 Mont. 61 , 300 P.3d 687 ; see § 1-2-101, MCA (“the office of the judge is simply to ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted or to omit what has been inserted”).

2021State v. Kelm, 2013 MT 115, ¶ 22 , 370 Mont. 61 , 300 P.3d 687 ; see § 1-2-101, MCA (“the office of the judge is simply to ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted or to omit what has been inserted”).

2002See also Patterson v. State (1976), 171 Mont. 168, 171-77 , 557 P.2d 798, 801-03 (analyzing property valuation system under Article VIII, Section 3 and treating “uniform” appraisal as requiring equal protection); Roosevelt , ¶ 19-20; Montana Dep’t of Revenue v. Barron (1990), 245 Mont. 100 , 799 P.2d 533 ; Montana Dep’t of Revenue v. Sheehy (1993), 262 Mont. 104 , 862 P.2d 1181 (guaranteeing equal protection Tinder Article VIII, Section 3, by striking down property valuation systems that are not uniform because like taxpayers are not assessed alike, therefore resulting taxes would not be the s

2002See also Patterson v. State (1976), 171 Mont. 168, 171-77 , 557 P.2d 798, 801-03 (analyzing property valuation system under Article VIII, Section 3 and treating “uniform” appraisal as requiring equal protection); Roosevelt , ¶ 19-20; Montana Dep’t of Revenue v. Barron (1990), 245 Mont. 100 , 799 P.2d 533 ; Montana Dep’t of Revenue v. Sheehy (1993), 262 Mont. 104 , 862 P.2d 1181 (guaranteeing equal protection Tinder Article VIII, Section 3, by striking down property valuation systems that are not uniform because like taxpayers are not assessed alike, therefore resulting taxes would not be the s

2002See also Patterson v. State (1976), 171 Mont. 168, 171-77 , 557 P.2d 798, 801-03 (analyzing property valuation system under Article VIII, Section 3 and treating “uniform” appraisal as requiring equal protection); Roosevelt , ¶ 19-20; Montana Dep’t of Revenue v. Barron (1990), 245 Mont. 100 , 799 P.2d 533 ; Montana Dep’t of Revenue v. Sheehy (1993), 262 Mont. 104 , 862 P.2d 1181 (guaranteeing equal protection Tinder Article VIII, Section 3, by striking down property valuation systems that are not uniform because like taxpayers are not assessed alike, therefore resulting taxes would not be the s

2002See also Patterson v. State (1976), 171 Mont. 168, 171-77 , 557 P.2d 798, 801-03 (analyzing property valuation system under Article VIII, Section 3 and treating “uniform” appraisal as requiring equal protection); Roosevelt , ¶ 19-20; Montana Dep’t of Revenue v. Barron (1990), 245 Mont. 100 , 799 P.2d 533 ; Montana Dep’t of Revenue v. Sheehy (1993), 262 Mont. 104 , 862 P.2d 1181 (guaranteeing equal protection Tinder Article VIII, Section 3, by striking down property valuation systems that are not uniform because like taxpayers are not assessed alike, therefore resulting taxes would not be the s

2002Rankin v. Love (1951), 125 Mont. 184, 187 , 232 P.2d 998, 1000 ; see also Powder River, passim (relying on tax jurisprudence decided before 1972). ¶38 Other passages of the Convention history indicate that in addition to creating a more concise document, the delegates also intended to give the state even more flexibility regarding its tax policies.

2002Rankin v. Love (1951), 125 Mont. 184, 187 , 232 P.2d 998, 1000 ; see also Powder River, passim (relying on tax jurisprudence decided before 1972). ¶38 Other passages of the Convention history indicate that in addition to creating a more concise document, the delegates also intended to give the state even more flexibility regarding its tax policies.

1980Larson, supra, 166 Mont. at 455 , 534 P.2d at 857 .

1980Larson, supra, 166 Mont. at 455 , 534 P.2d at 857 .

1933It is held that exemption on account of service in time of war violates the uniformity clause of state and federal Constitutions (McLendon v. State, 179 Ala. 54 , 60 So. 392 , Ann.

1933It is held that exemption on account of service in time of war violates the uniformity clause of state and federal Constitutions (McLendon v. State, 179 Ala. 54 , 60 So. 392 , Ann.

1933Cas. 1915C, 691; In re Humphrey, 178 Minn. 331 , 227 N. W. 179 ), and that the exemption for license of one employed in a state institution, while requiring it of those engaged in private practice, is discriminatory (Jackson v. State, 55 Tex. Cr. 557, 117 S. W. 818 ).

1933Cas. 1915C, 691; In re Humphrey, 178 Minn. 331 , 227 N. W. 179 ), and that the exemption for license of one employed in a state institution, while requiring it of those engaged in private practice, is discriminatory (Jackson v. State, 55 Tex. Cr. 557, 117 S. W. 818 ).

1933Cas. 1915C, 691; In re Humphrey, 178 Minn. 331 , 227 N. W. 179 ), and that the exemption for license of one employed in a state institution, while requiring it of those engaged in private practice, is discriminatory (Jackson v. State, 55 Tex. Cr. 557, 117 S. W. 818 ).

1928Dist., 72 Mont. 221 , 232 Pac. 528 .) Counsel for the city urge that these decisions refer only to the uniformity clause of the Constitution, and that, in all other respects, special assessments should be treated as taxes, as the term is ordinarily used.

1928Dist., 72 Mont. 221 , 232 Pac. 528 .) Counsel for the city urge that these decisions refer only to the uniformity clause of the Constitution, and that, in all other respects, special assessments should be treated as taxes, as the term is ordinarily used.

1922Rep. 425 , 15 Pac. 380 .) In view of what has been said it is not necessary to give consideration to the uniformity requirement of the Constitution.

1916(Salt Lake City v. Wilson (Utah), 148 Pac. 1104 ; State v. Rayburn, 2 Okl.

1895(Ex parte Hurl, 49 Cal. 557 .) It was again said in City of Santa Barbara v. Stearns, 51 Cal. 499 : “A license charge or fee for the transaction of business is, in our opinion, a tax, within the meaning of the term ‘ tax, ’ as employed in those sections [referring to sections other than the uniformity clause].

1895(Ex parte Hurl, 49 Cal. 557 .) It was again said in City of Santa Barbara v. Stearns, 51 Cal. 499 : “A license charge or fee for the transaction of business is, in our opinion, a tax, within the meaning of the term ‘ tax, ’ as employed in those sections [referring to sections other than the uniformity clause].