uniformity requirement in Massachusetts

2002On KCI’s motion for summary judgment, the judge entered partial summary judgment in favor of KCI, ruling that KCI’s claim was not barred by the applicable limitations period, and declaring that § 29-6 of art. 29 was invalid under principles enunciated in SCIT v. Planning Bd. of Braintree, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 101, 107 (1984), in that the requirement that landowners within a GPOD obtain a conditional use permit for any use violated the uniformity requirement of § 2 of the enabling act.

1998The court struck down the discretionary permit section relying on the uniformity requirement of Mass. G.L.c. 40A, §4. 8 SCIT, 19 Mass.App.Ct. at 107 .

2010In Peterson v. Commissioner of Revenue, 441 Mass. 420, 421 (2004) (Peterson I), we concluded that, after allowable deductions and adjustments, the tax rate on long-term capital gains realized on or after May 1, 2002, became “higher than the tax rate on the same gain realized earlier in the year.” Because “[o]nly one tax rate may be applied to all long-term capital gains realized in calendar year 2002,” we held that the 2002 act violated the uniformity requirement of art. 44.

2005In Peterson v. Commissioner of Revenue, 441 Mass. 420, 429 (2004) (Peterson I), this court held that the use of May 1, 2002, as the effective date for a change in the capital gains tax rate, as set forth in the Revenue Enhancement Act of 2002 (Act), St. 2002, c. 186, § 32, violated the uniformity requirement of art. 44 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution.

2008Co. of Am. v. Board of Appeals of Westwood, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 278, 279 (1986), a Land Court judge ruled that the setback condition was unreasonable and beyond the board’s authority because it derogated from the uniformity requirement of G.

2005Although the “constitutional requirement of a uniform rate . . . cannot be absolute, because it is impossible to achieve a uniform effective rate of taxation where exemptions are allowed,” Opinions of the Justices, 386 Mass. 1223, 1226 (1982), we require that there be a “balance between uniformity and reasonableness” of the exemption, Massachusetts Taxpayers Found., Inc. v. Secretary of Admin., supra at 47.

2005“Not only must exemptions be reasonable, therefore, but also they must not conflict with the uniformity requirement.” Massachusetts Taxpayers Found., Inc. v. Secretary of Admin., 398 Mass. 40, 46 (1986).

2005Although the “constitutional requirement of a uniform rate . . . cannot be absolute, because it is impossible to achieve a uniform effective rate of taxation where exemptions are allowed,” Opinions of the Justices, 386 Mass. 1223, 1226 (1982), we require that there be a “balance between uniformity and reasonableness” of the exemption, Massachusetts Taxpayers Found., Inc. v. Secretary of Admin., supra at 47.

2004See Opinion of the Justices, 383 Mass. 940 , 943 n.3 (1981) (“it is generally agreed that the requirement of uniform rates of taxation in art. 44 applies to both earned and unearned income”).

2004Unlike the “uniformity” provision of art. 1, § 8, cl. 1, of the United States Constitution, which has been construed to mean geographical uniformity, see Billings v. United States, 232 U.S. 261, 282 (1914), the meaning of “uniformity” in art. 44 is broader.

2004Cf. Johnson v. Department of Revenue, supra at 66, quoting Snell v. Commissioner, 97 F.2d 891, 893 (5th Cir. 1938) (as to plaintiffs’ equal protection claim, stating, “[t]hat the law might be changed, not only in the tax rate but in any other of its provisions, was a risk the taxpayer^] took in deferring the [recognition] of [their] gains”). 2 That the tax provision at issue in this case took effect part way through the 2002 tax year does not offend the uniformity requirement of art. 44 because it does not disturb the classification of the plaintiffs’ income-producing property at issue here, a

2004See Salhanick v. Commissioner of Revenue, 391 Mass. 658, 662 (1984).

1998In 1930, the Justices answered a similar question regarding a bill which would grant a small, fixed income tax exemption to individuals whose net annual income did not exceed $10,000. 3 In advising that these exemptions comported with the uniformity requirement of art. 44, the Justices first recognized that the fixed exemptions were “not so large as to bear on their face indications of want of equality between the inhabitants.” Opinion of the Justices, supra at 601.

1998See also Henry v. White, 250 S.W.2d 70 (Tenn. 1952) (deciding that a uniformity requirement clearly forbids the ciiy from “permitting on certain streets in a given district the use of buildings for a purpose that is forbidden everywhere else in that district”).

1984What was said by Justice Qua in Smith v. Board of Appeals of Fall River, 319 Mass. 341, 344 (1946), with respect to a by-law’s violation of an earlier (but similar) version of the uniformity requirement, applies with equal force to § 135-604 and demonstrates why the attempt at regulation is bad: “Its provisions could be applied to a great number, if not to most, of the structures and [uses] in [a business] district and could be employed to break down one of the principal characteristics of the zoning system.