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19 California opinions name it 1 courts 2022–2026 19 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
El Dorado County Health & Human Services Agency v. J.S.green2 sentences2024(See In re L.S. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1183, 1194 [“the discretion of the juvenile court is limited by the statutory framework of dependency jurisdiction,” and application of the wrong burden of proof is an abuse of discretion]; In re Tamika C. (2005) 131 19 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1168 [“applying the wrong burden of proof” constituted an abuse of discretion].) The court also erred in applying the Caden C. factors to the sibling relationship exception rather than relying on the language of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(v). 2024(See In re L.S. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1183, 1194 [“the discretion of the juvenile court is limited by the statutory framework of dependency jurisdiction,” and application of the wrong burden of proof is an abuse of discretion]; In re Tamika C. (2005) 131 19 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1168 [“applying the wrong burden of proof” constituted an abuse of discretion].) The court also erred in applying the Caden C. factors to the sibling relationship exception rather than relying on the language of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(v). | 2 | 2 |
In Re Celine R.green2 sentences2023DISCUSSION A. Governing Law and Standard of Review “At the section 366.26 hearing, the focus shifts away from family reunification and toward the selection and implementation of a permanent plan for the child.” (In re S.B. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 529 , 532; accord, Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 630.) “‘Once the court determines the child is likely to be adopted, the burden shifts to the parent to show that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child under one of the exceptions listed in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1).’” (In re B.D. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 1218 , 1224-1225 2022As the Supreme Court in Caden C. cautioned, the legislative preference—the “norm”—is for adoption; the parental relationship exception, like the other exceptions to termination of parental rights, applies only in “‘exceptional circumstances.’” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 631; accord, In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53 .) Here, the juvenile court, expressly applying the correct Caden C. analysis, concluded there was no evidence in the record that the children’s relationship with Edwin outweighed the benefits of consistency and stability in the adoptive home of their paternal uncle | 2 | 2 |
Orange County Social Services Agency v. Jamie W.green1 sentence2025The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Terminating Parental Rights A. Regular Visitation The analysis of whether a parent has maintained regular visitation and contact is “straightforward” and requires that the parent “ ‘visit consistently,’ taking into account ‘the extent permitted by court orders.’ ” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) The Agency concedes substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding that the parents met the first element of the Caden C. analysis, and our review of the record shows that they maintained consistent visitation and contact with K.E | 1 | 1 |
People v. Ramirezgreen1 sentence2025No Error Father, joined by Mother, claims that the juvenile court, in finding P.S. and A.S. were adoptable and no exception applied, failed to follow the Caden C. analysis. “‘“We must indulge in every presumption to uphold a judgment, and it is [appellants’] burden on appeal to affirmatively demonstrate error—it will not be presumed.”’” (In re A.L. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1131 , 1161 (A.L.).) Further, “‘[i]n the absence of evidence to the contrary, we presume that the court “knows and applies the correct statutory and case law.”’” (People v. Jones (2017) 3 Cal.5th 583, 616 , quoting People v. Th | 1 | 1 |
In Re Daisy D.green1 sentence2025(V.S., supra, at pp. 1168–1169.) V.S. explained, “‘[N]othing in the legislative history nor in the language of the statute itself requires that the juvenile court give sua sponte consideration to the sibling relationship exception when no party has argued it applies’” (id. at p. 1168, quoting In re Daisy D. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 287, 292 (Daisy D.), and “sua sponte assertion of the sibling relationship exception undermined the statutory burdens placed upon the parties” (V.S., supra, at p. 1168). “‘The party claiming that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child has the | 1 | 1 |
Los Angeles County Department of Children & Family Services v. Daniel R.green1 sentence2022As the Court of Appeal explained in In re A.L. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1131 , at page 1156, “[W]e infer from 9 Mother’s formulation of the third step of the Caden C. analysis is not quite accurate: the third step properly considers whether “losing the relationship with [Mother] would harm the child to an extent not outweighed, on balance, by the security of a new, adoptive home.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 634.) 22 section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(D)—under which the juvenile court is required to ‘state its reasons in writing or on the record’ when it makes a finding that termination of | 1 | 1 |
L. A. Cnty. Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. C.P. (In re J.P.)green1 sentence2022(See In re J.P. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 789, 799 [appellate court’s consideration of whether error is harmless “is by definition a case-by- case analysis”].) In J.D., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at page 855, the appellate court concluded, contrary to the juvenile court, that the “mother [had] presented evidence to support a finding that J.D. ha[d] a ‘substantial, positive, emotional attachment’ to her sufficient to meet the 36 second element [of the exception].” The J.D. court specifically rejected the agency’s assertion that the mother had not satisfied the second element (id. at p. 859), going so fa | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re Autumn H.
green
2 sentences2026(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636; cf. Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575 .) The juvenile court properly applied the third prong of the Caden C. factors and its conclusion that no evidence supported a finding that the detriment of severing M.C.’s relationship with Mother outweighed the benefits of adoption is supported by the record. 2024(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636; cf. Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575 .) Contrary to Mother’s 12 conclusory and unsupported assertion, there is nothing in the record showing that the court “failed to properly apply the Caden C. factors.” To the extent Mother cites evidence or inferences that would have supported a contrary finding by the court on the third prong, she misapplies the abuse of discretion standard of review. | 4 | 2024–2026 |
People v. Thomas
green
2 sentences2025No Error Father, joined by Mother, claims that the juvenile court, in finding P.S. and A.S. were adoptable and no exception applied, failed to follow the Caden C. analysis. “‘“We must indulge in every presumption to uphold a judgment, and it is [appellants’] burden on appeal to affirmatively demonstrate error—it will not be presumed.”’” (In re A.L. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1131 , 1161 (A.L.).) Further, “‘[i]n the absence of evidence to the contrary, we presume that the court “knows and applies the correct statutory and case law.”’” (People v. Jones (2017) 3 Cal.5th 583, 616 , quoting People v. Th 2025Citing In re L.A.-O. (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 197 , 210–212; In re D.M. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 261 , 268, and In re J.D. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 833 , 864, Mother asserts “[r]eversal is required in cases where a court merely summarily states, as the [juvenile] court did here, that the parent had not occupied a parental role and it cannot be determined whether the court considered proper or improper factors [under Caden C.].” We reject this proposition as it ignores our duty to “ ‘presume’ ” juvenile courts “ ‘ “know[] and appl[y] the correct statutory and case law.” ’ ”3 (In re A.L., supra, 73 Cal.A | 2 | 2025–2025 |
Los Angeles County Department of Children & Family Services v. Lydia O.
green
2 sentences2022(In re Breanna S. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 636, 646-647 , disapproved on other grounds in Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 637, fn. 6, 638, fn. 7; compare In re D.M., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 271 [remand appropriate where primary source of error is in the third element of the analysis, it thus being unclear “how the [juvenile] court would have exercised its discretion” to balance the potential detriment of termination against the potential benefits of adoption without “the benefit of the Caden C. analysis”].) Therefore, in light of our ruling on the second prong, we need not address father’s 2022(In re Breanna S. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 636, 646-647 , disapproved on other grounds in Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 637, fn. 6, 638, fn. 7; compare In re D.M., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 271 [remand appropriate where primary source of error is in the third element of the analysis, it thus being unclear “how the [juvenile] court would have exercised its discretion” to balance the potential detriment of termination against the potential benefits of adoption without “the benefit of the Caden C. analysis”].) Therefore, in light of our ruling on the second prong, we need not address father’s | 2 | 2022–2022 |
In Re Zamer G.
green
1 sentence2026(In re Zamer G. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1271 .) In this case, the Agency reports and the exhibits admitted into evidence establish that many of the Caden C. factors—including K.M.’s age and the portion of her life spent out of Mother’s care—weigh against a finding in favor of Mother on the second element of the beneficial relationship exception. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
In Re Stephanie M.
green
1 sentence2026(Caden C., at p. 641; In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295 , 318–319.) Appellants do not call into question the court’s analysis as to the first prong of the three-prong Caden C. test for the beneficial parent-child relationship exception when it found Mother had maintained regular visitation and contact with M.C. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Jones
green
1 sentence2025No Error Father, joined by Mother, claims that the juvenile court, in finding P.S. and A.S. were adoptable and no exception applied, failed to follow the Caden C. analysis. “‘“We must indulge in every presumption to uphold a judgment, and it is [appellants’] burden on appeal to affirmatively demonstrate error—it will not be presumed.”’” (In re A.L. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1131 , 1161 (A.L.).) Further, “‘[i]n the absence of evidence to the contrary, we presume that the court “knows and applies the correct statutory and case law.”’” (People v. Jones (2017) 3 Cal.5th 583, 616 , quoting People v. Th | 1 | 2025–2025 |
San Diego County Health & Human Services Agency v. Sara D.
green
1 sentence2025And the relationship may be shaped by a slew of factors, such as ‘[t]he age of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, the “positive” or “negative” effect of interaction between parent and child, and the child’s particular needs.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 632.) “[C]ourts often consider how children feel about, interact with, look to, or talk about their parents.” (Ibid.) To carry the burden on this element, a parent “must show more than frequent and loving contact or pleasant visits.” (In re C.F. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 549, 555 ; In re G.H. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5t | 1 | 2025–2025 |
In Re Jonathan B.
green
1 sentence2024(In re Jonathan B. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 873, 875 .) The juvenile court found the mother had not satisfied parts two or three of the Caden C. test, and the section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) exception therefore did not apply. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Alameda Cnty. Soc. Servs. Agency v. I.T. (In re E.T.)
green
1 sentence2024Mother urges this court to follow In re E.T. (2018) 31 Cal.App.5th 68, 77 , in which the appellate court wrote, “The standard is whether the children benefit from Mother’s presence in their lives, not whether they could eventually be happy without her.” For the sake of addressing Mother’s argument, we will apply the foregoing benefit standard. “ ‘We apply the substantial evidence standard of review to the factual issue of the existence of a beneficial parental relationship.” (Id. at p. 76.) M.W. was removed from Mother’s custody in December 2021 due to Mother’s boyfriend physically abusing M.W | 1 | 2024–2024 |
In Re SB
green
1 sentence2023DISCUSSION A. Governing Law and Standard of Review “At the section 366.26 hearing, the focus shifts away from family reunification and toward the selection and implementation of a permanent plan for the child.” (In re S.B. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 529 , 532; accord, Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 630.) “‘Once the court determines the child is likely to be adopted, the burden shifts to the parent to show that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child under one of the exceptions listed in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1).’” (In re B.D. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 1218 , 1224-1225 | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.