Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
19 California opinions name it 2 courts 1900–2024 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Kirvingreen2 sentences2022These crimes – and the rule 31. governing them – fall into two categories.” (People v. Kirvin (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1507, 1517 .) “The first category pertains to crimes that treat harm or damage as one of their elements, and which permit the prosecution to aggregate that harm or damage. 2022These crimes—and the rule governing them—fall into two categories.” (People v. Kirvin (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1507, 1517 (Kirvin).) “The first category pertains to crimes that treat harm or damage as one of their elements, and which permit the prosecution to aggregate that harm or damage. | 1 | 2 |
Okorie v. L. A. Unified Sch. Dist.green1 sentence2022(See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a); Okorie v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 574, 600 [“[m]atters not properly raised or that are lacking in adequate legal discussion will be deemed forfeited. [¶] … [I]t is not this court’s role to construct theories or arguments that would undermine the judgment and defeat the presumption of correctness. | 1 | 1 |
Unruh v. Truck Insurance Exchangegreen2 sentences1987(E.g., Magliulo v. Superior Court (1975) 47 Cal.App. 3d 760, 779 [ 121 Cal.Rptr. 621 ] [assault by employer]; Ramey v. General Petroleum Corp. (1959) 173 Cal.App. 2d 386, 402 [ 343 P.2d 787 ] [fraud by employer, not a normal risk of employment]; Renteria v. County of Orange (1978) 82 Cal.App. 3d 833, 841-842 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 447 ] [intentional infliction of emotional distress, specifically noted by court that emotional distress without physical injury is not compensable in workers’ compensation]; Unruh v. Truck Insurance Exchange (1972) 7 Cal.3d 616, 630 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 815 , 498 P.2d 1063 ] [i 1987(E.g., Magliulo v. Superior Court (1975) 47 Cal.App. 3d 760, 779 [ 121 Cal.Rptr. 621 ] [assault by employer]; Ramey v. General Petroleum Corp. (1959) 173 Cal.App. 2d 386, 402 [ 343 P.2d 787 ] [fraud by employer, not a normal risk of employment]; Renteria v. County of Orange (1978) 82 Cal.App. 3d 833, 841-842 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 447 ] [intentional infliction of emotional distress, specifically noted by court that emotional distress without physical injury is not compensable in workers’ compensation]; Unruh v. Truck Insurance Exchange (1972) 7 Cal.3d 616, 630 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 815 , 498 P.2d 1063 ] [i | 1 | 1 |
Ramey v. General Petroleum Corp.green2 sentences1987(E.g., Magliulo v. Superior Court (1975) 47 Cal.App. 3d 760, 779 [ 121 Cal.Rptr. 621 ] [assault by employer]; Ramey v. General Petroleum Corp. (1959) 173 Cal.App. 2d 386, 402 [ 343 P.2d 787 ] [fraud by employer, not a normal risk of employment]; Renteria v. County of Orange (1978) 82 Cal.App. 3d 833, 841-842 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 447 ] [intentional infliction of emotional distress, specifically noted by court that emotional distress without physical injury is not compensable in workers’ compensation]; Unruh v. Truck Insurance Exchange (1972) 7 Cal.3d 616, 630 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 815 , 498 P.2d 1063 ] [i 1987(E.g., Magliulo v. Superior Court (1975) 47 Cal.App. 3d 760, 779 [ 121 Cal.Rptr. 621 ] [assault by employer]; Ramey v. General Petroleum Corp. (1959) 173 Cal.App. 2d 386, 402 [ 343 P.2d 787 ] [fraud by employer, not a normal risk of employment]; Renteria v. County of Orange (1978) 82 Cal.App. 3d 833, 841-842 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 447 ] [intentional infliction of emotional distress, specifically noted by court that emotional distress without physical injury is not compensable in workers’ compensation]; Unruh v. Truck Insurance Exchange (1972) 7 Cal.3d 616, 630 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 815 , 498 P.2d 1063 ] [i | 1 | 1 |
Magliulo v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1987(E.g., Magliulo v. Superior Court (1975) 47 Cal.App. 3d 760, 779 [ 121 Cal.Rptr. 621 ] [assault by employer]; Ramey v. General Petroleum Corp. (1959) 173 Cal.App. 2d 386, 402 [ 343 P.2d 787 ] [fraud by employer, not a normal risk of employment]; Renteria v. County of Orange (1978) 82 Cal.App. 3d 833, 841-842 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 447 ] [intentional infliction of emotional distress, specifically noted by court that emotional distress without physical injury is not compensable in workers’ compensation]; Unruh v. Truck Insurance Exchange (1972) 7 Cal.3d 616, 630 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 815 , 498 P.2d 1063 ] [i 1987(E.g., Magliulo v. Superior Court (1975) 47 Cal.App. 3d 760, 779 [ 121 Cal.Rptr. 621 ] [assault by employer]; Ramey v. General Petroleum Corp. (1959) 173 Cal.App. 2d 386, 402 [ 343 P.2d 787 ] [fraud by employer, not a normal risk of employment]; Renteria v. County of Orange (1978) 82 Cal.App. 3d 833, 841-842 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 447 ] [intentional infliction of emotional distress, specifically noted by court that emotional distress without physical injury is not compensable in workers’ compensation]; Unruh v. Truck Insurance Exchange (1972) 7 Cal.3d 616, 630 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 815 , 498 P.2d 1063 ] [i | 1 | 1 |
Renteria v. County of Orangegreen2 sentences1987(E.g., Magliulo v. Superior Court (1975) 47 Cal.App. 3d 760, 779 [ 121 Cal.Rptr. 621 ] [assault by employer]; Ramey v. General Petroleum Corp. (1959) 173 Cal.App. 2d 386, 402 [ 343 P.2d 787 ] [fraud by employer, not a normal risk of employment]; Renteria v. County of Orange (1978) 82 Cal.App. 3d 833, 841-842 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 447 ] [intentional infliction of emotional distress, specifically noted by court that emotional distress without physical injury is not compensable in workers’ compensation]; Unruh v. Truck Insurance Exchange (1972) 7 Cal.3d 616, 630 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 815 , 498 P.2d 1063 ] [i 1987(E.g., Magliulo v. Superior Court (1975) 47 Cal.App. 3d 760, 779 [ 121 Cal.Rptr. 621 ] [assault by employer]; Ramey v. General Petroleum Corp. (1959) 173 Cal.App. 2d 386, 402 [ 343 P.2d 787 ] [fraud by employer, not a normal risk of employment]; Renteria v. County of Orange (1978) 82 Cal.App. 3d 833, 841-842 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 447 ] [intentional infliction of emotional distress, specifically noted by court that emotional distress without physical injury is not compensable in workers’ compensation]; Unruh v. Truck Insurance Exchange (1972) 7 Cal.3d 616, 630 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 815 , 498 P.2d 1063 ] [i | 1 | 1 |
Duprey v. Shanegreen2 sentences1987(E.g., Magliulo v. Superior Court (1975) 47 Cal.App. 3d 760, 779 [ 121 Cal.Rptr. 621 ] [assault by employer]; Ramey v. General Petroleum Corp. (1959) 173 Cal.App. 2d 386, 402 [ 343 P.2d 787 ] [fraud by employer, not a normal risk of employment]; Renteria v. County of Orange (1978) 82 Cal.App. 3d 833, 841-842 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 447 ] [intentional infliction of emotional distress, specifically noted by court that emotional distress without physical injury is not compensable in workers’ compensation]; Unruh v. Truck Insurance Exchange (1972) 7 Cal.3d 616, 630 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 815 , 498 P.2d 1063 ] [i 1987(E.g., Magliulo v. Superior Court (1975) 47 Cal.App. 3d 760, 779 [ 121 Cal.Rptr. 621 ] [assault by employer]; Ramey v. General Petroleum Corp. (1959) 173 Cal.App. 2d 386, 402 [ 343 P.2d 787 ] [fraud by employer, not a normal risk of employment]; Renteria v. County of Orange (1978) 82 Cal.App. 3d 833, 841-842 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 447 ] [intentional infliction of emotional distress, specifically noted by court that emotional distress without physical injury is not compensable in workers’ compensation]; Unruh v. Truck Insurance Exchange (1972) 7 Cal.3d 616, 630 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 815 , 498 P.2d 1063 ] [i | 1 | 1 |
Karrell v. Watsongreen2 sentences1982As American Motorists concedes, there is a well recognized policy in favor of resolving appeals on their merits (e.g., Larrus v. First National Bank (1954) 122 Cal.App.2d 884, 886 [ 266 P.2d 143 ]; Karrell v. Watson (1953) 116 Cal.App.2d 769, 773 [ 254 P.2d 651 , 255 P.2d 464 ]) and, generally, little by way of “good cause” has been required in the decisions applying rule 2(c). 1982As American Motorists concedes, there is a well recognized policy in favor of resolving appeals on their merits (e.g., Larrus v. First National Bank (1954) 122 Cal.App.2d 884, 886 [ 266 P.2d 143 ]; Karrell v. Watson (1953) 116 Cal.App.2d 769, 773 [ 254 P.2d 651 , 255 P.2d 464 ]) and, generally, little by way of “good cause” has been required in the decisions applying rule 2(c). | 1 | 1 |
Larrus v. First National Bank of San Mateo Countygreen2 sentences1982As American Motorists concedes, there is a well recognized policy in favor of resolving appeals on their merits (e.g., Larrus v. First National Bank (1954) 122 Cal.App.2d 884, 886 [ 266 P.2d 143 ]; Karrell v. Watson (1953) 116 Cal.App.2d 769, 773 [ 254 P.2d 651 , 255 P.2d 464 ]) and, generally, little by way of “good cause” has been required in the decisions applying rule 2(c). 1982As American Motorists concedes, there is a well recognized policy in favor of resolving appeals on their merits (e.g., Larrus v. First National Bank (1954) 122 Cal.App.2d 884, 886 [ 266 P.2d 143 ]; Karrell v. Watson (1953) 116 Cal.App.2d 769, 773 [ 254 P.2d 651 , 255 P.2d 464 ]) and, generally, little by way of “good cause” has been required in the decisions applying rule 2(c). | 1 | 1 |
Webb v. Webbgreen2 sentences1982(See, e.g., Webb v. Webb (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 259, 262, fn. 1 [ 90 Cal.Rptr. 565 ]; Evola v. Wendt Construction Co. (1958) 158 Cal.App.2d 658, 660-661 [ 323 P.2d 158 ]; Smith v. *883 Smith (1954) 126 Cal.App.2d 194, 195 [ 272 P.2d 118 ]; Larrus v. First National Bank, supra, 122 Cal.App.2d 884 .) Here ample “good cause” appears for treating the notice of appeal from the minute order as being from the judgment subsequently ordered. 1982(See, e.g., Webb v. Webb (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 259, 262, fn. 1 [ 90 Cal.Rptr. 565 ]; Evola v. Wendt Construction Co. (1958) 158 Cal.App.2d 658, 660-661 [ 323 P.2d 158 ]; Smith v. *883 Smith (1954) 126 Cal.App.2d 194, 195 [ 272 P.2d 118 ]; Larrus v. First National Bank, supra, 122 Cal.App.2d 884 .) Here ample “good cause” appears for treating the notice of appeal from the minute order as being from the judgment subsequently ordered. | 1 | 1 |
Governing Board of Rialto Unified School District v. Manngreen2 sentences1982The reviewing court must dispose of the case under the law in force when its decision is rendered.’” Most of the decisions applying this rule deal with criminal laws, but as Justice Tobriner noted in Governing Board v. Mann (1977) 18 Cal.3d 819, 830 [ 135 Cal.Rptr. 526 , 558 P.2d 1 ]: “[T]he reach of this common law rule has never been confined solely to criminal or quasi-criminal matters.” (Fn. omitted.) One of the cases cited in Mann was Wolf v. Pacific Southwest etc. Corp. (1937) 10 Cal.2d 183 [ 74 P.2d 263 ], dealing with usury. 1982The reviewing court must dispose of the case under the law in force when its decision is rendered.’” Most of the decisions applying this rule deal with criminal laws, but as Justice Tobriner noted in Governing Board v. Mann (1977) 18 Cal.3d 819, 830 [ 135 Cal.Rptr. 526 , 558 P.2d 1 ]: “[T]he reach of this common law rule has never been confined solely to criminal or quasi-criminal matters.” (Fn. omitted.) One of the cases cited in Mann was Wolf v. Pacific Southwest etc. Corp. (1937) 10 Cal.2d 183 [ 74 P.2d 263 ], dealing with usury. | 1 | 1 |
Evola v. Wendt Construction Co.green2 sentences1982(See, e.g., Webb v. Webb (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 259, 262, fn. 1 [ 90 Cal.Rptr. 565 ]; Evola v. Wendt Construction Co. (1958) 158 Cal.App.2d 658, 660-661 [ 323 P.2d 158 ]; Smith v. *883 Smith (1954) 126 Cal.App.2d 194, 195 [ 272 P.2d 118 ]; Larrus v. First National Bank, supra, 122 Cal.App.2d 884 .) Here ample “good cause” appears for treating the notice of appeal from the minute order as being from the judgment subsequently ordered. 1982(See, e.g., Webb v. Webb (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 259, 262, fn. 1 [ 90 Cal.Rptr. 565 ]; Evola v. Wendt Construction Co. (1958) 158 Cal.App.2d 658, 660-661 [ 323 P.2d 158 ]; Smith v. *883 Smith (1954) 126 Cal.App.2d 194, 195 [ 272 P.2d 118 ]; Larrus v. First National Bank, supra, 122 Cal.App.2d 884 .) Here ample “good cause” appears for treating the notice of appeal from the minute order as being from the judgment subsequently ordered. | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Smithgreen2 sentences1982(See, e.g., Webb v. Webb (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 259, 262, fn. 1 [ 90 Cal.Rptr. 565 ]; Evola v. Wendt Construction Co. (1958) 158 Cal.App.2d 658, 660-661 [ 323 P.2d 158 ]; Smith v. *883 Smith (1954) 126 Cal.App.2d 194, 195 [ 272 P.2d 118 ]; Larrus v. First National Bank, supra, 122 Cal.App.2d 884 .) Here ample “good cause” appears for treating the notice of appeal from the minute order as being from the judgment subsequently ordered. 1982(See, e.g., Webb v. Webb (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 259, 262, fn. 1 [ 90 Cal.Rptr. 565 ]; Evola v. Wendt Construction Co. (1958) 158 Cal.App.2d 658, 660-661 [ 323 P.2d 158 ]; Smith v. *883 Smith (1954) 126 Cal.App.2d 194, 195 [ 272 P.2d 118 ]; Larrus v. First National Bank, supra, 122 Cal.App.2d 884 .) Here ample “good cause” appears for treating the notice of appeal from the minute order as being from the judgment subsequently ordered. | 1 | 1 |
Garrison v. Rourkegreen2 sentences1968(Garrison v. Rourke (1948) 32 Cal.2d 430, 435-436 [ 196 P.2d 884 ], and cases cited.) He relies on the decisions applying this rule to Code of Civil Procedure section 632, which declares that in a nonjury trial the court “must” file its findings of fact and conclusions of law “within 30 days” after submission of the cause, but provides no penalty for failure to do so. 1968(Garrison v. Rourke (1948) 32 Cal.2d 430, 435-436 [ 196 P.2d 884 ], and cases cited.) He relies on the decisions applying this rule to Code of Civil Procedure section 632, which declares that in a nonjury trial the court “must” file its findings of fact and conclusions of law “within 30 days” after submission of the cause, but provides no penalty for failure to do so. | 1 | 1 |
| Anderson v. Citizens Sav. & Tr. Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Pinsky v. Sloatgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Mitchell v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
American Motorists Insurance v. Cowan
green
2 sentences1986Co. v. Cowan (1982) 127 Cal.App.3d 875 [ 179 Cal.Rptr. 747 ], in language applicable to the circumstances of the present case; “[T]here is a well recognized policy in favor of resolving appeals on their merits [citations] and, generally, little by way of ‘good cause’ has been required in the decisions applying rule 2(c). [Citations.] Here ample ‘good cause’ appears for treating the notice of appeal from the minute order as being from the judgment subsequently ordered. 1986Co. v. Cowan (1982) 127 Cal.App.3d 875 [ 179 Cal.Rptr. 747 ], in language applicable to the circumstances of the present case; “[T]here is a well recognized policy in favor of resolving appeals on their merits [citations] and, generally, little by way of ‘good cause’ has been required in the decisions applying rule 2(c). [Citations.] Here ample ‘good cause’ appears for treating the notice of appeal from the minute order as being from the judgment subsequently ordered. | 2 | 1986–2020 |
People v. Ledesma
green
1 sentence2024(See People v. Ledesma (1997) 16 Cal.4th 90 , 100–101.) Contrary to Michael’s suggestion, the transmutation statutes and the rebuttable presumption of undue influence are not so “mutually exclusive” as to suggest the latter has been impliedly abrogated by the former. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Kemmerer v. County of Fresno
green
1 sentence2023The County leans heavily on the Court of Appeal’s opinion in Amylou R., supra, 28 Cal.App.4th 1205 , which held that section 821.6 applied to a decisions only for the principle that claims of negligence can come within section 821.6, not for what they may say on other points, such as when a public employee other than the public prosecutor may be considered to have initiated or prosecuted an official proceeding. 12 LEON v. COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. crime victim’s claims related to the mishandling of a police investigation because “investigation is part of the prosec | 1 | 2023–2023 |
County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2023(See Leon, supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at p. 855; Doe v. State of California (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 832, 844 ; Strong v. State of California, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 1461 ; County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2009) 181 Cal.App.4th 218, 229 ; Richardson-Tunnell v. Schools Ins. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Amylou R. v. County of Riverside
green
1 sentence2023The County leans heavily on the Court of Appeal’s opinion in Amylou R., supra, 28 Cal.App.4th 1205 , which held that section 821.6 applied to a decisions only for the principle that claims of negligence can come within section 821.6, not for what they may say on other points, such as when a public employee other than the public prosecutor may be considered to have initiated or prosecuted an official proceeding. 12 LEON v. COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. crime victim’s claims related to the mishandling of a police investigation because “investigation is part of the prosec | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Jenkins v. County of Orange
green
1 sentence2023The County leans heavily on the Court of Appeal’s opinion in Amylou R., supra, 28 Cal.App.4th 1205 , which held that section 821.6 applied to a decisions only for the principle that claims of negligence can come within section 821.6, not for what they may say on other points, such as when a public employee other than the public prosecutor may be considered to have initiated or prosecuted an official proceeding. 12 LEON v. COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. crime victim’s claims related to the mishandling of a police investigation because “investigation is part of the prosec | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Johnson v. City of Pacifica
green
2 sentences2023The County leans heavily on the Court of Appeal’s opinion in Amylou R., supra, 28 Cal.App.4th 1205 , which held that section 821.6 applied to a decisions only for the principle that claims of negligence can come within section 821.6, not for what they may say on other points, such as when a public employee other than the public prosecutor may be considered to have initiated or prosecuted an official proceeding. 12 LEON v. COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. crime victim’s claims related to the mishandling of a police investigation because “investigation is part of the prosec 2023The County leans heavily on the Court of Appeal’s opinion in Amylou R., supra, 28 Cal.App.4th 1205 , which held that section 821.6 applied to a decisions only for the principle that claims of negligence can come within section 821.6, not for what they may say on other points, such as when a public employee other than the public prosecutor may be considered to have initiated or prosecuted an official proceeding. 12 LEON v. COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. crime victim’s claims related to the mishandling of a police investigation because “investigation is part of the prosec | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Strong v. State
green
1 sentence2023(See Leon, supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at p. 855; Doe v. State of California (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 832, 844 ; Strong v. State of California, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 1461 ; County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2009) 181 Cal.App.4th 218, 229 ; Richardson-Tunnell v. Schools Ins. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Stearns v. County of Los Angeles
green
1 sentence2023The County leans heavily on the Court of Appeal’s opinion in Amylou R., supra, 28 Cal.App.4th 1205 , which held that section 821.6 applied to a decisions only for the principle that claims of negligence can come within section 821.6, not for what they may say on other points, such as when a public employee other than the public prosecutor may be considered to have initiated or prosecuted an official proceeding. 12 LEON v. COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. crime victim’s claims related to the mishandling of a police investigation because “investigation is part of the prosec | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Doe v. State of California
green
1 sentence2023(See Leon, supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at p. 855; Doe v. State of California (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 832, 844 ; Strong v. State of California, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 1461 ; County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2009) 181 Cal.App.4th 218, 229 ; Richardson-Tunnell v. Schools Ins. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Lopez v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group
green
1 sentence1984Thus, in Lopez v. Southern Cal. Permanente Medical Group (1981) 115 *724 Cal.App.3d 673 [ 171 Cal.Rptr. 527 ], plaintiffs were barred from amending their complaint, two and one-half years after filing suit, to allege a dereliction by the state entirely different from that set forth in the claim and the original complaint. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Beach v. Arblaster
green
1 sentence1984In the Beach case the court denied, for the reasons expressed in Kroger , an action for fraud based upon an alleged oral agreement to make a will. ( 194 Cal.App.2d at p. 163 .) Although we do agree with the court in Assemblies of God that it is not necessarily true that a plaintiff who undertakes to plead and prove actionable fraud is attempting to get around the statute of frauds by a “ ‘transparent device,’ ” permitting a fraud action will tend to subvert the purpose of the statute of frauds, and if the reasoning of Kroger is sound, we see no valid reason it is not equally applicable to a ca | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Estate of Catlett
green
1 sentence1982As American Motorists concedes, there is a well recognized policy in favor of resolving appeals on their merits (e.g., Larrus v. First National Bank (1954) 122 Cal.App.2d 884, 886 [ 266 P.2d 143 ]; Karrell v. Watson (1953) 116 Cal.App.2d 769, 773 [ 254 P.2d 651 , 255 P.2d 464 ]) and, generally, little by way of “good cause” has been required in the decisions applying rule 2(c). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Wolf v. Pacific Southwest Discount Corp.
green
2 sentences1982The reviewing court must dispose of the case under the law in force when its decision is rendered.’” Most of the decisions applying this rule deal with criminal laws, but as Justice Tobriner noted in Governing Board v. Mann (1977) 18 Cal.3d 819, 830 [ 135 Cal.Rptr. 526 , 558 P.2d 1 ]: “[T]he reach of this common law rule has never been confined solely to criminal or quasi-criminal matters.” (Fn. omitted.) One of the cases cited in Mann was Wolf v. Pacific Southwest etc. Corp. (1937) 10 Cal.2d 183 [ 74 P.2d 263 ], dealing with usury. 1982The reviewing court must dispose of the case under the law in force when its decision is rendered.’” Most of the decisions applying this rule deal with criminal laws, but as Justice Tobriner noted in Governing Board v. Mann (1977) 18 Cal.3d 819, 830 [ 135 Cal.Rptr. 526 , 558 P.2d 1 ]: “[T]he reach of this common law rule has never been confined solely to criminal or quasi-criminal matters.” (Fn. omitted.) One of the cases cited in Mann was Wolf v. Pacific Southwest etc. Corp. (1937) 10 Cal.2d 183 [ 74 P.2d 263 ], dealing with usury. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Grant v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1964The recent cases of Grant v. Superior Court, 214 Cal.App.2d 15 [ 29 Cal.Rptr. 125 ], and Carlson v. Carlson, 221 Cal.App.2d 47 [ 34 Cal.Rptr. 195 ] (hearings denied in each case), provide a comprehensive review of the decisions applying the rule established in Leupe and are determinative of the issue here presented. 1964The recent cases of Grant v. Superior Court, 214 Cal.App.2d 15 [ 29 Cal.Rptr. 125 ], and Carlson v. Carlson, 221 Cal.App.2d 47 [ 34 Cal.Rptr. 195 ] (hearings denied in each case), provide a comprehensive review of the decisions applying the rule established in Leupe and are determinative of the issue here presented. | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Carlson v. Carlson
green
2 sentences1964The recent cases of Grant v. Superior Court, 214 Cal.App.2d 15 [ 29 Cal.Rptr. 125 ], and Carlson v. Carlson, 221 Cal.App.2d 47 [ 34 Cal.Rptr. 195 ] (hearings denied in each case), provide a comprehensive review of the decisions applying the rule established in Leupe and are determinative of the issue here presented. 1964The recent cases of Grant v. Superior Court, 214 Cal.App.2d 15 [ 29 Cal.Rptr. 125 ], and Carlson v. Carlson, 221 Cal.App.2d 47 [ 34 Cal.Rptr. 195 ] (hearings denied in each case), provide a comprehensive review of the decisions applying the rule established in Leupe and are determinative of the issue here presented. | 1 | 1964–1964 |
| Freelon v. Adrian green | 1 | 1961–1961 |
| Mallory v. United States green | 1 | 1958–1958 |
| Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission neutral | 1 | 1919–1919 |
| Hancock v. Plummer green | 1 | 1912–1912 |
| Spaulding v. North San Francisco Homestead & Railroad neutral | 1 | 1912–1912 |
| Palmer v. Palmer green | 1 | 1900–1900 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.