19 California opinions name it 3 courts 1971–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Victor v. Nebraskagreen2 sentences1998Reasonable Doubt Instruction The jury was instructed in the language of then CALJIC No. 2.90 (1979 rev.), the standard reasonable doubt instruction, which contained references to the terms "moral evidence" and "moral certainty." [82] *194 As defendant acknowledges, both the United States Supreme Court and our court have upheld the efficacy of this instruction despite some reservations. ( Victor v. Nebraska (1994) 511 U.S. 1, 6 , 114 S.Ct. 1239, 1243 , 127 L.Ed.2d 583 , affg. 1998Reasonable Doubt Instruction The jury was instructed in the language of then CALJIC No. 2.90 (1979 rev.), the standard reasonable doubt instruction, which contained references to the terms "moral evidence" and "moral certainty." [82] *194 As defendant acknowledges, both the United States Supreme Court and our court have upheld the efficacy of this instruction despite some reservations. ( Victor v. Nebraska (1994) 511 U.S. 1, 6 , 114 S.Ct. 1239, 1243 , 127 L.Ed.2d 583 , affg. | 3 | 4 |
People v. Bradfordgreen2 sentences1998“We have repeatedly upheld the efficacy of this instruction, and defendant cites no persuasive reason to revisit this conclusion.” (People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1054 [ 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 225 , 929 P.2d 544 ]; see Victor v. Nebraska (1994) 511 U.S. 1, 6 [ 114 S.Ct. 1239, 1243 , 127 L.Ed.2d 583 ].) 5. 1998“We have repeatedly upheld the efficacy of this instruction, and defendant cites no persuasive reason to revisit this conclusion.” (People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1054 [ 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 225 , 929 P.2d 544 ]; see Victor v. Nebraska (1994) 511 U.S. 1, 6 [ 114 S.Ct. 1239, 1243 , 127 L.Ed.2d 583 ].) 5. | 2 | 3 |
Herring v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2015Instead we have focused on the efficacy of the rule in deterring Fourth Amendment violations in the future. [Citations.] [¶] In addition, the benefits of deterrence must outweigh the costs. [Citation.] 'We have never suggested that the exclusionary rule must apply in every circumstance in which it might provide marginal deterrence.' [Citation.] '[T]o the extent that application of the exclusionary rule could provide some incremental deterrent, that possible benefit must be weighed against [its] substantial social costs.' " (Herring, supra, 555 U.S. at p. 141 .) In Herring, the court confronted 2015Instead we have focused on the efficacy of the rule in deterring Fourth Amendment violations in the future. [Citations.] [¶] In addition, the benefits of deterrence must outweigh the costs. [Citation.] 'We have never suggested that the exclusionary rule must apply in every circumstance in which it might provide marginal deterrence.' [Citation.] '[T]o the extent that application of the exclusionary rule could provide some incremental deterrent, that possible benefit must be weighed against [its] substantial social costs.' " (Herring, supra, 555 U.S. at p. 141 .) In Herring, the court confronted | 1 | 2 |
People v. Sandovalgreen2 sentences1998People v. Sandoval (1992) 4 Cal.4th 155, 185-186 , 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 342 , 841 P.2d 862 ; People v. Bradford supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 1053-1054, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 225 , 929 P.2d 544 ; People v. Rodrigues, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 1145 , 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235 , 885 P.2d 1 .) Nonetheless, he contends his state and federal constitutional rights to jury trial and due process of law were violated in light of the prosecutor's closing argument telling the jury: "If you have that feeling, that conviction, that gut feeling that says yes, this man is guilty, he's guilty of these crimes and guilty of the robbery an 1998People v. Sandoval (1992) 4 Cal.4th 155, 185-186 , 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 342 , 841 P.2d 862 ; People v. Bradford supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 1053-1054, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 225 , 929 P.2d 544 ; People v. Rodrigues, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 1145 , 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235 , 885 P.2d 1 .) Nonetheless, he contends his state and federal constitutional rights to jury trial and due process of law were violated in light of the prosecutor's closing argument telling the jury: "If you have that feeling, that conviction, that gut feeling that says yes, this man is guilty, he's guilty of these crimes and guilty of the robbery an | 1 | 2 |
United States v. Leongreen2 sentences2015(United States v. Leon (1984) 468 U.S. 897, 918 [ 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L.Ed.2d 677 ] (Leon).) The exclusionary rule applies when it results in appreciable deterrence: “we have focused on the efficacy of the rule in deterring Fourth Amendment violations in the future.” (Herring, supra, 555 U.S. at p. 141 .) Herring elaborated on this deterrent rationale in a circumstance, similar to the case before us, in which an unlawful search was prompted by faulty police records. 2015(United States v. Leon (1984) 468 U.S. 897, 918 [ 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L.Ed.2d 677 ] (Leon).) The exclusionary rule applies when it results in appreciable deterrence: “we have focused on the efficacy of the rule in deterring Fourth Amendment violations in the future.” (Herring, supra, 555 U.S. at p. 141 .) Herring elaborated on this deterrent rationale in a circumstance, similar to the case before us, in which an unlawful search was prompted by faulty police records. | 1 | 1 |
Finn v. G. D. Searle & Co.green2 sentences2008Searle & Co. (1984) 35 Cal.3d 691, 701 [ 200 Cal.Rptr. 870 , 677 P.2d 1147 ], quoting Twerski et al., The Use and Abuse of Warnings in Products Liability—Design Defect Litigation Comes of Age (1976) 61 Cornell L.Rev. 495, 521; see also Rest.3d Torts, Products Liability, § 2, com. j, p. 31 [“[Requiring warnings of obvious or generally known risks could reduce the efficacy of warnings generally.”].) The sophisticated user defense fits into this understanding of the role of warnings; it helps ensure that warnings will be heeded. 2008Searle & Co. (1984) 35 Cal.3d 691, 701 [ 200 Cal.Rptr. 870 , 677 P.2d 1147 ], quoting Twerski et al., The Use and Abuse of Warnings in Products Liability—Design Defect Litigation Comes of Age (1976) 61 Cornell L.Rev. 495, 521; see also Rest.3d Torts, Products Liability, § 2, com. j, p. 31 [“[Requiring warnings of obvious or generally known risks could reduce the efficacy of warnings generally.”].) The sophisticated user defense fits into this understanding of the role of warnings; it helps ensure that warnings will be heeded. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Bolingreen2 sentences2002It is that state of the case which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charges." Defendant contends this instruction was erroneous, because it uses the terms "moral evidence" and "to a moral certainty" to define reasonable doubt. "`We have repeatedly upheld the efficacy of this instruction, and defendant cites no persuasive reason to revisit this conclusion.' [Citations.]" ( People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 330 , 2002It is that state of the case which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charges." Defendant contends this instruction was erroneous, because it uses the terms "moral evidence" and "to a moral certainty" to define reasonable doubt. "`We have repeatedly upheld the efficacy of this instruction, and defendant cites no persuasive reason to revisit this conclusion.' [Citations.]" ( People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 330 , | 1 | 1 |
People v. Falsettagreen2 sentences1999I write separately only to disavow the majority's endorsement of CALJIC No. 2.50.01 (1999 rev.) (6th ed. pocket pt.) as "adequately set[ting] forth the controlling principles under [Evidence Code] section 1108." (Maj. opn., ante, 89 Cal.Rptr.2d at p. 860 , 986 P.2d at p. 194 ; id. at p. 859, 986 P.2d at p. 193 [CALJIC No. 2.50.01 "contains language appropriate for cases involving the admission of disposition evidence"]; id. at p. 861, 986 P.2d at p. 195 [trial court's "failure to instruct the jury along the lines of CALJIC No. 2.50.01 ... was clearly harmless"].) The efficacy of this instructi 1999I write separately only to disavow the majority's endorsement of CALJIC No. 2.50.01 (1999 rev.) (6th ed. pocket pt.) as "adequately set[ting] forth the controlling principles under [Evidence Code] section 1108." (Maj. opn., ante, 89 Cal.Rptr.2d at p. 860 , 986 P.2d at p. 194 ; id. at p. 859, 986 P.2d at p. 193 [CALJIC No. 2.50.01 "contains language appropriate for cases involving the admission of disposition evidence"]; id. at p. 861, 986 P.2d at p. 195 [trial court's "failure to instruct the jury along the lines of CALJIC No. 2.50.01 ... was clearly harmless"].) The efficacy of this instructi | 1 | 1 |
People v. Freemangreen2 sentences1997(Victor v. Nebraska (1994) 511 U.S. 1, 6 [ 127 L.Ed.2d 583, 591 , 114 S.Ct. 1239 ], affirming People v. Sandoval (1992) 4 Cal.4th 155,185-186 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 342 , 841 P.2d 862 ]; People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 501-505 [ 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 558 , 882 P.2d 249 , 31 A.L.R.5th 888 ].) b. 1997(Victor v. Nebraska (1994) 511 U.S. 1, 6 [ 127 L.Ed.2d 583, 591 , 114 S.Ct. 1239 ], affirming People v. Sandoval (1992) 4 Cal.4th 155,185-186 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 342 , 841 P.2d 862 ]; People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 501-505 [ 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 558 , 882 P.2d 249 , 31 A.L.R.5th 888 ].) b. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Sumstinegreen2 sentences1996The issue is where the efficacy of that waiver can be tested. [5] In People v. Sumstine , for example, the court provided answers to the administrative efficiency argument which would later be raised in Custis. ( 36 Cal.3d at p. 919, fn. 6 .) [6] As we have explained above, we are not dealing here with a "federal question." Therefore, the United States Supreme Court's decision in Custis does not trump our own Supreme Court's decision in Sumstine . 1996In People v. Sumstine , for example, the court provided answers to the administrative efficiency argument which would later be raised in Custis. ( 36 Cal.3d at p. 919, fn. 6 .) As we have explained above, we are not dealing here with a “federal question.” Therefore, the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Custis does not trump our own Supreme Court’s decision in Sumstine . | 1 | 1 |
People v. Superior Court (Williams)green2 sentences1996(See People v. Superior Court (Williams) (1992) 8 Cal. App.4th 688, 702-703 [ 10 Cal. Rptr.2d 873 ].) [*] Reporter's Note: Opinion (A068385) deleted upon direction of Supreme Court by order dated June 26, 1996. [7] Guzman is particularly relevant to the present case because it also involved an imperfect advisement of rights. 1996(See People v. Superior Court (Williams) (1992) 8 Cal. App.4th 688, 702-703 [ 10 Cal. Rptr.2d 873 ].) [*] Reporter's Note: Opinion (A068385) deleted upon direction of Supreme Court by order dated June 26, 1996. [7] Guzman is particularly relevant to the present case because it also involved an imperfect advisement of rights. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Nicolle-Wagner v. Deukmejian
green
2 sentences2018They further argue that this proliferation of unnecessary warnings " 'could distract the public from other important warnings on consumer products.' " ( Nicolle-Wagner v. Deukmejian (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 652 , 661, 281 Cal.Rptr. 494 .) Intervenors also point out that like warning about obvious and generally known risks, over-warning may have the additional pernicious effect of causing users and consumers to ignore the warnings and possibly reducing the efficacy of warnings generally. 2018They further argue that this proliferation of unnecessary warnings " 'could distract the public from other important warnings on consumer products.' " ( Nicolle-Wagner v. Deukmejian (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 652 , 661, 281 Cal.Rptr. 494 .) Intervenors also point out that like warning about obvious and generally known risks, over-warning may have the additional pernicious effect of causing users and consumers to ignore the warnings and possibly reducing the efficacy of warnings generally. | 3 | 2018–2018 |
Johnson v. American Standard, Inc.
green
2 sentences2022Requiring manufacturers to warn their products’ users in all instances would place an onerous burden on them and would ‘ “invite mass consumer disregard and ultimate contempt for the warning process.” ’ ” (Johnson v. American Standard, Inc. (2008) 43 Cal.4th 56, 70 .) Moreover, as explained above, there is potential for heightened consumer confusion here by requiring a warning that is only relevant if the consumer chooses to use Sream’s water pipe in a certain way. 2018As the California Supreme Court has noted with respect to warnings in the context of products liability: "Requiring manufacturers to *242 warn their products' users in all instances would place an onerous burden on them and would ' "invite mass consumer disregard and ultimate contempt for the warning process." ' [Citations.]" ( Johnson v. American Standard, Inc. (2008) 43 Cal.4th 56 , 70, 74 Cal.Rptr.3d 108 , 179 P.3d 905 .) Intervenor David Roe, principal drafter and author of the Proposition 65, argues in his brief that Proposition 65 was designed to keep up with current science, OEHHA has f | 2 | 2018–2022 |
Mateel Envtl. Justice Found. v. Office of Envtl. Health Hazard Assessment
green
1 sentence2022Indeed, the “proliferation of unnecessary warnings ‘ “could distract the public from other important warnings on consumer products.’ ” (Mateel Environmental Justice Foundation v. Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 220, 241 .) “[O]verwarning may have the additional pernicious effect of causing users and consumers to ignore the warnings and possibly reducing the efficacy of warnings generally.” (Ibid.) The California Supreme Court has noted this issue in the product liability context: “Not all warnings, however, promote user safety. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
New York v. Belton
red
1 sentence2010As the court acknowledged in Gant, supra , 556 U.S. ___ [ 129 S.Ct. 1710 ], Belton, supra , 453 U.S. 454 had "been widely understood to allow a vehicle search incident to the arrest of a recent occupant even if there is no *Page 1329 possibility the arrestee could gain access to the vehicle at the time of the search," even to the extent that "the doctrine of qualified immunity will shield officers from liability for searches conducted in reasonable reliance on that understanding." ( Gant, supra , at pp. ___, ___, fn. 11 [ 129 S.Ct. at pp. 1718 , 1723 , fn. 11].) 18 Under these circumstances it | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Arizona v. Gant
green
1 sentence2010As the court acknowledged in Gant, supra , 556 U.S. ___ [ 129 S.Ct. 1710 ], Belton, supra , 453 U.S. 454 had "been widely understood to allow a vehicle search incident to the arrest of a recent occupant even if there is no *Page 1329 possibility the arrestee could gain access to the vehicle at the time of the search," even to the extent that "the doctrine of qualified immunity will shield officers from liability for searches conducted in reasonable reliance on that understanding." ( Gant, supra , at pp. ___, ___, fn. 11 [ 129 S.Ct. at pp. 1718 , 1723 , fn. 11].) 18 Under these circumstances it | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Standard Accident Insurance v. Pellecchia
green
2 sentences2006Co. v. Pellecchia (1954) 15 N.J. 162 [ 104 A.2d 288 , 303 ].) Important to the case before us, the efficacy of the doctrine has been questioned in cases involving the defendant's alleged negligence. "[I]n these tort actions the insurer-subrogee steps into the shoes of his insured and is bound by the principles of the law of negligence which would control if the insured himself were bringing suit. 2006Co. v. Pellecchia (1954) 15 N.J. 162 [ 104 A.2d 288 , 303 ].) Important to the case before us, the efficacy of the doctrine has been questioned in cases involving the defendant's alleged negligence. "[I]n these tort actions the insurer-subrogee steps into the shoes of his insured and is bound by the principles of the law of negligence which would control if the insured himself were bringing suit. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
People v. Mendoza
red
2 sentences2002We have rejected this contention. ( People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 181 , 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 485 , 6 P.3d 150 .) PENALTY PHASE ISSUES A. First Penalty Phase Jury's Request to Address Defendant On the third day of deliberations at the first penalty phase of the proceedings, the jury sent the court a note stating: "Are we permitted to address the defendant to let him know our feelingsregardless of our decision? 2002We have rejected this contention. ( People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 181 , 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 485 , 6 P.3d 150 .) PENALTY PHASE ISSUES A. First Penalty Phase Jury's Request to Address Defendant On the third day of deliberations at the first penalty phase of the proceedings, the jury sent the court a note stating: "Are we permitted to address the defendant to let him know our feelingsregardless of our decision? | 1 | 2002–2002 |
People v. Benson
green
2 sentences2001We have held a trial court may refuse to read this instruction where neither deterrence nor cost is raised by the parties. ( People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 806-807 , 276 Cal.Rptr. 827 , 802 P.2d 330 .) Moreover, so long as these issues are not raised, there can be no prejudice from the instruction's omission. ( People v. Bacigalupo (1991) 1 Cal.4th 103, 146 , 2 Cal. Rptr.2d 335 , 820 P.2d 559 ; People v. Thompson (1988) 45 Cal.3d 86, 132 , 246 Cal.Rptr. 245 , 753 P.2d 37 .) The absence of evidence regarding these issues during the penalty phase precludes our finding prejudicial error. 2001We have held a trial court may refuse to read this instruction where neither deterrence nor cost is raised by the parties. ( People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 806-807 , 276 Cal.Rptr. 827 , 802 P.2d 330 .) Moreover, so long as these issues are not raised, there can be no prejudice from the instruction's omission. ( People v. Bacigalupo (1991) 1 Cal.4th 103, 146 , 2 Cal. Rptr.2d 335 , 820 P.2d 559 ; People v. Thompson (1988) 45 Cal.3d 86, 132 , 246 Cal.Rptr. 245 , 753 P.2d 37 .) The absence of evidence regarding these issues during the penalty phase precludes our finding prejudicial error. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
People v. Beardslee
green
2 sentences2001We have held a trial court may refuse to read this instruction where neither deterrence nor cost is raised by the parties. ( People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 806-807 , 276 Cal.Rptr. 827 , 802 P.2d 330 .) Moreover, so long as these issues are not raised, there can be no prejudice from the instruction's omission. ( People v. Bacigalupo (1991) 1 Cal.4th 103, 146 , 2 Cal. Rptr.2d 335 , 820 P.2d 559 ; People v. Thompson (1988) 45 Cal.3d 86, 132 , 246 Cal.Rptr. 245 , 753 P.2d 37 .) The absence of evidence regarding these issues during the penalty phase precludes our finding prejudicial error. 2001We have held a trial court may refuse to read this instruction where neither deterrence nor cost is raised by the parties. ( People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 806-807 , 276 Cal.Rptr. 827 , 802 P.2d 330 .) Moreover, so long as these issues are not raised, there can be no prejudice from the instruction's omission. ( People v. Bacigalupo (1991) 1 Cal.4th 103, 146 , 2 Cal. Rptr.2d 335 , 820 P.2d 559 ; People v. Thompson (1988) 45 Cal.3d 86, 132 , 246 Cal.Rptr. 245 , 753 P.2d 37 .) The absence of evidence regarding these issues during the penalty phase precludes our finding prejudicial error. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
People v. Bacigalupo
green
2 sentences2001We have held a trial court may refuse to read this instruction where neither deterrence nor cost is raised by the parties. ( People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 806-807 , 276 Cal.Rptr. 827 , 802 P.2d 330 .) Moreover, so long as these issues are not raised, there can be no prejudice from the instruction's omission. ( People v. Bacigalupo (1991) 1 Cal.4th 103, 146 , 2 Cal. Rptr.2d 335 , 820 P.2d 559 ; People v. Thompson (1988) 45 Cal.3d 86, 132 , 246 Cal.Rptr. 245 , 753 P.2d 37 .) The absence of evidence regarding these issues during the penalty phase precludes our finding prejudicial error. 2001We have held a trial court may refuse to read this instruction where neither deterrence nor cost is raised by the parties. ( People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 806-807 , 276 Cal.Rptr. 827 , 802 P.2d 330 .) Moreover, so long as these issues are not raised, there can be no prejudice from the instruction's omission. ( People v. Bacigalupo (1991) 1 Cal.4th 103, 146 , 2 Cal. Rptr.2d 335 , 820 P.2d 559 ; People v. Thompson (1988) 45 Cal.3d 86, 132 , 246 Cal.Rptr. 245 , 753 P.2d 37 .) The absence of evidence regarding these issues during the penalty phase precludes our finding prejudicial error. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
People v. Thompson
green
2 sentences2001We have held a trial court may refuse to read this instruction where neither deterrence nor cost is raised by the parties. ( People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 806-807 , 276 Cal.Rptr. 827 , 802 P.2d 330 .) Moreover, so long as these issues are not raised, there can be no prejudice from the instruction's omission. ( People v. Bacigalupo (1991) 1 Cal.4th 103, 146 , 2 Cal. Rptr.2d 335 , 820 P.2d 559 ; People v. Thompson (1988) 45 Cal.3d 86, 132 , 246 Cal.Rptr. 245 , 753 P.2d 37 .) The absence of evidence regarding these issues during the penalty phase precludes our finding prejudicial error. 2001We have held a trial court may refuse to read this instruction where neither deterrence nor cost is raised by the parties. ( People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 806-807 , 276 Cal.Rptr. 827 , 802 P.2d 330 .) Moreover, so long as these issues are not raised, there can be no prejudice from the instruction's omission. ( People v. Bacigalupo (1991) 1 Cal.4th 103, 146 , 2 Cal. Rptr.2d 335 , 820 P.2d 559 ; People v. Thompson (1988) 45 Cal.3d 86, 132 , 246 Cal.Rptr. 245 , 753 P.2d 37 .) The absence of evidence regarding these issues during the penalty phase precludes our finding prejudicial error. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
People v. Rodrigues
green
2 sentences1998People v. Sandoval (1992) 4 Cal.4th 155, 185-186 , 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 342 , 841 P.2d 862 ; People v. Bradford supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 1053-1054, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 225 , 929 P.2d 544 ; People v. Rodrigues, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 1145 , 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235 , 885 P.2d 1 .) Nonetheless, he contends his state and federal constitutional rights to jury trial and due process of law were violated in light of the prosecutor's closing argument telling the jury: "If you have that feeling, that conviction, that gut feeling that says yes, this man is guilty, he's guilty of these crimes and guilty of the robbery an 1998People v. Sandoval (1992) 4 Cal.4th 155, 185-186 , 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 342 , 841 P.2d 862 ; People v. Bradford supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 1053-1054, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 225 , 929 P.2d 544 ; People v. Rodrigues, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 1145 , 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235 , 885 P.2d 1 .) Nonetheless, he contends his state and federal constitutional rights to jury trial and due process of law were violated in light of the prosecutor's closing argument telling the jury: "If you have that feeling, that conviction, that gut feeling that says yes, this man is guilty, he's guilty of these crimes and guilty of the robbery an | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Dunning v. Dunning
green
1 sentence1971Code, § 139, Am.Stats. 1967.) In Dunning v. Dunning, supra, 114 Cal.App.2d 110, 114 , the court said: “Whatever may be said of the efficacy of such a waiver so far as agreements between husband and wife regarding property and property rights are concerned, we are satisfied that any such agreement between the parties attempting to limit the power of the court over alimony and child support (Civ. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.