efficacy waiver in New York

2016Bank, N.A. v Stephen, 127 AD3d 1008 [2d Dept 2015]; E*Trade Bank v Vasquez, 126 AD3d 933, 934 [2d Dept 2015]; HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Miller, 121 AD3d 1044 [2d Dept 2014]; Youngstown Tube Co. v Russo, 120 AD3d 1409 [2d Dept 2014]; Canelas v Flores, 112 AD3d 871 [2d Dept 2013]).

2016Bank, N.A. v Stephen, 127 AD3d 1008 [2d Dept 2015]; E*Trade Bank v Vasquez, 126 AD3d 933, 934 [2d Dept 2015]; HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Miller, 121 AD3d 1044 [2d Dept 2014]; Youngstown Tube Co. v Russo, 120 AD3d 1409 [2d Dept 2014]; Canelas v Flores, 112 AD3d 871 [2d Dept 2013]).

2016Bank, N.A. v Stephen, 127 AD3d 1008 [2d Dept 2015]; E*Trade Bank v Vasquez, 126 AD3d 933, 934 [2d Dept 2015]; HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Miller, 121 AD3d 1044 [2d Dept 2014]; Youngstown Tube Co. v Russo, 120 AD3d 1409 [2d Dept 2014]; Canelas v Flores, 112 AD3d 871 [2d Dept 2013]).

2016Bank, N.A. v Stephen, 127 AD3d 1008 [2d Dept 2015]; E*Trade Bank v Vasquez, 126 AD3d 933, 934 [2d Dept 2015]; HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Miller, 121 AD3d 1044 [2d Dept 2014]; Youngstown Tube Co. v Russo, 120 AD3d 1409 [2d Dept 2014]; Canelas v Flores, 112 AD3d 871 [2d Dept 2013]).

2002Next, Supreme Court properly declined defendant’s request to charge assault in the third degree (see Penal Law § 120.00 [1], [2]) because there was no reasonable view of the evidence at trial to support either a finding that defendant acted recklessly rather than intentionally, or a finding that he intentionally caused Dickson’s physical injuries by means other than dangerous instruments (see People v Heide, 84 NY2d 943, 944 ; People v Glover, 57 NY2d 61, 63-64 ; cf. People v Van Norstrand, 85 NY2d 131, 135-136 ; CPL 300.50 [1]; Penal Law § 10.00 [13]).

2002Next, Supreme Court properly declined defendant’s request to charge assault in the third degree (see Penal Law § 120.00 [1], [2]) because there was no reasonable view of the evidence at trial to support either a finding that defendant acted recklessly rather than intentionally, or a finding that he intentionally caused Dickson’s physical injuries by means other than dangerous instruments (see People v Heide, 84 NY2d 943, 944 ; People v Glover, 57 NY2d 61, 63-64 ; cf. People v Van Norstrand, 85 NY2d 131, 135-136 ; CPL 300.50 [1]; Penal Law § 10.00 [13]).

2002Further, Supreme Court’s directive that defendant was to be accompanied by security personnel if he chose to approach the bench, to which defendant did not register an objection, was not an abuse of discretion in light of defendant’s criminal history, and this did not alter the efficacy of his waiver of his right to be present at the bench or render it the product of coercion (see People v Pondexter, 88 NY2d 363, 376-377 ; La Rocca v Lane, 37 NY2d 575 , cert denied 424 US 968 ; People v Riley, 292 AD2d 822, 823 , lv denied 98 NY2d 640 ; see also 22 NYCRR 700.5 [a], [d]).

2002Further, Supreme Court’s directive that defendant was to be accompanied by security personnel if he chose to approach the bench, to which defendant did not register an objection, was not an abuse of discretion in light of defendant’s criminal history, and this did not alter the efficacy of his waiver of his right to be present at the bench or render it the product of coercion (see People v Pondexter, 88 NY2d 363, 376-377 ; La Rocca v Lane, 37 NY2d 575 , cert denied 424 US 968 ; People v Riley, 292 AD2d 822, 823 , lv denied 98 NY2d 640 ; see also 22 NYCRR 700.5 [a], [d]).

2002Further, Supreme Court’s directive that defendant was to be accompanied by security personnel if he chose to approach the bench, to which defendant did not register an objection, was not an abuse of discretion in light of defendant’s criminal history, and this did not alter the efficacy of his waiver of his right to be present at the bench or render it the product of coercion (see People v Pondexter, 88 NY2d 363, 376-377 ; La Rocca v Lane, 37 NY2d 575 , cert denied 424 US 968 ; People v Riley, 292 AD2d 822, 823 , lv denied 98 NY2d 640 ; see also 22 NYCRR 700.5 [a], [d]).

2002Further, Supreme Court’s directive that defendant was to be accompanied by security personnel if he chose to approach the bench, to which defendant did not register an objection, was not an abuse of discretion in light of defendant’s criminal history, and this did not alter the efficacy of his waiver of his right to be present at the bench or render it the product of coercion (see People v Pondexter, 88 NY2d 363, 376-377 ; La Rocca v Lane, 37 NY2d 575 , cert denied 424 US 968 ; People v Riley, 292 AD2d 822, 823 , lv denied 98 NY2d 640 ; see also 22 NYCRR 700.5 [a], [d]).

2002Next, Supreme Court properly declined defendant’s request to charge assault in the third degree (see Penal Law § 120.00 [1], [2]) because there was no reasonable view of the evidence at trial to support either a finding that defendant acted recklessly rather than intentionally, or a finding that he intentionally caused Dickson’s physical injuries by means other than dangerous instruments (see People v Heide, 84 NY2d 943, 944 ; People v Glover, 57 NY2d 61, 63-64 ; cf. People v Van Norstrand, 85 NY2d 131, 135-136 ; CPL 300.50 [1]; Penal Law § 10.00 [13]).

2000In Arteaga (supra), the Court of Appeals found that exposing defendant to tort liability for the actions of its correction officers and Hearing Officers would seriously undermine the officers’ performance of their duties.

1993There is no showing, however, that defendant thereby was deprived of a fair trial (see, People v Curley, 159 AD2d 969, 970 , lv denied 76 NY2d 733 ).

1987The efficacy of the doctrine of estoppel, as it applies to paternity proceedings, achieved full recognition in Matter of Sharon GG. v Duane HH. ( 95 AD2d 466 , affd 63 NY2d 859 ).

1987The efficacy of the doctrine of estoppel, as it applies to paternity proceedings, achieved full recognition in Matter of Sharon GG. v Duane HH. ( 95 AD2d 466 , affd 63 NY2d 859 ).

1981(Seidlitz v Auerbach, 230 NY 167 .) The financing arrangements between U-Vend and the plaintiff in connection with the assignment cannot alter the efficacy of the clause.

1975John’s Univ., 17 AD2d 632 , affd 12 NY2d 802 ), the efficacy of that standard and the manner of its application has been questioned.

1975John’s Univ., 17 AD2d 632 , affd 12 NY2d 802 ), the efficacy of that standard and the manner of its application has been questioned.

1921I know of no other exception, and do not think we can graft upon the special and limited powers of the Comptroller when acting judicially the general powers which belong to courts of original jurisdiction.” (See Matter of Equitable Trust Co. v. Hamilton, supra, where the court, at page 245, say, in reviewing the audit of a board of supervisors, “ we do not impair the efficacy of the principle that quasi-judicial action, when the statute intends it to be final, may not thereafter be revoked,” citing People ex rel.

1919Chase v. Wemple, supra).