facial overbreadth challenge in California

2025Indeed, the jury in Grant had been given an instruction almost identical to that 16 Cf. People v. Fuski (1920) 49 Cal.App. 4, 7 [failure of indictment charging pimping to include a specific allegation that defendant knew money for support was derived from acts of prostitution was not fatal defect as “no one would have any difficulty in understanding from the indictment as a whole that such was the intended charge of the pleader”].) 32. given here; one that also failed to include a requirement regarding knowledge of the source of the prostitute’s support, and the court found no error.17 Instead

2025Here, Small does not differentiate between his claim as a facial or an as-applied challenge to condition No. 32. 15 p. 1353.) We agree with the appellate court in D.H. that this approach fails to address the inherent vagueness and overbreadth of the terms used, such as “graphic sexual activity” and “sexual deviance” here. ( D.H., supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at pp. 728-729.) Therefore, instead of modifying conditions Nos. 29 and 32 ourselves, we direct the trial court to do so, in particular with respect to condition No. 32 “to define more precisely the material the court intends to prohibit.” (D.H.,

2025(In re Malik J., at pp. 901-902.) The Court of Appeal found that “the condition is overbroad” and ordered it “to be modified to conform to constitutional requirements.” (Id. at p. 899.) As the Supreme Court has summarized it, the Court of Appeal in Malik J. addressed whether the “condition allowing officers ‘to search a cell phone to determine whether [the defendant] is the owner’ was reasonable in light of the defendant’s ‘history of robbing people of their cell phones.’ ” (In re Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1129 , italics added, parenthetically summarizing In re Malik J., at p. 902.) B

2025(Ibid.) 8 In People v. Guzman, supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at page 63 and footnote 3, the court deemed forfeited the defendant’s claim that the condition was overbroad as applied to him but considered the claim as a facial overbreadth claim.

2002Paul (1992) 505 U.S. 377 , 112 S.Ct. 2538 , 120 L.Ed.2d 305 [invalidating statute proscribing speech that might incite violence based on race, color, creed, or gender because the proscription was based on the disfavored content of inciting language].) In Gormley v. Director, Connecticut State Dept. of Probation (2d Cir.1980) 632 F.2d 938 , certiorari denied (1980) 449 U.S. 1023 , 101 S.Ct. 591 , 66 L.Ed.2d 485 , the court rejected a facial overbreadth challenge to Connecticut's telephone harassment statute, which provides, in relevant part, "`A person is guilty of harassment when ... (3) with

2002Paul (1992) 505 U.S. 377 , 112 S.Ct. 2538 , 120 L.Ed.2d 305 [invalidating statute proscribing speech that might incite violence based on race, color, creed, or gender because the proscription was based on the disfavored content of inciting language].) In Gormley v. Director, Connecticut State Dept. of Probation (2d Cir.1980) 632 F.2d 938 , certiorari denied (1980) 449 U.S. 1023 , 101 S.Ct. 591 , 66 L.Ed.2d 485 , the court rejected a facial overbreadth challenge to Connecticut's telephone harassment statute, which provides, in relevant part, "`A person is guilty of harassment when ... (3) with

2002Paul (1992) 505 U.S. 377 , 112 S.Ct. 2538 , 120 L.Ed.2d 305 [invalidating statute proscribing speech that might incite violence based on race, color, creed, or gender because the proscription was based on the disfavored content of inciting language].) In Gormley v. Director, Connecticut State Dept. of Probation (2d Cir.1980) 632 F.2d 938 , certiorari denied (1980) 449 U.S. 1023 , 101 S.Ct. 591 , 66 L.Ed.2d 485 , the court rejected a facial overbreadth challenge to Connecticut's telephone harassment statute, which provides, in relevant part, "`A person is guilty of harassment when ... (3) with

2002Paul (1992) 505 U.S. 377 , 112 S.Ct. 2538 , 120 L.Ed.2d 305 [invalidating statute proscribing speech that might incite violence based on race, color, creed, or gender because the proscription was based on the disfavored content of inciting language].) In Gormley v. Director, Connecticut State Dept. of Probation (2d Cir.1980) 632 F.2d 938 , certiorari denied (1980) 449 U.S. 1023 , 101 S.Ct. 591 , 66 L.Ed.2d 485 , the court rejected a facial overbreadth challenge to Connecticut's telephone harassment statute, which provides, in relevant part, "`A person is guilty of harassment when ... (3) with

2002Paul (1992) 505 U.S. 377 , 112 S.Ct. 2538 , 120 L.Ed.2d 305 [invalidating statute proscribing speech that might incite violence based on race, color, creed, or gender because the proscription was based on the disfavored content of inciting language].) In Gormley v. Director, Connecticut State Dept. of Probation (2d Cir.1980) 632 F.2d 938 , certiorari denied (1980) 449 U.S. 1023 , 101 S.Ct. 591 , 66 L.Ed.2d 485 , the court rejected a facial overbreadth challenge to Connecticut's telephone harassment statute, which provides, in relevant part, "`A person is guilty of harassment when ... (3) with

1997It has been employed ... sparingly and only as a last resort.' [Citation.] Consequently, to justify a conclusion of facial overbreadth, `the overbreadth of a [restriction] must not only be real, but substantial as well....'" ( Williams v. Garcetti, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 577 .) V.

1997It has been employed . . . sparingly and only as a last resort.’ [Citation.] Consequently, to justify a conclusion of facial overbreadth, ‘the overbreadth of a [restriction] must not only be real, but substantial as well . . . .’” (Williams v. Garcetti, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 577 .) V.

1979As the Bates court noted, the overbreadth doctrine is “ ‘strong medicine,’ which ‘has been employed . . . sparingly and only as a last resort.’ ” (Id., at p. 381 [ 53 L.Ed.2d at p. 834 ], quoting from Broadrick v. Oklahoma, supra, 413 U.S. at p. 613 [ 37 L.Ed.2d at p. 841 ].) We decline to administer that medicine in the circumstances of this case.

1979As the Bates court noted, the overbreadth doctrine is "`strong medicine,' which `has been employed ... sparingly and only as a last resort.'" ( Id., at p. 381 [ 53 L.Ed.2d at p. 834 ], quoting from Broadrick v. Oklahoma, supra, 413 U.S. at p. 613 [ 37 L.Ed.2d at p. 841 ].) We decline to administer that medicine in the circumstances of this case.