19 California opinions name it 3 courts 1995–2025 9 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
County of Kern v. T.C.E.F., Inc.green2 sentences2023(County of Kern v. T.C.E.F., Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 301, 315 (T.C.E.F.).) The goal of this test is to minimize the harm that an erroneous interim decision would cause. 2023(County of Kern v. T.C.E.F., Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 301, 315 (T.C.E.F.).) The goal of this test is to minimize the harm that an erroneous interim decision would cause. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Kerleygreen2 sentences2024Analysis As discussed, forfeiture by wrongdoing permits admission of unconfronted statements of an unavailable witness “if the trial judge finds by a preponderance of the 18. evidence that the defendant by a wrongful act made the witness unavailable with the intent of preventing the witness from testifying.” (Kerley, supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 549 .) “The goal of the doctrine was to remove the ‘otherwise powerful incentive for defendants to intimidate, bribe, and kill the witnesses against them — in other words, it is grounded in “the ability of courts to protect the integrity of their procee 2021This doctrine “allows admission of unconfronted testimonial statements ‘where the defendant ha[s] engaged in wrongful conduct designed to prevent a witness’s testimony.’ ” (People v. Reneaux (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 852 , 865 (Reneaux); see also Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, 62 [“the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing (which we accept) extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable grounds”].) 37 To admit evidence under the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing, the trial court must find “by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant by a wrongful act made the witnes | 1 | 3 |
Giles v. Californiagreen2 sentences2021This doctrine “allows admission of unconfronted testimonial statements ‘where the defendant ha[s] engaged in wrongful conduct designed to prevent a witness’s testimony.’ ” (People v. Reneaux (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 852 , 865 (Reneaux); see also Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, 62 [“the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing (which we accept) extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable grounds”].) 37 To admit evidence under the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing, the trial court must find “by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant by a wrongful act made the witnes 2018The latter doctrine dictates that a defendant forfeits his Sixth Amendment right to confront a witness against him when he by a wrongful act makes the witness unavailable to testify at trial. ( Giles v. California (2008) 554 U.S. 353 , 355, 358, 128 S.Ct. 2678 , 171 L.Ed.2d 488 ( Giles ).) In Giles , the Court held that the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing permits admission of unconfronted statements of an unavailable witness only if the trial judge finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant by a wrongful act made the witness unavailable with the intent of preventing the w | 1 | 2 |
United States v. Lawrence Blackshiregreen1 sentence2024Analysis As discussed, forfeiture by wrongdoing permits admission of unconfronted statements of an unavailable witness “if the trial judge finds by a preponderance of the 18. evidence that the defendant by a wrongful act made the witness unavailable with the intent of preventing the witness from testifying.” (Kerley, supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 549 .) “The goal of the doctrine was to remove the ‘otherwise powerful incentive for defendants to intimidate, bribe, and kill the witnesses against them — in other words, it is grounded in “the ability of courts to protect the integrity of their procee | 1 | 1 |
Leif Carlson, Sr. v. Attorney General of Californiagreen1 sentence2024Analysis As discussed, forfeiture by wrongdoing permits admission of unconfronted statements of an unavailable witness “if the trial judge finds by a preponderance of the 18. evidence that the defendant by a wrongful act made the witness unavailable with the intent of preventing the witness from testifying.” (Kerley, supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 549 .) “The goal of the doctrine was to remove the ‘otherwise powerful incentive for defendants to intimidate, bribe, and kill the witnesses against them — in other words, it is grounded in “the ability of courts to protect the integrity of their procee | 1 | 1 |
Friends of Westwood, Inc. v. City of Los Angelesgreen1 sentence2023(McCann v. City of San Diego (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 51 , 98 [“‘interim harm to the respective parties if an injunction is granted or denied’”]; Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. California Coastal Com. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 1165, 1172 [“interim harm to plaintiff or defendant if the court denies or grants the preliminary injunction”]; County of Los Angeles v. Sahag-Mesrob Armenian Christian School (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 851, 858 [second factor compares interim harms to plaintiff and defendant]; Right Site Coalition v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 336, 342 [comparative harms to b | 1 | 1 |
County of Los Angeles v. SAHAG-MESROB ARMENIAN CHRISTIAN SCHOOLgreen1 sentence2023(McCann v. City of San Diego (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 51 , 98 [“‘interim harm to the respective parties if an injunction is granted or denied’”]; Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. California Coastal Com. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 1165, 1172 [“interim harm to plaintiff or defendant if the court denies or grants the preliminary injunction”]; County of Los Angeles v. Sahag-Mesrob Armenian Christian School (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 851, 858 [second factor compares interim harms to plaintiff and defendant]; Right Site Coalition v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 336, 342 [comparative harms to b | 1 | 1 |
Right Site Coalition v. Los Angeles Unified School Districtgreen1 sentence2023(McCann v. City of San Diego (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 51 , 98 [“‘interim harm to the respective parties if an injunction is granted or denied’”]; Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. California Coastal Com. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 1165, 1172 [“interim harm to plaintiff or defendant if the court denies or grants the preliminary injunction”]; County of Los Angeles v. Sahag-Mesrob Armenian Christian School (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 851, 858 [second factor compares interim harms to plaintiff and defendant]; Right Site Coalition v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 336, 342 [comparative harms to b | 1 | 1 |
Miller v. City of Hermosa Beachgreen1 sentence2023(McCann v. City of San Diego (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 51 , 98 [“‘interim harm to the respective parties if an injunction is granted or denied’”]; Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. California Coastal Com. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 1165, 1172 [“interim harm to plaintiff or defendant if the court denies or grants the preliminary injunction”]; County of Los Angeles v. Sahag-Mesrob Armenian Christian School (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 851, 858 [second factor compares interim harms to plaintiff and defendant]; Right Site Coalition v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 336, 342 [comparative harms to b | 1 | 1 |
Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. California Coastal Commissiongreen1 sentence2023(McCann v. City of San Diego (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 51 , 98 [“‘interim harm to the respective parties if an injunction is granted or denied’”]; Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. California Coastal Com. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 1165, 1172 [“interim harm to plaintiff or defendant if the court denies or grants the preliminary injunction”]; County of Los Angeles v. Sahag-Mesrob Armenian Christian School (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 851, 858 [second factor compares interim harms to plaintiff and defendant]; Right Site Coalition v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 336, 342 [comparative harms to b | 1 | 1 |
People v. Investco Mgmt. & Dev. LLCgreen2 sentences2023(People v. Investco Management & Development LLC (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 443, 468-470 (Investco).) The goal of the analysis is “ ‘to place the estimated value of the case beside the actual cost and make the value judgment whether it is desirable to offer the bounty of a court-awarded fee in order to encourage litigation of the sort involved in [the] case.’ ” (Whitley, at p. 1216.) Because the required analysis involves a weighing of the financial burdens and benefits, where the “potential financial benefit is indirect and speculative . . . a trial court does not abuse its discretion in concludin 2023(People v. Investco Management & Development LLC (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 443, 468-470 (Investco).) The goal of the analysis is “ ‘to place the estimated value of the case beside the actual cost and make the value judgment whether it is desirable to offer the bounty of a court-awarded fee in order to encourage litigation of the sort involved in [the] case.’ ” (Whitley, at p. 1216.) Because the required analysis involves a weighing of the financial burdens and benefits, where the “potential financial benefit is indirect and speculative . . . a trial court does not abuse its discretion in concludin | 1 | 1 |
Crawford v. Washingtongreen1 sentence2021This doctrine “allows admission of unconfronted testimonial statements ‘where the defendant ha[s] engaged in wrongful conduct designed to prevent a witness’s testimony.’ ” (People v. Reneaux (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 852 , 865 (Reneaux); see also Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, 62 [“the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing (which we accept) extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable grounds”].) 37 To admit evidence under the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing, the trial court must find “by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant by a wrongful act made the witnes | 1 | 1 |
Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commissiongreen2 sentences2015Rules Civ.Proc., rule 1, 28 U.S.C.) 7 The award of fees under 42 United States Code section 1988 (b) is discretionary (see Rossello-Gonzalez v. Acevedo-Vila (1st Cir. 2007) 483 F.3d 1 , 5), and under 42 United States Code section 1983 , such fees are awarded to a defendant only “upon a finding that the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith.” (Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC (1978) 434 U.S. 412, 421 [ 54 L.Ed.2d 648 , 98 S.Ct. 694 ].) 8 The court in Duncan v. Workers’ Comp. 2015Rules Civ.Proc., rule 1, 28 U.S.C.) 7 The award of fees under 42 United States Code section 1988 (b) is discretionary (see Rossello-Gonzalez v. Acevedo-Vila (1st Cir. 2007) 483 F.3d 1 , 5), and under 42 United States Code section 1983 , such fees are awarded to a defendant only “upon a finding that the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith.” (Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC (1978) 434 U.S. 412, 421 [ 54 L.Ed.2d 648 , 98 S.Ct. 694 ].) 8 The court in Duncan v. Workers’ Comp. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Estate of Manuelgreen2 sentences2015In marked contrast, admission requests seek to eliminate the need for proof: ‘[T]he purpose of the admissions procedure ... is to limit the triable issues and spare the parties the burden and expense of litigating undisputed issues.’ Sometimes the admissions obtained will even leave the party making them vulnerable to summary judgment.” (1 Hogan & Weber, Cal. Civil Discovery (2d ed. 2005) Requests for Admission, § 9.1, p. 9-2, fn. omitted.) 6 Because “the current language of. . . section 2033.420 is similar to the current language of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 37(c)(2) (28 U.S.C.)” 2015In marked contrast, admission requests seek to eliminate the need for proof: ‘[T]he purpose of the admissions procedure ... is to limit the triable issues and spare the parties the burden and expense of litigating undisputed issues.’ Sometimes the admissions obtained will even leave the party making them vulnerable to summary judgment.” (1 Hogan & Weber, Cal. Civil Discovery (2d ed. 2005) Requests for Admission, § 9.1, p. 9-2, fn. omitted.) 6 Because “the current language of. . . section 2033.420 is similar to the current language of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 37(c)(2) (28 U.S.C.)” | 1 | 1 |
Welch v. Bancorp Management Advisors, Inc.green2 sentences1998The goal of the privilege is promoted by protecting advice that is motivated, even in part, by a good faith intent to benefit the principal’s interest.” (Id. at p. 328; see also Welch v. Bancorp Management Services (1983) 296 Or. 208 [ 675 P.2d 172 ] [applying mixed-motive formulation of manager’s privilege].) Another line of cases has held that a manager’s motive to benefit the employer must predominate over other self-interested motives in order for the manager to take advantage of the privilege. 1998The goal of the privilege is promoted by protecting advice that is motivated, even in part, by a good faith intent to benefit the principal’s interest.” (Id. at p. 328; see also Welch v. Bancorp Management Services (1983) 296 Or. 208 [ 675 P.2d 172 ] [applying mixed-motive formulation of manager’s privilege].) Another line of cases has held that a manager’s motive to benefit the employer must predominate over other self-interested motives in order for the manager to take advantage of the privilege. | 1 | 1 |
Palermo v. Stockton Theatres, Inc.green2 sentences1995As the author of the majority opinion has, in another context, aptly stated: "[T]he *130 purpose of statutory construction is not merely to declare the plain meaning of the words used; the purpose is to understand the intent of the lawmakers, and the goal of that inquiry, in turn, is to give maximum effect to that intent." ( Rossi v. Brown (1995) 9 Cal.4th 688, 716 [ 38 Cal. Rptr.2d 363 , 889 P.2d 557 ] (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.).) Consistent with the intent of the lawmakers in enacting the statutes here at issue, I would find defendant entitled to 191 days of conduct credit, applied to his state 1995As the author of the majority opinion has, in another context, aptly stated: "[T]he *130 purpose of statutory construction is not merely to declare the plain meaning of the words used; the purpose is to understand the intent of the lawmakers, and the goal of that inquiry, in turn, is to give maximum effect to that intent." ( Rossi v. Brown (1995) 9 Cal.4th 688, 716 [ 38 Cal. Rptr.2d 363 , 889 P.2d 557 ] (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.).) Consistent with the intent of the lawmakers in enacting the statutes here at issue, I would find defendant entitled to 191 days of conduct credit, applied to his state | 1 | 1 |
| Rossi v. Browngreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
White v. Davis
green
2 sentences2024(Butt v. State of California, supra, at p. 678 .) The goal of this test is to minimize the harm that an erroneous interim decision would cause. ( White, supra, at p. 554 ; People v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 266 , 284.)” (Tulare Lake, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at pp. 396–397.) “The trial court’s evaluation and weighing of the parties’ likelihood of success on the merits and the balance of harm is reviewed for abuse of discretion. 2023(Butt v. State of California, supra, at p. 678 .) The goal of this test is to minimize the harm that an erroneous interim decision would cause. ( White, supra, at p. 554 ; People v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 266 , 284.) The usual or basic description of the interrelated factors test, which refers to the interim harms to the parties, appears in several CEQA decisions. | 5 | 2023–2025 |
In Re Benoit
green
2 sentences2020(In re Benoit, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 86 .) The California Supreme Court has explained the goal of applying the doctrine under such circumstances is to avoid penalizing a defendant for justifiably relying on his attorney to file the notice of appeal in a timely fashion. 2020(In re Benoit, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 86 .) The California Supreme Court has explained the goal of applying the doctrine under such circumstances is to avoid penalizing a defendant for justifiably relying on his attorney to file the notice of appeal in a timely fashion. | 3 | 2020–2020 |
Butt v. State of California
green
2 sentences2024(Butt v. State of California, supra, at p. 678 .) The goal of this test is to minimize the harm that an erroneous interim decision would cause. ( White, supra, at p. 554 ; People v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 266 , 284.)” (Tulare Lake, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at pp. 396–397.) “The trial court’s evaluation and weighing of the parties’ likelihood of success on the merits and the balance of harm is reviewed for abuse of discretion. 2023(Butt v. State of California, supra, at p. 678 .) The goal of this test is to minimize the harm that an erroneous interim decision would cause. ( White, supra, at p. 554 ; People v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 266 , 284.) The usual or basic description of the interrelated factors test, which refers to the interim harms to the parties, appears in several CEQA decisions. | 2 | 2023–2024 |
Dodge, Warren & Peter Insurance Service, Inc. v. Riley
green
1 sentence2025Services, Inc. v. Riley (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1414, 1420 .) But we review questions of law de novo. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
IT Corp. v. County of Imperial
green
1 sentence2024(IT Corp. v. County of Imperial (1983) 35 Cal.3d 63 , 69–70.) We review de novo the trial court’s application of legal principles and we review its findings of fact under the substantial evidence standard. [Citation.]” (Anderson v. County of Santa Barbara (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 554 , 568.) 11 2. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Sweetwater Union High Sch. Dist. v. Julian Union Elementary Sch. Dist.
green
1 sentence2023(People v. Investco Management & Development LLC (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 443, 468-470 (Investco).) The goal of the analysis is “ ‘to place the estimated value of the case beside the actual cost and make the value judgment whether it is desirable to offer the bounty of a court-awarded fee in order to encourage litigation of the sort involved in [the] case.’ ” (Whitley, at p. 1216.) Because the required analysis involves a weighing of the financial burdens and benefits, where the “potential financial benefit is indirect and speculative . . . a trial court does not abuse its discretion in concludin | 1 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Banos
green
2 sentences2020(Id.[, 554 U.S.] at pp. 358-368.) The goal of the doctrine was to remove the ‘otherwise powerful incentive for defendants to intimidate, bribe, and kill the witnesses against them—in other words, it is grounded in “the ability of the courts to protect the integrity of their proceedings.” ’ (Id. at p. 374.)” (People v. Kerley, supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at pp. 549–550.) This doctrine is codified in California Evidence Code section 1390, which provides: “Evidence of a statement is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement is offered against a party that has engaged, or aided and abet 2020(Id.[, 554 U.S.] at pp. 358-368.) The goal of the doctrine was to remove the ‘otherwise powerful incentive for defendants to intimidate, bribe, and kill the witnesses against them—in other words, it is grounded in “the ability of the courts to protect the integrity of their proceedings.” ’ (Id. at p. 374.)” (People v. Kerley, supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at pp. 549–550.) This doctrine is codified in California Evidence Code section 1390, which provides: “Evidence of a statement is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement is offered against a party that has engaged, or aided and abet | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Iowa v. Tovar
green
2 sentences2017(See Iowa v. Tovar (2004) 541 U.S. 77 , 92, 124 S.Ct. 1379 , 158 L.Ed.2d 209 ( Tovar ), quoting Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) 304 U.S. 458 , 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 ["In prescribing scripted admonitions and holding them necessary in every guilty plea instance, ... the Iowa high court overlooked our observations that the information a defendant must have to waive counsel intelligently will 'depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case.' "].) Here, too, whether particular information bears on the intelligence of a jury waiver must depend, at least 2017(See Iowa v. Tovar (2004) 541 U.S. 77 , 92, 124 S.Ct. 1379 , 158 L.Ed.2d 209 ( Tovar ), quoting Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) 304 U.S. 458 , 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 ["In prescribing scripted admonitions and holding them necessary in every guilty plea instance, ... the Iowa high court overlooked our observations that the information a defendant must have to waive counsel intelligently will 'depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case.' "].) Here, too, whether particular information bears on the intelligence of a jury waiver must depend, at least | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Adams v. United States Ex Rel. McCann
green
2 sentences2017Unlike most jury waivers, defendant's waiver as to guilt and special circumstances was plainly not made with an eye to "self-protect[ion]," or to secure any litigation "advantages." ( Adams , supra , 317 U.S. at p. 278 , 63 S.Ct. 236 .) As such, while an express advisement about the fundamental attributes of jury trial might have made even clearer to defendant the protection that a jury might afford, there is every indication that he did not want that protection at his trial on the substantive charges-and that additional advisements on that point, if anything, would have simply reinforced his 2017Unlike most jury waivers, defendant's waiver as to guilt and special circumstances was plainly not made with an eye to "self-protect[ion]," or to secure any litigation "advantages." ( Adams , supra , 317 U.S. at p. 278 , 63 S.Ct. 236 .) As such, while an express advisement about the fundamental attributes of jury trial might have made even clearer to defendant the protection that a jury might afford, there is every indication that he did not want that protection at his trial on the substantive charges-and that additional advisements on that point, if anything, would have simply reinforced his | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Johnson v. Zerbst
green
2 sentences2017(See Iowa v. Tovar (2004) 541 U.S. 77 , 92, 124 S.Ct. 1379 , 158 L.Ed.2d 209 ( Tovar ), quoting Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) 304 U.S. 458 , 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 ["In prescribing scripted admonitions and holding them necessary in every guilty plea instance, ... the Iowa high court overlooked our observations that the information a defendant must have to waive counsel intelligently will 'depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case.' "].) Here, too, whether particular information bears on the intelligence of a jury waiver must depend, at least 2017(See Iowa v. Tovar (2004) 541 U.S. 77 , 92, 124 S.Ct. 1379 , 158 L.Ed.2d 209 ( Tovar ), quoting Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) 304 U.S. 458 , 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 ["In prescribing scripted admonitions and holding them necessary in every guilty plea instance, ... the Iowa high court overlooked our observations that the information a defendant must have to waive counsel intelligently will 'depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case.' "].) Here, too, whether particular information bears on the intelligence of a jury waiver must depend, at least | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Kevin F. Marchand v. Mercy Medical Center, an Idaho Corporation, and Neil K. Farris, D.O.
green
1 sentence2015In marked contrast, admission requests seek to eliminate the need for proof: ‘[T]he purpose of the admissions procedure ... is to limit the triable issues and spare the parties the burden and expense of litigating undisputed issues.’ Sometimes the admissions obtained will even leave the party making them vulnerable to summary judgment.” (1 Hogan & Weber, Cal. Civil Discovery (2d ed. 2005) Requests for Admission, § 9.1, p. 9-2, fn. omitted.) 6 Because “the current language of. . . section 2033.420 is similar to the current language of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 37(c)(2) (28 U.S.C.)” | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Hon. Pedro J. Rosselló-González v. Aníbal Acevedo-Vilá
green
1 sentence2015Rules Civ.Proc., rule 1, 28 U.S.C.) 7 The award of fees under 42 United States Code section 1988 (b) is discretionary (see Rossello-Gonzalez v. Acevedo-Vila (1st Cir. 2007) 483 F.3d 1 , 5), and under 42 United States Code section 1983 , such fees are awarded to a defendant only “upon a finding that the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith.” (Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC (1978) 434 U.S. 412, 421 [ 54 L.Ed.2d 648 , 98 S.Ct. 694 ].) 8 The court in Duncan v. Workers’ Comp. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Los Angeles Airways, Inc., a Corporation v. Chester C. Davis, Los Angeles Airways, Inc., a Corporation v. Chester C. Davis
green
1 sentence2003The goal of the privilege is promoted by protecting advice that is motivated, even in part, by a good faith intent to benefit the principal’s interest.” (Los Angeles Airways, Inc., supra, 687 F.2d at p. 328 , italics added.) The opinion went on to embrace a rule acknowledging the practical reality that few business decisions are made with complete altruism: “We believe that advice by an agent to a principal is rarely, if ever, motivated purely by a desire to benefit only the principal. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Aurora Air Service, Inc.
green
1 sentence1998(See Alyeska Pipeline Service v. Aurora Air Service (Alaska 1979) 604 P.2d 1090 .) In Alyeska Pipeline Service , the defendant induced a third party to breach a contract with the plaintiff. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.