goal exception in Oregon

2024See State v. Kammeyer, 226 Or App 210, 214 , 203 P3d 274 , rev den, 346 Or 590 (2009) (“Under the invited error doctrine, a party who was actively instrumental in bringing about an alleged error cannot be heard to complain, and the case ought not to be reversed because of it. * * * The goal of the rule is to ensure that parties who make intentional or strategic trial choices do not later blame the court if those choices prove to be unwise.” (Internal quotation marks and citations omitted.)).

2024See, e.g., State v. Kammeyer, 226 Or App 210, 214 , 203 P3d 274 , rev den, 346 Or 590 (2009) (explaining that the goal of the doctrine of invited error is “to ensure that parties who make intentional or strategic trial choices do not later blame the court if those choices prove to be unwise” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

2026“A LUBA order is unlawful in substance if it represents a mistaken interpretation of the applicable law,” Redside Restoration v. Deschutes County, 344 Or App 383 , 391, 581 P3d 501 (2025) (internal quotation marks omitted), or if it misapplies LUBA’s standard of review in determining whether a local government’s decision is supported by substantial evidence in the whole record, Citizens for Responsibility v. Lane County, 218 Or App 339, 345 , 180 P3d 35 (2008); see also ORS 197.835(9)(a)(C) (providing for LUBA’s substantial evidence review of land use decisions); ORS 197.732(6)(a) (providing f

2026“A LUBA order is unlawful in substance if it represents a mistaken interpretation of the applicable law,” Redside Restoration v. Deschutes County, 344 Or App 383 , 391, 581 P3d 501 (2025) (internal quotation marks omitted), or if it misapplies LUBA’s standard of review in determining whether a local government’s decision is supported by substantial evidence in the whole record, Citizens for Responsibility v. Lane County, 218 Or App 339, 345 , 180 P3d 35 (2008); see also ORS 197.835(9)(a)(C) (providing for LUBA’s substantial evidence review of land use decisions); ORS 197.732(6)(a) (providing f

2026“A LUBA order is unlawful in substance if it represents a mistaken interpretation of the applicable law,” Redside Restoration v. Deschutes County, 344 Or App 383 , 391, 581 P3d 501 (2025) (internal quotation marks omitted), or if it misapplies LUBA’s standard of review in determining whether a local government’s decision is supported by substantial evidence in the whole record, Citizens for Responsibility v. Lane County, 218 Or App 339, 345 , 180 P3d 35 (2008); see also ORS 197.835(9)(a)(C) (providing for LUBA’s substantial evidence review of land use decisions); ORS 197.732(6)(a) (providing f

2026“A LUBA order is unlawful in substance if it represents a mistaken interpretation of the applicable law,” Redside Restoration v. Deschutes County, 344 Or App 383 , 391, 581 P3d 501 (2025) (internal quotation marks omitted), or if it misapplies LUBA’s standard of review in determining whether a local government’s decision is supported by substantial evidence in the whole record, Citizens for Responsibility v. Lane County, 218 Or App 339, 345 , 180 P3d 35 (2008); see also ORS 197.835(9)(a)(C) (providing for LUBA’s substantial evidence review of land use decisions); ORS 197.732(6)(a) (providing f

2024For example, in State v. Ferguson, 201 Or App 261, 269-70 , 119 P3d 794 (2005), rev den, 340 Or 34 (2006), we explained that, if a party was actively instrumental in bringing about an asserted error, that party cannot complain about that error on appeal.

2024For example, in State v. Ferguson, 201 Or App 261, 269-70 , 119 P3d 794 (2005), rev den, 340 Or 34 (2006), we explained that, if a party was actively instrumental in bringing about an asserted error, that party cannot complain about that error on appeal.

2024For example, in State v. Ferguson, 201 Or App 261, 269-70 , 119 P3d 794 (2005), rev den, 340 Or 34 (2006), we explained that, if a party was actively instrumental in bringing about an asserted error, that party cannot complain about that error on appeal.

2024For example, in State v. Ferguson, 201 Or App 261, 269-70 , 119 P3d 794 (2005), rev den, 340 Or 34 (2006), we explained that, if a party was actively instrumental in bringing about an asserted error, that party cannot complain about that error on appeal.

2005The goal of that inquiry is “to understand the wording in the light of the way that wording would have been understood and used by those who created the provision,” Vannatta v. Keisling, 324 Or 514, 530 , 931 P2d 770 (1997), and to “apply faithfully the principles embodied in the Oregon Constitution to modern circumstances as those circumstances arise,” State v. Rogers, 330 Or 282, 297 , 4 P3d 1261 (2000).

2005The goal of that inquiry is “to understand the wording in the light of the way that wording would have been understood and used by those who created the provision,” Vannatta v. Keisling, 324 Or 514, 530 , 931 P2d 770 (1997), and to “apply faithfully the principles embodied in the Oregon Constitution to modern circumstances as those circumstances arise,” State v. Rogers, 330 Or 282, 297 , 4 P3d 1261 (2000).

2022OAR 660-012-0065(3)(n) provides that “[e]xpansions or alterations of public use airports that do not permit service to a larger class of airplanes” are consistent with Goals 3, 4, 11, and 14.1 In Schaefer v. Oregon Aviation Board, 312 Or App 316, 345 , 495 P3d 1267 , adh’d to as modified on recons, 313 Or App 725 , 492 P3d 782 , rev den, 369 Or 69 (2021), we interpreted the phrase “permit service to a larger class of airplanes” in that rule provision.

2022OAR 660-012-0065(3)(n) provides that “[e]xpansions or alterations of public use airports that do not permit service to a larger class of airplanes” are consistent with Goals 3, 4, 11, and 14.1 In Schaefer v. Oregon Aviation Board, 312 Or App 316, 345 , 495 P3d 1267 , adh’d to as modified on recons, 313 Or App 725 , 492 P3d 782 , rev den, 369 Or 69 (2021), we interpreted the phrase “permit service to a larger class of airplanes” in that rule provision.

2017The goal of defense counsel's presentation of Holbrook's denial of any ground for the cross-examination questions was to "rebut or discredit the challenged [questions]." Id. , 64 P.3d 1123 .

2017The goal of defense counsel's presentation of Holbrook's denial of any ground for the cross-examination questions was to "rebut or discredit the challenged [questions]." Id. , 64 P.3d 1123 .

2016“The goal of the rule is to ensure that parties who make intentional or strategic trial choices do not later ‘blame the court’ if those choices prove to be unwise.” Id. (quoting Crawford v. Jackson, 252 Or 552, 555 , 451 P2d 115 (1969)).

2015IAFF, Local 3564, 262 Or App at 661 .

2013The goal of that inquiry is “to understand the wording [of the constitutional provision] in the light of the way that the wording would have been understood and used by those who created the provision * * * and to apply faithfully the principles embodied in the Oregon Constitution to modern circumstances as those circumstances arise.” Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc., 332 Or 83, 90-91 , 23 P3d 333 (2001) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

2013The goal of that inquiry is “to understand the wording [of the constitutional provision] in the light of the way that the wording would have been understood and used by those who created the provision * * * and to apply faithfully the principles embodied in the Oregon Constitution to modern circumstances as those circumstances arise.” Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc., 332 Or 83, 90-91 , 23 P3d 333 (2001) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

2005The goal of that inquiry is “to understand the wording in the light of the way that wording would have been understood and used by those who created the provision,” Vannatta v. Keisling, 324 Or 514, 530 , 931 P2d 770 (1997), and to “apply faithfully the principles embodied in the Oregon Constitution to modern circumstances as those circumstances arise,” State v. Rogers, 330 Or 282, 297 , 4 P3d 1261 (2000).

2005The goal of that inquiry is “to understand the wording in the light of the way that wording would have been understood and used by those who created the provision,” Vannatta v. Keisling, 324 Or 514, 530 , 931 P2d 770 (1997), and to “apply faithfully the principles embodied in the Oregon Constitution to modern circumstances as those circumstances arise,” State v. Rogers, 330 Or 282, 297 , 4 P3d 1261 (2000).

2005ORS 197.732, the statute relating to exceptions taken by local governments, provides, in part: “(1) A local government may adopt an exception to a goal if: <(%: ífí “(c) The following standards are met: “(A) Reasons justify why the state policy embodied in the applicable goals should not apply; “(B) Areas which do not require a new exception cannot reasonably accommodate the use; “(C) The long term environmental, economic, social and energy consequences resulting from the use at the proposed site with measures designed to reduce adverse impacts are not significantly more adverse than would typ

2005ORS 197.732, the statute relating to exceptions taken by local governments, provides, in part: “(1) A local government may adopt an exception to a goal if: <(%: ífí “(c) The following standards are met: “(A) Reasons justify why the state policy embodied in the applicable goals should not apply; “(B) Areas which do not require a new exception cannot reasonably accommodate the use; “(C) The long term environmental, economic, social and energy consequences resulting from the use at the proposed site with measures designed to reduce adverse impacts are not significantly more adverse than would typ

1996We resort to the maxim stated in State ex rel Appling v. Chase, 224 Or 112, 117 , 355 P2d 631 (1960): the courts “are required to harmonize apparent conflicts within a statute if it is possible to do so.” 6 Applying that principle here, we conclude that a goal or rule compliance challenge cannot be advanced under ORS 197.829(l)(d) when, however phrased, the argument necessarily depends on the thesis that the acknowledged local land use legislation itself does not comply with a goal or rule, and when a direct contention that the acknowledged legislation is contrary to the goal or rule could not

1996We resort to the maxim stated in State ex rel Appling v. Chase, 224 Or 112, 117 , 355 P2d 631 (1960): the courts “are required to harmonize apparent conflicts within a statute if it is possible to do so.” 6 Applying that principle here, we conclude that a goal or rule compliance challenge cannot be advanced under ORS 197.829(l)(d) when, however phrased, the argument necessarily depends on the thesis that the acknowledged local land use legislation itself does not comply with a goal or rule, and when a direct contention that the acknowledged legislation is contrary to the goal or rule could not

1996The subdivision use is urban in character, and it cannot be conducted on land outside the city’s UGB, at least without an appropriate goal exception. 1000 Friends of Oregon v. LCDC (Curry Co.), 301 Or 447 , 724 P2d 268 (1986); Hammack & Associates, Inc. v. Washington County, 89 Or App 40 , 747 P2d 373 (1987).

1996The subdivision use is urban in character, and it cannot be conducted on land outside the city’s UGB, at least without an appropriate goal exception. 1000 Friends of Oregon v. LCDC (Curry Co.), 301 Or 447 , 724 P2d 268 (1986); Hammack & Associates, Inc. v. Washington County, 89 Or App 40 , 747 P2d 373 (1987).

1996The subdivision use is urban in character, and it cannot be conducted on land outside the city’s UGB, at least without an appropriate goal exception. 1000 Friends of Oregon v. LCDC (Curry Co.), 301 Or 447 , 724 P2d 268 (1986); Hammack & Associates, Inc. v. Washington County, 89 Or App 40 , 747 P2d 373 (1987).

1996The subdivision use is urban in character, and it cannot be conducted on land outside the city’s UGB, at least without an appropriate goal exception. 1000 Friends of Oregon v. LCDC (Curry Co.), 301 Or 447 , 724 P2d 268 (1986); Hammack & Associates, Inc. v. Washington County, 89 Or App 40 , 747 P2d 373 (1987).

1992Even assuming the correctness of the statement, but see OBS215.203(l); Meyer v. Lord, 37 Or App 59 , 586 P2d 367 (1978), rev den 286 Or 303 (1979), the fact that the goal might have required the original EFU zoning of the area does not demonstrate how or why a site specific exception would necessarily support a change in the existing EFU zoning.

1992Even assuming the correctness of the statement, but see OBS215.203(l); Meyer v. Lord, 37 Or App 59 , 586 P2d 367 (1978), rev den 286 Or 303 (1979), the fact that the goal might have required the original EFU zoning of the area does not demonstrate how or why a site specific exception would necessarily support a change in the existing EFU zoning.

1988ORS 183.482(8) (b)(B); see 1000 Friends of Oregon v. LCDC, 72 Or App 443 , 696 P2d 550 , rev den 299 Or 584 (1985); Coats v. LCDC, 67 Or App 504 , 679 P2d 898 (1984).

1988ORS 183.482(8) (b)(B); see 1000 Friends of Oregon v. LCDC, 72 Or App 443 , 696 P2d 550 , rev den 299 Or 584 (1985); Coats v. LCDC, 67 Or App 504 , 679 P2d 898 (1984).

1984In its motion to dismiss, Lane County relies on Citadel Corp. v. Tillamook Co., 66 Or App 965 , 675 P2d 1114 (1984), Carmel Estates, Inc. v. LCDC, 51 Or App 435 , 625 P2d 1367 (1981), rev den 291 Or 309 (1981) and Card v. Flegel, 26 Or App 783 , 554 P2d 596 (1976), all of which are inapposite.

1984In its motion to dismiss, Lane County relies on Citadel Corp. v. Tillamook Co., 66 Or App 965 , 675 P2d 1114 (1984), Carmel Estates, Inc. v. LCDC, 51 Or App 435 , 625 P2d 1367 (1981), rev den 291 Or 309 (1981) and Card v. Flegel, 26 Or App 783 , 554 P2d 596 (1976), all of which are inapposite.

1984In its motion to dismiss, Lane County relies on Citadel Corp. v. Tillamook Co., 66 Or App 965 , 675 P2d 1114 (1984), Carmel Estates, Inc. v. LCDC, 51 Or App 435 , 625 P2d 1367 (1981), rev den 291 Or 309 (1981) and Card v. Flegel, 26 Or App 783 , 554 P2d 596 (1976), all of which are inapposite.

1984In its motion to dismiss, Lane County relies on Citadel Corp. v. Tillamook Co., 66 Or App 965 , 675 P2d 1114 (1984), Carmel Estates, Inc. v. LCDC, 51 Or App 435 , 625 P2d 1367 (1981), rev den 291 Or 309 (1981) and Card v. Flegel, 26 Or App 783 , 554 P2d 596 (1976), all of which are inapposite.

1984In its motion to dismiss, Lane County relies on Citadel Corp. v. Tillamook Co., 66 Or App 965 , 675 P2d 1114 (1984), Carmel Estates, Inc. v. LCDC, 51 Or App 435 , 625 P2d 1367 (1981), rev den 291 Or 309 (1981) and Card v. Flegel, 26 Or App 783 , 554 P2d 596 (1976), all of which are inapposite.

1984In its motion to dismiss, Lane County relies on Citadel Corp. v. Tillamook Co., 66 Or App 965 , 675 P2d 1114 (1984), Carmel Estates, Inc. v. LCDC, 51 Or App 435 , 625 P2d 1367 (1981), rev den 291 Or 309 (1981) and Card v. Flegel, 26 Or App 783 , 554 P2d 596 (1976), all of which are inapposite.

1983Land use decisions by a local government with an acknowledged comprehensive plan are reviewable for compliance with the plan and with local rules but are generally not reviewable for compliance with the statewide goals. 2 Byrd v. Stringer, 295 Or 311 , 666 P2d 1332 (1983); Fujimoto v. Land Use Board, 52 Or App 875 , 630 P2d 364 , rev den 291 Or 662 (1981).

1983Land use decisions by a local government with an acknowledged comprehensive plan are reviewable for compliance with the plan and with local rules but are generally not reviewable for compliance with the statewide goals. 2 Byrd v. Stringer, 295 Or 311 , 666 P2d 1332 (1983); Fujimoto v. Land Use Board, 52 Or App 875 , 630 P2d 364 , rev den 291 Or 662 (1981).

1983Land use decisions by a local government with an acknowledged comprehensive plan are reviewable for compliance with the plan and with local rules but are generally not reviewable for compliance with the statewide goals. 2 Byrd v. Stringer, 295 Or 311 , 666 P2d 1332 (1983); Fujimoto v. Land Use Board, 52 Or App 875 , 630 P2d 364 , rev den 291 Or 662 (1981).

1983Land use decisions by a local government with an acknowledged comprehensive plan are reviewable for compliance with the plan and with local rules but are generally not reviewable for compliance with the statewide goals. 2 Byrd v. Stringer, 295 Or 311 , 666 P2d 1332 (1983); Fujimoto v. Land Use Board, 52 Or App 875 , 630 P2d 364 , rev den 291 Or 662 (1981).