Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
19 California opinions name it 2 courts 1900–2006 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Helmsgreen2 sentences1967(See People v. Helms, 242 Cal.App.2d 476, 487 [ 51 Cal.Rptr. 484 ]; People v. Sipult, 234 Cal.App.2d 862, 870 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 846 ]; People v. Niles, 227 Cal.App.2d 749, 755 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 11 ]; People v. Collins, 220 Cal.App.2d 563, 579 [ 33 Cal.Rptr. 638 ] [facts recited in earlier opinion, 117 Cal.App.2d at pp. 178-180]; cf. People v. Scott, supra, 247 Cal.App.2d 371 .) Since first degree burglary carries a more severe maximum penalty than assault with a deadly weapon, as between counts 1 and 2 defendant can only be punished under count 2, the burglary charge. 1967(See People v. Helms, 242 Cal.App.2d 476, 487 [ 51 Cal.Rptr. 484 ]; People v. Sipult, 234 Cal.App.2d 862, 870 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 846 ]; People v. Niles, 227 Cal.App.2d 749, 755 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 11 ]; People v. Collins, 220 Cal.App.2d 563, 579 [ 33 Cal.Rptr. 638 ] [facts recited in earlier opinion, 117 Cal.App.2d at pp. 178-180]; cf. People v. Scott, supra, 247 Cal.App.2d 371 .) Since first degree burglary carries a more severe maximum penalty than assault with a deadly weapon, as between counts 1 and 2 defendant can only be punished under count 2, the burglary charge. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Sipultgreen2 sentences1967(See People v. Helms, 242 Cal.App.2d 476, 487 [ 51 Cal.Rptr. 484 ]; People v. Sipult, 234 Cal.App.2d 862, 870 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 846 ]; People v. Niles, 227 Cal.App.2d 749, 755 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 11 ]; People v. Collins, 220 Cal.App.2d 563, 579 [ 33 Cal.Rptr. 638 ] [facts recited in earlier opinion, 117 Cal.App.2d at pp. 178-180]; cf. People v. Scott, supra, 247 Cal.App.2d 371 .) Since first degree burglary carries a more severe maximum penalty than assault with a deadly weapon, as between counts 1 and 2 defendant can only be punished under count 2, the burglary charge. 1967(See People v. Helms, 242 Cal.App.2d 476, 487 [ 51 Cal.Rptr. 484 ]; People v. Sipult, 234 Cal.App.2d 862, 870 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 846 ]; People v. Niles, 227 Cal.App.2d 749, 755 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 11 ]; People v. Collins, 220 Cal.App.2d 563, 579 [ 33 Cal.Rptr. 638 ] [facts recited in earlier opinion, 117 Cal.App.2d at pp. 178-180]; cf. People v. Scott, supra, 247 Cal.App.2d 371 .) Since first degree burglary carries a more severe maximum penalty than assault with a deadly weapon, as between counts 1 and 2 defendant can only be punished under count 2, the burglary charge. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Collinsgreen2 sentences1967(See People v. Helms, 242 Cal.App.2d 476, 487 [ 51 Cal.Rptr. 484 ]; People v. Sipult, 234 Cal.App.2d 862, 870 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 846 ]; People v. Niles, 227 Cal.App.2d 749, 755 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 11 ]; People v. Collins, 220 Cal.App.2d 563, 579 [ 33 Cal.Rptr. 638 ] [facts recited in earlier opinion, 117 Cal.App.2d at pp. 178-180]; cf. People v. Scott, supra, 247 Cal.App.2d 371 .) Since first degree burglary carries a more severe maximum penalty than assault with a deadly weapon, as between counts 1 and 2 defendant can only be punished under count 2, the burglary charge. 1967(See People v. Helms, 242 Cal.App.2d 476, 487 [ 51 Cal.Rptr. 484 ]; People v. Sipult, 234 Cal.App.2d 862, 870 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 846 ]; People v. Niles, 227 Cal.App.2d 749, 755 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 11 ]; People v. Collins, 220 Cal.App.2d 563, 579 [ 33 Cal.Rptr. 638 ] [facts recited in earlier opinion, 117 Cal.App.2d at pp. 178-180]; cf. People v. Scott, supra, 247 Cal.App.2d 371 .) Since first degree burglary carries a more severe maximum penalty than assault with a deadly weapon, as between counts 1 and 2 defendant can only be punished under count 2, the burglary charge. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Nilesgreen2 sentences1967(See People v. Helms, 242 Cal.App.2d 476, 487 [ 51 Cal.Rptr. 484 ]; People v. Sipult, 234 Cal.App.2d 862, 870 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 846 ]; People v. Niles, 227 Cal.App.2d 749, 755 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 11 ]; People v. Collins, 220 Cal.App.2d 563, 579 [ 33 Cal.Rptr. 638 ] [facts recited in earlier opinion, 117 Cal.App.2d at pp. 178-180]; cf. People v. Scott, supra, 247 Cal.App.2d 371 .) Since first degree burglary carries a more severe maximum penalty than assault with a deadly weapon, as between counts 1 and 2 defendant can only be punished under count 2, the burglary charge. 1967(See People v. Helms, 242 Cal.App.2d 476, 487 [ 51 Cal.Rptr. 484 ]; People v. Sipult, 234 Cal.App.2d 862, 870 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 846 ]; People v. Niles, 227 Cal.App.2d 749, 755 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 11 ]; People v. Collins, 220 Cal.App.2d 563, 579 [ 33 Cal.Rptr. 638 ] [facts recited in earlier opinion, 117 Cal.App.2d at pp. 178-180]; cf. People v. Scott, supra, 247 Cal.App.2d 371 .) Since first degree burglary carries a more severe maximum penalty than assault with a deadly weapon, as between counts 1 and 2 defendant can only be punished under count 2, the burglary charge. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Thomasgreen2 sentences1996Brooks, therefore, is inapplicable to the present case. [^0 We conclude that, having failed to show good cause why the sufficiency of the affidavit offered in support of the search warrant was not challenged at the initial section 1538.5 hearing, defendant was not entitled, under section 1538.5, to a second pretrial suppression hearing, and that the trial court acted in excess of its jurisdiction in hearing such second motion; moreover, that the facts of defendant’s case do not fall within the exception announced in People v. Brooks, supra, 26 Cal.3d 471 .” (Nelson, supra, 126 Cal.App.3d at p. 1996Brooks, therefore, is inapplicable to the present case. [^0 We conclude that, having failed to show good cause why the sufficiency of the affidavit offered in support of the search warrant was not challenged at the initial section 1538.5 hearing, defendant was not entitled, under section 1538.5, to a second pretrial suppression hearing, and that the trial court acted in excess of its jurisdiction in hearing such second motion; moreover, that the facts of defendant’s case do not fall within the exception announced in People v. Brooks, supra, 26 Cal.3d 471 .” (Nelson, supra, 126 Cal.App.3d at p. | 1 | 1 |
Vasquez v. Superior Courtred2 sentences1979Secondly, inasmuch as “[protection of unwary consumers from being duped by unscrupulous sellers is an exigency of the utmost priority in contemporary society” (Vasquez v. Superior Court (1971) 4 Cal.3d 800, 808 [ 911 Cal.Rptr. 796 , 484 P.2d 964 , 53 A.L.R.3d 513 ]), we must effectuate the full deterrent force of the unfair trade statute. 1979Secondly, inasmuch as “[protection of unwary consumers from being duped by unscrupulous sellers is an exigency of the utmost priority in contemporary society” (Vasquez v. Superior Court (1971) 4 Cal.3d 800, 808 [ 911 Cal.Rptr. 796 , 484 P.2d 964 , 53 A.L.R.3d 513 ]), we must effectuate the full deterrent force of the unfair trade statute. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Medinagreen2 sentences1973We hold that, regardless of whether the arrest was valid, the motion was properly denied. “ ‘In reviewing a determination of a trial court on a 1538.5 motion, the function of the reviewing court is to determine whether there was substantial evidence to support the trial court’s findings . . . .’ [Citations.]” (People v. Medina (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 809, 815 [ 103 Cal.Rptr. 337 ].) Although neither the motel manager nor the sheriff’s radio dispatcher was a witness at the preliminary examination, Officer King testified that “the manager of the El Tejón” had phoned the sheriff’s department and had 1973We hold that, regardless of whether the arrest was valid, the motion was properly denied. “ ‘In reviewing a determination of a trial court on a 1538.5 motion, the function of the reviewing court is to determine whether there was substantial evidence to support the trial court’s findings . . . .’ [Citations.]” (People v. Medina (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 809, 815 [ 103 Cal.Rptr. 337 ].) Although neither the motel manager nor the sheriff’s radio dispatcher was a witness at the preliminary examination, Officer King testified that “the manager of the El Tejón” had phoned the sheriff’s department and had | 1 | 1 |
People v. Jonesgreen2 sentences1966(People v. Jones, 211 Cal.App.2d 63, 73 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 429 ].) This is so even though all of the sentences have been ordered by the trial court to run concurrently. 1966(People v. Jones, 211 Cal.App.2d 63, 73 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 429 ].) This is so even though all of the sentences have been ordered by the trial court to run concurrently. | 1 | 1 |
Walsh v. Walshgreen2 sentences1953(Walsh v. Walsh, 18 Cal.2d 439, 444 [ 116 P.2d 62 ].) The judgment is reversed. 1953(Walsh v. Walsh, 18 Cal.2d 439, 444 [ 116 P.2d 62 ].) The judgment is reversed. | 1 | 1 |
Eckart v. Browngreen2 sentences1950The agreement of August 3, 1948, constitutes a novation, and the rights of the parties were covered solely by the new agreement, the original lease being void and of no effect. (.Eckart v. Brown, 34 Cal.App.2d 182, 187 [ 93 P.2d 212 ].) Second: Were defendants entitled to recover damages for (1) the value of trade fixtures left in the premises, or (2) the cost of removing and relocating the fixtures taken awayf This question must also be answered in the negative. (1) Since it is conceded that all the machinery and equipment installed on the premises by defendants were removable fixtures, the f 1950The agreement of August 3, 1948, constitutes a novation, and the rights of the parties were covered solely by the new agreement, the original lease being void and of no effect. (.Eckart v. Brown, 34 Cal.App.2d 182, 187 [ 93 P.2d 212 ].) Second: Were defendants entitled to recover damages for (1) the value of trade fixtures left in the premises, or (2) the cost of removing and relocating the fixtures taken awayf This question must also be answered in the negative. (1) Since it is conceded that all the machinery and equipment installed on the premises by defendants were removable fixtures, the f | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Scott
green
2 sentences1967(See People v. Helms, 242 Cal.App.2d 476, 487 [ 51 Cal.Rptr. 484 ]; People v. Sipult, 234 Cal.App.2d 862, 870 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 846 ]; People v. Niles, 227 Cal.App.2d 749, 755 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 11 ]; People v. Collins, 220 Cal.App.2d 563, 579 [ 33 Cal.Rptr. 638 ] [facts recited in earlier opinion, 117 Cal.App.2d at pp. 178-180]; cf. People v. Scott, supra, 247 Cal.App.2d 371 .) Since first degree burglary carries a more severe maximum penalty than assault with a deadly weapon, as between counts 1 and 2 defendant can only be punished under count 2, the burglary charge. 1967(See People v. Helms, 242 Cal.App.2d 476 , 487 [ 51 Cal.Rptr. 484 ] ; People v. Sipult, 234 Cal.App.2d 862 , 870 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 846 ]; People v. Niles, 227 Cal.App.2d 749 , 755 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 11 ]; People v. Collins, 220 Cal.App.2d 563 , 579 [ 33 Cal.Rptr. 638 ] [facts recited in earlier opinion, 117 Cal.App. 2 d at pp. 178-180]; cf. People v. Scott, supra, 247 Cal.App.2d 371 . ) Since first degree burglary carries a more severe maximum penalty than assault with a deadly weapon, as between counts 1 and 2 defendant can only be punished under count 2, the burglary charge. | 2 | 1967–1967 |
Fitzpatrick v. Underwood
green
2 sentences1954Fitzpatrick v. Underwood, 17 Cal.2d 722 [ 112 P.2d 3 ], was an appeal on the judgment roll alone in a case where the court found against plaintiff broker on his claim to a commission. 1954Fitzpatrick v. Underwood, 17 Cal.2d 722 [ 112 P.2d 3 ], was an appeal on the judgment roll alone in a case where the court found against plaintiff broker on his claim to a commission. | 2 | 1954–1954 |
Donald v. Cafe Royale, Inc.
green
1 sentence2006On appeal, the fact of the violation was understood by all parties: “All parties agreed that Cafe Royale’s seating capacity was in violation of the handicap access requirements.” (Donald v. Cafe Royale, supra, 218 Cal.App.3d at p. 174 .) Hence issue was joined as to whether the restaurant’s “good faith” belief that it was “in compliance” {ibid.) was sufficient to deny the patron recovery under section 54.3. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
People v. Brooks
green
2 sentences1996Brooks, therefore, is inapplicable to the present case. [^0 We conclude that, having failed to show good cause why the sufficiency of the affidavit offered in support of the search warrant was not challenged at the initial section 1538.5 hearing, defendant was not entitled, under section 1538.5, to a second pretrial suppression hearing, and that the trial court acted in excess of its jurisdiction in hearing such second motion; moreover, that the facts of defendant’s case do not fall within the exception announced in People v. Brooks, supra, 26 Cal.3d 471 .” (Nelson, supra, 126 Cal.App.3d at p. 1996Brooks , therefore, is inapplicable to the present case. [¶] We conclude that, having failed to show good cause why the sufficiency of the affidavit offered in support of the search warrant was not challenged at the initial section 1538.5 hearing, defendant was not entitled, under section 1538.5, to a second pretrial suppression hearing, and that the trial court acted in excess of its jurisdiction in hearing such second motion; moreover, that the facts of defendant's case do not fall within the exception announced in People v. Brooks, supra, 26 Cal.3d 471 ." ( Nelson, supra, 126 Cal. App.3d at | 1 | 1996–1996 |
People v. Nelson
green
2 sentences1996Brooks, therefore, is inapplicable to the present case. [^0 We conclude that, having failed to show good cause why the sufficiency of the affidavit offered in support of the search warrant was not challenged at the initial section 1538.5 hearing, defendant was not entitled, under section 1538.5, to a second pretrial suppression hearing, and that the trial court acted in excess of its jurisdiction in hearing such second motion; moreover, that the facts of defendant’s case do not fall within the exception announced in People v. Brooks, supra, 26 Cal.3d 471 .” (Nelson, supra, 126 Cal.App.3d at p. 1996Brooks , therefore, is inapplicable to the present case. [¶] We conclude that, having failed to show good cause why the sufficiency of the affidavit offered in support of the search warrant was not challenged at the initial section 1538.5 hearing, defendant was not entitled, under section 1538.5, to a second pretrial suppression hearing, and that the trial court acted in excess of its jurisdiction in hearing such second motion; moreover, that the facts of defendant's case do not fall within the exception announced in People v. Brooks, supra, 26 Cal.3d 471 ." ( Nelson, supra, 126 Cal. App.3d at | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Briggs v. Sterner
green
1 sentence1987The court in Briggs v. Sterner (S.D.Iowa 1981) 529 F.Supp. 1155 discussed this issue in a context remarkably similar to the present one: “Sections 15 and 20(a) mandate a finding of the controlled person’s transaction of a sale of securities in contravention of the applicable securities law as a necessary prerequisite to imputation of liability therefor to the controlling person. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Harold Kemmerer v. Mark L. Weaver
green
1 sentence1987The court explained, “Although Armstrong was not a defendant in these actions, it is clear that Armstrong was a ‘seller’ of the securities within the Section 12 meaning of that term. [Citations.] Hence defendants Edens and Lasher, officers of Armstrong, were implicated as persons controlling Armstrong within the meaning of Section 15.” (Id. at p. 840.) Similarly in Kemmerer v. Weaver (7th Cir. 1971) 445 F.2d 76, 78 , the court rejected defendants’ contention that dismissal of the primary violator, an agricultural cooperative, from the suit due to a failure to obtain service of process did not | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Fein v. Permanente Medical Group
green
2 sentences1985Fein v. Permanente Medical Group (1985) 38 Cal.3d 137 [ 211 Cal.Rptr. 368 , 695 P.2d 665 ] is dispositive of this issue by declaring Civil Code *170 section 3333.2 constitutional with respect to the $250,000 limit on noneconomic damages in health provider cases. 1985Fein v. Permanente Medical Group (1985) 38 Cal.3d 137 [ 211 Cal.Rptr. 368 , 695 P.2d 665 ] is dispositive of this issue by declaring Civil Code *170 section 3333.2 constitutional with respect to the $250,000 limit on noneconomic damages in health provider cases. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Usher v. Soltz
green
2 sentences1982In Usher v. Soltz (1981), 123 Cal.App.3d 692 [ 176 Cal. Rptr. 746 ], the Court of Appeal for the Fourth District held that Code of Civil Procedure section 473 could not be invoked to set aside a judgment based on an arbitration award. 1982In Usher v. Soltz (1981), 123 Cal.App.3d 692 [ 176 Cal. Rptr. 746 ], the Court of Appeal for the Fourth District held that Code of Civil Procedure section 473 could not be invoked to set aside a judgment based on an arbitration award. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Brewer v. Second Baptist Church
green
2 sentences1960(Brewer v. Second Baptist Church, supra, 32 Cal.2d 791, 796-797 .) Hence defendants could legitimately comment upon and criticize Maidman's activities, even though the criticism adversely affected Maidman's reputation. [12] But this defense of fair comment is not absolute. 1960(Brewer v. Second Baptist Church, supra, 32 Cal.2d 791, 796-797 .) Hence defendants could legitimately comment upon and criticize Maidman’s activities, even though the criticism adversely affected Maidman’s reputation. | 1 | 1960–1960 |
People v. Hardy
green
2 sentences1953(People v. Hardy, 33 Cal.2d 52 [ 198 P.2d 865 ] and cases there cited.) Hence defendant’s offered instruction was correct. 1953(People v. Hardy, 33 Cal.2d 52 [ 198 P.2d 865 ] and cases there cited.) Hence defendant’s offered instruction was correct. | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Cunningham v. Cunningham
green
1 sentence1951These cases are Cunningham v. Cunningham, 60 Nev. 191 [ 105 P.2d 398 ], and Bass v. Ring, 210 Minn. 598 [ 299 N.W. 679 ]. | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Bass v. Ring
green
2 sentences1951These cases are Cunningham v. Cunningham, 60 Nev. 191 [ 105 P.2d 398 ], and Bass v. Ring, 210 Minn. 598 [ 299 N.W. 679 ]. 1951These cases are Cunningham v. Cunningham, 60 Nev. 191 [ 105 P.2d 398 ], and Bass v. Ring, 210 Minn. 598 [ 299 N.W. 679 ]. | 1 | 1951–1951 |
People v. Simpson
green
1 sentence1939There is no merit in defendant’s contention that the rule stated in People v. Simpson, 31 Cal. App. (2d) 267 [ 88 Pac. (2d) 175 ], to the effect that it is prejudicially erroneous for the trial court to refuse defendant a reasonable time in which to prepare for trial, is applicable to the facts of the instant case, since at the time the case was called for trial defendant’s counsel stated to the court that he was not basing his motion for a continuance on the ground that he had just been substituted into the case. | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Jordan v. Fay
neutral
2 sentences1900Hence defendants say, under section 164 of the Civil Code, as it stood at that time, the land became community property of said Ann and her presumptive husband; that she was incompetent to convey it, and her deed thereof to Nellie Holt, the immediate grantor of plaintiff, was void; citing Jordan v. Fay, 98 Cal. 264 , 33 Pac. 95 . 1900Hence defendants say, under section 164 of the Civil Code, as it stood at that time, the land became community property of said Ann and her presumptive husband; that she was incompetent to convey it, and her deed thereof to Nellie Holt, the immediate grantor of plaintiff, was void; citing Jordan v. Fay, 98 Cal. 264 , 33 Pac. 95 . | 1 | 1900–1900 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.