19 California opinions name it 2 courts 1976–2025 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Ariasgreen2 sentences2021(See Arias, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 177 [in the service of statutory construction, “we may consider a variety of extrinsic aids, including legislative history, the statute’s purpose, and public policy”].) There, we find strong evidence that the reasonable diligence standard imposed by the trial court in this case contravenes the Legislature’s intent. 2021(See Arias, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 177 [in the service of statutory construction, “we may consider a variety of extrinsic aids, including legislative history, the statute’s purpose, and public policy”].) There, we find strong evidence that the reasonable diligence standard imposed by the trial court in this case contravenes the Legislature’s intent. | 3 | 3 |
People v. MENDOCINO COUNTY ASSESSOR'S PARCEL NO. 056-500-09green2 sentences2025Feb. 10, 1969).) However, it “shall not apply where the address of the person to be served with the document is not known.” (Yamaha Motor Co., at p. 270, fn. 4; see also In re R.L. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 125, 147 (R.L.).) 15 Our courts have added a reasonable diligence requirement, holding that “[t]he Hague Service Convention does not apply where the address of the person to be served is not known and the plaintiff has exercised reasonable diligence to ascertain that person’s whereabouts.” (R.L., supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at pp. 147–148; Buchanan v. Soto (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1366 ; People v. 2012However, treaties are to be read and interpreted in “the light of the conditions and circumstances existing at the time they were entered into, with a view to effecting the objects and purposes of the States thereby contracting.” (Rocca v. Thompson (1912) 223 U.S. 317, 331-332 [ 56 L.Ed. 453 , 32 S.Ct. 207 ], italics added.) “ ‘ “Treaties are construed more liberally than private agreements, and to ascertain their meaning we may look beyond the written words to the history of the treaty, the negotiations, and the practical construction adopted by the parties.” ’ [Citation.]” (Schlunk, supra, 4 | 1 | 2 |
Lebel v. Maigreen1 sentence2025These are likely sources of information, and consequently must be searched before resorting to service by publication.’ ” (Kott v. Superior Court (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1126, 1137 .) “However, the showing of diligence in a given case must rest on its own facts and ‘[n]o single formula nor mode of search can be said to constitute due diligence in every case.’ ” (Id. at pp. 1137–1138; Lebel v. Mai (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1162 [noting there is “[n]o bright-line rule or singular test [for] . . . identifying or quantifying what good faith efforts would amount to a proper showing of reasonable d | 1 | 1 |
San Diego County Health & Human Services Agency v. Cynthia C.green2 sentences2025Feb. 10, 1969).) However, it “shall not apply where the address of the person to be served with the document is not known.” (Yamaha Motor Co., at p. 270, fn. 4; see also In re R.L. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 125, 147 (R.L.).) 15 Our courts have added a reasonable diligence requirement, holding that “[t]he Hague Service Convention does not apply where the address of the person to be served is not known and the plaintiff has exercised reasonable diligence to ascertain that person’s whereabouts.” (R.L., supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at pp. 147–148; Buchanan v. Soto (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1366 ; People v. 2025Feb. 10, 1969).) However, it “shall not apply where the address of the person to be served with the document is not known.” (Yamaha Motor Co., at p. 270, fn. 4; see also In re R.L. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 125, 147 (R.L.).) 15 Our courts have added a reasonable diligence requirement, holding that “[t]he Hague Service Convention does not apply where the address of the person to be served is not known and the plaintiff has exercised reasonable diligence to ascertain that person’s whereabouts.” (R.L., supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at pp. 147–148; Buchanan v. Soto (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1366 ; People v. | 1 | 1 |
Jackson v. County of Los Angelesgreen1 sentence2024DISCUSSION We presume that a trial court order is correct, and the burden is on an appellant “to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment.” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 609 ; Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564 .) “In order to demonstrate error, an appellant must supply the reviewing court with some cogent argument supported by legal analysis and citation to the record.” (City of Santa Maria v. Adam (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 266, 286-287 .) “In an appellate bri | 1 | 1 |
Bruns v. E-Commerce Exchange, Inc.green2 sentences2019Even assuming Elliott is correct that this fact weighs against plaintiffs in the reasonable diligence inquiry, the law is clear that applicability of the section 583.340, subdivision (c) exception “is generally fact specific, depending on the obstacles faced by the plaintiff in prosecuting the action and the plaintiff’s exercise of reasonable diligence in overcoming those obstacles.” (Howard v. Thrifty Drug & Discount Stores (1995) 10 Cal.4th 424, 438 ; accord, Bruns, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 731 [impracticability is determined in light of all relevant circumstances in the particular case tendi 2019Even assuming Elliott is correct that this fact weighs against plaintiffs in the reasonable diligence inquiry, the law is clear that applicability of the section 583.340, subdivision (c) exception “is generally fact specific, depending on the obstacles faced by the plaintiff in prosecuting the action and the plaintiff’s exercise of reasonable diligence in overcoming those obstacles.” (Howard v. Thrifty Drug & Discount Stores (1995) 10 Cal.4th 424, 438 ; accord, Bruns, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 731 [impracticability is determined in light of all relevant circumstances in the particular case tendi | 1 | 1 |
People v. Cogswellgreen1 sentence2014Code of Civil Procedure section 1219, subdivision (b), provides, in relevant part, “Notwithstanding any other law, no court may imprison or otherwise confine or place in custody the victim of a sexual assault . . . for contempt when the contempt consists of refusing to testify concerning that sexual assault . . . .” The California Supreme Court has held the enactment of this provision “reflects the Legislature’s view that sexual assault victims generally should not be jailed for refusing to testify against the assailant.” (People v. Cogswell (2010) 48 Cal.4th 467, 478 (Cogswell).) “We review t | 1 | 1 |
Rocca v. Thompsongreen2 sentences2012However, treaties are to be read and interpreted in “the light of the conditions and circumstances existing at the time they were entered into, with a view to effecting the objects and purposes of the States thereby contracting.” (Rocca v. Thompson (1912) 223 U.S. 317, 331-332 [ 56 L.Ed. 453 , 32 S.Ct. 207 ], italics added.) “ ‘ “Treaties are construed more liberally than private agreements, and to ascertain their meaning we may look beyond the written words to the history of the treaty, the negotiations, and the practical construction adopted by the parties.” ’ [Citation.]” (Schlunk, supra, 4 2012However, treaties are to be read and interpreted in “the light of the conditions and circumstances existing at the time they were entered into, with a view to effecting the objects and purposes of the States thereby contracting.” (Rocca v. Thompson (1912) 223 U.S. 317, 331-332 [ 56 L.Ed. 453 , 32 S.Ct. 207 ], italics added.) “ ‘ “Treaties are construed more liberally than private agreements, and to ascertain their meaning we may look beyond the written words to the history of the treaty, the negotiations, and the practical construction adopted by the parties.” ’ [Citation.]” (Schlunk, supra, 4 | 1 | 1 |
Trailmobile, Inc. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2000(Trailmobile, Inc. v. Superior Court (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 1451, 1455-1456 [ 259 Cal.Rptr. 100 ].) The determinative issue is whether the reasonable diligence requirement is satisfied where the claimant and his counsel knew the roadway *1294 was flooded at the time of the accident due to work being performed by the DWP and failed to act on that knowledge within the statutory time limit. 3 3. 2000(Trailmobile, Inc. v. Superior Court (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 1451, 1455-1456 [ 259 Cal.Rptr. 100 ].) The determinative issue is whether the reasonable diligence requirement is satisfied where the claimant and his counsel knew the roadway *1294 was flooded at the time of the accident due to work being performed by the DWP and failed to act on that knowledge within the statutory time limit. 3 3. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Padfieldgreen2 sentences1997(People v. Padfleld (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 218, 226 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 903 ].) In such a case, the trial court may then decide the issue. 1997(People v. Padfleld (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 218, 226 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 903 ].) In such a case, the trial court may then decide the issue. | 1 | 1 |
Serrano v. FMC Corp.green2 sentences1990(See, e.g., Serrano v. FMC Corp. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1027, 1031 [ 271 Cal.Rptr. 41 ]; Baccus v. Superior Court (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1526, 1536 [ 255 Cal.Rptr. 781 ]; Santa Monica Hospital Medical Center v. Superior Court (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 1026, 1033 [ 250 Cal.Rptr. 384 ]; Berry v. Weitzman (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 351, 355-357 [ 249 Cal.Rptr. 816 ].) First, however, we briefly trace developments in the reasonable diligence rule. 1990(See, e.g., Serrano v. FMC Corp. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1027, 1031 [ 271 Cal.Rptr. 41 ]; Baccus v. Superior Court (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1526, 1536 [ 255 Cal.Rptr. 781 ]; Santa Monica Hospital Medical Center v. Superior Court (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 1026, 1033 [ 250 Cal.Rptr. 384 ]; Berry v. Weitzman (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 351, 355-357 [ 249 Cal.Rptr. 816 ].) First, however, we briefly trace developments in the reasonable diligence rule. | 1 | 1 |
Berry v. Weitzmangreen2 sentences1990(See, e.g., Serrano v. FMC Corp. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1027, 1031 [ 271 Cal.Rptr. 41 ]; Baccus v. Superior Court (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1526, 1536 [ 255 Cal.Rptr. 781 ]; Santa Monica Hospital Medical Center v. Superior Court (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 1026, 1033 [ 250 Cal.Rptr. 384 ]; Berry v. Weitzman (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 351, 355-357 [ 249 Cal.Rptr. 816 ].) First, however, we briefly trace developments in the reasonable diligence rule. 1990(See, e.g., Serrano v. FMC Corp. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1027, 1031 [ 271 Cal.Rptr. 41 ]; Baccus v. Superior Court (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1526, 1536 [ 255 Cal.Rptr. 781 ]; Santa Monica Hospital Medical Center v. Superior Court (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 1026, 1033 [ 250 Cal.Rptr. 384 ]; Berry v. Weitzman (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 351, 355-357 [ 249 Cal.Rptr. 816 ].) First, however, we briefly trace developments in the reasonable diligence rule. | 1 | 1 |
Santa Monica Hospital Medical Center v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1990(See, e.g., Serrano v. FMC Corp. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1027, 1031 [ 271 Cal.Rptr. 41 ]; Baccus v. Superior Court (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1526, 1536 [ 255 Cal.Rptr. 781 ]; Santa Monica Hospital Medical Center v. Superior Court (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 1026, 1033 [ 250 Cal.Rptr. 384 ]; Berry v. Weitzman (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 351, 355-357 [ 249 Cal.Rptr. 816 ].) First, however, we briefly trace developments in the reasonable diligence rule. 1990(See, e.g., Serrano v. FMC Corp. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1027, 1031 [ 271 Cal.Rptr. 41 ]; Baccus v. Superior Court (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1526, 1536 [ 255 Cal.Rptr. 781 ]; Santa Monica Hospital Medical Center v. Superior Court (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 1026, 1033 [ 250 Cal.Rptr. 384 ]; Berry v. Weitzman (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 351, 355-357 [ 249 Cal.Rptr. 816 ].) First, however, we briefly trace developments in the reasonable diligence rule. | 1 | 1 |
Baccus v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1990(See, e.g., Serrano v. FMC Corp. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1027, 1031 [ 271 Cal.Rptr. 41 ]; Baccus v. Superior Court (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1526, 1536 [ 255 Cal.Rptr. 781 ]; Santa Monica Hospital Medical Center v. Superior Court (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 1026, 1033 [ 250 Cal.Rptr. 384 ]; Berry v. Weitzman (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 351, 355-357 [ 249 Cal.Rptr. 816 ].) First, however, we briefly trace developments in the reasonable diligence rule. 1990(See, e.g., Serrano v. FMC Corp. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1027, 1031 [ 271 Cal.Rptr. 41 ]; Baccus v. Superior Court (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1526, 1536 [ 255 Cal.Rptr. 781 ]; Santa Monica Hospital Medical Center v. Superior Court (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 1026, 1033 [ 250 Cal.Rptr. 384 ]; Berry v. Weitzman (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 351, 355-357 [ 249 Cal.Rptr. 816 ].) First, however, we briefly trace developments in the reasonable diligence rule. | 1 | 1 |
| Barrows v. American Motors Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Dujardin v. Ventura County Gen. Hosp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Johnson v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Kott v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2025These are likely sources of information, and consequently must be searched before resorting to service by publication.’ ” (Kott v. Superior Court (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1126, 1137 .) “However, the showing of diligence in a given case must rest on its own facts and ‘[n]o single formula nor mode of search can be said to constitute due diligence in every case.’ ” (Id. at pp. 1137–1138; Lebel v. Mai (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1162 [noting there is “[n]o bright-line rule or singular test [for] . . . identifying or quantifying what good faith efforts would amount to a proper showing of reasonable d | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Buchanan v. Soto
green
1 sentence2025Feb. 10, 1969).) However, it “shall not apply where the address of the person to be served with the document is not known.” (Yamaha Motor Co., at p. 270, fn. 4; see also In re R.L. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 125, 147 (R.L.).) 15 Our courts have added a reasonable diligence requirement, holding that “[t]he Hague Service Convention does not apply where the address of the person to be served is not known and the plaintiff has exercised reasonable diligence to ascertain that person’s whereabouts.” (R.L., supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at pp. 147–148; Buchanan v. Soto (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1366 ; People v. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Jameson v. Desta
green
1 sentence2024DISCUSSION We presume that a trial court order is correct, and the burden is on an appellant “to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment.” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 609 ; Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564 .) “In order to demonstrate error, an appellant must supply the reviewing court with some cogent argument supported by legal analysis and citation to the record.” (City of Santa Maria v. Adam (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 266, 286-287 .) “In an appellate bri | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Denham v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2024DISCUSSION We presume that a trial court order is correct, and the burden is on an appellant “to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment.” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 609 ; Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564 .) “In order to demonstrate error, an appellant must supply the reviewing court with some cogent argument supported by legal analysis and citation to the record.” (City of Santa Maria v. Adam (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 266, 286-287 .) “In an appellate bri | 1 | 2024–2024 |
General Motors Corp. v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2024If a reasonable diligence standard governed section 474, plaintiffs would be incentivized to routinely name any and all persons who might conceivably have some connection with the suit at the outset.” (Ibid.) 13 “Ignorance of the facts giving rise to a cause of action is the ‘ignorance’ required by section 474, and the pivotal question is, ‘“did plaintiff know facts?” not “did plaintiff know or believe that [he] had a cause of action based on those facts?”’” (General Motors Corp. v. Superior Court (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 580, 594 .) “[T]he plaintiff does not relinquish her rights under section 4 | 1 | 2024–2024 |
City of Santa Maria v. Adam
green
1 sentence2024DISCUSSION We presume that a trial court order is correct, and the burden is on an appellant “to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment.” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 609 ; Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564 .) “In order to demonstrate error, an appellant must supply the reviewing court with some cogent argument supported by legal analysis and citation to the record.” (City of Santa Maria v. Adam (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 266, 286-287 .) “In an appellate bri | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Fuller v. Tucker
green
1 sentence2023(See ibid. [“the plaintiff does not relinquish her rights under section 474 simply because she has a suspicion of wrongdoing arising from one or more facts she does know”].) Hahn observed, “If a reasonable diligence standard governed section 474, plaintiffs would be incentivized to routinely name any and all persons who might conceivably have some connection with the suit at the outset.” (Hahn, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 900.) A rule requiring a plaintiff to substitute a named defendant for a Doe defendant upon learning of the possibility of liability would create a similar problematic incent | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Munoz v. Purdy
green
1 sentence2022(Munoz v. Purdy (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 942, 947-948 .) The trial court appears to have relied on a passing statement in this division’s McClatchy opinion: “ ‘The question is whether [the plaintiff] knew or reasonably should have known that [she] had a cause of action against [the defendant].’ ” (McClatchy, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 372 .) But McClatchy does not endorse a duty to investigate reasonably available facts. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
McClatchy v. Coblentz, Patch, Duffy & Bass, LLP
green
1 sentence2022(Munoz v. Purdy (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 942, 947-948 .) The trial court appears to have relied on a passing statement in this division’s McClatchy opinion: “ ‘The question is whether [the plaintiff] knew or reasonably should have known that [she] had a cause of action against [the defendant].’ ” (McClatchy, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 372 .) But McClatchy does not endorse a duty to investigate reasonably available facts. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Howard v. Thrifty Drug & Discount Stores
green
1 sentence2019Even assuming Elliott is correct that this fact weighs against plaintiffs in the reasonable diligence inquiry, the law is clear that applicability of the section 583.340, subdivision (c) exception “is generally fact specific, depending on the obstacles faced by the plaintiff in prosecuting the action and the plaintiff’s exercise of reasonable diligence in overcoming those obstacles.” (Howard v. Thrifty Drug & Discount Stores (1995) 10 Cal.4th 424, 438 ; accord, Bruns, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 731 [impracticability is determined in light of all relevant circumstances in the particular case tendi | 1 | 2019–2019 |
People v. Herrera
green
1 sentence2014Code of Civil Procedure section 1219, subdivision (b), provides, in relevant part, “Notwithstanding any other law, no court may imprison or otherwise confine or place in custody the victim of a sexual assault . . . for contempt when the contempt consists of refusing to testify concerning that sexual assault . . . .” The California Supreme Court has held the enactment of this provision “reflects the Legislature’s view that sexual assault victims generally should not be jailed for refusing to testify against the assailant.” (People v. Cogswell (2010) 48 Cal.4th 467, 478 (Cogswell).) “We review t | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Martinez
green
1 sentence2014Loyal to that higher purpose, some California cases suggest that the standard of diligence may be relaxed when the newly discovered evidence would probably lead to a different result on retrial. [Citations.]” (Martinez, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 825 , fn. omitted.) The court concluded the defendant had presented newly discovered evidence that would probably lead to a different result at retrial, and, therefore, “[r]eliance upon counsel’s lack of diligence to bar defendant from presenting that evidence to a trier of fact would work a manifest miscarriage of justice.” (Id. at p. 826.) Martinez crea | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Soojian
green
2 sentences2014(See Soojian, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at 13 p. 516.) In People v. Dyer (1988) 45 Cal.3d 26 (Dyer), the California Supreme Court clarified its holding in Martinez and “distanced itself” from that opinion. ( Soojian, supra, at p. 516 .) After discussing the facts and holding of Martinez, the Dyer court stated: “At no time, however, did we indicate [in Martinez] that a defendant is entitled to a new trial whenever evidence that was not presented at a previous trial is sought to be offered on retrial. 2014(See Soojian, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at 13 p. 516.) In People v. Dyer (1988) 45 Cal.3d 26 (Dyer), the California Supreme Court clarified its holding in Martinez and “distanced itself” from that opinion. ( Soojian, supra, at p. 516 .) After discussing the facts and holding of Martinez, the Dyer court stated: “At no time, however, did we indicate [in Martinez] that a defendant is entitled to a new trial whenever evidence that was not presented at a previous trial is sought to be offered on retrial. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Dyer
green
1 sentence2014(See Soojian, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at 13 p. 516.) In People v. Dyer (1988) 45 Cal.3d 26 (Dyer), the California Supreme Court clarified its holding in Martinez and “distanced itself” from that opinion. ( Soojian, supra, at p. 516 .) After discussing the facts and holding of Martinez, the Dyer court stated: “At no time, however, did we indicate [in Martinez] that a defendant is entitled to a new trial whenever evidence that was not presented at a previous trial is sought to be offered on retrial. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk
green
2 sentences2012However, treaties are to be read and interpreted in “the light of the conditions and circumstances existing at the time they were entered into, with a view to effecting the objects and purposes of the States thereby contracting.” (Rocca v. Thompson (1912) 223 U.S. 317, 331-332 [ 56 L.Ed. 453 , 32 S.Ct. 207 ], italics added.) “ ‘ “Treaties are construed more liberally than private agreements, and to ascertain their meaning we may look beyond the written words to the history of the treaty, the negotiations, and the practical construction adopted by the parties.” ’ [Citation.]” (Schlunk, supra, 4 2012However, treaties are to be read and interpreted in “the light of the conditions and circumstances existing at the time they were entered into, with a view to effecting the objects and purposes of the States thereby contracting.” (Rocca v. Thompson (1912) 223 U.S. 317, 331-332 [ 56 L.Ed. 453 , 32 S.Ct. 207 ], italics added.) “ ‘ “Treaties are construed more liberally than private agreements, and to ascertain their meaning we may look beyond the written words to the history of the treaty, the negotiations, and the practical construction adopted by the parties.” ’ [Citation.]” (Schlunk, supra, 4 | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Moran v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence1990(Moran v. Superior Court, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 240 ; see also fn. 3, ante.) After Moran , however, in an apparent zeal to apply the new tolling rule, several courts ignored or relegated the reasonable diligence standard to a less prominent position. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Hocharian v. Superior Court green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Lockhart-Mummery v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Davenport v. Vido Artukovich & Son, Inc. green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| People v. Swinney green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| People v. Doctor green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| People v. Crosby green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.