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25 Pennsylvania opinions name it 4 courts 1995–2026 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Nicolaou, N., h/w, Aplts. v. J. Martin M.D.green2 sentences2026Under the reasonable diligence standard, “a plaintiff’s actions are examined to determine whether the plaintiff demonstrated those qualities of attention, knowledge, intelligence[,] and judgment which society requires of its members for the protection of their own interest and the interest of others.” Nicolaou v. Martin, 195 A.3d 880, 893 (Pa. 2018). 2022See id. at 895 (“We reach this conclusion keeping in mind that the appropriate formulation of discovery rule jurisprudence applies a reasonable diligence requirement, as opposed to an all-vigilance one.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). - 17 - J-A16037-22 Order reversed. | 6 | 8 |
E.J.M. v. Archdiocese of Philadelphiagreen2 sentences2020The reasonable diligence standard “is not a standard of reasonable diligence unique to a particular plaintiff, but instead a standard of reasonable diligence as applied to a ‘reasonable person.’” Id. “[T]he point at which the complaining party should reasonably be aware that he has suffered an injury is generally an issue of fact to be determined by the jury; only where the facts are so clear that reasonable minds cannot differ may the commencement of the limitations period be determined as a matter of law.” E.J.M. v. Archdiocese of Phila., 622 A.2d 1388, 1391 (Pa. Super. 1993) (citation omitt 2020The reasonable diligence standard “is not a standard of reasonable diligence unique to a particular plaintiff, but instead a standard of reasonable diligence as applied to a ‘reasonable person.’” Id. “[T]he point at which the complaining party should reasonably be aware that he has suffered an injury is generally an issue of fact to be determined by the jury; only where the facts are so clear that reasonable minds cannot differ may the commencement of the limitations period be determined as a matter of law.” E.J.M. v. Archdiocese of Phila., 622 A.2d 1388, 1391 (Pa. Super. 1993) (citation omitt | 5 | 5 |
Fine v. Checciogreen2 sentences2018Under this reasonable diligence standard, a plaintiff's actions are examined to determine whether the plaintiff demonstrated "those qualities of attention, knowledge, intelligence and judgment which society requires of its members for the protection of their own interest and the interest of others." Fine , 870 A.2d at 858 . 2014In Wilson v. El-Daief, 964 A.2d 354 (Pa. 2009), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that “[m]ost cases apply a reasonable- diligence requirement, as opposed to an all-vigilance one, see, e.g., Fine, [ ] 870 A.2d at 858 , and reasonable diligence as described in Fine is the appropriate formulation.” Id. at 363. | 2 | 7 |
Burnside v. Abbott Laboratoriesgreen2 sentences2000In Cochran v. GAF Corp., 542 Pa. 210, 217 , 666 A.2d 245, 249 (1995), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained that “[ujnder [the reasonable diligence standard] the plaintiff’s actions must be evaluated to determine whether he exhibited those qualities of attention, knowledge, intelligence and judgement which society requires its members for the protection of their own interests.” (emphasis added) The court explained further that the standard is “sufficiently flexible... to take into account differences between persons and their capacity to meet certain situations and the circumstances confron 2000In Cochran v. GAF Corp., 542 Pa. 210, 217 , 666 A.2d 245, 249 (1995), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained that “[ujnder [the reasonable diligence standard] the plaintiff’s actions must be evaluated to determine whether he exhibited those qualities of attention, knowledge, intelligence and judgement which society requires its members for the protection of their own interests.” (emphasis added) The court explained further that the standard is “sufficiently flexible... to take into account differences between persons and their capacity to meet certain situations and the circumstances confron | 2 | 6 |
Wilson v. El-Daiefgreen2 sentences2025Although the reasonable diligence standard is an objective one, “it is to be applied with reference to individual characteristics.” Wilson v. El-Daief, 600 Pa. 161 , 964 A.2d 354, 365 (2009) (citation omitted). 2025Although the reasonable diligence standard is an objective one, “it is to be applied with reference to individual characteristics.” Wilson v. El-Daief, 600 Pa. 161 , 964 A.2d 354, 365 (2009) (citation omitted). | 2 | 4 |
O'Kelly v. Dawsongreen2 sentences2020The reasonable diligence standard “is not a standard of reasonable diligence unique to a particular plaintiff, but instead a standard of reasonable diligence as applied to a ‘reasonable person.’” Id. “[T]he point at which the complaining party should reasonably be aware that he has suffered an injury is generally an issue of fact to be determined by the jury; only where the facts are so clear that reasonable minds cannot differ may the commencement of the limitations period be determined as a matter of law.” E.J.M. v. Archdiocese of Phila., 622 A.2d 1388, 1391 (Pa. Super. 1993) (citation omitt 2020The reasonable diligence standard “is not a standard of reasonable diligence unique to a particular plaintiff, but instead a standard of reasonable diligence as applied to a ‘reasonable person.’” Id. “[T]he point at which the complaining party should reasonably be aware that he has suffered an injury is generally an issue of fact to be determined by the jury; only where the facts are so clear that reasonable minds cannot differ may the commencement of the limitations period be determined as a matter of law.” E.J.M. v. Archdiocese of Phila., 622 A.2d 1388, 1391 (Pa. Super. 1993) (citation omitt | 2 | 2 |
Banks v. Dretkegreen1 sentence2026As the High Court has stated, “A rule thus declaring ‘prosecutor may hide, defendant must seek,’ is not tenable in a system constitutionally bound to accord defendants due process.” Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 696 (2004). [J-31-2025] [MO: Wecht, J.] - 16 Thus, I do not join the Majority’s recitation of the Brady standard insofar as it imposes a fourth prong, a reasonable diligence requirement, to establish a Brady violation, nor its finding that the Commonwealth had no duty to disclose the corrections file related to its key witness in this case. | 1 | 1 |
Borough of Mifflinburg v. Heimgreen1 sentence2025Critically, a plaintiff’s “failure to make inquiry when information is available is failure to exercise reasonable diligence, as a matter of law.” Borough of Mifflinburg v. Heim, 705 A.2d 456, 467 (Pa. Super. 1997), appeal denied, 794 A.2d 359 (Pa. 1999) (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Commc'ns Network Int'l, Ltd. v. Mullineauxgreen1 sentence2023Although Pennsylvania favors the strict application of a statute of limitations, see Communications Network Int’l, 187 A.3d 951, 961 (Pa. Super. 2018), the discovery rule jurisprudence applies a reasonable-diligence requirement as opposed to an all-vigilance one. | 1 | 1 |
Cochran v. GAF Corp.green2 sentences2000In Cochran v. GAF Corp., 542 Pa. 210, 217 , 666 A.2d 245, 249 (1995), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained that “[ujnder [the reasonable diligence standard] the plaintiff’s actions must be evaluated to determine whether he exhibited those qualities of attention, knowledge, intelligence and judgement which society requires its members for the protection of their own interests.” (emphasis added) The court explained further that the standard is “sufficiently flexible... to take into account differences between persons and their capacity to meet certain situations and the circumstances confron 2000In Cochran v. GAF Corp., 542 Pa. 210, 217 , 666 A.2d 245, 249 (1995), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained that “[ujnder [the reasonable diligence standard] the plaintiff’s actions must be evaluated to determine whether he exhibited those qualities of attention, knowledge, intelligence and judgement which society requires its members for the protection of their own interests.” (emphasis added) The court explained further that the standard is “sufficiently flexible... to take into account differences between persons and their capacity to meet certain situations and the circumstances confron | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Dalrymple v. Brown
green
2 sentences2020The reasonable diligence standard “is not a standard of reasonable diligence unique to a particular plaintiff, but instead a standard of reasonable diligence as applied to a ‘reasonable person.’” Id. “[T]he point at which the complaining party should reasonably be aware that he has suffered an injury is generally an issue of fact to be determined by the jury; only where the facts are so clear that reasonable minds cannot differ may the commencement of the limitations period be determined as a matter of law.” E.J.M. v. Archdiocese of Phila., 622 A.2d 1388, 1391 (Pa. Super. 1993) (citation omitt 2020The reasonable diligence standard “is not a standard of reasonable diligence unique to a particular plaintiff, but instead a standard of reasonable diligence as applied to a ‘reasonable person.’” Id. “[T]he point at which the complaining party should reasonably be aware that he has suffered an injury is generally an issue of fact to be determined by the jury; only where the facts are so clear that reasonable minds cannot differ may the commencement of the limitations period be determined as a matter of law.” E.J.M. v. Archdiocese of Phila., 622 A.2d 1388, 1391 (Pa. Super. 1993) (citation omitt | 5 | 2015–2020 |
Petri v. Smith
green
2 sentences1995Despite the objective nature of the reasonable diligence standard, “[i]t is sufficiently flexible, however, to take into account difference[s] between persons and their capacity to meet certain situations and the circumstances confronting them at the time in question.” Burnside, 351 Pa.Super. at 292 , 505 A.2d at 988 (quoting Petri, 307 Pa.Super. at 271-72 , 453 A.2d at 347 ). 1995Despite the objective nature of the reasonable diligence standard, “[i]t is sufficiently flexible, however, to take into account difference[s] between persons and their capacity to meet certain situations and the circumstances confronting them at the time in question.” Burnside, 351 Pa.Super. at 292 , 505 A.2d at 988 (quoting Petri, 307 Pa.Super. at 271-72 , 453 A.2d at 347 ). | 4 | 1995–1995 |
Gleason v. Borough of Moosic
green
2 sentences2019See also Nicolaou v. Martin, ___ Pa. ___, 195 A.3d 880 (2018) (holding when appellant reasonably knew or should have known of appellees’ misdiagnosis of multiple sclerosis was question for fact-finder, where appellees told appellant over seven years that she had four negative tests for Lyme disease; appellant was later able independently to confirm Lyme disease diagnosis); Gleason v. Borough of Moosic, 609 Pa. 353 , 15 A.3d 479 (2011) (holding when appellants reasonably knew or should have known they had suffered injury from toxic mold was question for fact-finder, where basement flooding occu 2019See also Nicolaou v. Martin, ___ Pa. ___, 195 A.3d 880 (2018) (holding when appellant reasonably knew or should have known of appellees’ misdiagnosis of multiple sclerosis was question for fact-finder, where appellees told appellant over seven years that she had four negative tests for Lyme disease; appellant was later able independently to confirm Lyme disease diagnosis); Gleason v. Borough of Moosic, 609 Pa. 353 , 15 A.3d 479 (2011) (holding when appellants reasonably knew or should have known they had suffered injury from toxic mold was question for fact-finder, where basement flooding occu | 2 | 2018–2019 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.