cooperation clause in Florida

2011In Bankers Insurance Co. v. Macias, 475 So.2d 1216, 1217 (Fla.1985), the court stated, "The cooperation requirement ... arises to prevent fraud and collusion in proceedings to determine liability once notice has been given." Id. at 1217 ; 16 Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 49:106 (4th ed. 2000) ("A standard clause in casualty insurance policies provides that the insured's right to indemnification depends on the insured cooperating with the insurer in defending claims.

2011In Bankers Insurance Co. v. Macias, 475 So.2d 1216, 1217 (Fla.1985), the court stated, "The cooperation requirement ... arises to prevent fraud and collusion in proceedings to determine liability once notice has been given." Id. at 1217 ; 16 Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 49:106 (4th ed. 2000) ("A standard clause in casualty insurance policies provides that the insured's right to indemnification depends on the insured cooperating with the insurer in defending claims.

1984Ramos v. Northwestern Mutual Insurance Co., 336 So.2d 71 (Fla.1976); Donnell v. Industrial Fire & Casualty Insurance Co., 439 So.2d 974 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Travelers Insurance Co. v. Jones, 422 So.2d 1000 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), rev. denied, 431 So.2d 990 (Fla.1983); United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Perez, 384 So.2d 904 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 392 So.2d 1381 (Fla.1980).

1983Ramos v. Northwestern Mutual Insurance Co., 336 So.2d 71 (Fla.1976); Travelers Insurance Co. v. Jones, 422 So.2d 1000 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), rev. denied, 431 So.2d 990 (Fla.1983); United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Perez, 384 So.2d 904 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 392 So.2d 1381 (Fla.1980).

2015Co. v. Collura, 163 So.2d 784, 788 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964) ("In considering the question of breach of a cooperation clause in an insurance poli *14 cy, it must always be borne in mind that in order for the company to avoid liability by reason of the insured's breach, the company must show that it has exercised diligence and good faith in bringing about the cooperation of the insured, and that it has in good faith complied with the terms and conditions of the policy.

1968NOTES [1] See American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Collura, Fla.App. 1964, 163 So.2d 784 , in which the court points out the different treatment accorded a written notice requirement, vis-a-vis a cooperation clause.

2011In Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. U.S. Aviation Underwriters, Inc., 716 So.2d 340, 343 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998), the court explained, “The cooperation requirement applies in Florida only when the insured and the insurer are in a fiduciary relationship; the insurer has the duty to operate in good faith, and the insured ‘has the reciprocal obligation to allow the insurer to control the defense and to cooperate with the insurer.’ ” Id. at 343 (quoting Doe, 653 So.2d at 374 ).

2011In Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. U.S. Aviation Underwriters, Inc., 716 So.2d 340, 343 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998), the court explained, "The cooperation requirement applies in Florida only when the insured and the insurer are in a fiduciary relationship; the insurer has the duty to operate in good faith, and the insured `has the reciprocal obligation to allow the insurer to control the defense and to cooperate with the insurer.'" Id. at 343 (quoting Doe, 653 So.2d at 374 ).

1966In this *61 regard plaintiff cites the case of Glens Falls Indemnity Co. v. Lingle, Fla.App. 1961, 133 So.2d 78 wherein the second district held as a matter of law that the insurer should have been granted a summary judgment.

1964We began our discussion of the authorities with the statement that the insurer is held to be justified in denying coverage "* * * in cases where there is no question of the facts, and the facts themselves plainly show that the statement first given by an insured is material, and his later repudiation of that statement shows that he expects to gain an advantage by such repudiation * * *." 133 So.2d at 80.

2018See Schnagel, 843 So. 2d at 1038 (holding that where the insured provided some, but not all, of the insurer requested documents pursuant to the policy’s cooperation clause, the issue of whether the insured materially breached the policy was one for the jury to resolve).

2012Co., 613 So.2d 101 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993); Goldman, 660 So.2d at 304 (holding policy provision requiring an insured to submit to an examination under oath is a condition precedent to suit rather than a cooperation clause).

2011In Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. U.S. Aviation Underwriters, Inc., 716 So.2d 340, 343 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998), the court explained, "The cooperation requirement applies in Florida only when the insured and the insurer are in a fiduciary relationship; the insurer has the duty to operate in good faith, and the insured `has the reciprocal obligation to allow the insurer to control the defense and to cooperate with the insurer.'" Id. at 343 (quoting Doe, 653 So.2d at 374 ).

2011In Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. U.S. Aviation Underwriters, Inc., 716 So.2d 340, 343 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998), the court explained, "The cooperation requirement applies in Florida only when the insured and the insurer are in a fiduciary relationship; the insurer has the duty to operate in good faith, and the insured `has the reciprocal obligation to allow the insurer to control the defense and to cooperate with the insurer.'" Id. at 343 (quoting Doe, 653 So.2d at 374 ).

2011See Crosby Forrest Prods., Inc. v. Byers, 623 So.2d 565, 567 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993) (penalty provision in contract unenforceable).

2011In Warrilow v. Superior Court of Arizona, 142 Ariz. 250 , 689 P.2d 193 (1984), the court held that an examination under oath clause is "a standard provision usually found in insurance contracts of this nature, and the law is well settled that a failure or refusal of the insured to comply with his obligation of cooperation under such a provision will constitute a bar to any recovery against the insurance company." Id. at 196.

2011In Warrilow v. Superior Court of Arizona, 142 Ariz. 250 , 689 P.2d 193 (1984), the court held that an examination under oath clause is "a standard provision usually found in insurance contracts of this nature, and the law is well settled that a failure or refusal of the insured to comply with his obligation of cooperation under such a provision will constitute a bar to any recovery against the insurance company." Id. at 196.

2011Similarly, in Weissberg v. Royal Insurance Co., 240 A.D.2d 733 , 659 N.Y.S.2d 505 , (N.Y.App.Div.1997), the court explained that the purpose of a cooperation clause is to enable the insurer to properly investigate the claim in order to protect itself from false and fraudulent claims and that "the insureds' willful failure to provide material and relevant documents, or to submit to an examination under oath, is a material breach of the policy which bars recovery under the policy." Id. at 507.

2011Similarly, in Weissberg v. Royal Insurance Co., 240 A.D.2d 733 , 659 N.Y.S.2d 505 , (N.Y.App.Div.1997), the court explained that the purpose of a cooperation clause is to enable the insurer to properly investigate the claim in order to protect itself from false and fraudulent claims and that "the insureds' willful failure to provide material and relevant documents, or to submit to an examination under oath, is a material breach of the policy which bars recovery under the policy." Id. at 507.

2010Co. v. Danville Const. Co., 463 S.W.2d 125, 128-130 (Ky.1971) (concluding that factual material submitted to the trial court of the insured's failure or refusal to attend a trial or appear as a witness was not sufficient to support a conclusion that there was a substantial violation of the cooperation clause by the insured, and observing that various factors of materiality, diligence on the insurer's part, or the exeusability of the absence from the insured's point of view, have rarely been regarded as individually controlling and typically present a question of fact for the jury); see also Ro

2010Co. v. Danville Const. Co., 463 S.W.2d 125, 128-130 (Ky.1971) (concluding that factual material submitted to the trial court of the insured's failure or refusal to attend a trial or appear as a witness was not sufficient to support a conclusion that there was a substantial violation of the cooperation clause by the insured, and observing that various factors of materiality, diligence on the insurer's part, or the exeusability of the absence from the insured's point of view, have rarely been regarded as individually controlling and typically present a question of fact for the jury); see also Ro

2010Co. v. Danville Const. Co., 463 S.W.2d 125, 128-130 (Ky.1971) (concluding that factual material submitted to the trial court of the insured's failure or refusal to attend a trial or appear as a witness was not sufficient to support a conclusion that there was a substantial violation of the cooperation clause by the insured, and observing that various factors of materiality, diligence on the insurer's part, or the exeusability of the absence from the insured's point of view, have rarely been regarded as individually controlling and typically present a question of fact for the jury); see also Ro