cooperation clause (North Carolina) · Go Syfert
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cooperation clause in North Carolina

7 North Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 1961–2012 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by North Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (2)

CaseFollowedCited
Henderson v. Rochester American Insurance Co.green
nc · 1961 · cited in 3 North Carolina opinions naming this issue, 1964–2005
2 sentences

1966This Court has held binding and enforceable provisions requiring that an insured give notice of an accident, Muncie v. Insurance Co., supra, and Woodruff v. Insurance Co., supra, and requiring the insured’s cooperation in defense of any action against him, Henderson v. Insurance Co., 254 N.C. 329 , 118 S.E. 2d 885 .

1966This Court has held binding and enforceable provisions requiring that an insured give notice of an accident, Muncie v. Insurance Co., supra, and Woodruff v. Insurance Co., supra, and requiring the insured’s cooperation in defense of any action against him, Henderson v. Insurance Co., 254 N.C. 329 , 118 S.E. 2d 885 .

13
Continental Casualty Company v. William S. Burton, Audrey H. Buckner, Mary R. Thweattgreen
ca4 · 1986 · cited in 1 North Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2012–2012
2 sentences

2012Interpreting Virginia law, the court explained that, "to establish that the insured has breached a cooperation clause by being unavailable, the insurer must prove that the insured willfully breached the clause in a material or essential particular and that the insurer made a reasonable effort to secure the insured's cooperation." 795 F.2d 1187, 1193-94 (4th Cir.1986).

2012Interpreting Virginia law, the court explained that, “to establish that the insured has breached a cooperation clause by being unavailable, the insurer must prove that the insured willfully breached the clause in a material or essential particular and that the insurer made a reasonable effort to secure the insured’s cooperation.” 795 F.2d 1187, 1193-94 (4th Cir. 1986).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (7)

CaseCitedYears
Lockwood v. Porter green
ncctapp · 1990
2 sentences

2012The action was dismissed by motion of summary judgment, and we affirmed on appeal, explaining that the insured's "unjustified refusal to be so examined violated the cooperation clause of the policy and bar[red] his action as a matter of law." Id. at 411 , 390 S.E.2d at 743-44 .

2012The action was dismissed by motion of summary judgment, and we affirmed on appeal, explaining that the insured's "unjustified refusal to be so examined violated the cooperation clause of the policy and bar[red] his action as a matter of law." Id. at 411 , 390 S.E.2d at 743-44 .

12012–2012
Orozco v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. green
flsd · 1972
1 sentence

1990Orozco v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co., 360 F.Supp. 223 (S.D.

11990–1990
McDowell v. J. S. Kent Co. neutral
nc · 1910
2 sentences

1966As Chief Justice Clark said in McDowell v. Kent, 153 N.C. 555, 558 , 69 S.E. 626, 627 , and as Stacy, C.J., repeated in Greene v. Dishman, 202 N.C. 811, 812 , 164 S.E. 342 , 343: “What the Court desires, and indeed the least that any appellate court requires, is that the exceptions which are bona *270 fide be presented to the Court for a decision, as the points determinative of the appeal, shall be stated clearly and intelligibly by the assignment of errors and not by referring to the record, and therewith shall be set out so much of the evidence or of the charge or other matter or circumstanc

1966As Chief Justice Clark said in McDowell v. Kent, 153 N.C. 555, 558 , 69 S.E. 626, 627 , and as Stacy, C.J., repeated in Greene v. Dishman, 202 N.C. 811, 812 , 164 S.E. 342 , 343: “What the Court desires, and indeed the least that any appellate court requires, is that the exceptions which are bona *270 fide be presented to the Court for a decision, as the points determinative of the appeal, shall be stated clearly and intelligibly by the assignment of errors and not by referring to the record, and therewith shall be set out so much of the evidence or of the charge or other matter or circumstanc

11966–1966
Greene v. . Dishman neutral
nc · 1932
2 sentences

1966As Chief Justice Clark said in McDowell v. Kent, 153 N.C. 555, 558 , 69 S.E. 626, 627 , and as Stacy, C.J., repeated in Greene v. Dishman, 202 N.C. 811, 812 , 164 S.E. 342 , 343: “What the Court desires, and indeed the least that any appellate court requires, is that the exceptions which are bona *270 fide be presented to the Court for a decision, as the points determinative of the appeal, shall be stated clearly and intelligibly by the assignment of errors and not by referring to the record, and therewith shall be set out so much of the evidence or of the charge or other matter or circumstanc

1966As Chief Justice Clark said in McDowell v. Kent, 153 N.C. 555, 558 , 69 S.E. 626, 627 , and as Stacy, C.J., repeated in Greene v. Dishman, 202 N.C. 811, 812 , 164 S.E. 342 , 343: “What the Court desires, and indeed the least that any appellate court requires, is that the exceptions which are bona *270 fide be presented to the Court for a decision, as the points determinative of the appeal, shall be stated clearly and intelligibly by the assignment of errors and not by referring to the record, and therewith shall be set out so much of the evidence or of the charge or other matter or circumstanc

11966–1966
Norwich Union Indemnity Co. v. Haas green
ca7 · 1950
2 sentences

1961It said: “. . .(U)nder the overwhelming weight of authority, including that of the courts of Texas, it is the law that it is essential to proof of breach of the cooperation clause, that actual, not merely suppositious or theoretical prejudice to the insurer therefrom be shown . . .” These statements of the law find support in Norwich Union Indemnity Co. v. Haas, 179 F 2d 827 ; Juvland v. Plaisance, 96 N.W. 2d 537 ; General Acc. Fire & Life Assur.

1961It said: "* * * (U)nder the overwhelming weight of authority, including that of the courts of Texas, it is the law that it is essential to proof of breach of the cooperation clause, that actual, not merely suppositious or theoretical prejudice to the insurer therefrom be shown * * *" These statements of the law find support in Norwich Union Indemnity Co. v. Haas, 7 Cir., 179 F.2d 827 ; Juvland v. Plaisance, 255 Minn. 262 , 96 N.W.2d 537 ; General Acc. Fire & Life Assur.

11961–1961
General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v. Rinnert green
ca5 · 1948
2 sentences

1961Corp. v. Rinnert, 170 F 2d 440 ; Rowoldt v. Cook County Farmers Mut.

1961Corp. v. Rinnert, 5 Cir., 170 F.2d 440 ; Rowoldt, for Use of Flanagan v. Cook County Farmers Mut.

11961–1961
Juvland v. Plaisance green
minn · 1959
2 sentences

1961It said: "* * * (U)nder the overwhelming weight of authority, including that of the courts of Texas, it is the law that it is essential to proof of breach of the cooperation clause, that actual, not merely suppositious or theoretical prejudice to the insurer therefrom be shown * * *" These statements of the law find support in Norwich Union Indemnity Co. v. Haas, 7 Cir., 179 F.2d 827 ; Juvland v. Plaisance, 255 Minn. 262 , 96 N.W.2d 537 ; General Acc. Fire & Life Assur.

1961It said: "* * * (U)nder the overwhelming weight of authority, including that of the courts of Texas, it is the law that it is essential to proof of breach of the cooperation clause, that actual, not merely suppositious or theoretical prejudice to the insurer therefrom be shown * * *" These statements of the law find support in Norwich Union Indemnity Co. v. Haas, 7 Cir., 179 F.2d 827 ; Juvland v. Plaisance, 255 Minn. 262 , 96 N.W.2d 537 ; General Acc. Fire & Life Assur.

11961–1961

Where else courts name it

IL 71 (1964–2025) CA 35 (1934–2026) NY 26 (1958–2024) AZ 25 (1984–2022) MO 20 (1934–2023) FL 19 (1961–2018) PA 15 (1938–2019) WA 13 (1974–2025) MA 13 (1953–2008) NJ 12 (1961–2026) OH 11 (1942–2021) LA 8 (1952–2024) NC 7 (1961–2012) MD 7 (1962–2015) TX 7 (2003–2018) SC 6 (1958–2023) MN 6 (1958–2010) AL 6 (1939–2013) CT 6 (1974–2019) VA 6 (1949–2004) IN 6 (1983–2009) TN 6 (1968–2024) CO 5 (1989–2026) WI 4 (1991–2022) NM 4 (1960–2010) NE 4 (1966–2021) VT 4 (1980–2015) KS 4 (1983–2020) AR 3 (1994–2016) GA 3 (1971–2014) AK 3 (1993–2000) MT 3 (2002–2013) OK 2 (1997–2002) WV 2 (1997–2000) IA 2 (1986–1991) OR 2 (1970–1975) RI 2 (1992–1997) WY 2 (2002–2026) MI 2 (1973–1999) UT 2 (1956–2009) MS 2 (1964–1973)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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