factual basis claim (Idaho) · Go Syfert
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factual basis claim in Idaho

19 Idaho opinions name it 2 courts 1985–2026 5 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Idaho courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (8)

CaseFollowedCited
Charboneau v. Stategreen
idaho · 2007 · cited in 12 Idaho opinions naming this issue, 2009–2014
2 sentences

2014This Court found Abbott’s assertion that mental disease or psychotropic medication rendered him incompetent and prevented him from pursuing challenges to his conviction during the one-year period was sufficient to raise factual issues and intertwining legal issues as to whether he was 1 This Court was referencing Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 904-05 , 174 P.3d 870, 874-75 (2008), in which the Idaho Supreme Court recognized that the limitation period may be postponed until the petitioner has discovered the factual basis for the claim where the post- conviction claim raises important due p

2014This Court found Abbott’s assertion that mental disease or psychotropic medication rendered him incompetent and prevented him from pursuing challenges to his conviction during the one-year period was sufficient to raise factual issues and intertwining legal issues as to whether he was 1 This Court was referencing Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 904-05 , 174 P.3d 870, 874-75 (2008), in which the Idaho Supreme Court recognized that the limitation period may be postponed until the petitioner has discovered the factual basis for the claim where the post- conviction claim raises important due p

1112
Delano Marco Medinagreen
colo · 2023 · cited in 2 Idaho opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024
2 sentences

2024And it certainly does not imply that the factual-basis requirement of Fed.R.Crim.P. 12 11(f) and its state-law counterparts comes from the Constitution.”); Medina v. People, 535 P.3d 82, 90 (Colo. 2023) (“[Whether] a guilty plea is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent necessarily depends on the circumstances of each case.

2024And it certainly does not imply that the factual-basis requirement of Fed.R.Crim.P. 12 11(f) and its state-law counterparts comes from the Constitution.”); Medina v. People, 535 P.3d 82, 90 (Colo. 2023) (“[Whether] a guilty plea is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent necessarily depends on the circumstances of each case.

22
Rhoades v. Stategreen
idaho · 2009 · cited in 2 Idaho opinions naming this issue, 2010–2012
2 sentences

2010In addition, two decisions of our Supreme Court, Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 250-51 , 220 P.3d 1066, 1069-70 (2009), and Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 904-05 , 174 P.3d 870, 874-75 (2007), indicate that where the post-conviction claim raises an important due process issue, there may be a tolling of the statute of limitation until the petitioner knows or reasonably should know of the factual basis of the claim.

2010In addition, two decisions of our Supreme Court, Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 250-51 , 220 P.3d 1066, 1069-70 (2009), and Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 904-05 , 174 P.3d 870, 874-75 (2007), indicate that where the post-conviction claim raises an important due process issue, there may be a tolling of the statute of limitation until the petitioner knows or reasonably should know of the factual basis of the claim.

22
Shinn v. Martinez Ramirezgreen
scotus · 2022 · cited in 2 Idaho opinions naming this issue, 2025–2026
2 sentences

2026See 740 F.3d 1302 , 1320–22 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc), abrogated by, Shinn v. Ramirez, 596 U.S. 366 (2022), as recognized in Hampton v. Shinn, 143 F.4th 1047 (9th Cir. 2025).

2025While that motion was pending, the Ninth Circuit issued Dickens v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1302 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc), abrogated by Shinn v. Ramirez, 596 U.S. 366 (2022), as recognized in Hampton v. Shinn, 143 F.4th 1047 (2025), which held that an inadequately supported claim, decided on the merits by a state court, could become a new procedurally defaulted claim in federal court if the petitioner provided new evidence that changed the factual basis of the claim such that it resulted 1 In federal court, a procedural default occurs in two instances.

12
Gregory Dickens v. Charles L. Ryangreen
ca9 · 2014 · cited in 2 Idaho opinions naming this issue, 2025–2026
2 sentences

2026See 740 F.3d 1302 , 1320–22 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc), abrogated by, Shinn v. Ramirez, 596 U.S. 366 (2022), as recognized in Hampton v. Shinn, 143 F.4th 1047 (9th Cir. 2025).

2025While that motion was pending, the Ninth Circuit issued Dickens v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1302 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc), abrogated by Shinn v. Ramirez, 596 U.S. 366 (2022), as recognized in Hampton v. Shinn, 143 F.4th 1047 (2025), which held that an inadequately supported claim, decided on the merits by a state court, could become a new procedurally defaulted claim in federal court if the petitioner provided new evidence that changed the factual basis of the claim such that it resulted 1 In federal court, a procedural default occurs in two instances.

12
Amboh v. Stategreen
idahoctapp · 2010 · cited in 2 Idaho opinions naming this issue, 2011–2013
2 sentences

2013In Amboh v. State, 149 Idaho 650 , 239 P.3d 448 (Ct. App. 2010), this Court said “in cases where equitable tolling was allowed, the petitioner was alleged to have been unable to timely file a petition due to extraordinary circumstances beyond his effective control, or the facts underlying the claim were hidden from the petitioner by unlawful state action.” Id. at 653 , 239 P.3d at 451 (internal citations omitted).

2013In Amboh v. State, 149 Idaho 650 , 239 P.3d 448 (Ct. App. 2010), this Court said “in cases where equitable tolling was allowed, the petitioner was alleged to have been unable to timely file a petition due to extraordinary circumstances beyond his effective control, or the facts underlying the claim were hidden from the petitioner by unlawful state action.” Id. at 653 , 239 P.3d at 451 (internal citations omitted).

12
Metcalf v. Intermountain Gas Co.green
idaho · 1989 · cited in 1 Idaho opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021
2 sentences

2021See Metcalf, 116 Idaho 622 , 778 P.2d 744 (first addressing whether an employee handbook altered the terms under which an employee could be fired, then addressing whether an at-will employee could pursue a good faith and fair dealing claim against their employer). 17 In light of the above, we hold that summary judgment was appropriate on Knudsen’s good faith and fair dealing claim because he did not demonstrate a triable issue of material fact as to whether Simplot deprived him of the benefit of any term of his employment agreement.

2021See Metcalf, 116 Idaho 622 , 778 P.2d 744 (first addressing whether an employee handbook altered the terms under which an employee could be fired, then addressing whether an at-will employee could pursue a good faith and fair dealing claim against their employer). 17 In light of the above, we hold that summary judgment was appropriate on Knudsen’s good faith and fair dealing claim because he did not demonstrate a triable issue of material fact as to whether Simplot deprived him of the benefit of any term of his employment agreement.

11
Chico-Rodriguez v. Stategreen
idahoctapp · 2005 · cited in 1 Idaho opinions naming this issue, 2010–2010
2 sentences

2010However, as we noted in Chico-Rodriguez v. State, 4 141 Idaho 579, 582 , 114 P.3d 137, 140 (Ct. App. 2005), American courts generally have applied equitable tolling only in rare and exceptional circumstances beyond the petitioner’s control that prevented him or her from filing a timely petition.

2010However, as we noted in Chico-Rodriguez v. State, 4 141 Idaho 579, 582 , 114 P.3d 137, 140 (Ct. App. 2005), American courts generally have applied equitable tolling only in rare and exceptional circumstances beyond the petitioner’s control that prevented him or her from filing a timely petition.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Idaho. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (5)

CaseCitedYears
Judd v. State green
idahoctapp · 2009
2 sentences

2013“In Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 904-05 , 174 P.3d 870, 874-75 (2007), the Idaho Supreme Court recognized that, at least where the post-conviction claim raises important due process issues, the limitations period may be postponed until the petitioner has discovered the factual basis for the claim.” Judd, 148 Idaho at 26 , 218 P.3d at 5 .

2013“In Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 904-05 , 174 P.3d 870, 874-75 (2007), the Idaho Supreme Court recognized that, at least where the post-conviction claim raises important due process issues, the limitations period may be postponed until the petitioner has discovered the factual basis for the claim.” Judd, 148 Idaho at 26 , 218 P.3d at 5 .

22013–2013
Gray v. Netherland green
scotus · 1996
1 sentence

2025First, when “petitioner has not fairly presented a habeas claim to the state courts, and it is now clear that the claim would be barred by a state procedural rule, the claim has been procedurally defaulted.” Row, 2007 WL 683792 , at *2 (citing Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152 , 161–62 (1996)).

12025–2025
Schlup v. Delo red
scotus · 1995
1 sentence

2013The appellate courts, however, “have not permitted equitable tolling 1 Snowball points to Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995), to support his request for a freestanding actual innocence claim.

12013–2013
Kuhn v. COLDWELL BANKER LANDMARK, INC. green
idaho · 2010
2 sentences

2012In the decision, the district court held that Rich County’s Second Motion for New Trial was, although timely under I.R.C.P. 59(b), “fatally flawed because it does not set forth with particularity the factual basis for its claim for new trial pursuant to the requirements of I.R.C.P. 59(a)(7).” In reliance upon this Court’s opinion in Kuhn, 150 Idaho at 246 , 245 P.3d at 998 , the district court found that the memorandum in support of the Second Motion for New Trial was not filed within the required fourteen days post entry of judgment. 1.

2012In the decision, the district court held that Rich County’s Second Motion for New Trial was, although timely under I.R.C.P. 59(b), “fatally flawed because it does not set forth with particularity the factual basis for its claim for new trial pursuant to the requirements of I.R.C.P. 59(a)(7).” In reliance upon this Court’s opinion in Kuhn, 150 Idaho at 246 , 245 P.3d at 998 , the district court found that the memorandum in support of the Second Motion for New Trial was not filed within the required fourteen days post entry of judgment. 1.

12012–2012
Hearst Corp. v. Keller green
idaho · 1979
1 sentence

1985Id.

11985–1985

Statutes the citing opinions construe

ID § Idaho Code § 19-4902 (13) ID § Idaho Code § 19-4906 (7) ID § Idaho Code § 19-4907 (4) ID § Idaho Code § 19-4901 (3) ID § Idaho Code § 19-4904 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

TX 368 (1962–2026) IL 218 (1969–2026) CA 136 (1954–2026) MA 92 (1990–2026) MS 72 (1992–2025) MI 71 (1971–2026) WI 43 (1968–2025) NJ 39 (1981–2026) WA 37 (1976–2026) MN 34 (1978–2026) NY 31 (1968–2026) IA 28 (1980–2022) PA 25 (1973–2023) FL 23 (1974–2025) MO 22 (1974–2022) ID 19 (1985–2026) IN 18 (1990–2026) CT 17 (1987–2021) TN 16 (1994–2020) VT 15 (1978–2026) OR 14 (1974–2024) MD 13 (1987–2025) KS 13 (1993–2022) OK 13 (1988–2023) GA 10 (1988–2026) SD 10 (1987–2016) WY 9 (1989–2023) NH 8 (2011–2025) DC 8 (1974–2024) AZ 7 (1977–2018) DE 7 (2001–2015) OH 7 (2004–2023) NM 6 (1976–2019) UT 6 (1984–2023) ND 6 (1982–2012) AK 5 (1998–2025) LA 5 (1975–2008) AR 5 (1987–2016) ME 4 (1983–2008) NE 4 (2017–2026) AL 4 (1988–2026) NV 4 (2014–2018) SC 4 (2012–2022) WV 4 (1936–2025) NC 3 (2012–2022) CO 3 (1993–2023)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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