factual basis claim in Oregon

2021The taxpayer accepted the department’s “surrender,” “but urged the court to proceed with a hearing to allow it to establish that there is a factual basis for its claim for attorney fees.” Id.

2019We have held that “[a] guilty plea obvi- ates the need for the state to present any evidence, so long as the judge has a basis for determining that the plea is voluntary and has a factual basis.” Barnes v. Cupp, 44 Or App 533, 538 , 606 P2d 664 , rev den, 289 Or 587 (1980), cert den, 449 US 1088 (1981) (citing ORS 135.395).

2019We have held that “[a] guilty plea obvi- ates the need for the state to present any evidence, so long as the judge has a basis for determining that the plea is voluntary and has a factual basis.” Barnes v. Cupp, 44 Or App 533, 538 , 606 P2d 664 , rev den, 289 Or 587 (1980), cert den, 449 US 1088 (1981) (citing ORS 135.395).

2019We have held that “[a] guilty plea obvi- ates the need for the state to present any evidence, so long as the judge has a basis for determining that the plea is voluntary and has a factual basis.” Barnes v. Cupp, 44 Or App 533, 538 , 606 P2d 664 , rev den, 289 Or 587 (1980), cert den, 449 US 1088 (1981) (citing ORS 135.395).

2013See Young v. Hill, 347 Or 165, 171 , 218 P3d 125 (2009) (“To plead a claim for relief, a party must allege the factual basis for a claim for relief].]”); Billings v. Gates, 323 Or 167, 182 , 916 P2d 291 (1996) (under ORS 34.680, which is worded similarly to ORS 138.525, a habeas corpus petitioner must allege sufficient facts that, if true, give rise to a claim for relief).

2013See Young v. Hill, 347 Or 165, 171 , 218 P3d 125 (2009) (“To plead a claim for relief, a party must allege the factual basis for a claim for relief].]”); Billings v. Gates, 323 Or 167, 182 , 916 P2d 291 (1996) (under ORS 34.680, which is worded similarly to ORS 138.525, a habeas corpus petitioner must allege sufficient facts that, if true, give rise to a claim for relief).

2013The special motion, thus, may require the plaintiff to present the factual basis for its claim at the beginning of the litigation.” 222 Or App at 29 .

2009Holger v. Irish, 316 Or 402, 406-07 , 851 P2d 1122 (1993) (by requiring a party to state a “claim for relief’ rather than a “cause of action,” Oregon procedural rules require pleader to allege ultimate facts that provide a basis for relief); see also Davis v. Tyee Industries, Inc., 295 Or 467, 476-79 , 668 P2d 1186 (1983) (Oregon is a code pleading state; whatever a party’s theory of recovery, the party must allege facts that, if proved, are a basis on which the party can prevail).

2009Holger v. Irish, 316 Or 402, 406-07 , 851 P2d 1122 (1993) (by requiring a party to state a “claim for relief’ rather than a “cause of action,” Oregon procedural rules require pleader to allege ultimate facts that provide a basis for relief); see also Davis v. Tyee Industries, Inc., 295 Or 467, 476-79 , 668 P2d 1186 (1983) (Oregon is a code pleading state; whatever a party’s theory of recovery, the party must allege facts that, if proved, are a basis on which the party can prevail).

1984Most of the opinion was devoted to rejecting defendants' argument that the statutes of limitations, though by then expressly excluding actions brought by governmental plaintiffs, nevertheless should apply against a city acting in its "private or proprietary capacity." The opinion described the street improvement as a "proprietary activity," and it again assumed without discussion that the foreclosure suit would be barred by laches, although the court held that the defendants had failed to plead the factual basis of this defense. 177 Or. at 548 , 164 P.2d 434 .

1984Most of the opinion was devoted to rejecting defendants' argument that the statutes of limitations, though by then expressly excluding actions brought by governmental plaintiffs, nevertheless should apply against a city acting in its "private or proprietary capacity." The opinion described the street improvement as a "proprietary activity," and it again assumed without discussion that the foreclosure suit would be barred by laches, although the court held that the defendants had failed to plead the factual basis of this defense. 177 Or. at 548 , 164 P.2d 434 .

1984But in a third case, a school district's action to recover funds paid out by a bank, the court stated that it was "not here concerned with private dealings but with matters affecting the public," and referred to the "`well-settled'" doctrine that "`no laches can be imputed to a municipal corporation, acting ... in a public and governmental capacity.'" School Dist. 47 v. U.S. Nat'l Bank, 187 Or. 360, 383-384 , 211 P.2d 723 (1949), quoting Common School Dist.

1984But in a third case, a school district's action to recover funds paid out by a bank, the court stated that it was "not here concerned with private dealings but with matters affecting the public," and referred to the "`well-settled'" doctrine that "`no laches can be imputed to a municipal corporation, acting ... in a public and governmental capacity.'" School Dist. 47 v. U.S. Nat'l Bank, 187 Or. 360, 383-384 , 211 P.2d 723 (1949), quoting Common School Dist.

1974In Burkholder v. SAIF, 11 Or App 334 , 502 P2d 1394 (1972), we held that a request for a hearing pursuant to ORS 656.283 (2) that failed to include the claimant’s address was sufficient to establish the right to a hearing because the statutory requirements of the compensation law should be liberally construed in favor of the workman and because the Board was aware of claimant’s attorney’s address.

1974In Burkholder v. SAIF, 11 Or App 334 , 502 P2d 1394 (1972), we held that a request for a hearing pursuant to ORS 656.283 (2) that failed to include the claimant’s address was sufficient to establish the right to a hearing because the statutory requirements of the compensation law should be liberally construed in favor of the workman and because the Board was aware of claimant’s attorney’s address.