factual basis claim (California) · Go Syfert
← California issues

factual basis claim in California

136 California opinions name it 3 courts 1954–2026 32 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (36)

CaseFollowedCited
People v. Holmesgreen
cal · 2004 · cited in 22 California opinions naming this issue, 2007–2026
2 sentences

2024In California, the trial court must inquire into the factual basis for any negotiated plea. (§ 1192.5, subd. (c); People v. Hoffard (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1170, 1180-1182 .) The requirement exists because the prospect of “substantially reduced punishment” can be such a powerful “motivating factor for a plea” that a negotiated plea “creates an especially high risk the defendant will plead to a crime he or she did not commit and for which no factual basis can be established.” (Id. at p. 1182.) The factual basis requirement thus “helps ensure that the ‘constitutional standards of voluntariness and int

2024Rather, it applies only to conditional pleas. (§ 1192.5, subd. (c); Hoffard, at pp. 1180-1182.) The point of the requirement is that, because the prospect of “substantially reduced punishment” can be such a powerful “motivating factor for a plea,” a negotiated plea “creates an especially high risk the defendant will plead to a crime he or she did not commit and for which no factual basis can be established.” (Hoffard, at p. 1182.) The factual basis requirement thus “helps ensure that the ‘constitutional standards of voluntariness and intelligence are met.’” (People v. Holmes (2004) 32 Cal.4th

1222
People v. Hoffardgreen
cal · 1995 · cited in 13 California opinions naming this issue, 1995–2024
2 sentences

2024In California, the trial court must inquire into the factual basis for any negotiated plea. (§ 1192.5, subd. (c); People v. Hoffard (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1170, 1180-1182 .) The requirement exists because the prospect of “substantially reduced punishment” can be such a powerful “motivating factor for a plea” that a negotiated plea “creates an especially high risk the defendant will plead to a crime he or she did not commit and for which no factual basis can be established.” (Id. at p. 1182.) The factual basis requirement thus “helps ensure that the ‘constitutional standards of voluntariness and int

2024In California, the trial court must inquire into the factual basis for any negotiated plea. (§ 1192.5, subd. (c); People v. Hoffard (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1170, 1180-1182 .) The requirement exists because the prospect of “substantially reduced punishment” can be such a powerful “motivating factor for a plea” that a negotiated plea “creates an especially high risk the defendant will plead to a crime he or she did not commit and for which no factual basis can be established.” (Id. at p. 1182.) The factual basis requirement thus “helps ensure that the ‘constitutional standards of voluntariness and int

613
Semole v. Sansouciegreen
calctapp · 1972 · cited in 8 California opinions naming this issue, 1983–2018
2 sentences

2018Although Ditech asserts Randall's allegations on these points were not sufficiently specific, the particularity required of a pleading varies given the parties' relative knowledge of the facts in issue. ( Semole v. Sansoucie (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 714 , 719, 104 Cal.Rptr. 897 .) "[L]ess particularity is required where the defendant may be assumed to possess knowledge of the facts at least equal, if not superior, to that possessed by the plaintiff." ( Burks v. Poppy Construction Co. (1962) 57 Cal.2d 463 , 474, 20 Cal.Rptr. 609 , 370 P.2d 313 .) Ultimately, the complaint is sufficient if " 'the ad

2018Although Ditech asserts Randall's allegations on these points were not sufficiently specific, the particularity required of a pleading varies given the parties' relative knowledge of the facts in issue. ( Semole v. Sansoucie (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 714 , 719, 104 Cal.Rptr. 897 .) "[L]ess particularity is required where the defendant may be assumed to possess knowledge of the facts at least equal, if not superior, to that possessed by the plaintiff." ( Burks v. Poppy Construction Co. (1962) 57 Cal.2d 463 , 474, 20 Cal.Rptr. 609 , 370 P.2d 313 .) Ultimately, the complaint is sufficient if " 'the ad

58
People v. Palmergreen
cal · 2013 · cited in 7 California opinions naming this issue, 2015–2026
2 sentences

2026The purpose of the factual basis requirement is to help ensure that the constitutional standards of voluntariness and intelligence are met.” (People v. Palmer (2013) 58 Cal.4th 110, 118 (Palmer).) The trial court can satisfy itself that there is an adequate factual basis “by having the defendant describe the conduct or answer questions, by detailing a factual basis, or by having defense counsel stipulate to a particular document such as the transcript of a preliminary hearing as providing a factual basis for a plea.

2023A. Legal Principles and Standard of Review When a defendant enters a conditional plea of guilty or no contest to a felony charge, the trial court “shall [] cause an inquiry to be made of the defendant to satisfy itself that the plea is freely and voluntarily made, and that there is a factual basis for the plea.” (§ 1192.5, subd. (c).) “The purpose of the factual basis requirement is to help 5 ensure that the constitutional standards of voluntariness and intelligence are met.” (People v. Palmer (2013) 58 Cal.4th 110, 118 (Palmer), quoting People v. Holmes (2004) 32 Cal.4th 432, 438-439 .) “On a

57
People v. Wattsgreen
calctapp · 1977 · cited in 8 California opinions naming this issue, 1978–2021
2 sentences

2021However, the California Supreme Court has held that although “[w]aiver and forfeiture principles are appropriately applied to most kinds of trial error, . . . their application in the present context would be inappropriate, given the prophylactic purpose behind the factual basis requirement . . . .” (People v. Palmer (2013) 58 Cal.4th 110, 116 (Palmer).) Accordingly, we will address McCright’s claim on the merits. 25 that the plea is freely and voluntarily made, and that there is a factual basis for the plea.” “ ‘The purpose of the requirement is to protect against the situation where the defe

1995“Conducting a factual basis inquiry before accepting or entering judgment on a guilty plea may further important interests,” noted the court. ( 10 Cal.4th at p. 1183 .) The first of these is the constitutional standard that the plea “ ‘ “represents a voluntary and intelligent choice.” ’ ” (Ibid., quoting North Carolina v. Alford (1970) 400 U.S. 25, 31 [ 27 L.Ed.2d 162, 167-168 , 91 S.Ct. 160 ].) “Although not itself constitutionally compelled, a factual-basis inquiry may help to ensure the constitutional standards of voluntariness and intelligence are met. . . .” ( 10 Cal.4th at p. 1183, fn. 1

48
Norgart v. Upjohn Co.green
cal · 1999 · cited in 5 California opinions naming this issue, 2008–2025
2 sentences

2025We are merely concerned with the standards governing accrual of a claim under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5 for purposes of the Government Claims Act. 15. sources open to his investigation … the statute commences to run.’ ” (Sanchez v. South Hoover Hospital (1976) 18 Cal.3d 93, 101 .) Put differently, section 340.5’s one-year period is only triggered once “ ‘the patient’s “reasonably founded suspicions [have been aroused],” and she has actually “become alerted to the necessity for investigation and pursuit of her remedies[ ]” ….’ ” (Artal v. Allen (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 273, 279 ; see

2025We are merely concerned with the standards governing accrual of a claim under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5 for purposes of the Government Claims Act. 15. sources open to his investigation … the statute commences to run.’ ” (Sanchez v. South Hoover Hospital (1976) 18 Cal.3d 93, 101 .) Put differently, section 340.5’s one-year period is only triggered once “ ‘the patient’s “reasonably founded suspicions [have been aroused],” and she has actually “become alerted to the necessity for investigation and pursuit of her remedies[ ]” ….’ ” (Artal v. Allen (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 273, 279 ; see

45
Estate of Archergreen
calctapp · 1987 · cited in 4 California opinions naming this issue, 2005–2020
2 sentences

2020Project CBD also alleged that multiple people became ill after using RSHO due to heavy metals and other toxins based on Cranford's opinion"].) While these allegations were set forth in the general factual allegations of the first amended complaint and were not in any of the enumerated claims, they were sufficient to "apprise[ ]" the Project CBD defendants of "the factual basis of the claim[s]" asserted in the second amended complaint." (Estate of Archer, supra, at p. 245 .) We therefore conclude that the relation-back doctrine applies, such that the Project CBD defendants cannot rely on the st

2020A complaint must contain "[a] statement of the facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language." (§ 425.10, subd. (a)(1).) This fact-pleading requirement obligates the plaintiff to allege ultimate facts that "as a whole apprise[ ] the adversary of the factual basis of the claim. [Citations.]" (Estate of Archer (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 238, 245 .) used to attack parts of a [single cause of action] as pleaded." (Baral, at pp. 381–382, 393, 384–396.) In defining a claim properly subject to a motion to strike, the Baral court stated that the Legislature "had in mind allegatio

34
Lim v. The.Tv Corp. Internationalgreen
calctapp · 2002 · cited in 3 California opinions naming this issue, 2005–2017
2 sentences

2009(See Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 47 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 709 , 960 P.2d 513 ]; Lim v. The.TV Corp. Internat. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 684, 690 [121 *1549 Cal.Rptr.2d 333].) A plaintiff need not plead evidentiary facts supporting the allegation of ultimate fact. ( Committee on Children's Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 212 [ 197 Cal.Rptr. 783 , 673 P.2d 660 ].) The pleading is adequate so long as it apprises the defendant of the factual basis for the claim. ( Ibid. ; Lim, at p. 690.) Second, the trial court, relying on language from V

2005Pleading requirements and the relation-back doctrine A complaint must contain “[a] statement of the facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language.” (§ 425.10, subd. (a)(1).) This fact-pleading requirement obligates the plaintiff to allege ultimate facts that “as a whole apprise[] the adversary of the factual basis of the claim. [Citations.]” (Estate of Archer (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 238, 245 [ 239 Cal.Rptr. 137 ]; see also Lim v. The.TV Corp. Internat. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 684, 689-690 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 333 ].) When a complaint complies with the fact-pleading requirem

33
Salma v. Capongreen
calctapp · 2008 · cited in 3 California opinions naming this issue, 2014–2015
2 sentences

2015Brown Electrical Contractor, Inc. v. Rhino Electric Supply, Inc. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1118, 1125 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 ] [a “cause of action is vulnerable to a special motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute only if the protected conduct forms a substantial part of the factual basis for the claim”]; Salma v. Capon (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1288 [ 74 Cal.Rptr.3d 873 ] [“[Allegations of protected conduct in the original intentional interference claim were not merely incidental to the allegations of unprotected conduct.

2015Brown Electrical Contractor, Inc. v. Rhino Electric Supply, Inc. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1118, 1125 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 ] [a “cause of action is vulnerable to a special motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute only if the protected conduct forms a substantial part of the factual basis for the claim”]; Salma v. Capon (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1288 [ 74 Cal.Rptr.3d 873 ] [“[Allegations of protected conduct in the original intentional interference claim were not merely incidental to the allegations of unprotected conduct.

33
People v. Wilkersongreen
calctapp · 1992 · cited in 5 California opinions naming this issue, 2004–2026
2 sentences

2016“The purpose of the factual basis requirement is to help ensure that the constitutional standards of voluntariness and intelligence are met.” (People v. Palmer (2013) 58 Cal.4th 110, 118 .) In effect, section 1192.5 requires the court to “‘satisfy itself . . . that there is a 13 factual basis for the plea.’” (People v. Holmes (2004) 32 Cal.4th 432, 435 .) The purpose of the inquiry is “to ‘“protect against the situation where the defendant, although he realizes what he has done, is not sufficiently skilled in law to recognize that his acts do not constitute the offense with which he is charged

2004The trial court may cause a factual basis inquiry to be made of the defendant by directly questioning the defendant, or by gamering statements and admissions by his counsel. 5 (Wilkerson, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 1576.) When both parties stipulate on the record to a document, such as a police report, the factual basis requirement is met. (.People v. Enright (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 631, 634-635 [ 183 Cal.Rptr. 249 ]; Watts, supra, 61 Cal.App.3d at p. 182.) A summary recitation that “ ‘[t]here’s a factual basis,’ ” however, absent any other attempt by the trial court to develop a factual basis,

25
People v. Marlingreen
calctapp · 2004 · cited in 4 California opinions naming this issue, 2013–2026
2 sentences

2024Rather, it applies only to conditional pleas. (§ 1192.5, subd. (c); Hoffard, at pp. 1180-1182.) The point of the requirement is that, because the prospect of “substantially reduced punishment” can be such a powerful “motivating factor for a plea,” a negotiated plea “creates an especially high risk the defendant will plead to a crime he or she did not commit and for which no factual basis can be established.” (Hoffard, at p. 1182.) The factual basis requirement thus “helps ensure that the ‘constitutional standards of voluntariness and intelligence are met.’” (People v. Holmes (2004) 32 Cal.4th

2014Noting that a claim questioning the factual basis for a plea is “fundamentally equivalent” to an attack on the sufficiency of evidence, the Sixth District in Voit concluded that a guilty plea forecloses appellate review of the factual basis for that plea. ( Voit, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1365-1366.) In contrast, the Third District, in People v. Marlin (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 559, 571-572 [ 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 470 ], characterized the factual basis inquiry as a procedural safeguard and found that a challenge to that procedure was cognizable on appeal.

24
City of Los Angeles v. Aalbersgreen
calctapp · 1977 · cited in 4 California opinions naming this issue, 1982–2007
2 sentences

1995However, a careful reading would seem to limit it to plea bargain situations [citation].” (Id. at p. 533, fn. 2 (conc. opn. of Hopper, J.); see also People v. Watts (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 173, 178 [ 136 Cal.Rptr. 496 ] [§ 1192.5 requires a factual-basis inquiry “upon a plea of guilty which is part of a plea bargain” (italics added)]; cf. § 1192.6, subd. (c) [prosecutor must state reasons for recommending punishment on guilty or no contest plea “whether or not that plea is entered pursuant to section 1192.5”].) 10 The Legislature has also required the existence of a factual basis for a plea enter

1995“Conducting a factual basis inquiry before accepting or entering judgment on a guilty plea may further important interests,” noted the court. ( 10 Cal.4th at p. 1183 .) The first of these is the constitutional standard that the plea “ ‘ “represents a voluntary and intelligent choice.” ’ ” (Ibid., quoting North Carolina v. Alford (1970) 400 U.S. 25, 31 [ 27 L.Ed.2d 162, 167-168 , 91 S.Ct. 160 ].) “Although not itself constitutionally compelled, a factual-basis inquiry may help to ensure the constitutional standards of voluntariness and intelligence are met. . . .” ( 10 Cal.4th at p. 1183, fn. 1

24
A.F. Brown Electrical Contractor, Inc. v. Rhino Electric Supply, Inc.green
calctapp · 2006 · cited in 3 California opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
2 sentences

2015Brown Electrical Contractor, Inc. v. Rhino Electric Supply, Inc. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1118, 1125 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 ] [a “cause of action is vulnerable to a special motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute only if the protected conduct forms a substantial part of the factual basis for the claim”]; Salma v. Capon (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1288 [ 74 Cal.Rptr.3d 873 ] [“[Allegations of protected conduct in the original intentional interference claim were not merely incidental to the allegations of unprotected conduct.

2015Brown Electrical Contractor, Inc. v. Rhino Electric Supply, Inc. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1118, 1125 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 ] [a “cause of action is vulnerable to a special motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute only if the protected conduct forms a substantial part of the factual basis for the claim”]; Salma v. Capon (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1288 [ 74 Cal.Rptr.3d 873 ] [“[Allegations of protected conduct in the original intentional interference claim were not merely incidental to the allegations of unprotected conduct.

23
Committee on Children's Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp.red
cal · 1983 · cited in 3 California opinions naming this issue, 2009–2015
2 sentences

2015(Committee on Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 211-212 [ 197 Cal.Rptr. 783 , 673 P.2d 660 ].) Accordingly, a complaint “is adequate so long as it apprises the defendant of the factual basis for the claim.” (Birke v. Oakwood Worldwide (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1540, 1549 [ 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 602 ] (Birke).) Alternatively stated, a complaint must set forth the essential facts of the plaintiff’s case with reasonable precision and with particularity sufficient to acquaint the defendant with the nature, source, and extent of the plaintiff’s claim.

2015(Committee on Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 211-212 [ 197 Cal.Rptr. 783 , 673 P.2d 660 ].) Accordingly, a complaint “is adequate so long as it apprises the defendant of the factual basis for the claim.” (Birke v. Oakwood Worldwide (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1540, 1549 [ 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 602 ] (Birke).) Alternatively stated, a complaint must set forth the essential facts of the plaintiff’s case with reasonable precision and with particularity sufficient to acquaint the defendant with the nature, source, and extent of the plaintiff’s claim.

23
Birke v. Oakwood Worldwidegreen
calctapp · 2009 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
22
Prakashpalan v. Engstrom, Lipscomb & Lackgreen
calctapp · 2014 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
22
People v. Enrightgreen
calctapp · 1982 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1991–2004
22
North Carolina v. Alfordgreen
scotus · 1970 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1995–1995
22
People v. Jacksongreen
cal · 1973 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1989–1990
22
In Re Estate of Bixlergreen
cal · 1924 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1987–1987
22
In Re Clarkred
cal · 1993 · cited in 6 California opinions naming this issue, 1998–2024
2 sentences

2021(Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 774 .) Though it is unusual for a petitioner to make the required showing, we have said consideration of such a claim is ordinarily warranted “where the factual basis for a claim was unknown to the petitioner and he had no reason to believe that the claim might be made” and the claim is “asserted as promptly as reasonably possible.” (Id. at p. 775.) In addition, claims based on a change in the law that is retroactively applicable to final judgments will be considered if promptly asserted and if application of the former rule is shown to have been prejudicial.

2009For example, "where the factual basis for a claim was unknown to the petitioner and he had no reason to believe that the claim might be made, or where the petitioner was unable to present his claim, the court will continue to consider the merits of the claim if asserted as promptly as reasonably possible." ( In re Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 775 .) Another exception to the general rule that "absent justification for the failure to present all known claims in a single, timely petition for writ of habeas corpus, successive and/or untimely petitions will be summarily denied," is "petitions whic

16
Davaloo v. State Farm Insurancegreen
calctapp · 2005 · cited in 4 California opinions naming this issue, 2011–2017
2 sentences

2017Such an allegation falls far short of apprising State Farm of the factual basis of their claim.” (Davaloo, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 417 .) The court in Pointe San Diego agreed with the reasoning of Davaloo : “If an original complaint lacks facts sufficient to provide notice to the defendant of the essential nature of the claim, it would defeat this policy to permit the plaintiff to remedy this error by filing a new amended complaint beyond the limitations period.

2011Such an allegation falls far short of apprising State Farm of the factual basis of the claim. [Citations.]” (Ibid.) The Davaloo court made clear that it was basing its holding on the “totality” of the circumstances and was not intending to establish a “bright-line rule as to when a complaint is so deficient to preclude relation back.” (Davaloo, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 417 .) The court also stressed that its decision to strictly enforce the statutory time limit was supported by the policy underlying the Northridge earthquake revival statute: “To allow an insured to file a complaint [on the

14
Jones v. Oxnard School Districtgreen
calctapp · 1969 · cited in 3 California opinions naming this issue, 1972–2018
2 sentences

2018Although Ditech asserts Randall's allegations on these points were not sufficiently specific, the particularity required of a pleading varies given the parties' relative knowledge of the facts in issue. ( Semole v. Sansoucie (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 714 , 719, 104 Cal.Rptr. 897 .) "[L]ess particularity is required where the defendant may be assumed to possess knowledge of the facts at least equal, if not superior, to that possessed by the plaintiff." ( Burks v. Poppy Construction Co. (1962) 57 Cal.2d 463 , 474, 20 Cal.Rptr. 609 , 370 P.2d 313 .) Ultimately, the complaint is sufficient if " 'the ad

2018Although Ditech asserts Randall's allegations on these points were not sufficiently specific, the particularity required of a pleading varies given the parties' relative knowledge of the facts in issue. ( Semole v. Sansoucie (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 714 , 719, 104 Cal.Rptr. 897 .) "[L]ess particularity is required where the defendant may be assumed to possess knowledge of the facts at least equal, if not superior, to that possessed by the plaintiff." ( Burks v. Poppy Construction Co. (1962) 57 Cal.2d 463 , 474, 20 Cal.Rptr. 609 , 370 P.2d 313 .) Ultimately, the complaint is sufficient if " 'the ad

13
People v. Willardgreen
calctapp · 2007 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2016–2021
2 sentences

2021The trial court’s acceptance of the guilty plea, after pursuing an inquiry to satisfy itself that there is a factual basis for the plea, will be reversed only for abuse of discretion.’” ( Palmer, supra, 58 Cal.4th at pp. 118-119.) “A finding of error under this standard will qualify as harmless where the contents of the record support a finding of a factual basis for the conditional plea.” (Holmes, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 443 ; accord, People v. Willard (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1329, 1333 .) Here, Langram confirmed that she understood the plea, wanted to accept it, and did not have any questions

2016Defendant asserts that the complaint, by itself, is insufficient to satisfy section 1192.5 because the complaint “is couched largely in the language of the statute, rather than setting forth the facts underlying the charge.” He argues that, pursuant to People v. Willard (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1329, 1331 , “[t]his is not enough to satisfy the purpose of the factual basis inquiry, to corroborate what defendant had already admitted by his plea.” However, as the court in People v. Palmer, supra, 58 Cal.4th 110 explained, a trial court is afforded flexibility in establishing a factual basis for the

12
People v. Perkinsgreen
calctapp · 2016 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
2 sentences

2016(People v. Rivas-Colon (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 444, 449 [ 193 Cal.Rptr.3d 651 ]; People v. Perkins (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 129, 136 [ 197 Cal.Rptr.3d 743 ]; People v. Sherow (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 875, 879-880 [ 191 Cal.Rptr.3d 295 ].) Simply alleging that the petitioner “believes” the property was worth $950 or less is not enough, even if the petition is under penalty of perjury. “ ‘An affidavit based on “information and belief’ is hearsay and must be disregarded.’ [Citation.]” (Baustert v. Superior Court (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1275, fn. 5 [ 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 208 ].) Rather, the petitioner m

2016(People v. Rivas-Colon (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 444, 449 [ 193 Cal.Rptr.3d 651 ]; People v. Perkins (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 129, 136 [ 197 Cal.Rptr.3d 743 ]; People v. Sherow (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 875, 879-880 [ 191 Cal.Rptr.3d 295 ].) Simply alleging that the petitioner “believes” the property was worth $950 or less is not enough, even if the petition is under penalty of perjury. “ ‘An affidavit based on “information and belief’ is hearsay and must be disregarded.’ [Citation.]” (Baustert v. Superior Court (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1275, fn. 5 [ 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 208 ].) Rather, the petitioner m

12
Boykin v. Alabamagreen
scotus · 1969 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2013–2015
12
People v. Tignergreen
calctapp · 1982 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1991–2004
12
Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co.green
cal · 1988 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025
11
Doe v. Roman Catholic Bishopgreen
calctapp · 2010 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025
11
Maheu v. CBS, INC.green
calctapp · 1988 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2023–2023
11
Rebmann v. Rohdegreen
calctapp · 2011 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2023–2023
11
Bel Air Internet, LLC v. Moralesgreen
calctapp5d · 2018 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2023–2023
11
Henry Grausz, M.D. v. Bradford F. Englander Linowes and Blocher, L.L.P.green
ca4 · 2003 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
11
People v. Pregreen
calctapp · 2004 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019
11
Navellier v. Slettengreen
cal · 2002 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2018–2018
11
Amtower v. Photon Dynamics, Inc.green
calctapp · 2008 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (44)

CaseCitedYears
People v. French green
cal · 2008
2 sentences

2024In California, the trial court must inquire into the factual basis for any negotiated plea. (§ 1192.5, subd. (c); People v. Hoffard (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1170, 1180-1182 .) The requirement exists because the prospect of “substantially reduced punishment” can be such a powerful “motivating factor for a plea” that a negotiated plea “creates an especially high risk the defendant will plead to a crime he or she did not commit and for which no factual basis can be established.” (Id. at p. 1182.) The factual basis requirement thus “helps ensure that the ‘constitutional standards of voluntariness and int

2024In California, the trial court must inquire into the factual basis for any negotiated plea. (§ 1192.5, subd. (c); People v. Hoffard (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1170, 1180-1182 .) The requirement exists because the prospect of “substantially reduced punishment” can be such a powerful “motivating factor for a plea” that a negotiated plea “creates an especially high risk the defendant will plead to a crime he or she did not commit and for which no factual basis can be established.” (Id. at p. 1182.) The factual basis requirement thus “helps ensure that the ‘constitutional standards of voluntariness and int

72015–2024
Shively v. Bozanich green
cal · 2003
2 sentences

2023(Maheu v. CBS, Inc. (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 662, 676 [invasion of privacy claims].) The statute of limitations begins to run when the challenged statement is published to a third party or, in certain cases, when the plaintiff discovered, or reasonably should have discovered or suspected, the factual basis for his claim. ( Shively, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 1247–1248.) Huang’s statements to Chang that give rise to Choi’s libel, slander, and false light claims were published on May 29, 2019— i.e., the date Huang made the statements to Chang.6 (See Medical Marijuana, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 884.

2008The situation facing plaintiff was analogous to that presented in other cases where the factual basis for the claim is a matter of public record and thus does not invoke the rationale for applying the discovery rule. [Citations.] We conclude that any equitable ground supporting the application of the discovery rule to the earlier defamations ceased to exist once the book was published and was distributed to the general public.” (Shively, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1253 .) Assuming arguendo Shively’s holding supports a general rule that in defamation and other cases the discovery rule does not app

52004–2023
Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. green
cal · 2005
2 sentences

2025“The discovery rule only delays accrual until the plaintiff has, or should have, inquiry notice of the cause of action.” (Fox, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 807 .) Consequently, accrual may be delayed if, despite conducting a reasonable inquiry, a plaintiff would not have discovered the factual basis for its claim within a reasonable period of time.

2016(Fox, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 811 .) Under Fox, once Winston suspected an injury (paralysis) and some wrongful cause (medical malpractice), her claim for medical malpractice against KMC accrued unless she was able to prove that a reasonable investigation at that time would not have revealed a factual basis for her claim against KMC.

32016–2025
Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. green
cal · 2001
2 sentences

2026(See Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 853 .) 16 Asserting the eleventh affirmative defense in their general denial, defendants alleged only their possession of unspecified “legal and equitable rights of offset against any recovery by the plaintiff.” Defendants did not allege the factual basis for this defense.

2026(See Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 853 .) 16 Asserting the eleventh affirmative defense in their general denial, defendants alleged only their possession of unspecified “legal and equitable rights of offset against any recovery by the plaintiff.” Defendants did not allege the factual basis for this defense.

22026–2026
Artal v. Allen green
calctapp · 2003
2 sentences

2025We are merely concerned with the standards governing accrual of a claim under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5 for purposes of the Government Claims Act. 15. sources open to his investigation … the statute commences to run.’ ” (Sanchez v. South Hoover Hospital (1976) 18 Cal.3d 93, 101 .) Put differently, section 340.5’s one-year period is only triggered once “ ‘the patient’s “reasonably founded suspicions [have been aroused],” and she has actually “become alerted to the necessity for investigation and pursuit of her remedies[ ]” ….’ ” (Artal v. Allen (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 273, 279 ; see

2025We are merely concerned with the standards governing accrual of a claim under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5 for purposes of the Government Claims Act. 15. sources open to his investigation … the statute commences to run.’ ” (Sanchez v. South Hoover Hospital (1976) 18 Cal.3d 93, 101 .) Put differently, section 340.5’s one-year period is only triggered once “ ‘the patient’s “reasonably founded suspicions [have been aroused],” and she has actually “become alerted to the necessity for investigation and pursuit of her remedies[ ]” ….’ ” (Artal v. Allen (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 273, 279 ; see

22025–2025
Sanchez v. South Hoover Hospital green
cal · 1976
2 sentences

2025We are merely concerned with the standards governing accrual of a claim under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5 for purposes of the Government Claims Act. 15. sources open to his investigation … the statute commences to run.’ ” (Sanchez v. South Hoover Hospital (1976) 18 Cal.3d 93, 101 .) Put differently, section 340.5’s one-year period is only triggered once “ ‘the patient’s “reasonably founded suspicions [have been aroused],” and she has actually “become alerted to the necessity for investigation and pursuit of her remedies[ ]” ….’ ” (Artal v. Allen (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 273, 279 ; see

2025We are merely concerned with the standards governing accrual of a claim under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5 for purposes of the Government Claims Act. 15. sources open to his investigation … the statute commences to run.’ ” (Sanchez v. South Hoover Hospital (1976) 18 Cal.3d 93, 101 .) Put differently, section 340.5’s one-year period is only triggered once “ ‘the patient’s “reasonably founded suspicions [have been aroused],” and she has actually “become alerted to the necessity for investigation and pursuit of her remedies[ ]” ….’ ” (Artal v. Allen (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 273, 279 ; see

22025–2025
In re Friend green
cal · 2021
2 sentences

2024First, non-successiveness is established “ ‘where the factual basis for a claim was unknown to the petitioner and he had no reason 7 Some amici curiae in Friend I (Friend I, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 729 ) advocated a sweeping interpretation of “successive”—essentially a “one-strike and you’re out” rule—that would have rigidly foreclosed claims “based on newly available evidence of trial misconduct by jurors, the prosecutor, defense counsel, or the trial judge” where the misconduct was “serious enough to call into question the validity of the judgment, yet fail[ed] to meet section 1509(d)’s inno

2024First, non-successiveness is established “ ‘where the factual basis for a claim was unknown to the petitioner and he had no reason 7 Some amici curiae in Friend I (Friend I, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 729 ) advocated a sweeping interpretation of “successive”—essentially a “one-strike and you’re out” rule—that would have rigidly foreclosed claims “based on newly available evidence of trial misconduct by jurors, the prosecutor, defense counsel, or the trial judge” where the misconduct was “serious enough to call into question the validity of the judgment, yet fail[ed] to meet section 1509(d)’s inno

22024–2024
Baral v. Schnitt green
cal · 2016
2 sentences

2023In Baral, our Supreme Court addressed what it described as “ ‘the mixed cause of action’ problem.” (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 394 .) Framed by the court, that problem is this: “What showing is required of a plaintiff with respect to a pleaded cause of action that includes allegations of both protected and unprotected activity?” (Id. at p. 385.) Prior to Baral, some 41 courts (e.g., Mann) held that, so long as the plaintiff could show minimal merit to allegations of unprotected conduct, a “mixed cause of action” could proceed, despite the inclusion of allegations of protected conduct in the

2018(See Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 88 (Navellier).) If the court determines the defendant has met its threshold burden, it then determines whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the merits of the challenged claim. ( Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 384-385.) To meet its 10 burden, the plaintiff must state and substantiate a legally sufficient claim; it must show that the challenged claim is both legally sufficient and supported by a prima facie evidentiary showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is cr

22018–2023
Burks v. Poppy Construction Co. green
cal · 1962
2 sentences

2018Although Ditech asserts Randall's allegations on these points were not sufficiently specific, the particularity required of a pleading varies given the parties' relative knowledge of the facts in issue. ( Semole v. Sansoucie (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 714 , 719, 104 Cal.Rptr. 897 .) "[L]ess particularity is required where the defendant may be assumed to possess knowledge of the facts at least equal, if not superior, to that possessed by the plaintiff." ( Burks v. Poppy Construction Co. (1962) 57 Cal.2d 463 , 474, 20 Cal.Rptr. 609 , 370 P.2d 313 .) Ultimately, the complaint is sufficient if " 'the ad

2018Although Ditech asserts Randall's allegations on these points were not sufficiently specific, the particularity required of a pleading varies given the parties' relative knowledge of the facts in issue. ( Semole v. Sansoucie (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 714 , 719, 104 Cal.Rptr. 897 .) "[L]ess particularity is required where the defendant may be assumed to possess knowledge of the facts at least equal, if not superior, to that possessed by the plaintiff." ( Burks v. Poppy Construction Co. (1962) 57 Cal.2d 463 , 474, 20 Cal.Rptr. 609 , 370 P.2d 313 .) Ultimately, the complaint is sufficient if " 'the ad

22018–2018
Scott v. Metabolite International, Inc. green
calctapp · 2004
2 sentences

2015Conversely, if the 8 allegations of protected activity are only incidental to a cause of action based essentially on nonprotected activity, the mere mention of the protected activity does not subject the cause of action to an anti-SLAPP motion.” (Scott v. Metabolife Internat., Inc. (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 404, 414 .) Therefore, a “cause of action is vulnerable to a special motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute only if the protected conduct forms a substantial part of the factual basis for the claim.” (A.F.

2006(Mann v. Quality Old Time Service, Inc. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 90, 103 [ 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 215 ] (Mann); Scott v. Metabolife Internal, Inc. (2004) 115 *1125 Cal.App.4th 404, 419 [ 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 242 ].) Nevertheless, where a cause of action is based on allegations that include protected and nonprotected activities, the cause of action is vulnerable to a special motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute only if the protected conduct forms a substantial part of the factual basis for the claim.

22006–2015
People v. Larsen green
calctapp · 2012
2 sentences

2015You may consider this evidence only for the limited purpose of deciding whether, at the time of the charged crime, the defendant acted [or failed to act] with the intent or mental state required for that crime. [¶] The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted [or failed to act] with the required intent or mental state, specifically: <insert specific intent or mental state required, e.g., ‘malice aforethought,’ ‘the intent to permanently deprive the owner of his or her property,’ or ‘knowledge that . . . .>’ If the People have not met this burden, you

2015You may consider this evidence only for the limited purpose of deciding whether, at the time of the charged crime, the defendant acted [or failed to act] with the intent or mental state required for that crime. [¶] The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted [or failed to act] with the required intent or mental state, specifically: <insert specific intent or mental state required, e.g., ‘malice aforethought,’ ‘the intent to permanently deprive the owner of his or her property,’ or ‘knowledge that . . . .>’ If the People have not met this burden, you

22015–2015
People v. Musselwhite green
cal · 1998
22015–2015
Broberg v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America green
calctapp · 2009
22013–2014
People v. Boyer red
cal · 2006
22012–2014
People v. Blankenship green
calctapp · 1989
21992–1998
Jazayeri v. Mao green
calctapp · 2009
12026–2026
DOHENY PARK TERRACE HOME-OWNERS ASS'N., INC. v. Truck Ins. Exchange green
calctapp · 2005
12025–2025
Prue v. Brady Company/San Diego, Inc. CA4/1 green
calctapp · 2015
12025–2025
McCoy v. Louisiana green
scotus · 2018
12024–2024
People v. Manriquez green
cal · 2005
12024–2024
People v. Young green
calctapp · 1978
12023–2023
People v. Hunt green
calctapp · 1985
12023–2023
People v. Shaw green
calctapp · 1998
12023–2023
People v. Breslin green
calctapp · 2012
12023–2023
In Re Birch green
cal · 1973
12023–2023
People v. Fairbank green
cal · 1997
12023–2023
People v. Dillard green
calctapp · 2017
12023–2023
People v. Patterson green
cal · 2017
12023–2023
Capitol Hill Group v. Pillsbury, Winthrop, Shaw, Pittman, LLC green
cadc · 2009
12022–2022
People v. Andersen green
calctapp · 1994
12022–2022
cluster 425962 green
ca9 · 1983
12022–2022
D.A. Elia Construction Corp. v. Damon & Morey, LLP green
nywd · 2008
12022–2022
People v. Shaw green
calctapp · 2002
12022–2022
People v. Ross green
calctapp · 2007
12022–2022
People v. Guiton green
cal · 1993
12022–2022
The People v. Hernandez green
calctapp · 2013
12022–2022
People v. Page green
cal · 2017
12021–2021
Frisvold v. Leahy green
calctapp · 1936
12021–2021
People v. Roderick Wash. green
calctapp5d · 2018
12021–2021
In Re Lynch red
cal · 1972
12020–2020

Statutes the citing opinions construe

CA § Cal. Evidence Code § 402 (5) CA § Cal. Evidence Code § 452 (5) CA § Cal. Government Code § 12900 (5) CA § Cal. Penal Code § 187 (5) USC § 15u.s.c.1692 (5)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

TX 368 (1962–2026) IL 218 (1969–2026) CA 136 (1954–2026) MA 92 (1990–2026) MS 72 (1992–2025) MI 71 (1971–2026) WI 43 (1968–2025) NJ 39 (1981–2026) WA 37 (1976–2026) MN 34 (1978–2026) NY 31 (1968–2026) IA 28 (1980–2022) PA 25 (1973–2023) FL 23 (1974–2025) MO 22 (1974–2022) ID 19 (1985–2026) IN 18 (1990–2026) CT 17 (1987–2021) TN 16 (1994–2020) VT 15 (1978–2026) OR 14 (1974–2024) MD 13 (1987–2025) KS 13 (1993–2022) OK 13 (1988–2023) GA 10 (1988–2026) SD 10 (1987–2016) WY 9 (1989–2023) NH 8 (2011–2025) DC 8 (1974–2024) AZ 7 (1977–2018) DE 7 (2001–2015) OH 7 (2004–2023) NM 6 (1976–2019) UT 6 (1984–2023) ND 6 (1982–2012) AK 5 (1998–2025) LA 5 (1975–2008) AR 5 (1987–2016) ME 4 (1983–2008) NE 4 (2017–2026) AL 4 (1988–2026) NV 4 (2014–2018) SC 4 (2012–2022) WV 4 (1936–2025) NC 3 (2012–2022) CO 3 (1993–2023)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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