Bright rule in Illinois

1981While a party will not be required to exhaust his administrative remedies when it would be patently useless to seek relief before local bodies (Van Laten v. City of Chicago (1963), 28 Ill. 2d 157 , 190 N.E.2d 717 (city twice amended zoning ordinance after suit was filed); County of Lake v. MacNeal (1962), 24 Ill. 2d 253 , 181 N.E.2d 85 (county brought petition to enjoin defendants’ use of the property)), the exhaustion requirement cannot be avoided simply because relief may be, or even probably will be, denied by the local authorities.

1981While a party will not be required to exhaust his administrative remedies when it would be patently useless to seek relief before local bodies (Van Laten v. City of Chicago (1963), 28 Ill. 2d 157 , 190 N.E.2d 717 (city twice amended zoning ordinance after suit was filed); County of Lake v. MacNeal (1962), 24 Ill. 2d 253 , 181 N.E.2d 85 (county brought petition to enjoin defendants’ use of the property)), the exhaustion requirement cannot be avoided simply because relief may be, or even probably will be, denied by the local authorities.

2007Bright, 166 Ill. 2d at 209 .

2007Bright, 166 Ill. 2d at 209 .

2001The county principally relies on the decision of our supreme court in Northwestern University v. City of Evanston, 74 Ill. 2d 80 , 383 N.E.2d 964 (1978), for the proposition that you cannot maintain an action for declaratory relief while simultaneously maintaining a pending action before the ZBA.

2001The county principally relies on the decision of our supreme court in Northwestern University v. City of Evanston, 74 Ill. 2d 80 , 383 N.E.2d 964 (1978), for the proposition that you cannot maintain an action for declaratory relief while simultaneously maintaining a pending action before the ZBA.

1977Van Laten v. City of Chicago 28 Ill. 2d 157 .” ( 29 Ill. 2d 532, 539-40 .) In McNeal, the court stated: “To compel a property owner to first seek local relief in the fact of the demonstrated attitude of the local authority, would be a patently useless step which would increase costs, promote circuity of action and delay the administration of justice.” ( 24 Ill. 2d 253, 260 .) In this case the defendants have not shown how they have been prejudiced or how a delay in the administration of justice has taken place.

1968The plaintiffs further rely upon the case of Sulzberger v. County of Peoria, 29 Ill2d 532, 194 NE2d 287 . ■ In Sulzberger, plaintiffs petitioned the Zoning Board of Appeals, seeking a reclassification of the subject property from residential to commercial.

1977(Wiercioch v. Village of Niles, 27 Ill. 2d 363 .) To do so would defeat one of the purposes of the Bright doctrine, (Bright v. City of Evanston, 10 Ill. 2d 178 ) which was to prevent delay in the administration of justice.

1963(Wiercioch v. Village of Niles, 27 Ill.2d 363 .) To do so would defeat one of the purposes of the Bright doctrine, (Bright v. City of Evanston,. 10 Ill.2d 178 ) which was to prevent delay in the administration of justice.

1963As we stated in County of Lake v. MacNeal, 24 Ill.2d 253 , 259: “The Bright rule did not stem from legislative or constitutional command, but is no more than an expression of judicial policy prompted by the circumstance that zoning is legislative and administrative in nature, not judicial, and which is aimed at providing the local authority an opportunity to correct error and to settle disputes locally before there is judicial intervention. [Citations].” And again, at page 260, “To compel a property owner to first seek local relief in the face of the demonstrated attitude of the local authorit

1963As we stated in County of Lake v. MacNeal, 24 Ill.2d 253 , 259: “The Bright rule did not stem from legislative or constitutional command, but is no more than an expression of judicial policy prompted by the circumstance that zoning is legislative and administrative in nature, not judicial, and which is aimed at providing the local authority an opportunity to correct error and to settle disputes locally before there is judicial intervention. [Citations].” And again, at page 260, “To compel a property owner to first seek local relief in the face of the demonstrated attitude of the local authorit

1978Despite the language in Bright that a plaintiff must attack the ordinance “as a whole” or “in its entirety” to dispense with exhaustion ( 10 Ill. 2d 178, 184-85 ), later decisions have held it sufficient that a plaintiff attack the ordinance or statute “in its terms” (Bank of Lyons v. County of Cook (1958), 13 Ill. 2d 493, 495 ; Pierce v. Carpentier (1960), 20 Ill. 2d 526, 530 ) or “on its face” (Walker v. State Board of Elections (1976), 65 Ill. 2d 543, 552 ; Bio-Medical Laboratories, Inc. v. Trainor (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 540, 548 ).

1978Despite the language in Bright that a plaintiff must attack the ordinance “as a whole” or “in its entirety” to dispense with exhaustion ( 10 Ill. 2d 178, 184-85 ), later decisions have held it sufficient that a plaintiff attack the ordinance or statute “in its terms” (Bank of Lyons v. County of Cook (1958), 13 Ill. 2d 493, 495 ; Pierce v. Carpentier (1960), 20 Ill. 2d 526, 530 ) or “on its face” (Walker v. State Board of Elections (1976), 65 Ill. 2d 543, 552 ; Bio-Medical Laboratories, Inc. v. Trainor (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 540, 548 ).

1978(Bright v. City of Evanston (1956), 10 Ill. 2d 178 ; Bank of Lyons v. County of Cook (1958), 13 Ill. 2d 493 .) The city argues that Northwestern was obliged to exhaust its administrative remedies because it did not chaHenge every section of the zoning ordinance, an interpretation of the Bright doctrine which we believe too restrictive.

1978Despite the language in Bright that a plaintiff must attack the ordinance “as a whole” or “in its entirety” to dispense with exhaustion ( 10 Ill. 2d 178, 184-85 ), later decisions have held it sufficient that a plaintiff attack the ordinance or statute “in its terms” (Bank of Lyons v. County of Cook (1958), 13 Ill. 2d 493, 495 ; Pierce v. Carpentier (1960), 20 Ill. 2d 526, 530 ) or “on its face” (Walker v. State Board of Elections (1976), 65 Ill. 2d 543, 552 ; Bio-Medical Laboratories, Inc. v. Trainor (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 540, 548 ).

1978Despite the language in Bright that a plaintiff must attack the ordinance “as a whole” or “in its entirety” to dispense with exhaustion ( 10 Ill. 2d 178, 184-85 ), later decisions have held it sufficient that a plaintiff attack the ordinance or statute “in its terms” (Bank of Lyons v. County of Cook (1958), 13 Ill. 2d 493, 495 ; Pierce v. Carpentier (1960), 20 Ill. 2d 526, 530 ) or “on its face” (Walker v. State Board of Elections (1976), 65 Ill. 2d 543, 552 ; Bio-Medical Laboratories, Inc. v. Trainor (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 540, 548 ).

1977The City contends, however, that the University's presentation was merely a token effort to comply with the exhaustion requirement, and that it was not a good faith effort since the University presented "no evidence" before these bodies. • 1, 2 When a landowner seeks relief from the enforcement or application of a zoning ordinance, but does not attack the ordinance as a whole, judicial relief is appropriate only after available administrative remedies have been exhausted. ( Bright v. City of Evanston (1956), 10 Ill.2d 178 , *617 139 N.E.2d 270 .) The Bright rule of exhaustion of administrative

1977The City contends, however, that the University's presentation was merely a token effort to comply with the exhaustion requirement, and that it was not a good faith effort since the University presented "no evidence" before these bodies. • 1, 2 When a landowner seeks relief from the enforcement or application of a zoning ordinance, but does not attack the ordinance as a whole, judicial relief is appropriate only after available administrative remedies have been exhausted. ( Bright v. City of Evanston (1956), 10 Ill.2d 178 , *617 139 N.E.2d 270 .) The Bright rule of exhaustion of administrative

1969Under the circumstances presented, we are of the opinion that seeking a further amendment would have been futile and therefore the Bright rule does not apply.” In the opinion filed in the previous appeal (22 Ill App2d 274, 160 NE2d 702 ), it is stated (p 279) : “From the record before us it does not appear that there was a final decision of an administrative body which would require the appeal to be taken under the provisions of the Administrative Review Act.

1969Under the circumstances presented, we are of the opinion that seeking a further amendment would have been futile and therefore the Bright rule does not apply.” In the opinion filed in the previous appeal (22 Ill App2d 274, 160 NE2d 702 ), it is stated (p 279) : “From the record before us it does not appear that there was a final decision of an administrative body which would require the appeal to be taken under the provisions of the Administrative Review Act.

1963(Napierkowski v. Township of Gloucester, 29 N.J. 481 , 150 A.2d 481 ; City of Holly Hill v. State ex rel.

1963(Napierkowski v. Township of Gloucester, 29 N.J. 481 , 150 A.2d 481 ; City of Holly Hill v. State ex rel.

1963As we stated in County of Lake v. MacNeal, 24 Ill.2d 253 , 259: “The Bright rule did not stem from legislative or constitutional command, but is no more than an expression of judicial policy prompted by the circumstance that zoning is legislative and administrative in nature, not judicial, and which is aimed at providing the local authority an opportunity to correct error and to settle disputes locally before there is judicial intervention. [Citations].” And again, at page 260, “To compel a property owner to first seek local relief in the face of the demonstrated attitude of the local authorit

1963As we stated in County of Lake v. MacNeal, 24 Ill.2d 253 , 259: “The Bright rule did not stem from legislative or constitutional command, but is no more than an expression of judicial policy prompted by the circumstance that zoning is legislative and administrative in nature, not judicial, and which is aimed at providing the local authority an opportunity to correct error and to settle disputes locally before there is judicial intervention. [Citations].” And again, at page 260, “To compel a property owner to first seek local relief in the face of the demonstrated attitude of the local authorit

1962(See e.g., City of Loves Park v. Woodward Governor Co., 14 Ill.2d 623 ; County of Cook v. Glasstex Co. 16 Ill.2d 72 .) The Bright rule did not stem from legislative or constitutional command, but is no more than an expression of judicial policy prompted by the circumstance that zoning is legislative and administrative in nature, not judicial, and which is aimed at providing the local authority an opportunity to correct error and to settle disputes locally before there is judicial intervention.

1962(See e.g., City of Loves Park v. Woodward Governor Co., 14 Ill.2d 623 ; County of Cook v. Glasstex Co. 16 Ill.2d 72 .) The Bright rule did not stem from legislative or constitutional command, but is no more than an expression of judicial policy prompted by the circumstance that zoning is legislative and administrative in nature, not judicial, and which is aimed at providing the local authority an opportunity to correct error and to settle disputes locally before there is judicial intervention.

1962(See e.g., City of Loves Park v. Woodward Governor Co., 14 Ill.2d 623 ; County of Cook v. Glasstex Co. 16 Ill.2d 72 .) The Bright rule did not stem from legislative or constitutional command, but is no more than an expression of judicial policy prompted by the circumstance that zoning is legislative and administrative in nature, not judicial, and which is aimed at providing the local authority an opportunity to correct error and to settle disputes locally before there is judicial intervention.

1962(See e.g., City of Loves Park v. Woodward Governor Co., 14 Ill.2d 623 ; County of Cook v. Glasstex Co. 16 Ill.2d 72 .) The Bright rule did not stem from legislative or constitutional command, but is no more than an expression of judicial policy prompted by the circumstance that zoning is legislative and administrative in nature, not judicial, and which is aimed at providing the local authority an opportunity to correct error and to settle disputes locally before there is judicial intervention.