expert witness defense in Illinois

2020Defendant seeks a new trial. ¶ 17 ANALYSIS ¶ 18 Claims of ineffective assistance, such as the one raised by defendant here, are governed by the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

1991A defendant seeking to show trial counsel’s performance was ineffective must first show “counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” (Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 687 , 80 L.

2017The court noted that the doctrine of absolute privilege is broad in scope, has been “liberally protected” by Illinois courts, and to carve an expert-witness exception into - 12 - No. 1-16-3313 the doctrine would require the court to “break with Illinois precedent *** [and] go beyond the most far-reaching precedents in any jurisdiction.” Id. at 906 . ¶ 32 We agree with the decision in McNall and see no reason to depart from its holding.

2017The court noted that the doctrine of absolute privilege is broad in scope, that the doctrine has been “liberally protected” by Illinois courts, and that an expert-witness exception to the doctrine would require the court to “break with Illinois -7- precedent *** [and] go beyond the most far-reaching precedents in any jurisdiction.” Id. at 907 . ¶ 32 We agree with the decision in McNall and see no reason to depart from its holding.

2016The court said that S.B.’s testimony “can only be described as not just the words that she spoke but the particular way in which she spoke them.” It further stated, “I don’t see - 21 - 2016 IL App (2d) 130703 how the appellate court would sustain a conviction under this subsection and I’m required to apply the same standard.” ¶ 46 Dr. Locker, a practicing obstetrician/gynecologist at Lutheran General Hospital, testified as an expert witness for the defense.

2016The court said that S.B.’s testimony “can only be described as not just the words that she spoke but the particular way in which she spoke them.” It further stated, “I don’t see - 21 - 2016 IL App (2d) 130703 how the appellate court would sustain a conviction under this subsection and I’m required to apply the same standard.” ¶ 46 Dr. Locker, a practicing obstetrician/gynecologist at Lutheran General Hospital, testified as an expert witness for the defense.

2011Northern Trust Co., 213 Ill.

2011Northern Trust Co., 213 Ill.

2002Century , 316 Ill.

2002Century, 316 Ill.

2024As such, we include only those facts necessary to address the issues presented to this court. ¶5 Defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition in October 2013, alleging his constitutional rights were violated in the following ways, (1) he was convicted and sentenced for “unconstitutional charges;” (2) trial counsel, posttrial counsel, and appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance when each of them allowed him to be incarcerated for “unconstitutional charges;” (3) the State committed a Brady violation (See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)) when it failed to discover and disclose

2023People v. Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 13 .

2023Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶ 90 . ¶ 44 Here, defendant contends he made a showing of possible neglect based on trial counsel’s failure to ask the trial court for funds to procure an expert witness for the defense.

1988While wide latitude should be granted in cross-examination of an expert witness to test his opinion on subjects not of common knowledge (People v. Charleston (1985), 132 Ill.

1988App. 3d 769, 776 , 477 N.E.2d 762 ), generally, the scope of cross-examination rests within the discretion of the trial court, and its ruling will not be disturbed on review unless there has been an abuse of discretion resulting in manifest prejudice to the accused.

1987An individual will be permitted to testify as an expert if his experience and qualifications afford him knowledge which is not common to laypersons and where such would aid the trier of fact in reaching its conclusion, (People v. Jordan (1984), 103 Ill. 2d 192, 208 , 469 N.E.2d 569 .) A witness may be qualified as an expert by reason of knowledge, skill and experience, training or education.

1987An individual will be permitted to testify as an expert if his experience and qualifications afford him knowledge which is not common to laypersons and where such would aid the trier of fact in reaching its conclusion, (People v. Jordan (1984), 103 Ill. 2d 192, 208 , 469 N.E.2d 569 .) A witness may be qualified as an expert by reason of knowledge, skill and experience, training or education.

1985App. 3d 540 , 390 N.E.2d 1214 .) Wide latitude should be granted in cross-examination of an expert witness to test his opinion on subjects not of common knowledge.

1985(People v. Crawford Distributing Co. (1978), 65 Ill.

1980App. 3d 674 , 399 N.E.2d 1000 , this court found it was not error to refuse to permit an expert witness to challenge the conclusiveness of a chemical test he had not performed.

1966Respondent argues, “It would have been most helpful to the Court at arriving at a proper determination to have had the benefit of these texts, especially since there was such a wide disparity between the margin of accuracy ascribed to these tests, that is, whether or not the tests were in fact 92 percent accurate as maintained by the witness for the People or only from 10 to 20 percent accurate as maintained by the expert witness for the defense.” Cited in support of this contention is Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital, 33 Ill2d 326, 211 NE2d 253 (1965), where it is said (pp 33