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11 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1979–2022 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Snipes v. Stategreen2 sentences2022Specifically, he argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to secure an expert witness to challenge the reliability of the victim’s disclosure that McNeil had sexually abused her; present evidence of the victim’s allegedly false prior allegations of abuse; object to bolstering testimony by the lead investigator; and object to speculative testimony by the State’s expert witness. 8 To prevail on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, McNeil “must show both that his counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance so prejudiced him that, but for the def 2022Specifically, he argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to secure an expert witness to challenge the reliability of the victim’s disclosure that McNeil had sexually abused her; present evidence of the victim’s allegedly false prior allegations of abuse; object to bolstering testimony by the lead investigator; and object to speculative testimony by the State’s expert witness. 8 To prevail on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, McNeil “must show both that his counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance so prejudiced him that, but for the def | 1 | 1 |
Swanson v. Stategreen1 sentence2020“This requires a defendant to overcome the strong presumption that trial counsel’s performance was adequate.” Swanson v. State, 306 Ga. 153, 155 (2) ( 829 SE2d 312 ) (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted). (a) Treadaway first asserts that her trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective in relying solely on cross-examination of the State’s medical examiner rather than securing a forensic pathologist as an expert witness for the defense. | 1 | 1 |
Stevenson v. Stategreen1 sentence2011See Stevenson v. State, 272 Ga. App. at 342 (3) (f) (The defendant could not prevail on his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object when, according to him, the prosecution knowingly presented peijured testimony and tampered with the jury, because the defendant presented absolutely no evidence to support the allegations of prosecutorial misconduct.). (c) Bass argues that his counsel was ineffective when he failed to employ, or request funds from the court to employ, an expert witness to challenge the officer’s testimony that he smelled the odor of raw marijuana emanati | 1 | 1 |
Adkinson v. Stategreen2 sentences2002See Adkinson v. State, 245 Ga. App. 178, 179-180 (1)-(3) ( 537 SE2d 474 ) (2000). (b) Darnell cites to Johnson v. State, 272 Ga. 254 ( 526 SE2d 549 ) (2000), for the proposition that his trial counsel should have called an expert witness to challenge the reliability of the eyewitness identification of Darnell. 2002See Adkinson v. State, 245 Ga. App. 178, 179-180 (1)-(3) ( 537 SE2d 474 ) (2000). (b) Darnell cites to Johnson v. State, 272 Ga. 254 ( 526 SE2d 549 ) (2000), for the proposition that his trial counsel should have called an expert witness to challenge the reliability of the eyewitness identification of Darnell. | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Stategreen2 sentences2002See Adkinson v. State, 245 Ga. App. 178, 179-180 (1)-(3) ( 537 SE2d 474 ) (2000). (b) Darnell cites to Johnson v. State, 272 Ga. 254 ( 526 SE2d 549 ) (2000), for the proposition that his trial counsel should have called an expert witness to challenge the reliability of the eyewitness identification of Darnell. 2002See Adkinson v. State, 245 Ga. App. 178, 179-180 (1)-(3) ( 537 SE2d 474 ) (2000). (b) Darnell cites to Johnson v. State, 272 Ga. 254 ( 526 SE2d 549 ) (2000), for the proposition that his trial counsel should have called an expert witness to challenge the reliability of the eyewitness identification of Darnell. | 1 | 1 |
Campbell v. Stategreen2 sentences1998Campbell v. State, 221 Ga. App. 135, 136-137 ( 470 SE2d 524 ) (1996). 1998Campbell v. State, 221 Ga. App. 135, 136-137 ( 470 SE2d 524 ) (1996). | 1 | 1 |
Sandford v. Howardgreen2 sentences1984In fact, this court recently stated that even “the barriers between schools of practice are not insurmountable in this state” (Sandford v. Howard, 161 Ga. App. 495, 498 ( 288 SE2d 739 )), provided “there is proof by competent evidence that the methods of treatment are the same despite the difference in the nomenclature of the schools involved . . .” Id. p. 497. “ ‘A witness with such skill, knowledge or experience in a field or calling as to be able to draw an inference that could not be drawn by the average layman may be qualified as an expert witness.’ [Cit.] ‘Medical experts are persons pos 1984In fact, this court recently stated that even “the barriers between schools of practice are not insurmountable in this state” (Sandford v. Howard, 161 Ga. App. 495, 498 ( 288 SE2d 739 )), provided “there is proof by competent evidence that the methods of treatment are the same despite the difference in the nomenclature of the schools involved . . .” Id. p. 497. “ ‘A witness with such skill, knowledge or experience in a field or calling as to be able to draw an inference that could not be drawn by the average layman may be qualified as an expert witness.’ [Cit.] ‘Medical experts are persons pos | 1 | 1 |
Ginn v. Morgangreen2 sentences1979Thus, the sole issue is whether Howard, supra, is controlling in this case, or whether it falls within the ambit of Ginn v. Morgan, 225 Ga. 192, 195 ( 167 SE2d 393 ) (1969), relied on by appellant, in which the Supreme Court held "[t]hat even though the movant supported its motion by opinion evidence, summary judgment was unauthorized, because a jury might lawfully find that the conclusions were not authorized." It should be noted that in Howard, supra, the Supreme Court stated specifically " Ginn v. Morgan, supra, and its progeny continue to be correct insofar as nonexpert opinion cases are c 1979Thus, the sole issue is whether Howard, supra, is controlling in this case, or whether it falls within the ambit of Ginn v. Morgan, 225 Ga. 192, 195 ( 167 SE2d 393 ) (1969), relied on by appellant, in which the Supreme Court held "[t]hat even though the movant supported its motion by opinion evidence, summary judgment was unauthorized, because a jury might lawfully find that the conclusions were not authorized." It should be noted that in Howard, supra, the Supreme Court stated specifically " Ginn v. Morgan, supra, and its progeny continue to be correct insofar as nonexpert opinion cases are c | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Barlow v. Stategreen2 sentences2022But see Barlow v. State, 270 Ga. 54, 55 ( 507 SE2d 416 ) (1998) (“an expert witness for the defense cannot give an opinion that the victim made false allegations of molestation, because such testimony directly addresses the credibility of the victim”). 2022But see Barlow v. State, 270 Ga. 54, 55 ( 507 SE2d 416 ) (1998) (“an expert witness for the defense cannot give an opinion that the victim made false allegations of molestation, because such testimony directly addresses the credibility of the victim”). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Swanson v. State
green
1 sentence2020“This requires a defendant to overcome the strong presumption that trial counsel’s performance was adequate.” Swanson v. State, 306 Ga. 153, 155 (2) ( 829 SE2d 312 ) (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted). (a) Treadaway first asserts that her trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective in relying solely on cross-examination of the State’s medical examiner rather than securing a forensic pathologist as an expert witness for the defense. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Workman v. Crisco
neutral
2 sentences2019Instead, Glover argues that Dr. Light was exempt from the requirements of OCGA § 9-11-26 (b) under what Glover calls the "treating physician exception." The rule on which Glover relies holds that the requirements for identifying expert witnesses apply "only to experts whose knowledge of the facts and opinions held were acquired or developed in *686 anticipation of litigation or for trial, and not to an expert witness who is in fact an actor or observer of the subject matter of the suit." Workman v. Crisco , 328 Ga. App. 172 , 173-174, 761 S.E.2d 574 (2014) (citation and punctuation omitted) (p 2019Instead, Glover argues that Dr. Light was exempt from the requirements of OCGA § 9-11-26 (b) under what Glover calls the "treating physician exception." The rule on which Glover relies holds that the requirements for identifying expert witnesses apply "only to experts whose knowledge of the facts and opinions held were acquired or developed in *686 anticipation of litigation or for trial, and not to an expert witness who is in fact an actor or observer of the subject matter of the suit." Workman v. Crisco , 328 Ga. App. 172 , 173-174, 761 S.E.2d 574 (2014) (citation and punctuation omitted) (p | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Covington v. State
green
2 sentences1999However, a similar argument was made and rejected in Covington v. State, 226 Ga. App. 484 ( 486 SE2d 706 ) (1997), in which the defendant challenged his trafficking conviction based upon the fact that the expert witness did not test the entire sample, but rather tested representative pieces in reaching his conclusion that the cocaine was 32 percent pure. 1999However, a similar argument was made and rejected in Covington v. State, 226 Ga. App. 484 ( 486 SE2d 706 ) (1997), in which the defendant challenged his trafficking conviction based upon the fact that the expert witness did not test the entire sample, but rather tested representative pieces in reaching his conclusion that the cocaine was 32 percent pure. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Johnson v. State
green
2 sentences1996The trial court’s determination that an accused has not been denied effective assistance of counsel will be affirmed on appeal unless that determination is clearly erroneous.” (Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) Johnson v. State, 214 Ga. App. 77 (1) ( 447 SE2d 74 ). (a) With respect to trial counsel’s alleged failure, over a five-month period, to prepare for defendant’s motion for funds to hire an expert witness to challenge the reliability of the canine alert, we assume — but do not hold — that such a failure to prepare and to use wisely such time and resources as were 1996The trial court’s determination that an accused has not been denied effective assistance of counsel will be affirmed on appeal unless that determination is clearly erroneous.” (Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) Johnson v. State, 214 Ga. App. 77 (1) ( 447 SE2d 74 ). (a) With respect to trial counsel’s alleged failure, over a five-month period, to prepare for defendant’s motion for funds to hire an expert witness to challenge the reliability of the canine alert, we assume — but do not hold — that such a failure to prepare and to use wisely such time and resources as were | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Avret v. McCormick
green
2 sentences1984In fact, this court recently stated that even “the barriers between schools of practice are not insurmountable in this state” (Sandford v. Howard, 161 Ga. App. 495, 498 ( 288 SE2d 739 )), provided “there is proof by competent evidence that the methods of treatment are the same despite the difference in the nomenclature of the schools involved . . .” Id. p. 497. “ ‘A witness with such skill, knowledge or experience in a field or calling as to be able to draw an inference that could not be drawn by the average layman may be qualified as an expert witness.’ [Cit.] ‘Medical experts are persons pos 1984In fact, this court recently stated that even “the barriers between schools of practice are not insurmountable in this state” (Sandford v. Howard, 161 Ga. App. 495, 498 ( 288 SE2d 739 )), provided “there is proof by competent evidence that the methods of treatment are the same despite the difference in the nomenclature of the schools involved . . .” Id. p. 497. “ ‘A witness with such skill, knowledge or experience in a field or calling as to be able to draw an inference that could not be drawn by the average layman may be qualified as an expert witness.’ [Cit.] ‘Medical experts are persons pos | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.