determining claim in Louisiana

2021This Court, in State v. Hutsell, set forth the standard for determining a claim of insufficiency of the evidence as follows: When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, Louisiana appellate courts are controlled by the standard enunciated in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

2021This Court, in State v. Hutsell, set forth the standard for determining a claim of insufficiency of the evidence as follows: When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, Louisiana appellate courts are controlled by the standard enunciated in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

2018App. 4 Cir. 5/16/16), 194 So.3d 1160 , 1165-66 (quoting State v. Brown , 03-0897, p. 22 (La. 4/12/05), 907 So.2d 1 , 18 ), set forth the standard for determining a claim of insufficiency of the evidence as follows: When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, Louisiana appellate courts are controlled by the standard enunciated in Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

2018App. 4 Cir. 5/16/16), 194 So.3d 1160 , 1165-1166 (quoting State v. Brown , 03-0897, p. 22 (La. 4/12/05), 907 So.2d 1 , 18 ), set forth the standard for determining a claim of insufficiency of the evidence as follows: When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, Louisiana appellate courts are controlled by the standard enunciated in Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

2018App. 4 Cir. 5/16/16), 194 So.3d 1160 , 1165-66 (quoting State v. Brown , 03-0897, p. 22 (La. 4/12/05), 907 So.2d 1 , 18 ), set forth the standard for determining a claim of insufficiency of the evidence as follows: When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, Louisiana appellate courts are controlled by the standard enunciated in Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

2018App. 4 Cir. 5/16/16), 194 So.3d 1160 , 1165-1166 (quoting State v. Brown , 03-0897, p. 22 (La. 4/12/05), 907 So.2d 1 , 18 ), set forth the standard for determining a claim of insufficiency of the evidence as follows: When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, Louisiana appellate courts are controlled by the standard enunciated in Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

2009When deciding how much weight is to be given to a minor child's testimony, this court has observed that "competency and maturity, not age, are the true determining factors." Bandy v. Bandy, 07-849, p. 14 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/5/07), 971 So.2d 456, 465 .

2009When deciding how much weight is to be given to a minor child’s testimony, this court has |Robserved that “competency and maturity, not age, are the true determining factors.” Bandy v. Bandy, 07-849, p. 14 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/5/07), 971 So.2d 456, 465 .

1982Hue v. Blanchard, 337 So.2d 1218 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1976).

1973Lomenick v. Schoeffler, supra; Odom v. Sanders, 277 So.2d 188 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1973).

1967In the case of Slaughter v. Gravity Draining District No. 4, La.App., 145 So.2d 50 (3rd Cir. 1962) which involves an eleven year old child, states the law as follows: "In determining whether a body of water is an attractive nuisance in a particular case, many factors must be considered, such as the age of the child, his ability to understand and avoid dangers, whether the proprietor has reason to anticipate the presence of children, whether there was a strong likelihood of the accident and whether the danger was one other than those ordinarily encountered.

1965For example, in Mays v. Hansbro, 222 La. 957 , 64 So.2d 232 , the court, in considering the question of interruption of a right of servitude, declared: "It is unimportant whether this production was in paying quantities so long as there was some production or use of the servitude." In Union Sulphur Co. v. Lognion, 212 La. 632 , 33 So.2d 178 , although holding that mere commencement of operations is insufficient to interrupt prescription with respect to a royalty interest, the opinion declared: "* * * the date of the original royalty deed and that of production were the determining factors resp

1965For example, in Mays v. Hansbro, 222 La. 957 , 64 So.2d 232 , the court, in considering the question of interruption of a right of servitude, declared: "It is unimportant whether this production was in paying quantities so long as there was some production or use of the servitude." In Union Sulphur Co. v. Lognion, 212 La. 632 , 33 So.2d 178 , although holding that mere commencement of operations is insufficient to interrupt prescription with respect to a royalty interest, the opinion declared: "* * * the date of the original royalty deed and that of production were the determining factors resp

1965For example, in Mays v. Hansbro, 222 La. 957 , 64 So.2d 232 , the court, in considering the question of interruption of a right of servitude, declared: "It is unimportant whether this production was in paying quantities so long as there was some production or use of the servitude." In Union Sulphur Co. v. Lognion, 212 La. 632 , 33 So.2d 178 , although holding that mere commencement of operations is insufficient to interrupt prescription with respect to a royalty interest, the opinion declared: "* * * the date of the original royalty deed and that of production were the determining factors resp

1965For example, in Mays v. Hansbro, 222 La. 957 , 64 So.2d 232 , the court, in considering the question of interruption of a right of servitude, declared: "It is unimportant whether this production was in paying quantities so long as there was some production or use of the servitude." In Union Sulphur Co. v. Lognion, 212 La. 632 , 33 So.2d 178 , although holding that mere commencement of operations is insufficient to interrupt prescription with respect to a royalty interest, the opinion declared: "* * * the date of the original royalty deed and that of production were the determining factors resp

1965For example, in Mays v. Hansbro, 222 La. 957 , 64 So.2d 232 , the court, in considering the question of interruption of a right of servitude, declared: "It is unimportant whether this production was in paying quantities so long as there was some production or use of the servitude." In Union Sulphur Co. v. Lognion, 212 La. 632 , 33 So.2d 178 , although holding that mere commencement of operations is insufficient to interrupt prescription with respect to a royalty interest, the opinion declared: "* * * the date of the original royalty deed and that of production were the determining factors resp

1965For example, in Mays v. Hansbro, 222 La. 957 , 64 So.2d 232 , the court, in considering the question of interruption of a right of servitude, declared: "It is unimportant whether this production was in paying quantities so long as there was some production or use of the servitude." In Union Sulphur Co. v. Lognion, 212 La. 632 , 33 So.2d 178 , although holding that mere commencement of operations is insufficient to interrupt prescription with respect to a royalty interest, the opinion declared: "* * * the date of the original royalty deed and that of production were the determining factors resp

1912Ann. 1157 [ 24 South. 590 ], whose facts closely resemble those in this case. * * * It is contended that the verdict of acquittal carried with it, as its necessary consequence, the ex-tinguishment of the bond, independently of the date at which it was rendered, and independently of any question as to whether his appearance was a voluntary appearance after the forfeiture, or whether he had been surrendered by his surety, and independently of the question whether his appearance on the 6th of April was a forced appearance under an arrest made by the sheriff; that the sole determining factors in t